the common law-第44节

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　bound　〃body　for　body；〃　/3/　and　modern　law…books　find　it　necessary　to　state　that　this　does　not　make　them　liable　to　the　punishment　of　the　principal　offender　if　he　does　not　appear；　but　only　to　a　fine。　/4/　The　contract　also　differed　from　our　modern　ideas　in　the　mode　of　execution。　It　was　simply　a　solemn　admission　of　liability　in　the　presence　of　the　officer　authorized　to　take　it。　The　signature　of　the　bail　was　not　necessary；　/5/　and　it　was　not　requisite　that　the　person　bailed　should　bind　himself　as　a　party。　/6/

But　these　peculiarities　have　been　modified　or　done　away　with　by　statute；　and　I　have　dwelt　upon　the　case；　not　so　much　as　a　special　form　of　contract　differing　from　all　others　as　because　the　history　of　its　origin　shows　one　of　the　first　appearances　of　contract　in　our　law。　It　is　to　be　traced　to　the　gradual　increase　of　faith　in　the　honor　of　a　hostage　if　the　case　calling　for　his　surrender　should　arrive；　and　to　the　consequent　relaxation　of　actual　imprisonment。　An　illustration　may　be　found　in　the　parallel　mode　of　dealing　with　the　prisoner　himself。　His　bail；　to　whom　his　body　is　supposed　to　be　delivered；　have　a　right　to　seize　him　at　any　time　and　anywhere；　but　he　is　allowed　to　go　at　large　until　＇251＇　surrendered。　It　will　be　noticed　that　this　form　of　contract；　like　debt　as　dealt　with　by　the　Roman　law　of　the　Twelve　Tables；　and　for　the　same　motive；　although　by　a　different　process；　looked　to　the　body　of　the　contracting　party　as　the　satisfaction。

Debt　is　another　and　more　popular　candidate　for　the　honors　of　priority。　Since　the　time　of　Savigny；　the　first　appearance　of　contract　both　in　Roman　and　German　law　has　often　been　attributed　to　the　case　of　a　sale　by　some　accident　remaining　incomplete。　The　question　does　not　seem　to　be　of　great　philosophical　significance。　For　to　explain　how　mankind　first　learned　to　promise；　we　must　go　to　metaphysics；　and　find　out　how　it　ever　came　to　frame　a　future　tense。　The　nature　of　the　particular　promise　which　was　first　enforced　in　a　given　system　can　hardly　lead　to　any　truth　of　general　importance。　But　the　history　of　the　action　of　debt　is　instructive；　although　in　a　humbler　way。　It　is　necessary　to　know　something　about　it　in　order　to　understand　the　enlightened　rules　which　make　up　the　law　of　contract　at　the　present　time。

In　Glanvill's　treatise　the　action　of　debt　is　found　already　to　be　one　of　the　well…known　remedies。　But　the　law　of　those　days　was　still　in　a　somewhat　primitive　state；　and　it　will　easily　be　imagined　that　a　form　of　action　which　goes　back　as　far　as　that　was　not　founded　on　any　very　delicate　discriminations。　It　was；　as　I　shall　try　to　show　directly；　simply　the　general　form　in　which　any　money　claim　was　collected；　except　unliquidated　claims　for　damages　by　force；　for　which　there　was　established　the　equally　general　remedy　of　trespass。

It　has　been　thought　that　the　action　was　adopted　from　the　then　more　civilized　procedure　of　the　Roman　law。　A　＇252＇　natural　opinion；　seeing　that　all　the　early　English　law…writers　adopt　their　phraseology　and　classification　from　Rome。　Still　it　seems　much　more　probable　that　the　action　is　of　pure　German　descent。　It　has　the　features　of　the　primitive　procedure　which　is　found　upon　the　Continent；　as　described　by　Laband。　/1/

The　substance　of　the　plaintiff's　claim　as　set　forth　in　the　writ　of　debt　is　that　the　defendant　owes　him　so　much　and　wrongfully　withholds　it。　It　does　not　matter；　for　a　claim　framed　like　that；　how　the　defendant's　duty　arises。　It　is　not　confined　to　contract。　It　is　satisfied　if　there　is　a　duty　to　pay　on　any　ground。　It　states　a　mere　conclusion　of　law；　not　the　facts　upon　which　that　conclusion　is　based；　and　from　which　the　liability　arises。　The　old　German　complaint　was；　in　like　manner；　〃A　owes　me　so　much。〃

It　was　characteristic　of　the　German　procedure　that　the　defendant　could　meet　that　complaint　by　answering；　in　an　equally　general　form；　that　he　did　not　owe　the　plaintiff。　The　plaintiff　had　to　do　more　than　simply　allege　a　debt；　if　he　would　prevent　the　defendant　from　escaping　in　that　way。　In　England；　if　the　plaintiff　had　not　something　to　show　for　his　debt；　the　defendant's　denial　turned　him　out　of　court；　and　even　if　he　had；　he　was　liable　to　be　defeated　by　the　defendant's　swearing　with　some　of　his　friends　to　back　him　that　he　owed　nothing。　The　chief　reason　why　debt　was　supplanted　for　centuries　by　a　later　remedy；　assumpsit；　was　the　survival　of　this　relic　of　early　days。

Finally；　in　England　as　in　Germany；　debt　for　the　detention　of　money　was　the　twin　brother　of　the　action　brought　for　wrongfully　withholding　any　other　kind　of　chattel。　The　gist　of　the　complaint　in　either　case　was　the　same。

