the common law-第54节

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A　proper　name；　when　used　in　business　or　in　pleading；　/2/　means　one　individual　thing；　and　no　other；　as　every　one　knows；　and　therefore　one　to　whom　such　a　name　is　used　must　find　out　at　his　peril　what　the　object　designated　is。　If　there　are　no　circumstances　which　make　the　use　deceptive　on　either　side；　each　is　entitled　to　insist　on　the　＇310＇　meaning　favorable　to　him　for　the　word　as　used　by　him；　and　neither　is　entitled　to　insist　on　that　meaning　for　the　word　as　used　by　the　other。　So　far　from　mistake　having　been　the　ground　of　decision；　as　mistake；　its　only　bearing；　as　it　seems　to　me；　was　to　establish　that　neither　party　knew　that　he　was　understood　by　the　other　to　use　the　word　〃Peerless　〃in　the　sense　which　the　latter　gave　to　it。　In　that　event　there　would　perhaps　have　been　a　binding　contract；　because；　if　a　man　uses　a　word　to　which　he　knows　the　other　party　attaches；　and　understands　him　to　attach；　a　certain　meaning；　he　may　be　held　to　that　meaning；　and　not　be　allowed　to　give　it　any　other。　/1/

Next；　suppose　a　case　in　which　the　offer　and　acceptance　do　not　differ；　and　in　which　both　parties　have　used　the　same　words　in　the　same　sense。　Suppose　that　A　agreed　to　buy；　and　B　agreed　to　sell；　〃these　barrels　of　mackerel；〃　and　that　the　barrels　in　question　turn　out　to　contain　salt。　There　is　mutual　mistake　as　to　the　contents　of　the　barrels；　and　no　fraud　on　either　side。　I　suppose　the　contract　would　be　void。　/2/

It　is　commonly　said　that　the　failure　of　the　contract　in　such　a　case　is　due　to　the　fact　of　a　difference　in　kind　between　the　actual　subject…matter　and　that　to　which　the　intention　of　the　parties　was　directed。　It　is　perhaps　more　instructive　to　say　that　the　terms　of　the　supposed　contract；　although　seemingly　consistent；　were　contradictory；　in　matters　that　went　to　the　root　of　the　bargain。　For；　by　one　of　the　essential　terms；　the　subject…matter　of　the　agreement　was　the　contents　of　certain　barrels；　and　nothing　else；　and；　by　another　equally　important；　it　was　mackerel；　and　nothing　else；　＇311＇　while；　as　a　matter　of　fact；　it　could　not　be　both；　because　the　contents　of　the　barrels　were　salt。　As　neither　term　could　be　left　out　without　forcing　on　the　parties　a　contract　which　they　did　not　make；　it　follows　that　A　cannot　be　required　to　accept；　nor　B　to　deliver　either　these　barrels　of　salt；　or　other　barrels　of　mackerel；　and　without　omitting　one　term；　the　promise　is　meaningless。

If　there　had　been　fraud　on　the　seller's　part；　or　if　he　had　known　what　the　barrels　really　contained；　the　buyer　might　have　had　a　right　to　insist　on　delivery　of　the　inferior　article。　Fraud　would　perhaps　have　made　the　contract　valid　at　his　option。　Because；　when　a　man　qualifies　sensible　words　with　others　which　he　knows；　on　secret　grounds；　are　insensible　when　so　applied；　he　may　fairly　be　taken　to　authorize　his　promisee　to　insist　on　the　possible　part　of　his　promise　being　performed；　if　the　promisee　is　willing　to　forego　the　rest。

Take　one　more　illustration　like　the　last　case。　A　policy　of　insurance　is　issued　on　a　certain　building　described　in　the　policy　as　a　machine…shop。　In　fact　the　building　is　not　a　machine…shop；　but　an　organ　factory；　which　is　a　greater　risk。　The　contract　is　void；　not　because　of　any　misrepresentation；　but；　as　before；　because　two　of　its　essential　terms　are　repugnant；　and　their　union　is　insensible。　/1/

Of　course　the　principle　of　repugnancy　last　explained　might　be　stretched　to　apply　to　any　inconsistency　between　the　different　terms　of　a　contract。　It　might　be　said；　for　instance；　that　if　a　piece　of　gold　is　sold　as　eighteen…carat　gold；　and　it　is　in　fact　not　so　pure；　or　if　a　cow　is　sold　as　yielding　an　average　of　twelve　quarts　of　milk　a　day；　and　in　fact　she　yields　only　six　quarts；　there　is　no　logical　difference；　＇312＇　according　to　the　explanation　which　has　just　been　offered；　between　those　cases　and　that　of　the　barrel　of　salt　sold　for　mackerel。　Yet　those　bargains　would　not　be　void。　At　the　most；　they　would　only　be　voidable；　if　the　buyer　chose　to　throw　them　up。

The　distinctions　of　the　law　are　founded　on　experience；　not　on　logic。　It　therefore　does　not　make　the　dealings　of　men　dependent　on　a　mathematical　accuracy。　Whatever　is　promised；　a　man　has　a　right　to　be　paid　for；　if　it　is　not　given；　but　it　does　not　follow　that　the　absence　of　some　insignificant　detail　will　authorize　him　to　throw　up　the　contract；　still　less　that　it　will　prevent　the　formation　of　a　contract；　which　is　the　matter　now　under　consideration。　The　repugnant　terms　must　both　be　very　important；so　important　that　the　court　thinks　that；　if　either　is　omitted；　the　contract　would　be　different　in　substance　from　that　which　the　words　of　the　parties　seemed　to　express。

