the common law-第53节

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nstruction　that　exceptional　risks　were　intended　to　be　assumed。　The　foregoing　analysis　is　believed　to　show　that　the　result　which　has　been　reached　by　the　courts　on　grounds　of　practical　good　sense；　falls　in　with　the　true　theory　of　contract　under　the　common　law。

The　discussion　of　the　nature　of　a　promise　has　led　me　to　analyze　contract　and　the　consequences　of　contract　somewhat　in　advance　of　their　place。　I　must　say　a　word　more　concerning　the　facts　which　constitute　a　promise。　It　is　laid　down；　with　theoretical　truth；　that；　besides　the　assurance　or　offer　on　the　one　side；　there　must　be　an　acceptance　on　the　other。　But　I　find　it　hard　to　think　of　a　case　where　a　simple　contract　fails　to　be　made；　which　could　not　be　accounted　for　on　other　grounds；　generally　by　the　want　of　relation　between　assurance　or　offer　and　consideration　as　reciprocal　inducements　each　of　the　other。　Acceptance　of　an　offer　usually　follows　by　mere　implication　from　the　furnishing　of　the　consideration；　and　inasmuch　as　by　our　law　an　accepted　offer；　or　promise；　until　the　consideration　is　furnished；　stands　on　no　different　footing　from　an　offer　not　yet　accepted；　each　being　subject　to　revocation　until　that　time；　and　each　continuing　＇304＇　until　then　unless　it　has　expired　or　has　been　revoked；　the　question　of　acceptance　is　rarely　of　practical　importance。

Assuming　that　the　general　nature　of　consideration　and　promise　is　understood；　some　questions　peculiar　to　bilateral　contracts　remain　to　be　considered。　These　concern　the　sufficiency　of　the　consideration　and　the　moment　when　the　contract　is　made。

A　promise　may　be　a　consideration　for　a　promise；　although　not　every　promise　for　every　other。　It　may　be　doubted　whether　a　promise　to　make　a　gift　of　one　hundred　dollars　would　be　supported　by　a　promise　to　accept　it。　But　in　a　case　of　mutual　promises　respectively　to　transfer　and　to　accept　unpaid　shares　in　a　railway　company；　it　has　been　held　that　a　binding　contract　was　made。　Here　one　party　agrees　to　part　with　something　which　may　prove　valuable；　and　the　other　to　assume　a　liability　which　may　prove　onerous。　/1/

But　now　suppose　that　there　is　no　element　of　uncertainty　except　in　the　minds　of　the　parties。　Take；　for　instance；　a　wager　on　a　past　horse…race。　It　has　been　thought　that　this　would　amount　to　an　absolute　promise　on　one　side；　and　no　promise　at　all　on　the　other。　/2/　But　this　does　not　seem　to　me　sound。　Contracts　are　dealings　between　men；　by　which　they　make　arrangements　for　the　future。　In　making　such　arrangements　the　important　thing　is；　not　what　is　objectively　true；　but　what　the　parties　know。　Any　present　fact　which　is　unknown　to　the　parties　is　just　as　uncertain　for　the　purposes　of　making　an　arrangement　at　this　moment；　as　any　future　fact。　It　is　therefore　a　detriment　to　undertake　to　be　ready　to　pay　if　the　event　turns　out　not　＇305＇　to　have　been　as　expected。　This　seems　to　be　the　true　explanation　why　forbearance　to　sue　upon　a　claim　believed　the　plaintiff　to　be　good　is　a　sufficient　consideration；　although　the　claim　was　bad　in　fact；　and　known　by　the　defendant　to　be　bad。　/1/　Were　this　view　unsound；　it　is　hard　to　see　how　wagers　on　any　future　event；　except　a　miracle；　could　be　sustained。　For　if　the　happening　or　not　happening　of　the　event　is　subject　to　the　law　of　causation；　the　only　uncertainty　about　it　is　in　our　foresight；　not　in　its　happening。

The　question　when　a　contract　is　made　arises　for　the　most　part　with　regard　to　bilateral　contracts　by　letter；　the　doubt　being　whether　the　contract　is　complete　at　the　moment　when　the　return　promise　is　put　into　the　post；　or　at　the　moment　when　it　is　received。　If　convenience　preponderates　in　favor　of　either　view；　that　is　a　sufficient　reason　for　its　adoption。　So　far　as　merely　logical　grounds　go；　the　most　ingenious　argument　in　favor　of　the　later　moment　is　Professor　Langdell's。　According　to　him　the　conclusion　follows　from　the　fact　that　the　consideration　which　makes　the　offer　binding　is　itself　a　promise。　Every　promise；　he　says；　is　an　offer　before　it　is　a　promise；　and　the　essence　of　an　offer　is　that　it　should　be　communicated。　/2/　But　this　reasoning　seems　unsound。　When；　as　in　the　case　supposed；　the　consideration　for　the　return　promise　has　been　put　into　the　power　of　the　offeree　and　the　return　promise　has　been　accepted　in　advance；　there　is　not　an　instant；　either　in　time　or　logic；　when　the　return　promise　is　an　offer。　It　is　a　promise　and　a　term　of　a　binding　contract　as　soon　as　it　is　anything。　An　offer　is　a　revocable　and　unaccepted

communication　of　willingness　to　promise。　＇306＇　When　an　offer　of　a　certain　bilateral　contract　has　been　made；　the　same　contract　cannot　be　offered　by　the　other　side。　The　so…called　offer　would　neither　be　revocable　nor　unaccepted。　It　would　complete　the　contract　as　soon　as　made。

