the common law-第49节

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　may　have　been　a　mere　omission　letting　in　the　operation　of　natural　forces。　But　if　you　connect　it；　as　it　was　connected　in　fact；　with　the　previous　dealings；　you　have　a　course　of　action　and　conduct　which；　taken　as　a　whole；　has　caused　or　occasioned　the　harm。

The　objection　may　be　urged；　to　be　sure；　that　there　is　a　considerable　step　from　holding　a　man　liable　for　the　consequences　of　his　acts　which　he　might　have　prevented；　to　making　him　answerable　for　not　having　interfered　with　the　course　of　nature　when　he　neither　set　it　in　motion　nor　opened　the　door　for　it　to　do　harm；　and　that　there　is　just　that　difference　between　making　a　hole　in　a　roof　and　leaving　it　open；　or　cutting　the　cord　and　letting　it　bleed；　on　the　one　side；　and　the　case　of　a　farrier　who　receives　a　sick　horse　and　omits　proper　precautions；　on　the　other。　/1/

There　seem　to　be　two　answers　to　this。　First；　it　is　not　clear　that　such　a　distinction　was　adverted　to　by　the　court　which　decided　the　case　which　I　have　mentioned。　It　was　alleged　that　the　defendant　performed　his　cure　so　negligently　that　the　horse　died。　It　might　not　have　occurred　to　＇280＇　the　judges　that　the　defendant's　conduct　possibly　went　no　further　than　the　omission　of　a　series　of　beneficial　measures。　It　was　probably　assumed　to　have　consisted　of　a　combination　of　acts　and　neglects；　which　taken　as　a　whole　amounted　to　an　improper　dealing　with　the　thing。

In　the　next　place；　it　is　doubtful　whether　the　distinction　is　a　sound　one　on　practical　grounds。　It　may　well　be　that；　so　long　as　one　allows　a　trust　to　be　reposed　in　him；　he　is　bound　to　use　such　precautions　as　are　known　to　him；　although　he　has　made　no　contract；　and　is　at　liberty　to　renounce　the　trust　in　any　reasonable　manner。　This　view　derives　some　support　from　the　issue　on　which　the　parties　went　to　trial；　which　was　that　the　defendant　performed　the　cure　as　well　as　he　knew　how；　without　this；　that　the　horse　died　for　default　of　his　care　（cure？）。　/l　/

But　it　cannot　be　denied　that　the　allegation　of　an　undertaking　conveyed　the　idea　of　a　promise；　as　well　as　that　of　an　entering　upon　the　business　in　hand。　Indeed；　the　latter　element　is　sufficiently　conveyed；　perhaps；　without　it。　It　may　be　asked；

therefore；　whether　the　promise　did　not　count　for　something　in　raising　a　duty　to　act。　So　far　as　this　involves　the　consequence　that　the　action　was　in　fact　for　the　breach　of　a　contract；　the　answer　has　been　given　already；　and　is　sustained　by　too　great　a　weight　of　authority　to　be　doubted。　/2/　To　bind　the　defendant　by　a　contract；　an　instrument　under　seal　was　essential。　As　has　been　shown；　already；　even　the　ancient　sphere　of　debt　had　been　limited　by　this　requirement；　and　in　the　time　of　Edward　III。　a　deed　was　necessary　even　to　bind　a　surety。　It　was　so　＇281＇　a　fortiori　to　introduce　a　liability　upon　promises　not　enforced　by　the　ancient　law。　Nevertheless；　the　suggestion　was　made　at　an　early　date；　that　an　action　on　the　case　for　damage　by　negligence；　that　is；　by　an　omission　of　proper　precautions；　alleging　an　undertaking　by　way　of　inducement；　was　in　fact　an　action　of　contract。

Five　years　after　the　action　for　negligence　in　curing　a　horse；　which　has　been　stated；　an　action　was　brought　/1/　in　form　against　a　surgeon；　alleging　that　he　undertook　to　cure　the　plaintiff's　hand；　and　that　by　his　negligence　the　hand　was　maimed。　There　was；　however；　this　difference；　that　it　was　set　forth　that　the　plaintiff's　hand　had　been　wounded　by　one　T。B。　And　hence　it　appeared　that；　however　much　the　bad　treatment　may　have　aggravated　matters；　the　maiming　was　properly　attributable　to　T。B。；　and　that　the　plaintiff　had　an　action　against　him。　This　may　have　led　the　defendant　to　adopt　the　course　he　did；　because　he　felt　uncertain　whether　any　action　of　tort　would　lie。　He　took　issue　on　the　undertaking；　assuming　that　to　be　essential　to　the　plaintiff's　case；　and　then　objected　that　the　writ　did　not　show　the　place　of　the　undertaking；　and　hence　was　bad；　because　it　did　not　show　whence　the　inquest　should　be　summoned　to　speak　to　that　point。　The　writ　was　adjudged　bad　on　that　ground；　which　seems　as　if　the　court　sanctioned　the　defendant's　view。　Indeed；　one　of　the　judges　called　it　an　action　of　covenant；　and　said　that　〃of　necessity　it　was　maintainable　without　specialty；　because　for　so　small　a　matter　a　man　cannot　always　have　a　clerk　at　hand　to　write　a　deed〃　（pur　faire　especially）。　At　the　same　time　the　earlier　cases　which　＇282＇　have　been　mentioned　were　cited　and　relied　on；　and　it　is　evident　that　the　court　was　not　prepared　to　go　beyond　them；　or　to　hold　that　the　action　could　be　maintained　on　its　merits　apart　from　the　technical　objection。　In　another　connection　it　seems　to　have　considered　the　action　from　the　point　of　view　of　trespass。　/1/