It　seems　strange　that　this　crude　product　of　the　infancy　of　law　should　have　any　importance　for　us　at　the　present　time。　Yet　whenever　we　trace　a　leading　doctrine　of　substantive　law　far　enough　back；　we　are　very　likely　to　find　some　forgotten　circumstance　of　procedure　at　its　source。　Illustrations　of　this　truth　have　been　given　already。　The　action　of　debt　and　the　other　actions　of　contract　will　furnish　others。　Debt　throws　most　light　upon　the　doctrine　of　consideration。

Our　law　does　not　enforce　every　promise　which　a　man　may　make。　Promises　made　as　ninety…nine　promises　out　of　a　hundred　are；　by　word　of　mouth　or　simple　writing；　are　not　binding　unless　there　is　a　consideration　for　them。　That　is；　as　it　is　commonly　explained；　unless　the　promisee　has　either　conferred　a　benefit　on　the　promisor；　or　incurred　a　detriment；　as　the　inducement　to　the　promise。

It　has　been　thought　that　this　rule　was　borrowed　from　Roman　law　by　the　Chancery；　and；　after　undergoing　some　modification　there；　passed　into　the　common　law。

But　this　account　of　the　matter　is　at　least　questionable。　So　far　as　the　use　of　words　goes；　I　am　not　aware　that　consideration　is　distinctly　called　cause　before　the　reign　of　Elizabeth；　in　the　earlier　reports　it　always　appears　as　quid　pro　quo。　Its　first　appearance；　so　far　as　I　know；　is　in　Fleta's　account　of　the　action　of　debt；　/1/　and　although　I　am　inclined　to　believe　that　Fleta's　statement　is　not　to　be　trusted；　a　careful　consideration　of　the　chronological　order　of　the　cases　in　the　Year　Books　will　show；　I　think；　that　the　doctrine　was　fully　developed　in　debt　before　any　mention　of　it　in　equity　can　be　found。　One　of　the　earliest　＇254＇　references　to　what　a　promisor　was　to　have　for　his　undertaking　was　in　the　action　of　assumpsit。　/1/　But　the　doctrine　certainly　did　not　originate　there。　The　first　mention　of　consideration　in　connection　with　equity　which　I　have　seen　is　in　the　form　of　quid　pro　quo；　/2/　and　occurs　after　the　requirement　had　been　thoroughly　established　in　debt。　/3/

The　single　fact　that　a　consideration　was　never　required　for　contracts　under　seal；　unless　Fleta　is　to　be　trusted　against　the　great　weight　of　nearly　contemporaneous　evidence；　goes　far　to　show　that　the　rule　cannot　have　originated　on　grounds　of　policy　as　a　rule　of　substantive　law。　And　conversely；　the　coincidence　of　the　doctrine　with　a　peculiar　mode　of　procedure　points　very　strongly　to　the　probability　that　the　peculiar　requirement　and　the　peculiar　procedure　were　connected。　It　will　throw　light　on　the　question　to　put　together　a　few　undisputed　facts；　and　to　consider　what　consequences　naturally　followed。　It　will　therefore　be　desirable　to　examine　the　action　of　debt　a　little　further。　But　it　is　only　fair　to　admit；　at　the　outset；　that　I　offer　the　explanation　which　follows　with　great　hesitation；　and；　I　think；　with　a　full　appreciation　of　the　objections　which　might　be　urged。

It　was　observed　a　moment　ago；　that；　in　order　to　recover　against　a　defendant　who　denied　his　debt；　the　plaintiff　had　to　show　something　for　it；　otherwise　he　was　turned　over　to　the　limited　jurisdiction　of　the　spiritual　tribunals。　/4/　This　requirement　did　not　mean　evidence　in　the　modern　sense。　It　meant　simply　that　he　must　maintain　his　cause　in　one　of　the　ways　then　recognized　by　law。　These　were　three；　the　＇255＇　duel；　a　writing；　and　witnesses。　The　duel　need　not　be　discussed；　as　it　soon　ceased　to　be　used　in　debt；　and　has　no　bearing　on　what　I　have　to　say。　Trial　by　writing　and　by　witnesses；　on　the　other　hand；　must　both　be　carefully　studied。　It　will　be　convenient　to　consider　the　latter　first　and　to　find　out　what　these　witnesses　were。

One　thing　we　know　at　the　start；　they　were　not　witnesses　as　we　understand　the　term。　They　were　not　produced　before　a　jury　for　examination　and　cross…　examination；　nor　did　their　testimony　depend　for　its　effect　on　being　believed　by　the　court　that　heard　it。　Nowadays；　a　case　is　not　decided　by　the　evidence；　but　by　a　verdict；　or　a　finding　of　facts；　followed　by　a　judgment。　The　oath　of　a　witness　has　no　effect　unless　it　is　believed。　But　in　the　time　of　Henry　II。　our　trial　by　jury　did　not　exist。　When　an　oath　was　allowed　to　be　sworn　it　had　the　same　effect；　whether　it　was　believed　or　not。　There　was　no　provision　for　sifting　it　by　a　second　body。　In　those　cases　where　a　trial　by　witnesses　was　possible；　if　the　party　called　on　to　go　forward　could　find　a　certain　number　of　men　who　were　willing　to　swear　in　a　certain　form；　there　was　an　end　of　the　matter。

Now　this　seems　like　a　more　primitive　way　of　establishing　a　debt　than　the　production　of　the　defendant's　written　acknowledgement；　and　it　is　material　to　discover　its　origin。

The　cases　in　which　this　mode　of　trial　was　used　appear　from　the　early　books