the common law-第47节

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objected　to　au　action　upon　an　＇268＇　assumpsit　for　not　building　a　mill；　that　it　was　not　shown　what　the　defendant　was　to　have　for　doing　it。　In　the　thirty…sixth　year　of　the　same　reign　（A。D。　1459）；　the　doctrine　appears　full　grown；　and　is　assumed　to　be　familiar。　/1/

The　case　turned　upon　a　question　which　was　debated　for　centuries　before　it　was　settled；　whether　debt　would　lie　for　a　sum　of　money　promised　by　the　defendant　to　the　plaintiff　if　he　would　marry　the　defendant's　daughter。　But　whereas　formerly　the　debate　had　been　whether　the　promise　was　not　so　far　incident　to　the　marriage　that　it　belonged　exclusively　to　the　jurisdiction　of　the　spiritual　courts；　it　now　touched　the　purely　mundane　doubt　whether　the　defendant　had　had　quid　pro　quo。

It　will　be　remembered　that　the　fact　formerly　sworn　to　by　the　transaction　witnesses　was　a　benefit　to　the　defendant；　namely；　a　delivery　of　the　things　sold　or　the　money　lent　to　him。　Such　cases；　also；　offer　the　most　obvious　form　of　consideration。　The　natural　question　is；　what　the　promisor　was　to　have　for　his　promise。　/2/　It　is　only　by　analysis　that　the　supposed　policy　of　the　law　is　seen　to　be　equally　satisfied　by　a　detriment　incurred　by　the　promisee。　It　therefore　not　unnaturally　happened　that　the　judges；　when　they　first　laid　down　the　law　that　there　must　be　quid　pro　quo；　were　slow　to　recognize　a　detriment　to　the　contractee　as　satisfying　the　requirement　which　had　been　laid　down。　In　the　case　which　I　have　mentioned　some　of　the　judges　were　inclined　to　hold　that　getting　rid　of　his　daughter　was　a　sufficient　benefit　to　the　defendant　to　make　him　a　debtor　for　the　money　which　he　promised；　and　there　was　even　some　hint　of　the　opinion；　that　marrying　the　lady　was　a　＇269＇　consideration；　because　it　was　a　detriment　to　the　promisee。　/1/　But　the　other　opinion　prevailed；　at　least　for　a　time；　because　the　defendant　had　had　nothing　from　the　plaintiff　to　raise　a　debt。　/2/

So　it　was　held　that　a　service　rendered　to　a　third　person　upon　the　defendant's　request　and　promise　of　a　reward　would　not　be　enough；　/3/　although　not　without　strong　opinions　to　the　contrary；　and　for　a　time　the　precedents　were　settled。　It　became　established　law　that　an　action　of　debt　would　only　lie　upon　a　consideration　actually　received　by　and　enuring　to　the　benefit　of　the　debtor。

It　was；　however；　no　peculiarity　of　either　the　action　or　contract　of　debt　which　led　to　this　view；　but　the　imperfectly　developed　theory　of　consideration　prevailing　between　the　reigns　of　Henry　VI。　and　Elizabeth。　The　theory　the　same　in　assumpsit；　/4/　and　in　equity。　/5/　Wherever　consideration　was　mentioned；　it　was　always　as　quid　pro　quo；　as　what　the　contractor　was　to　have　for　his　contract。

Moreover；　before　consideration　was　ever　heard　of；　debt　was　the　time…honored　remedy　on　every　obligation　to　pay　money　enforced　by　law；　except　the　liability　to　damages　for　a　wrong。　/6/　It　has　been　shown　already　that　a　surety　could　be　sued　in　debt　until　the　time　of　Edward　III。　without　a　writing；　yet　a　surety　receives　no　benefit　from　the　dealing　with　his　principal。　For　instance；　if　a　man　sells　corn　to　A；　＇270＇　and　B　says；　〃I　will　pay　if　A　does　not；〃　the　sale　does　B　no　good　so　far　as　appears　by　the　terms　of　the　bargain。　For　this　reason；　debt　cannot　now　be　maintained　against　a　surety　in　such　a　case。

It　was　not　always　so。　It　is　not　so　to　this　day　if　there　is　an　obligation　under　seal。　In　that　case；　it　does　not　matter　how　the　obligation　arose；　or　whether　there　was　any　consideration　for　it　or　not。　But　a　writing　was　a　more　general　way　of　establishing　a　debt　in　Glanvill's　time　than　witness；　and　it　is　absurd　to　determine　the　scope　of　the　action　by　considering　only　a　single　class　of　debts　enforced　by　it。　Moreover；　a　writing　for　a　long　time　was　only　another；　although　more　conclusive；　mode　of　proof。　The　foundation　of　the　action　was　the　same；　however　it　was　proved。　This　was　a　duty　or　〃duity〃　/1/　to　the　plaintiff；　in　other　words；　that　money　was　due　him；　no　matter　how；　as　any　one　may　see　by　reading　the　earlier　Year　Books。　Hence　it　was；　that　debt　lay　equally　upon　a　judgment；　/2/　which　established　such　a　duty　by　matter　of　record；　or　upon　the　defendant's　admission　recorded　in　like　manner。　/3/

To　sum　up；　the　action　of　debt　has　passed　through　three　stages。　At　first；　it　was　the　only　remedy　to　recover　money　due；　except　when　the　liability　was　simply　to　pay　damages　for　a　wrongful　act。　It　was　closely　akin　toindeed　it　was　but　a　branch　ofthe　action　for　any　form　of　personal　property　which　the　defendant　was　bound　by　contract　or　otherwise　to　hand　over　to　the　plaintiff。　/4/　If　there　was　a　contract　to　pay　money；　the　only　question　was　how　you　＇271＇　could　prove　it。　Any　such　contract；　which　could　be　proved　by　any　of　the　means　known　to　early　law；　constituted　a　debt。　There　was　no　theory　of　consideration；　and　therefore；　of　course；　no　limit　to　either　the　action　or　the　contract　based　upon　the　nature　of　the　consideration　received。

