the common law-第48节

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h　the　distinction　between　sealed　and　unsealed　instruments　altogether；　and　this　has　been　done　in　some　of　the　Western　States。

＇274＇　While　covenants　survive　in　a　somewhat　weak　old　age；　and　debt　has　disappeared；　leaving　a　vaguely　disturbing　influence　behind　it；　the　whole　modern　law　of　contract　has　grown　up　through　the　medium　of　the　action　of　Assumpsit；　which　must　now　be　explained。

After　the　Norman　conquest　all　ordinary　actions　were　begun　by　a　writ　issuing　from　the　king；　and　ordering　the　defendant　to　be　summoned　before　the　court　to　answer　the　plaintiff。　These　writs　were　issued　as　a　matter　of　course；　in　the　various　well…known　actions　from　which　they　took　their　names。　There　were　writs　of　debt　and　of　covenant；　there　were　writs　of　trespass　for　forcible　injuries　to　the　plaintiff's　person；　or　to　property　in　his　possession；　and　so　on。　But　these　writs　were　only　issued　for　the　actions　which　were　known　to　the　law；　and　without　a　writ　the　court　had　no　authority　to　try　a　case。　In　the　time　of　Edward　I。　there　were　but　few　of　such　actions。　The　cases　in　which　you　could　recover　money　of　another　fell　into　a　small　number　of　groups；　for　each　of　which　there　was　a　particular　form　of　suing　and　stating　your　claim。

These　forms　had　ceased　to　be　adequate。　Thus　there　were　many　cases　which　did　not　exactly　fall　within　the　definition　of　a　trespass；　but　for　which　it　was　proper　that　a　remedy　should　be　furnished。　In　order　to　furnish　a　remedy；　the　first　thing　to　be　done　was　to　furnish　a　writ。　Accordingly；　the　famous　statute　of　13　Edward　I。；　c。　24；　authorized　the　office　from　which　the　old　writs　issued　to　frame　new　ones　in　cases　similar　in　principle　to　those　for　which　writs　were　found；　and　requiring　like　remedy；　but　not　exactly　falling　within　the　scope　of　the　writs　already　in　use。

Thus　writs　of　trespass　on　the　case　began　to　make　their　appearance；　that　is；　writs　stating　a　ground　of　complaint　＇275＇　to　a　trespass；　but　not　quite　amounting　to　a　trespass　as　it　had　been　sued　for　in　the　older　precedents。　To　take　an　instance　which　is　substantially　one　of　the　earliest　cases；　suppose　that　a　man　left　a　horse　with　a　blacksmith　to　be　shod；　and　he　negligently　drove　a　nail　into　the　horse's　foot。　It　might　be　that　the　owner　of　the　horse　could　not　have　one　of　the　old　writs；　because　the　horse　was　not　in　his　possession　when　the　damage　was　done。　A　strict　trespass　property　could　only　be　committed　against　the　person　in　possession　of　it。　It　could　not　be　committed　by　one　who　was　in　possession　himself。　/1/　But　as　laming　the　horse　was　equally　a　wrong；　whether　the　owner　held　the　horse　by　the　bridle　or　left　it　with　the　smith；　and　as　the　wrong　was　closely　analogous　to　a　trespass；　although　not　one；　the　law　gave　the　owner　a　writ　of　trespass　on　the　case。　/2/

An　example　like　this　raises　no　difficulty；　it　is　as　much　an　action　of　tort　for　a　wrong　as　trespass　itself。　No　contract　was　stated；　and　none　was　necessary　on　principle。　But　this　does　not　belong　to　the　class　of　cases　to　be　considered；　for　the　problem　before　us　is　to　trace　the　origin　of　assumpsit；　which　is　an　action　of　contract。　Assumpsit；　however；　began　as　an　action　of　trespass　on　the　case；　and　the　thing　to　be　discovered　is　how　trespass　on　the　case　ever　became　available　for　a　mere　breach　of　agreement。

It　will　be　well　to　examine　some　of　the　earliest　cases　in　which　an　undertaking　（assumpsit）　was　alleged。　The　first　reported　in　the　books　is　of　the　reign　of　Edward　III。　/3/　The　plaintiff　alleged　that　the　defendant　undertook　to　carry　the　plaintiff's　horse　safely　across　the　Humber；　but　surcharged　＇276＇　the　boat；　by　reason　of　which　the　horse　perished。　It　was　objected　that　the　action　should　have　been　either　covenant　for　breach　of　the　agreement；　or　else　trespass。　But　it　was　answered　that　the　defendant　committed　a　wrongful　act　when　he　surcharged　the　boat；　and　the　objection　was　overruled。　This　case　again；　although　an　undertaking　was　stated；　hardly　introduced　a　new　principle。　The　force　did　not　proceed　directly　from　the　defendant；　to　be　sure；　but　it　was　brought　to　bear　by　the　combination　of　his　overloading　and　then　pushing　into　the　stream。