A　term　which　refers　directly　to　an　identification　by　the　senses　has　always　this　degree　of　importance。　If　a　promise　is　made　to　sell　this　cow；　or　this　mackerel；　to　this　man；　whatever　else　may　be　stricken　from　the　contract；　it　can　never　be　enforced　except　touching　this　object　and　by　this　man。　If　this　barrel　of　salt　is　fraudulently　sold　for　a　barrel　of　mackerel；　the　buyer　may　perhaps　elect　to　take　this　barrel　of　salt　if　he　chooses；　but　he　cannot　elect　to　take　another　barrel　of　mackerel。　If　the　seller　is　introduced　by　the　name　B；　and　the　buyer　supposes　him　to　be　another　person　of　the　same　name；　and　under　that　impression　delivers　his　written　promise　to　buy　of　B；　the　B　to　whom　the　writing　is　delivered　is　the　contractee；　if　any　one　is；　and；　notwithstanding　what　has　been　said　of　the　use　of　proper　names；　I　should　suppose　＇313＇　a　contract　would　be　made。　/1/　For　it　is　further　to　be　said　that；　so　far　as　by　one　of　the　terms　of　a　contract　the　thing　promised　or　the　promisee　is　identified　by　sight　and　hearing；　that　term　so　far　preponderates　over　all　others　that　it　is　very　rare　for　the　failure　of　any　other　element　of　description　to　prevent　the　making　of　a　contract。　/2/　The　most　obvious　of　seeming　exceptions　is　where　the　object　not　in　fact　so　identified；　but　only　its　covering　or　wrapper。

Of　course　the　performance　of　a　promise　may　be　made　conditional　on　all　the　terms　stipulated　from　the　other　side　being　complied　with；　but　conditions　attaching　to　performance　can　never　come　into　consideration　until　a　contract　has　been　made；　and　so　far　the　question　has　been　touching　the　existence　of　a　contract　in　the　first　instance。

A　different　case　may　be　suggested　from　any　yet　considered。　Instead　of　a　repugnancy　between　offer　and　assent　which　prevents　an　agreement；　or　between　the　terms　of　an　agreement　which　makes　it　insensible　on　its　fact；　there　may　be　a　like　repugnancy　between　a　term　of　the　contract　and　a　previous　representation　of　fact　which　is　not　expressly　made　a　part　of　the　contract。　The　representation　may　have　been　the　chief　inducement　and　very　foundation　of　the　bargain。　It　may　be　more　important　than　any　of　the　expressed　terms；　and　yet　the　contract　may　have　＇314＇　been　reduced　to　writing　in　words　which　cannot　fairly　be　construed　to　include　it。　A　vendor　may　have　stated　that　barrels　filled　with　salt　contain　mackerel；　but　the　contract　may　be　only　for　the　barrels　and　their　contents。　An　applicant　for　insurance　may　have　misstated　facts　essential　to　the　risk；　yet　the　policy　may　simply　insure　a　certain　building　or　a　certain　life。　It　may　be　asked　whether　these　contracts　are　not　void　also。

There　might　conceivably　be　cases　in　which；　taking　into　account　the　nature　of　the　contract；　the　words　used　could　be　said　to　embody　the　representation　as　a　term　by　construction。　For　instance；　it　might　be　said　that　the　true　and　well…understood　purport　of　a　contract　of　insurance　is　not；　as　the　words　seem　to　say；　to　take　the　risk　of　any　loss　by　fire　or　perils　of　the　sea；　however　great　the　risk　may　be；　but　to　take　a　risk　of　a　certain　magnitude；　and　no　other；　which　risk　has　been　calculated　mathematically　from　the　statements　of　the　party　insured。　The　extent　of　the　risk　taken　is　not　specified　in　the　policy；　because　the　old　forms　and　established　usage　are　otherwise；　but　the　meaning　is　perfectly　understood。

If　this　reasoning　were　adopted；　there　would　be　an　equal　repugnancy　in　the　terms　of　the　contract；　whether　the　nature　of　the　risk　were　written　in　the　policy　or　fixed　by　previous　description。　But；　subject　to　possible　exceptions　of　this　kind；　it　would　seem　that　a　contract　would　be　made；　and　that　the　most　that　could　be　claimed　would　be　a　right　to　rescind。　Where　parties　having　power　to　bind　themselves　do　acts　and　use　words　which　are　fit　to　create　an　obligation；　I　take　it　that　an　obligation　arises。　If　there　is　a　mistake　as　to　a　fact　not　mentioned　in　the　contract；　it　goes　only　to　the　motives　for　making　the　contract。　But　a　＇315＇　contract　is　not　prevented　from　being　made　by　the　mere　fact　that　one　party　would　not　have　made　it　if　he　had　known　the　truth。　In　what　cases　a　mistake　affecting　motives　is　a　ground　for　avoidance；　does　not　concern　this　discussion；　because　the　subject　now　under　consideration　is　when　a　contract　is　made；　and　the　question　of　avoiding　or　rescinding　it　presupposes　that　it　has　been　made。

I　think　that　it　may　now　be　assumed　that；　when　fraud；　misrepresentation；　or　mistake　is　said　to　make　a　contract　void；　there　is　no　new　principle　which　comes　in　to　set　aside　an　otherwise　perfect　obligation；　but　that　in　every　such　case　there　is　wanting　one　or　more　of　the　first　elements　which　were　explained　in　the　foregoing　Lecture。　Either　there　is　n