the common law-第51节

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ould　be　incurred　by　the　promisee　as　before；　but　obviously　it　would　be　incurred　for　the　sole　purpose　of　enabling　the　promisor　to　carry　as　agreed。

＇292＇　It　appears　to　me　that　it　has　not　always　been　sufficiently　borne　in　mind　that　the　same　thing　may　be　a　consideration　or　not；　as　it　is　dealt　with　by　the　parties。　The　popular　explanation　of　Coggs　v。　Bernard　is；　that　the　delivery　was　a　consideration　for　a　promise　to　carry　the　casks　safely。　I　have　given　what　I　believe　to　be　the　true　explanation；　and　that　which　I　think　Lord　Holt　had　in　view；　in　the　fifth　Lecture。　/1/　But　whether　that　which　I　have　offered　be　true　or　not；　a　serious　objection　to　the　one　which　is　commonly　accepted　is　that　the　declaration　does　not　allege　that　the　delivery　was　the　consideration。

The　same　caution　should　be　observed　in　construing　the　terms　of　an　agreement。　It　is　hard　to　see　the　propriety　of　erecting　any　detriment　which　an　instrument　may　disclose　or　provide　for；　into　a　consideration；　unless　the　parties　have　dealt　with　it　on　that　footing。　In　many　cases　a　promisee　may　incur　a　detriment　without　thereby　furnishing　a　consideration。　The　detriment　may　be　nothing　but　a　condition　precedent　to　performance　of　the　promise；　as　where　a　man　promises　another　to　pay　him　five　hundred　dollars　if　he　breaks　his　leg。　/2/

The　courts；　however；　have　gone　far　towards　obliterating　this　distinction。　Acts　which　by　a　fair　interpretation　of　language　would　seem　to　have　been　contemplated　as　only　the　compliance　with　a　condition；　have　been　treated　as　the　consideration　of　the　promise。　/3/　And　so　have　counter　promises　in　an　agreement　which　expressly　stated　other　matters　as　the　consideration。　/4/　So　it　should　be　mentioned；　subject　＇293＇　to　the　question　whether　there　may　not　be　a　special　explanation　for　the　doctrine；　that　it　is　said　that　an　assignment　of　a　leasehold　cannot　be　voluntary　under　the　statute　of　27　Elizabeth；　c。　4；　because　the　assignee　comes　into　the　obligations　of　the　tenant。　/1/　Yet　the　assignee's　incurring　this　detriment　may　not　be　contemplated　as　the　inducement　of　the　assignment；　and　in　many　cases　only　amounts　to　a　deduction　from　the　benefit　conferred；　as　a　right　of　way　would　be；　especially　if　the　only　obligation　is　to　pay　rent；　which　issues　out　of　the　land　in　theory　of　law。

But　although　the　courts　may　have　sometimes　gone　a　little　far　in　their　anxiety　to　sustain　agreements；　there　can　be　no　doubt　of　the　Principle　which　I　have　laid　down；　that　the　same　thing　may　be　a　consideration　or　not；　as　it　is　dealt　with　by　the　parties。　This　raises　the　question　how　a　thing　must　be　dealt　with；　in　order　to　make　it　a　consideration。

It　is　said　that　consideration　must　not　be　confounded　with　motive。　It　is　true　that　it　must　not　be　confounded　with　what　may　be　the　prevailing　or　chief　motive　in　actual　fact。　A　man　may　promise　to　paint　a　picture　for　five　hundred　dollars；　while　his　chief　motive　may　be　a　desire　for　fame。　A　consideration　may　be　given　and　accepted；　in　fact；　solely　for　the　purpose　of　making　a　promise　binding。　But；　nevertheless；　it　is　the　essence　of　a　consideration；　that；　by　the　terms　of　the　agreement；　it　is　given　and　accepted　as　the　motive　or　inducement　of　the　promise。　Conversely；　the　promise　must　be　made　and　accepted　as　the　conventional　motive　or　inducement　for　furnishing　the　consideration。　The　root　of　the　whole　matter　is　the　relation　of　reciprocal　＇294＇　conventional　inducement；　each　for　the　other；　between　consideration　and　promise。

A　good　example　of　the　former　branch　of　the　proposition　is　to　be　found　in　a　Massachusetts　case。　The　plaintiff　refused　to　let　certain　wood　be　removed　from　his　land　by　one　who　had　made　an　oral　bargain　and　given　his　note　for　it；　unless　he　received　additional　security。　The　purchaser　and　the　plaintiff　accordingly　went　to　the　defendant；　and　the　defendant　put　his　name　upon　the　note。　The　plaintiff　thereupon　let　the　purchaser　carry　off　the　wood。　But；　according　to　the　testimony；　the　defendant　signed　without　knowing　that　the　plaintiff　was　to　alter　his　position　in　any　way　on　the　faith　of　the　signature；　and　it　was　held　that；　if　that　story　was　believed；　there　was　no　consideration。　/1/

An　illustration　of　the　other　half　of　the　rule　is　to　be　found　in　those　cases　where　a　reward　is　offered　for　doing　something；　which　is　afterwards　done　by　a　person　acting　in　ignorance　of　the　offer。　In　such　a　case　the　reward　cannot　be　claimed；　because　the　alleged　consideration　has　not　been　furnished　on　the　faith　of　the　offer。　The　tendered　promise　has　not　induced　the　furnishing　of　the　consideration。　The　promise　cannot　be　set　up　as　a　conventional　motive　when　it　was　not　known　until　after　the　alleged　consideration　was　performed。　/2/