The　second　stage　was　when　the　doctrine　of　consideration　was　introduced　in　its　earlier　form　of　a　benefit　to　the　promisor。　This　applied　to　all　contracts　not　under　seal　while　it　prevailed；　but　it　was　established　while　debt　was　the　only　action　for　money　payable　by　such　contracts。　The　precedents　are；　for　the　most　part；　precedents　in　debt。

The　third　stage　was　reached　when　a　larger　view　was　taken　of　consideration；　and　it　was　expressed　in　terms　of　detriment　to　the　promisee。　This　change　was　a　change　in　substantive　law；　and　logically　it　should　have　been　applied　throughout。　But　it　arose　in　another　and　later　form　of　action；　under　circumstances　peculiarly　connected　with　that　action；　as　will　be　explained　hereafter。　The　result　was　that　the　new　doctrine　prevailed　in　the　new　action；　and　the　old　in　the　old；　and　that　what　was　really　the　anomaly　of　inconsistent　theories　carried　out　side　by　side　disguised　itself　in　the　form　of　a　limitation　upon　the　action　of　debt。　That　action　did　not　remain；　as　formerly；　the　remedy　for　all　binding　contracts　to　pay　money；　but；　so　far　as　parol　contracts　were　concerned；　could　only　be　used　where　the　consideration　was　a　benefit　actually　received　by　the　promisor。　With　regard　to　obligations　arising　in　any　other　way；　it　has　remained　unchanged。

I　must　now　devote　a　few　words　to　the　effect　upon　our　law　of　the　other　mode　of　proof　which　I　have　mentioned。　I　mean　charters。　A　charter　was　simply　a　writing。　As　few　could　write；　most　people　had　to　authenticate　a　document　＇272＇　in　some　other　way；　for　instance；　by　making　their　mark。　This　was；　in　fact；　the　universal　practice　in　England　until　the　introduction　of　Norman　customs。　/1/　With　them　seals　came　in。　But　as　late　as　Henry　II。　they　were　said　by　the　Chief　Justice　of　England　to　belong　properly　only　to　kings　and　to　very　great　men。　/2/　I　know　no　ground　for　thinking　that　an　authentic　charter　had　any　less　effect　at　that　time　when　not　under　seal　than　when　it　was　sealed。　/3/　It　was　only　evidence　either　way；　and　is　called　so　in　many　of　the　early　cases。　/4/　It　could　be　waived；　and　suit　tendered　in　its　place。　/5/　Its　conclusive　effect　was　due　to　the　satisfactory　nature　of　the　evidence；　not　to　the　seal。　/6/

But　when　seals　came　into　use　they　obviously　made　the　evidence　of　the　charter　better；　in　so　far　as　the　seal　was　more　difficult　to　forge　than　a　stroke　of　the　pen。　Seals　acquired　such　importance；　that；　for　a　time；　a　man　was　bound　by　his　seal；　although　it　was　affixed　without　his　consent。　/7/　At　last　a　seal　came　to　be　required；　in　order　that　a　charter　should　have　its　ancient　effect。　/8/

A　covenant　or　contract　under　seal　was　no　longer　a　promise　well　proved；　it　was　a　promise　of　a　distinct　nature；　for　which　a　distinct　form　of　action　came　to　be　provided。　＇273＇　/1/　I　have　shown　how　the　requirement　of　consideration　became　a　rule　of　substantive　law；　and　also　why　it　never　had　any　foothold　in　the　domain　of　covenants。　The　exception　of　covenants　from　the　requirement　became　a　rule　of　substantive　law　also。　The　man　who　had　set　his　hand　to　a　charter；　from　being　bound　because　he　had　consented　to　be；　and　because　there　was　a　writing　to　prove　it；　/2/　was　now　held　by　force　of　the　seal　and　by　deed　alone　as　distinguished　from　all　other　writings。　And　to　maintain　the　integrity　of　an　inadequate　theory；　a　seal　was　said　to　a　consideration。

Nowadays；　it　is　sometimes　thought　more　philosophical　to　say　that　a　covenant　is　a　formal　contract；　which　survives　alongside　of　the　ordinary　consensual　contract；　just　as　happened　in　the　Roman　law。　But　this　is　not　a　very　instructive　way　of　putting　it　either。　In　one　sense；　everything　is　form　which　the　law　requires　in　order　to　make　a　promise　binding　over　and　above　the　mere　expression　of　the　promisor's　will。　Consideration　is　a　form　as　much　as　a　seal。　The　only　difference　is；　that　one　form　is　of　modern　introduction；　and　has　a　foundation　in　good　sense；　or　at　least　in　with　our　common　habits　of　thought；　so　that　we　do　not　notice　it；　whereas　the　other　is　a　survival　from　an　older　condition　of　the　law；　and　is　less　manifestly　sensible；　or　less　familiar。　I　may　add；　that；　under　the　influence　of　the　latter　consideration；　the　law　of　covenants　is　breaking　down。　In　many　States　it　is　held　that　a　mere　scroll　or　flourish　of　the　pen　is　a　sufficient　seal。　From　this　it　is　a　short　step　to　abolish　the　distinction　between　sealed　and　unsealed　instruments　altogether；　and　this　has　been　done　in　some