the common law-第5节

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　and　take　up　the　doctrines　of　the　Admiralty。　In　the　early　books　which　have　just　been　referred　to；　and　long　afterwards；　the　fact　of　motion　is　adverted　to　as　of　much　importance。　A　maxim　of　Henry　Spigurnel；　a　judge　in　the　time　of　Edward　I。；　is　reported；　that　〃where　a　man　is　killed　by　a　cart；　or　by　the　fall　of　a　house；　or　in　other　like　manner；　and　the　thing　in　motion　is　the　cause　of　the　death；　it　shall　be　deodand。〃　/5/　So　it　was　＇26＇　said　in　the　next　reign　that　〃oinne　illud　quod　mover　cum　eo　quod　occidit　homines　deodandum　domino　Regi　erit；　vel　feodo　clerici。〃　/l　/　The　reader　sees　how　motion　gives　life　to　the　object　forfeited。

The　most　striking　example　of　this　sort　is　a　ship。　And　accordingly　the　old　books　say　that；　if　a　man　falls　from　a　ship　and　is　drowned；　the　motion　of　the　ship　must　be　taken　to　cause　the　death；　and　the　ship　is　forfeited；　　provided；　however；　that　this　happens　in　fresh　water。　/2/　For　if　the　death　took　place　on　the　high　seas；　that　was　outside　the　ordinary　jurisdiction。　This　proviso　has　been　supposed　to　mean　that　ships　at　sea　were　not　forfeited；　/3/　but　there　is　a　long　series　of　petitions　to　the　king　in　Parliament　that　such　forfeitures　may　be　done　away　with；　which　tell　a　different　story。　/4/　The　truth　seems　to　be　that　the　forfeiture　took　place；　but　in　a　different　court。　A　manuscript　of　the　reign　of　Henry　VI。；　only　recently　printed；　discloses　the　fact　that；　if　a　man　was　killed　or　drowned　at　sea　by　the　motion　of　the　ship；　the　vessel　was　forfeited　to　the　admiral　upon　a　proceeding　in　the　admiral's　court；　and　subject　to　release　by　favor　of　the　admiral　or　the　king。　/5/

A　ship　is　the　most　living　of　inanimate　things。　Servants　sometimes　say　〃she〃　of　a　clock；　but　every　one　gives　a　gender　to　vessels。　And　we　need　not　be　surprised；　therefore；　to　find　a　mode　of　dealing　which　has　shown　such　extraordinary　vitality　in　the　criminal　law　applied　with　even　more　striking　thoroughness　in　the　Admiralty。　It　is　only　by　supposing　＇27＇　the　ship　to　have　been　treated　as　if　endowed　with　personality；　that　the　arbitrary　seeming　peculiarities　of　the　maritime　law　can　be　made　intelligible；　and　on　that　supposition　they　at　once　become　consistent　and　logical。

By　way　of　seeing　what　those　peculiarities　are；　take　first　a　case　of　collision　at　sea。　A　collision　takes　place　between　two　vessels；　the　Ticonderoga　and　the　Melampus；　through　the　fault　of　the　Ticonderoga　alone。　That　ship　is　under　a　lease　at　the　time；　the　lessee　has　his　own　master　in　charge；　and　the　owner　of　the　vessel　has　no　manner　of　control　over　it。　The　owner；　therefore；　is　not　to　blame；　and　he　cannot　even　be　charged　on　the　ground　that　the　damage　was　done　by　his　servants。　He　is　free　from　personal　liability　on　elementary　principles。　Yet　it　is　perfectly　settled　that　there　is　a　lien　on　his　vessel　for　the　amount　of　the　damage　done；　/1/　and　this　means　that　that　vessel　may　be　arrested　and　sold　to　pay　the　loss　in　any　admiralty　court　whose　process　will　reach　her。　If　a　livery…stable　keeper　lets　a　horse　and　wagon　to　a　customer；　who　runs　a　man　down　by　careless　driving；　no　one　would　think　of　claiming　a　right　to　seize　the　horse　and　wagon。　It　would　be　seen　that　the　only　property　which　could　be　sold　to　pay　for　a　wrong　was　the　property　of　the　wrong…doer。

But；　again；　suppose　that　the　vessel；　instead　of　being　under　lease；　is　in　charge　of　a　pilot　whose　employment　is　made　compulsory　by　the　laws　of　the　port　which　she　is　just　entering。　The　Supreme　Court　of　the　United　States　holds　the　ship　liable　in　this　instance　also。　/2/　The　English　courts　would　probably　have　decided　otherwise；　and　the　matter　is　settled　in　England　by　legislation。　But　there　the　court　of　appeal；　the　Privy　Council；　has　been　largely　composed　of　common…law　＇28＇lawyers；　and　it　has　shown　a　marked　tendency　to　assimilate　common…law　doctrine。　At　common　law　one　who　could　not　impose　a　personal　liability　on　the　owner　could　not　bind　a　particular　chattel　to　answer　for　a　wrong　of　which　it　had　been　the　instrument。　But　our　Supreme　Court　has　long　recognized　that　a　person　may　bind　a　ship；　when　he　could　not　bind　the　owners　personally；　because　he　was　not　the　agent。