If　it　be　said　that　it　is　of　the　essence　of　a　promise　to　be　communicated；　whether　it　goes　through　the　stage　of　offer　or　not；　meaning　by　communicated　brought　to　the　actual　knowledge　of　the　promisee；　the　law　is　believed　to　be　otherwise。　A　covenant　is　binding　when　it　is　delivered　and　accepted；　whether　it　is　read　or　not。　On　the　same　principle；　it　is　believed　that；　whenever　the　obligation　is　to　be　entered　into　by　a　tangible　sign；　as；　in　the　case　supposed；　by　letter　containing　the　return　promise；　and　the　consideration　for　and　assent　to　the　promise　are　already　given；　the　only　question　is　when　the　tangible　sign　is　sufficiently　put　into　the　power　of　the　promisee。　I　cannot　believe　that；　if　the　letter　had　been　delivered　to　the　promisee　and　was　then　snatched　from　his　hands　before　he　had　read　it；　there　would　be　no　contract。　/l　/　If　I　am　right；　it　appears　of　little　importance　whether　the　post…office　be　regarded　as　agent　or　bailee　for　the　offerer；　or　as　a　mere　box　to　which　he　has　access。　The　offeree；　when　he　drops　the　letter　containing　the　counter…promise　into　the　letter…box；　does　an　overt　act；　which　by　general　understanding　renounces　control　over　the　letter；　and　puts　it　into　a　third　hand　for　the　benefit　of　the　offerer；　with　liberty　to　the　latter　at　any　moment　thereafter　to　take　it。

The　principles　governing　revocation　are　wholly　different。　One　to　whom　an　offer　is　made　has　a　right　to　assume　that　it　remains　open　according　to　its　terms　until　he　has　actual　＇307＇　notice　to　the　contrary。　The　effect　of　the　communication　must　be　destroyed　by　a　counter　communication。　But　the　making　of　a　contract　does　not　depend　on　the　state　of　the　parties'　minds；　it　depends　on　their　overt　acts。　When　the　sign　of　the　counter　promise　is　a　tangible　object；　the　contract　is　completed　when　the　dominion　over　that　object　changes。

＇308＇　LECTURE　IX。

CONTRACT。…　III。　VOID　AND　VOIDABLE。

THE　elements　of　fact　necessary　to　call　a　contract　into　existence；　and　the　legal　consequences　of　a　contract　when　formed；　have　been　discussed。　It　remains　to　consider　successively　the　cases　in　which　a　contract　is　said　to　be　void；　and　those　in　which　it　is　said　to　be　voidable；in　which；　that　is；　a　contract　fails　to　be　made　when　it　seems　to　have　been；　or；　having　been　made；　can　be　rescinded　by　one　side　or　the　other；　and　treated　as　if　it　had　never　been。　I　take　up　the　former　class　of　cases　first。

When　a　contract　fails　to　be　made；　although　the　usual　forms　have　been　gone　through　with；　the　ground　of　failure　is　commonly　said　to　be　mistake；　misrepresentation；　or　fraud。　But　I　shall　try　to　show　that　these　are　merely　dramatic　circumstances；　and　that　the　true　ground　is　the　absence　of　one　or　more　of　the　primary　elements；　which　have　been　shown；　or　are　seen　at　once；　to　be　necessary　to　the　existence　of　a　contract。

If　a　man　goes　through　the　form　of　making　a　contract　with　A　through　B　as　A's　agent；　and　B　is　not　in　fact　the　agent　of　A；　there　is　no　contract；　because　there　is　only　one　party。　The　promise　offered　to　A　has　not　been　accepted　by　him；　and　no　consideration　has　moved　from　him。　In　such　a　case；　although　there　is　generally　mistake　on　one　side　and　fraud　on　the　other；　it　is　very　clear　that　no　special　＇309＇　doctrine　need　be　resorted　to；　because　the　primary　elements　of　a　contract　explained　in　the　last　Lecture　are　not　yet　present。

Take　next　a　different　case。　The　defendant　agreed　to　buy；　and　the　plaintiff　agreed　to　sell；　a　cargo　of　cotton；　〃to　arrive　ex　Peerless　from　Bombay。〃　There　were　two　such　vessels　sailing　from　Bombay；　one　in　October；　the　other　in　December。　The　plaintiff　meant　the　latter；　the　defendant　the　former。　It　was　held　that　the　defendant　was　not　bound　to　accept　the　cotton。　/1/　It　is　commonly　said　that　such　a　contract　is　void；　because　of　mutual　mistake　as　to　the　subject…　matter；　and　because　therefore　the　parties　did　not　consent　to　the　same　thing。　But　this　way　of　putting　it　seems　to　me　misleading。　The　law　has　nothing　to　do　with　the　actual　state　of　the　parties'　minds。　In　contract；　as　elsewhere；　it　must　go　by　externals；　and　judge　parties　by　their　conduct。　If　there　had　been　but　one　〃Peerless；〃　and　the　defendant　had　said　〃Peerless〃　by　mistake；　meaning　〃Peri；〃　he　would　have　been　bound。　The　true　ground　of　the　decision　was　not　that　each　party　meant　a　different　thing　from　the　other；　as　is　implied　by　the　explanation　which　has　been　mentioned；　but　that　each　said　a　different　thing。　The　plaintiff　offered　one　thing；　the　defendant　expressed　his　assent　to　another。

A　proper　name；　when　used　in　business　or　in　pleading；　/2/　means　one　individual　thing；　and　no　other；　as　every　one