The　next　case　is　of　the　same　reign；　and　goes　further。　/1/　The　writ　set　forth　that　the　defendant　undertook　to　cure　the　plaintiff's　horse　of　sickness　（manucepit　equum　praedicti　W。　de　infirmirate）；　and　did　his　work　so　negligently　that　the　horse　died。　This　differs　from　the　case　of　laming　the　horse　with　a　nail　in　two　respects。　It　docs　not　charge　any　forcible　act；　nor　indeed　any　act　at　all；　but　a　mere　omission。　On　the　other　hand；　it　states　an　undertaking；　which　the　other　did　not。　The　defendant　at　once　objected　that　this　was　an　action　for　a　breach　of　an　undertaking；　and　that　the　plaintiff　should　have　brought　covenant。　The　plaintiff　replied；　that　he　could　not　do　that　without　a　deed；　and　that　the　action　was　for　negligently　causing　the　death　of　the　horse；　that　is；　for　a　tort；　not　for　a　breach　of　contract。　Then；　said　the　defendant；　you　might　have　had　trespass。　But　the　plaintiff　answered　that　by　saying　that　the　horse　was　not　killed　by　force；　but　died　per　def。　de　sa　cure；　and　upon　this　argument　the　writ　was　adjudged　good；　Thorpe；　J。　saying　that　he　had　seen　a　man　indicted　for　killing　a　patient　by　want　of　care　（default　in　curing）；　whom　he　had　undertaken　to　cure。

＇277＇　Both　these　cases；　it　will　be　seen；　were　dealt　with　by　the　court　as　pure　actions　of　tort；　notwithstanding　the　allegation　of　an　undertaking　on　the　part　of　the　defendant。　But　it　will　also　be　seen　that　they　are　successively　more　remote　from　an　ordinary　case　of　trespass。　In　the　case　last　stated；　especially；　the　destroying　force　did　not　proceed　from　the　defendant　in　any　sense。　And　thus　we　are　confronted　with　the　question；　What　possible　analogy　could　have　been　found　between　a　wrongful　act　producing　harm；　and　a　failure　to　act　at　all？

I　attempt　to　answer　it；　let　me　illustrate　a　little　further　by　examples　of　somewhat　later　date。　Suppose　a　man　undertook　to　work　upon　another's　house；　and　by　his　unskilfulness　spoiled　his　employer's　timbers；　it　would　be　like　a　trespass；　although　not　one；　and　the　employer　would　sue　in　trespass　on　the　case。　This　was　stated　as　clear　law　by　one　of　the　judges　in　the　reign　of　Henry　IV。　/1/　But　suppose　that；　instead　of　directly　spoiling　the　materials；　the　carpenter　had　simply　left　a　hole　in　the　roof　through　which　the　rain　had　come　in　and　done　the　damage。　The　analogy　to　the　previous　case　is　marked；　but　we　are　a　step　farther　away　from　trespass；　because　the　force　does　not　come　from　the　defendant。　Yet　in　this　instance　also　the　judges　thought　that　trespass　on　the　case　would　lie。　/2/　In　the　time　of　Henry　IV。　the　action　could　not　have　been　maintained　for　a　simple　refusal　to　build　according　to　agreement；　but　it　was　suggested　by　the　court；　that；　if　the　writ　had　mentioned　〃that　the　thing　had　been　commenced　and　then　by　not　done；　it　would　have　been　otherwise。〃　/3/

＇278＇　I　now　recur　to　the　question；　What　likeness　could　there　have　been　between　an　omission　and　a　trespass　sufficient　to　warrant　a　writ　of　trespass　on　the　case？　In　order　to　find　an　answer　it　is　essential　to　notice　that　in　all　the　earlier　cases　the　omission　occurred　in　the　course　of　dealing　with　the　plaintiff's　person　or　property；　and　occasioned　damage　to　the　one　or　the　other。　In　view　of　this　fact；　Thorpe's　reference　to　indictments　for　killing　a　patient　by　want　of　care；　and　the　later　distinction　between　neglect　before　and　after　the　task　is　commenced；　are　most　pregnant。　The　former　becomes　still　more　suggestive　when　it　is　remembered　that　this　is　the　first　argument　or　analogy　to　be　found　upon　the　subject。

The　meaning　of　that　analogy　is　plain。　Although　a　man　has　a　perfect　right　to　stand　by　and　see　his　neighbor's　property　destroyed；　or；　for　the　matter　of　that；　to　watch　his　neighbor　perish　for　want　of　his　help；　yet　if　he　once　intermeddles　he　has　no　longer　the　same　freedom。　He　cannot　withdraw　at　will。　To　give　a　more　specific　example；　if　a　surgeon　from　benevolence　cuts　the　umbilical　cord　of　a　newly…born　child；　he　cannot　stop　there　and　watch　the　patient　bleed　to　death。　It　would　be　murder　wilfully　to　allow　death　to　come　to　pass　in　that　way；　as　much　as　if　the　intention　had　been　entertained　at　the　time　of　cutting　the　cord。　It　would　not　matter　whether　the　wickedness　began　with　the　act；　or　with　the　subsequent　omission。

The　same　reasoning　applies　to　civil　liability。　A　carpenter　need　not　go　to　work　upon　another　man's　house　at　all；　but　if　he　accepts　the　other's　confidence　and　intermeddles；　he　cannot　stop　at　will　and　leave　the　roof　open　to　the　weather。　So　in　the　case　of　the　farrier；　when　he　had　taken　charge　of　the　horse；　he　could　not　stop　at　the　critical　moment　＇279＇　and　leave　the　consequences　to　fortune。　So；　still　more　clearly；　when　the　ferryman　undertook　to　carry　a　horse　across　the　Humber；　although　the　water　drowned　the　horse；　his　remote　acts　of　overloading　his　boat　and　pushing　it　into　the　stream　in　that　condition　occasioned　the　loss；　and　he　was　answerable　for　it。

In　the　foregoing　cases　the　duty　was　independent　of　contract；　or　at　least　was　so　regarded　by　the　judges　who　decided　them；　and　stood　on　the　general　rules　applied　to　human　conduct　even　by　the　criminal　law。　The　immediate　occasion　of　the　damage　complained　of　may　have　been　a　mere　omission　letting　in　the　operation　of　natural　forces。　But　if　you　connect　it；　as