the common law-第50节

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ant　had　not　any　quid　pro　quo。　The　court　adopted　the　argument；　and　said　that　there　was　no　contract　or　consideration　to　ground　this　action；　but　that　the　plaintiff　might　have　sued　in　assumpsit。　/1/

It　was；　perhaps；　the　lingering　of　this　idea；　and　the　often　repeated　notion　that　an　assumpsit　was　not　a　contract；　/2/　to　which　was　attributable　a　more　enlarged　theory　of　consideration　than　prevailed　in　debt。　It　was　settled　that　assumpsit　would　lie　for　a　mere　omission　or　nonfeasance。　The　cases　which　have　been　mentioned　of　the　reign　of　Henry　VI。　were　followed　by　others　in　the　latter　years　of　Henry　VII。；　/3/　and　it　was　never　again　doubted。　An　action　for　such　a　cause　was　clearly　for　a　breach　of　promise；　as　had　been　recognized　from　the　time　of　Edward　III。　If　so；　a　consideration　was　necessary。　/4/　Notwithstanding　occasional　vagaries；　that　also　had　been　settled　or　taken　for　granted　in　many　cases　of　Queen　Elizabeth's　time。　But　the　bastard　origin　of　the　action　which　gave　rise　to　the　doubt　how　far　any　consideration　at　all　was　necessary；　made　it　possible　to　hold　considerations　sufficient　which　had　been　in　debt。

Another　circumstance　may　not　have　been　without　its　influence。　It　would　seem　that；　in　the　period　when　assumpsit　＇286＇　was　just　growing　into　its　full　proportions；　there　was　some　little　inclination　to　identify　consideration　with　the　Roman　causa；　taken　in　its　broadest　sense。　The　word　〃cause〃　was　used　for　consideration　in　the　early　years　of　Elizabeth；　with　reference　to　a　covenant　to　stand　seized　to　uses。　/1/　It　was　used　in　the　same　sense　in　the　action　of　assumpsit。　/2/　In　the　last　cited　report；　although　the　principal　case　only　laid　down　a　doctrine　that　would　be　followed　to…day；　there　was　also　stated　an　anonymous　case　which　was　interpreted　to　mean　that　an　executed　consideration　furnished　upon　request；　but　without　any　promise　of　any　kind；　would　support　a　subsequent　promise　to　pay　for　it。　/3/　Starting　from　this　authority　and　the　word　〃cause；〃　the　conclusion　was　soon　reached　that　there　was　a　great　difference　between　a　contract　and　an　assumpsit；　and　that；　whereas　in　contracts　〃everything　which　is　requisite　ought　to　concur　and　meet　together；　viz。　the　consideration　of　the　one　side；　and　the　sale　or　the　promise　on　the　other　side；　。。。　to　maintain　an　action　upon　an　assumpsit；　the　same　is　not　requisite；　for　it　is　sufficient　if　there　be　a　moving　cause　or　consideration　precedent；　for　which　cause　or　consideration　the　promise　was　made。〃　/4/

Thus；　where　the　defendant　retained　the　plaintiff　to　be　＇287＇　to　his　aunt　at　ten　shillings　a　week；　it　was　held　that　assumpsit　would　lie；　because　the　service；　though　not　beneficial　to　the　defendant；　was　a　charge　or　detriment　to　the　plaintiff。　/1/　The　old　questions　were　reargued；　and　views　which　were　very　near　prevailing　in　debt　under　Henry　VI。；　prevailed　in　assumpsit　under　Elizabeth　and　James。

A　surety　could　be　sued　in　assumpsit；　although　he　had　ceased　to　be　liable　in　debt。　/2/　There　was　the　same　remedy　on　a　promise　in　consideration　that　the　plaintiff　would　marry　the　defendant's　daughter。　/3/　The　illusion　that　assumpsit　thus　extended　did　not　mean　contract；　could　not　be　kept　up。　In　view　of　this　admission　and　of　the　ancient　precedents；　the　law　oscillated　for　a　time　in　the　direction　of　reward　as　the　true　essence　of　consideration。　/4/　But　the　other　view　prevailed；　and　thus；　in　fact；　made　a　change　in　the　substantive　law。　A　simple　contract；　to　be　recognized　as　binding　by　the　courts　of　Henry　VI。；　must　have　been　based　upon　a　benefit　to　the　debtor；　now　a　promise　might　be　enforced　in　consideration　of　a　detriment　to　the　promisee。　But　in　the　true　archaic　spirit　the　doctrine　was　not　separated　or　distinguished　from　the　remedy　which　introduced　it；　and　thus　debt　in　modern　times　has　presented　the　altered　appearance　of　a　duty　limited　to　cases　where　the　consideration　was　of　a　special　sort。

The　later　fortunes　of　assumpsit　can　be　briefly　told。　It　introduced　bilateral　contracts；　because　a　promise　was　a　＇288＇　detriment；　and　therefore　a　sufficient　consideration　for　another　promise。　It　supplanted　debt；　because　the　existence　of　the　duty　to　pay　was　sufficient　consideration　for　a　promise　to　pay；　or　rather　because；　before　a　consideration　was　required；　and　as　soon　as　assumpsit　would　lie　for　a　nonfeasance；　this　action　was　used　to　avoid　the　defendant's　wager　of　law。　It　vastly　extended　the　number　of　actionable　contracts；　which　had　formerly　been　confined　to　debts　and　covenants；　whereas　nearly　any　promise　could　be　sued　in　assumpsit；　and　it　introduced　a　theory　which　has　had　great　influence　on　modern　law；that　all　the　liabilities　of　a　bailee　are　founded　on　contract。　/1/　Whether　the　prominence　which　was　thus　given　to　contract　as　the　foundation　of　legal　rights　and　duties　had　anything　to　do　with　the　similar　prominence　which　it　soon　acquired　in　political　speculation；　it　is　beyond　my　province　to　inquire。

