the common law-第45节

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　discover　its　origin。

The　cases　in　which　this　mode　of　trial　was　used　appear　from　the　early　books　and　reports　to　have　been　almost　wholly　confined　to　claims　arising　out　of　a　sale　or　loan。　And　the　question　at　once　occurs；　whether　we　are　not　upon　traces　of　an　institution　which　was　already　ancient　when　Glanvill　wrote。　For　centuries　before　the　Conquest　Anglo…Saxon　law　/1/　had　required　the　election　of　a　certain　＇256＇　number　of　official　witnesses；　two　or　three　of　whom　were　to　be　called　in　to　every　bargain　of　sale。　The　object　for　which　these　witnesses　were　established　is　not　commonly　supposed　to　have　been　the　proof　of　debts。　They　go　back　to　a　time　when　theft　and　similar　offences　were　the　chief　ground　of　litigation；　and　the　purpose　for　which　they　were　appointed　was　to　afford　a　means　of　deciding　whether　a　person　charged　with　having　stolen　property　had　come　by　it　rightfully　or　not。　A　defendant　could　clear　himself　of　the　felony　by　their　oath　that　he　had　bought　or　received　the　thing　openly　in　the　way　appointed　by　law。

Having　been　present　at　the　bargain；　the　witnesses　were　able　to　swear　to　what　they　had　seen　and　heard；　if　any　question　arose　between　the　parties。　Accordingly；　their　use　was　not　confined　to　disposing　of　a　charge　of　felony。　But　that　particular　service　identifies　the　transaction　witnesses　of　the　Saxon　period。　Now　we　know　that　the　use　of　these　witnesses　did　not　at　once　disappear　under　Norman　influence。　They　are　found　with　their　old　function　in　the　laws　of　William　the　Conqueror。　/1/　The　language　of　Glanvill　seems　to　prove　that　they　were　still　known　under　Henry　II。　He　says　that；　if　a　purchaser　cannot　summon　in　the　man　from　whom　he　bought；　to　warrant　the　property　to　him　and　defend　the　suit；　（for　if　he　does；　the　peril　is　shifted　to　the　seller；）　then　if　the　purchaser　has　sufficient　proof　of　his　having　lawfully　bought　the　thing；　de　legittimo　marcatu　suo；　it　will　clear　him　of　felony。　But　if　he　have　not　sufficient　suit；　he　will　be　in　danger。　/2/　This　is　the　law　of　William　over　again。　It　follows　that　purchasers　still　used　the　transaction　witnesses。

But　Glanvill　also　seems　to　admit　the　use　of　witness　to　establish　debts。　/1/　As　the　transaction　witnesses　were　formerly　available　for　this　purpose；　I　see　no　reason　to　doubt　that　they　still　were；　and　that　he　is　speaking　of　them　here　also。　/2/　Moreover；　for　a　long　time　after　Henry　II。；　whenever　an　action　was　brought　for　a　debt　of　which　there　was　no　written　evidence；　the　plaintiff；　when　asked　what　he　had　to　show　for　it；　always　answered　〃good　suit；〃　and　tendered　his　witnesses；　who　were　sometimes　examined　by　the　court。　/3/　I　think　it　is　not　straining　the　evidence　to　infer　that　the　〃good　suit〃　of　the　later　reports　was　the　descendant　of　the　Saxon　transaction　witnesses；　as　it　has　been　shown　that　Glanvill's　secta　was。　/4/

Assuming　this　step　in　the　argument　to　have　been　taken；　it　will　be　well　to　recall　again　for　a　moment　the　original　nature　of　the　witness　oath。　It　was　confined　to　facts　within　the　witnesses'　knowledge　by　sight　and　hearing。　But　as　the　purposes　for　which　witnesses　were　provided　only　required　their　presence　when　property　changed　hands；　the　principal　case　in　which　they　could　be　of　service　between　the　parties　＇258＇　to　a　bargain　was　when　a　debt　was　claimed　by　reason　of　the　delivery　of　property。　The　purpose　did　not　extend　to　agreements　which　were　executory　on　both　sides；　because　there　no　question　of　theft　could　arise。　And　Glanvill　shows　that　in　his　time　the　King's　Court　did　not　enforce　such　agreements。　/1/　Now；　if　the　oath　of　the　secta　could　only　be　used　to　establish　a　debt　where　the　transaction　witnesses　could　have　sworn；　it　will　be　seen；　readily　enough；　how　an　accident　of　procedure　may　have　led　to　a　most　important　rule　of　substantive　law。

The　rule　that　witnesses　could　only　swear　to　facts　within　their　knowledge；　coupled　with　the　accident　that　these　witnesses　were　not　used　in　transactions　which　might　create　a　debt；　except　for　a　particular　fact；　namely；　the　delivery　of　property；　together　with　the　further　accident　that　this　delivery　was　quid　pro　quo；　was　equivalent　to　the　rule　that；　when　a　debt　was　proved　by　witnesses　there　must　be　quid　pro　quo。　But　these　debts　proved　by　witnesses；　instead　of　by　deed　are　what　we　call　simple　contract　debts；　and　thus　beginning　with　debt；　and　subsequently　extending　itself　to　other　contracts；　is　established　our　peculiar　and　most　important　doctrine　that　every　simple　contract　must　have　a　consideration。　This　was　never　the　law　as　to　debts　or　contracts　proved　in　the　usual　way　by　the　defendant's　seal；　and　the　fact　that　it　applied　only　to　obligations　which　were　formerly　established　by　a　procedure　of　limited　use；　＇259＇　goes　far　to　show　that　the　connection　with　procedure　was　not　accidental。