Whatever　questions　this　case　may　suggest；　the　class　of　actions　which　alleged　an　undertaking　on　the　part　of　the　defendant　continued　to　be　dealt　with　as　actions　of　tort　for　a　long　time　after　Edward　III。　The　liability　was　limited　to　damage　to　person　or　property　arising　after　the　defendant　had　entered　upon　the　employment。　And　it　was　mainly　through　reasoning　drawn　from　the　law　of　tort　that　it　was　afterwards　extended；　as　will　be　seen。

At　the　beginning　of　the　reign　of　Henry　VI。　it　was　probably　still　the　law　that　the　action　would　not　lie　for　a　simple　failure　to　keep　a　promise。　/2/　But　it　had　been　several　times　suggested；　as　has　been　shown；　that　it　would　be　otherwise　if　the　omission　or　neglect　occurred　in　the　course　of　performance；　and　the　defendant's　conduct　had　been　followed　by　physical　damage。　/3/　This　suggestion　took　its　most　striking　form　in　the　early　years　of　Henry　VI。；　when　the　case　of　the　carpenter　leaving　a　hole　in　the　roof　was　put。　/4/　When　the　courts　had　got　as　far　as　this；　it　was　easy　to　go　one　step　farther；　and　to　allow　the　same　effect　to　an　omission　at　any　stage；　followed　by　similar　damage。

＇283＇　What　is　the　difference　in　principle；　it　was　asked；　a　few　years　later；　/1/　between　the　cases　where　it　is　admitted　that　the　action　will　lie；　and　that　of　a　smith　who　undertakes　to　shoe　a　horse　and　does　not；　by　reason　of　which　the　horse　goes　lame；or　that　of　a　lawyer；　who　undertakes　to　argue　your　case；　and；　after　thus　inducing　you　to　rely　upon　him；　neglects　to　be　present；　so　that　you　lose　it？　It　was　said　that　in　the　earlier　instances　the　duty　was　dependent　on　or　accessory　to　the　covenant；　and　that；　if　the　action　would　lie　on　the　accessory　matter；　it　would　lie　on　the　principal。　/2/　It　was　held　on　demurrer　that　an　action　would　lie　for　not　procuring　certain　releases　which　the　defendant　had　undertaken　to　get。

Five　years　later　another　case　/3/　came　up；　which　was　very　like　that　of　the　farrier　in　the　reign　of　Edward　III。　It　was　alleged　that　the　defendant　undertook　to　cure　the　plaintiff's　horse；　and　applied　medicine　so　negligently　that　the　horse　died。　In　this；　as　in　the　earlier　case；　the　issue　was　taken　on　the　assumpsit。　And　now　the　difference　between　an　omission　and　an　act　was　clearly　stated；　the　declaration　was　held　not　to　mean　necessarily　anything　more　than　an　omission；　and　it　was　said　that　but　for　the　undertaking　the　defendant　would　have　owed　no　duty　to　act。　Hence　the　allegation　of　the　defendant's　promise　was　material；　and　an　issue　could　properly　be　taken　on　it。

This　decision　distinctly　separated　from　the　mass　of　actions　on　the　case　a　special　class　arising　out　of　a　promise　as　the　source　of　the　defendant's　obligation；　and　it　was　only　a　matter　of　time　for　that　class　to　become　a　new　and　distinct　＇284＇　action　of　contract。　Had　this　change　taken　place　at　once；　the　doctrine　of　consideration；　which　was　first　definitely　enunciated　about　the　same　time；　would　no　doubt　have　been　applied；　and　a　quid　pro　quo　would　have　been　required　for　the　undertaking。　/1/　But　the　notion　of　tort　was　not　at　once　abandoned。　The　law　was　laid　down　at　the　beginning　of　the　reign　of　Henry　VII。；　in　accordance　with　the　earlier　decisions；　and　it　was　said　that　the　action　would　not　lie　for　a　failure　to　keep　a　promise；　but　only　for　negligence　after　the　defendant　had　entered　upon　his　undertaking。　/2/

So　far　as　the　action　did　not　exceed　the　true　limits　of　tort；　it　was　immaterial　whether　there　was　a　consideration　for　the　undertaking　or　not。　But　when　the　mistake　was　made　of　supposing　that　all　cases；　whether　proper　torts　or　not；　in　which　an　assumpsit　was　alleged；　were　equally　founded　on　the　promise；　one　of　two　erroneous　conclusions　was　naturally　thought　to　follow。　Either　no　assumpsit　needed　any　quid　pro　quo；　/3/　as　there　was　clearly　none　in　the　older　precedents；　（they　being　cases　of　pure　tort；）　or　else　those　precedents　were　wrong；　and　a　quid　pro　quo　should　be　alleged　in　every　case。　It　was　long　recognized　with　more　or　less　understanding　of　the　true　limit；　that；　in　cases　where　the　gist　of　the　action　was　negligent　damage　to　property；　a　consideration　was　not　necessary。　/4/　And　there　are　some　traces　of　the　notion　that　it　was　always　superfluous；　as　late　as　Charles　I。

＇285＇　In　a　case　of　that　reign；　the　defendant　retained　an　attorney　to　act　in　a　suit　for　a　third　person；　and　promised　to　pay　him　all　his　fees　and　expenses。　The　attorney　rendered　the　service；　and　then　brought　debt。　It　was　objected　that　debt　did　not　lie；　because　there　was　no　contract　between　the　parties；　and　the　defendant　had　not　any　quid　pro　quo。　The　court　adopted　the　argument；　and　said　that　there　was　no　contract　or