Both　sides　of　the　relation　between　consideration　and　promise；　and　the　conventional　nature　of　that　relation；　may　be　illustrated　by　the　case　of　the　cask。　Suppose　that　the　＇295＇　truckman　is　willing　to　carry　the　cask；　and　the　owner　to　let　him　carry　it；　without　any　bargain；　and　that　each　knows　the　other's　state　of　mind；　but　that　the　truckman；　seeing　his　own　advantage　in　the　matter；　says　to　the　owner；　〃In　consideration　of　your　delivering　me　the　cask；　and　letting　me　carry　it；　I　promise　to　carry　it；〃　and　that　the　owner　thereupon　delivers　it。　I　suppose　that　the　promise　would　be　binding。　The　promise　is　offered　in　terms　as　the　inducement　for　the　delivery；　and　the　delivery　is　made　in　terms　as　the　inducement　for　the　promise。　It　may　be　very　probable　that　the　delivery　would　have　been　made　without　a　promise；　and　that　the　promise　would　have　been　made　in　gratuitous　form　if　it　had　not　been　accepted　upon　consideration；　but　this　is　only　a　guess　after　all。　The　delivery　need　not　have　been　made　unless　the　owner　chose；　and　having　been　made　as　the　term　of　a　bargain；　the　promisor　cannot　set　up　what　might　have　happened　to　destroy　the　effect　of　what　did　happen。　It　would　seem　therefore　that　the　same　transaction　in　substance　and　spirit　might　be　voluntary　or　obligatory；　according　to　the　form　of　words　which　the　parties　chose　to　employ　for　the　purpose　of　affecting　the　legal　consequences。

If　the　foregoing　principles　be　accepted；　they　will　be　seen　to　explain　a　doctrine　which　has　given　the　courts　some　trouble　to　establish。　I　mean　the　doctrine　that　an　executed　consideration　will　not　sustain　a　subsequent　promise。　It　has　been　said；　to　be　sure；　that　such　a　consideration　was　sufficient　if　preceded　by　a　request。　But　the　objections　to　the　view　are　plain。　If　the　request　was　of　such　a　nature；　and　so　put；　as　reasonably　to　imply　that　the　other　person　was　to　have　a　reward；　there　was　an　express　promise；　although　not　put　in　words；　and　that　promise　was　made　at　＇296＇　the　same　time　the　consideration　was　given；　and　not　afterwards。　If；　on　the　other　hand；　the　words　did　not　warrant　the　understanding　that　the　service　was　to　be　paid　for；　the　service　was　a　gift；　and　a　past　gift　can　no　more　be　a　consideration　than　any　other　act　of　the　promisee　not　induced　by　the　promise。

The　source　of　the　error　can　be　traced　partially；　at　least；　in　history。　Some　suggestions　touching　the　matter　were　made　in　the　last　Lecture。　A　few　words　should　be　added　here。　In　the　old　cases　of　debt；　where　there　was　some　question　whether　the　plaintiff　had　showed　enough　to　maintain　his　action；　a　〃contract　precedent〃　was　spoken　of　several　times　as　raising　the　duty。　Thus；　where　a　man　had　granted　that　he　would　be　bound　in　one　hundred　shillings　to　pay　his　servant　on　a　certain　day　for　his　services；　and　for　payments　made　by　the　servant　on　his　account；　it　was　argued　that　there　was　no　contract　precedent；　and　that　by　parol　the　party　is

not　obliged；　and；　further；　that；　so　far　as　appeared；　the　payments　were　made　by　the　servant　out　of　his　own　head　and　at　no　request；　from　which　no　duty　could　commence。　/1/

So　when　debt　was　brought　on　a　deed　to　pay　the　plaintiff　ten　marks；　if　he　would　take　the　defendant's　daughter　to　wife；　and　it　was　objected　that　the　action　should　have　been　covenant；　it　was　answered　that　the　plaintiff　had　a　contract　precedent　which　gave　him　debt。　/2/

The　first　case　in　assumpsit　/3/　only　meant　to　adopt　this　long　familiar　thought。　A　man　went　bail　for　his　friend's　servant；　who　had　been　arrested。　Afterwards　the　master　＇297＇　promised　to　indemnify　the　bail；　and　on　his　failure　to　do　so　was　sued　by　him　in　assumpsit。　It　was　held　that　there　was　no　consideration　wherefore　the　defendant　should　be　charged　unless　the　master　had　first　promised　to　indemnify　the　plaintiff　before　the　servant　was　bailed；　〃for　the　master　did　never　make　request　to　the　plaintiff　for　his　servant　to　do　so　much；　but　he　did　it　of　his　own　head。〃　This　is　perfectly　plain　sailing；　and　means　no　more　than　the　case　in　the　Year　Books。　The　report；　however；　also　states　a　case　in　which　it　was　held　that　a　subsequent　promise；　in　consideration　that　the　plaintiff　at　the　special　instance　of　the　defendant　had　married　the　defendant's　cousin；　was　binding；　and　that　the　marriage　was　〃good　cause　。。。　because　＇it＇　ensued　the　request　of　the　defendant。〃　Whether　this　was　intended　to　establish　a　general　principle；　or　was　decided　with　reference　to　the　peculiar　consideration　of　marriage；　/1/　it　was　soon　interpreted　in　the　broader　sense；　as　was　shown　in　the　last　Lecture。　It　was　several　times　adjudged　that　a　past　and　executed　matter　was　a　sufficient　consideration　for　a　promise　at　a　later　day；　if　only　the　matter　relied　on　had