It　may　be　admitted　that；　if　this　doctrine　were　not　supported　by　an　appearance　of　good　sense；　it　would　not　have　survived。　The　ship　is　the　only　security　available　in　dealing　with　foreigners；　and　rather　than　send　one's　own　citizens　to　search　for　a　remedy　abroad　in　strange　courts；　it　is　easy　to　seize　the　vessel　and　satisfy　the　claim　at　home；　leaving　the　foreign　owners　to　get　their　indemnity　as　they　may　be　able。　I　dare　say　some　such　thought　has　helped　to　keep　the　practice　alive；　but　I　believe　the　true　historic　foundation　is　elsewhere。　The　ship　no　doubt；　like　a　sword　would　have　been　forfeited　for　causing　death；　in　whosesoever　hands　it　might　have　been。　So；　if　the　master　and　mariners　of　a　ship；　furnished　with　letters　of　reprisal；　committed　piracy　against　a　friend　of　the　king；　the　owner　lost　his　ship　by　the　admiralty　law；　although　the　crime　was　committed　without　his　knowledge　or　assent。　/2/　It　seems　most　likely　that　the　principle　by　which　the　ship　was　forfeited　to　the　king　for　causing　death；　or　for　piracy；　was　the　same　as　that　by　which　it　was　bound　to　private　sufferers　for　other　damage；　in　whose　hands　soever　it　might　have　been　when　it　did　the　harm。

If　we　should　say　to　an　uneducated　man　today；　〃She　did　it　and　she　ought　to　pay　for　it；〃　it　may　be　doubted　＇29＇　whether　he　would　see　the　fallacy；　or　be　ready　to　explain　that　the　ship　was　only　property；　and　that　to　say；　〃The　ship　has　to　pay　for　it；〃　/1/　was　simply　a　dramatic　way　of　saying　that　somebody's　property　was　to　be　sold；　and　the　proceeds　applied　to　pay　for　a　wrong　committed　by　somebody　else。

It　would　seem　that　a　similar　form　of　words　has　been　enough　to　satisfy　the　minds　of　great　lawyers。　The　following　is　a　passage　from　a　judgment　by　Chief　Justice　Marshall；　which　is　quoted　with　approval　by　Judge　Story　in　giving　the　opinion　of　the　Supreme　Court　of　the　United　States：　〃This　is　not　a　proceeding　against　the　owner；　it　is　a　proceeding　against　the　vessel　for　an　offence　committed　by　the　vessel；　which　is　not　the　less　an　offence；　and　does　not　the　less　subject　her　to　forfeiture；　because　it　was　committed　without　the　authority　and　against　the　will　of　the　owner。　It　is　true　that　inanimate　matter　can　commit　no　offence。　But　this　body　is　animated　and　put　in　action　by　the　crew；　who　are　guided　by　the　master。　The　vessel　acts　and　speaks　by　the　master。　She　reports　herself　by　the　master。　It　is；　therefore；　not　unreasonable　that　the　vessel　should　be　affected　by　this　report。〃　And　again　Judge　Story　quotes　from　another　case：　〃The　thing　is　here　primarily　considered　as　the　offender；　or　rather　the　offence　is　primarily　attached　to　the　thing。〃　/2/

In　other　words；　those　great　judges；　although　of　course　aware　that　a　ship　is　no　more　alive　than　a　mill…wheel；　thought　that　not　only　the　law　did　in　fact　deal　with　it　as　if　it　were　alive；　but　that　it　was　reasonable　that　the　law　should　do　so。　The　reader　will　observe　that　they　do　not　say　simply　that　it　is　reasonable　on　grounds　of　policy　to　＇30＇　sacrifice　justice　to　the　owner　to　security　for　somebody　else　but　that　it　is　reasonable　to　deal　with　the　vessel　as　an　offending　thing。　Whatever　the　hidden　ground　of　policy　may　be；　their　thought　still　clothes　itself　in　personifying　language。

Let　us　now　go　on　to　follow　the　peculiarities　of　the　maritime　law　in　other　directions。　For　the　cases　which　have　been　stated　are　only　parts　of　a　larger　whole。

By　the　maritime　law　of　the　Middle　Ages　the　ship　was　not　only　the　source；　but　the　limit；　of　liability。　The　rule　already　prevailed；　which　has　been　borrowed　and　adopted　by　the　English　statutes　and　by　our　own　act　of　Congress　of　1851；　according　to　which　the　owner　is　discharged　from　responsibility　for　wrongful　acts　of　a　master　appointed　by　himself　upon　surrendering　his　interest　in　the　vessel　and　the　freight　which　she　had　earned。　By　the　doctrines　of　agency　he　would　be　personally　liable　for　the　whole　damage。　If　the　origin　of　the　system　of　limited　liability　which　is　believed　to　be　so　essential　to　modern　commerce　is　be　attributed　to　those　considerations　of　public　policy　on　which　it　would　now　be　sustained；　that　system　has　nothing　to　do　with　the　law　of　collision。　But　if　the　limit　of　liability　here　stands　on　the　same　ground　as　the　noxoe　deditio；　confirms　the　explanation　already　given　of　the　liability　of　the　ship　for　wrongs　done　by　it　while　out　of　the　owner's　hands；　and　conversely　existence　of　that　liability　confirms　the　argument　here。

Let　us　now　take　another　rule；　for　which；　as　usual；　there　is　a　plausible　explanation　of　policy。　Freight；　it　is　said；　the　mother　of　wages；　for；　we　are　told；　〃if　the　ship　perished；　＇31＇　if　the　mariners　were　to　have　their　wages　in　such　cases；　they　would　not　use　their　endeavors；　nor　hazard　their　lives；　for　the　safety　of　the　ship。〃　/1/　The　best　commentary　on　this　reasoning　is；　that　the　law　has　recently　been　changed　by　statute。　But　even　by　the　old　law　there　was　an　exception　inconsistent　with　the　supposed　reason。　In　case　of　shipwreck；　which　was　the　usual　case　of　a　failure　to　earn　freight；　so　long　as　any　portion　of　the　ship　was　saved；　the　lien　of　the　mariners　remained。　I　suppose　it　would　have　been　said；　because　it　was　sound　policy　to　encourage　them　to　save　all　they　could。　If　we　consider　that　the　sailors　were　rega