The　mode　of　proof　soon　changed；　but　as　late　as　the　reign　of　Queen　Elizabeth　we　find　a　trace　of　this　original　connection。　It　is　said；　〃But　the　common　law　requires　that　there　should　be　a　new　cause　（i。　e。　consideration）；　whereof　the　country　may　have　intelligence　or　knowledge　for　the　trial　of　it；　if　need　be；　so　that　it　is　necessary　for　the　Public…weal。〃　/1/　Lord　Mansfield　showed　his　intuition　of　the　historical　grounds　of　our　law　when　he　said；　〃I　take　it　that　the　ancient　notion　about　the　want　of　consideration　was　for　the　sake　of　evidence　only；　for　when　it　is　reduced　into　writing；　as　in　covenants；　specialties；　bonds；　etc。；　there　was　no　objection　to　the　want　of　consideration。〃　/2/

If　it　should　be　objected　that　the　preceding　argument　is　necessarily　confined　to　debt；　whereas　the　requirement　of　consideration　applies　equally　to　all　simple　contracts；　the　answer　is；　that　in　all　probability　the　rule　originated　with　debt；　and　spread　from　debt　to　other　contracts。

But；　again；　it　may　be　asked　whether　there　were　no　other　contracts　proved　by　witness　except　those　which　have　been　mentioned。　Were　there　no　contracts　proved　in　that　way　to　which　the　accidental　consideration　was　wanting？　To　this　also　there　is　an　easy　answer。　The　contracts　enforced　by　the　civil　courts；　even　as　late　as　Henry　II。；　were　few　and　simple。　The　witness　procedure　was　no　doubt　broad　enough　for　all　the　contracts　which　were　made　in　early　times。　Besides　those　of　sale；　loan；　and　the　like；　which　have　been　mentioned；　I　find　but　two　contractual　＇260＇　obligations。　These　were　the　warranties　accompanying　a　sale　and　suretyship　which　was　referred　to　at　the　beginning　of　the　Lecture。　Of　the　former；　warranty　of　title　was　rather　regarded　as　an　obligation　raised　by　the　law　out　of　the　relation　of　buyer　and　seller　than　as　a　contract。　Other　express　warranties　were　matters　within　the　knowledge　of　the　transaction　witnesses；　and　were　sworn　to　by　them　in　Saxon　times。　/1/

But　in　the　Norman　period　warranty　is　very　little　heard　of；　except　with　regard　to　land；　and　then　it　was　decided　by　the　duel。　It　so　wholly　disappeared；　except　where　it　was　embodied　in　a　deed；　that　it　can　have　had　no　influence　upon　the　law　of　consideration。　I　shall　therefore　assume；　without　more　detail；　that　it　does　not　bear　upon　the　case。

Then　as　to　the　pledge　or　surety。　He　no　longer　paid　with　his　body；　unless　in　very　exceptional　cases；　but　his　liability　was　translated　into　money；　and　enforced　in　an　action　of　debt。　This　time…honored　contract；　like　the　other　debts　of　Glanvill's　time；　could　be　established　by　witness　without　a　writing；　/2/　and　in　this　case　there　was　not　such　a　consideration；　such　a　benefit　to　the　promisor；　as　the　law　required　when　the　doctrine　was　first　enunciated。　But　this　also　is　unimportant；　because　his　liability　on　the　oath　of　witness　came　to　an　end；　as　well　as　that　of　the　warrantor；　before　the　foundations　were　laid　for　the　rule　which　I　am　seeking　to　explain。　A　writing　soon　came　to　be　required；　as　will　be　seen　in　a　moment。

The　result　so　far　is；　that　the　only　action　of　contract　in　Glanvill's　time　was　debt；　that　the　only　debts　recovered　＇261＇　without　writing　were　those　which　have　been　described；　and　that　the　only　one　of　these　for　which　there　was　not　quid　pro　quo　ceased　to　be　recoverable　in　that　way　by　the　reign　of　Edward　III。

But　great　changes　were　beginning　in　the　reign　of　Henry　II。　More　various　and　complex　contracts　soon　came　to　be　enforced。　It　may　be　asked；　Why　was　not　the　scope　of　the　witness　oath　enlarged；　or；　if　any　better　proof　were　forthcoming；　why　was　not　the　secta　done　away　with；　and　other　oral　testimony　admitted？　In　any　event；　what　can　the　law　of　Henry　II。's　time　have　to　do　with　consideration；　which　not　heard　of　until　centuries　later？

It　is　manifest　that　a　witness　oath；　which　disposes　of　a　case　by　the　simple　fact　that　it　is　sworn；　is　not　a　satisfactory　mode　of　proof。　A　written　admission　of　debt　produced　in　court；　and　sufficiently　identified　as　issuing　from　the　defendant；　is　obviously　much　better。　The　only　weak　point　about　a　writing　is　the　means　of　identifying　it　as　the　defendant's；　and　this　difficulty　disappeared　as　soon　as　the　use　of　seals　became　common。　This　had　more　or　less　taken　place　in　Glanvill's　time；　and　then　all　that　a　party　had　to　do　was　to　produce　the　writing　and　satisfy　the　court　by　inspection　that　the　impression　on　the　wax　fitted　his　opponent's　seal。　/1/　The　oath　of　the　secta　could　always　be　successfully　met　by　wager　of　law；　/2/　that　is；　by　a　counter　oath　the　part　of　the　defendant；　with　the　same　or　double　the　number　of　fellow…swearers　produ