＇289＇　LECTURE　VIII。

CONTRACT。　II。　ELEMENTS。

THE　general　method　to　be　pursued　in　the　analysis　of　contract　is　the　same　as　that　already　explained　with　regard　to　possession。　Wherever　the　law　gives　special　rights　to　one；　or　imposes　special　burdens　on　another；　it　does　so　on　the　ground　that　certain　special　facts　are　true　of　those　individuals。　In　all　such　cases；　therefore；　there　is　a　twofold　task。　First；　to　determine　what　are　the　facts　to　which　the　special　consequences　are　attached；　second；　to　ascertain　the　consequences。　The　first　is　the　main　field　of　legal　argument。　With　regard　to　contracts　the　facts　are　not　always　the　same。　They　may　be　that　a　certain　person　has　signed；　sealed；　and　delivered　a　writing　of　a　certain　purport。　They　may　be　that　he　has　made　an　oral　promise；　and　that　the　promisee　has　furnished　him　a　consideration。

The　common　element　of　all　contracts　might　be　said　to　be　a　promise；　although　even　a　promise　was　not　necessary　to　a　liability　in　debt　as　formerly　understood。　But　as　it　will　not　be　possible　to　discuss　covenants　further；　and　as　consideration　formed　the　main　topic　of　the　last　Lecture；　I　will　take　up　that　first。　Furthermore；　as　there　is　an　historical　difference　between　consideration　in　debt　and　in　assumpsit；　I　shall　confine　myself　to　the　latter；　which　is　the　later　and　more　philosophical　form。

It　is　said　that　any　benefit　conferred　by　the　promisee　on　the　promisor；　or　any　detriment　incurred　by　the　promisee；　＇290＇　may　be　a　consideration。　It　is　also　thought　that　every　consideration　may　be　reduced　to　a　case　of　the　latter　sort；　using　the　word　〃detriment〃　in　a　somewhat　broad　sense。

To　illustrate　the　general　doctrine；　suppose　that　a　man　is　desirous　of　having　a　cask　of　brandy　carried　from　Boston　to　Cambridge；　and　that　a　truckman；　either　out　of　kindness　or　from　some　other　motive；　says　that　he　will　carry　it；　and　it　is　delivered　to　him　accordingly。　If　he　carelessly　staves　in　the　cask；　there　would　perhaps　be　no　need　to　allege　that　he　undertook　to　carry　it；　and　on　principle；　and　according　to　the　older　cases；　if　an　undertaking　was　alleged；　no　consideration　for　the　assumpsit　need　be　stated。　/1/　The　ground　of　complaint　in　that　case　would　be　a　wrong；　irrespective　of　contract。　But　if　the　complaint　was　that　he　did　not　carry　it　as　agreed；　the　plaintiff's　difficulty　would　be　that　the　truckman　was　not　bound　to　do　so　unless　there　was　a　consideration　for　his　promise。　Suppose；　therefore；　that　it　was　alleged　that　he　promised　to　do　so　in　consideration　of　the　delivery　to　him。　Would　this　be　a　sufficient　consideration？　The　oldest　cases；　going　on　the　notion　of　benefit　to　the　promisor；　said　that　it　could　not　be；　for　it　was　a　trouble；　not　a　benefit。　/2/　Then　take　it　from　the　side　of　detriment。　The　delivery　is　a　necessary　condition　to　the　promisor's　doing　the　kindness；　and　if　he　does　it；　the　delivery；　so　far　from　being　a　detriment　to　the　promisee；　is　a　clear　benefit　to　him。

But　this　argument　is　a　fallacy。　Clearly　the　delivery　would　be　sufficient　consideration　to　enable　the　owner　to　declare　in　assumpsit　for　the　breach　of　those　duties　which　＇291＇　arose；　irrespective　of　contract；　from　the　defendant's　having　undertaken　to　deal　with　the　thing。　/1/　It　would　be　a　sufficient　consideration　for　any　promise　not　involving　a　dealing　with　the　thing　for　its　performance；　for　instance；　to　pay　a　thousand　dollars。　/2/　And　the　law　has　not　pronounced　the　consideration　good　or　bad　according　to　the　nature　of　the　promise　founded　upon　it。　The　delivery　is　a　sufficient　consideration　for　any　promise。　/3/

The　argument　on　the　other　side　leaves　out　of　sight　the　point　of　time　at　which　the　sufficiency　of　the　consideration　is　to　be　determined。　This　is　the　moment　when　the　consideration　is　furnished。　At　that　moment　the　delivery　of　the　cask　is　a　detriment　in　the　strictest　sense。　The　owner　of　the　cask　has　given　up　a　present　control　over　it；　which　he　has　a　right　to　keep；　and　he　has　got　in　return；　not　a　performance　for　which　a　delivery　was　necessary；　but　a　mere　promise　of　performance。　The　performance　is　still　future。　/4/

But　it　will　be　seen　that；　although　the　delivery　may　be　a　consideration；　it　will　not　necessarily　be　one。　A　promise　to　carry　might　be　made　and　accepted　on　the　understanding　that　it　was　mere　matter　of　favor；　without　consideration；　and　not　legally　binding。　In　that　case　the　detriment　of　delivery　would　be　incurred　by　the　promisee　as　before；　but　obviously　it　would　be　incurred　for　the　sole　purpose