the common law-第42节

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o　intends　forthwith　to　enter　and　take　it。　The　finder's　power　to　reproduce　his　former　physical　relation　to　the　gold　is　rather　limited；　yet　I　believe　that　no　one　would　say　that　his　possession　was　at　an　end　until　the　burglar；　by　an　overt　＇238＇　act；　had　manifested　his　power　and　intent　to　exclude　others　from　the　purse。　The　reason　for　this　is　the　same　which　has　been　put　with　regard　to　the　power　to　exclude　at　the　moment　of　gaining　possession。　The　law　deals；　for　the　most　part；　with　overt　acts　and　facts　which　can　be　known　by　the　senses。　So　long　as　the　burglar　has　not　taken　the　purse；　he　has　not　manifested　his　intent；　and　until　he　breaks　through　the　barrier　which　measures　the　present　possessor's　power　of　excluding　him；　he　has　not　manifested　his　power。　It　may　be　observed　further；　that；　according　to　the　tests　adopted　in　this　Lecture；　the　owner　of　the　house　has　a　present　possession　in　the　strictest　sense；　because；　although　he　has　not　the　power　which　Savigny　says　is　necessary；　he　has　the　present　intent　and　power　to　exclude　others。

It　is　conceivable　that　the　common　law　should　go　so　far　as　to　deal　with　possession　in　the　same　way　as　a　title；　and　should　hold　that；　when　it　has　once　been　acquired；　rights　are　acquired　which　continue　to　prevail　against　all　the　world　but　one；　until　something　has　happened　sufficient　to　divest　ownership。

The　possession　of　rights；　as　it　is　called；　has　been　a　fighting…ground　for　centuries　on　the　Continent。　It　is　not　uncommon　for　German　writers　to　go　so　far　as　to　maintain　that　there　may　be　a　true　possession　of　obligations；　this　seeming　to　accord　with　a　general　view　that　possession　and　right　are　in　theory　coextensive　terms；　that　the　mastery　of　the　will　over　an　external　object　in　general　（be　that　object　a　thing　or　another　will）；　when　in　accord　with　the　general　will；　and　consequently　lawful；　is　called　right；　when　merely　de　facto　is　possession。　/1/　Bearing　in　mind　what　was　＇239＇　said　on　the　question　whether　possession　was　a　fact　or　right；　it　will　be　seen　that　such　an　antithesis　between　possession　and　right　cannot　be　admitted　as　a　legal　distinction。　The　facts　constituting　possession　generate　rights　as　truly　as　do　the　facts　which　constitute　ownership；　although　the　rights　a　mere　possessor　are　less　extensive　than　those　of　an　owner。

Conversely；　rights　spring　from　certain　facts　supposed　to　be　true　of　the　person　entitled　to　such　rights。　Where　these　facts　are　of　such　a　nature　that　they　can　be　made　successively　true　of　different　persons；　as　in　the　case　of　the　occupation　of　land；　the　corresponding　rights　may　be　successively　enjoyed。　But　when　the　facts　are　past　and　gone；　such　as　the　giving　of　a　consideration　and　the　receiving　of　a　promise；　there　can　be　no　claim　to　the　resulting　rights　set　up　by　any　one　except　the　party　of　whom　the　facts　were　originally　truein　the　case　supposed；　the　original　contractee；because　no　one　but　the　original　contractee　can　fill　the　situation　from　which　they　spring。

It　will　probably　be　granted　by　English　readers；　that　one　of　the　essential　constituent　facts　consists　in　a　certain　relation　to　a　material　object。　But　this　object　may　be　a　slave；　as　well　as　a　horse；　/1/　and　conceptions　originated　in　this　way　may　be　extended　by　a　survival　to　free　services。　It　is　noticeable　that　even　Bruns；　in　the　application　of　his　theory；　does　not　seem　to　go　beyond　cases　of　status　and　those　where；　in　common　language；　land　is　bound　for　the　services　in　question；　as　it　is　for　rent。　Free　services　being　＇240＇　so　far　treated　like　servile；　even　by　our　law；　that　the　master　has　a　right　of　property　in　them　against　all　the　world；　it　is　only　a　question　of　degree　where　the　line　shall　be　drawn。　It　would　be　possible　to　hold　that；　as　one　might　be　in　possession　of　a　slave　without　title；　so　one　might　have　all　the　rights　of　an　owner　in　free　services　rendered　without　contract。　Perhaps　there　is　something　of　that　sort　to　be　seen　when　a　parent　recovers　for　the　seduction　of　a　daughter　over　twenty…one；　although　there　is　no　actual　contract　of　service。　/1/　So；　throughout　the　whole　course　of　the　canon　law　and　in　the　early　law　of　England；　rents　were　regarded　as　so　far　a　part　of　the　realty　as　to　be　capable　of　possession　and　disseisin；　and　they　could　be　recovered　like　land　by　all　assize。　/2/

But　the　most　important　case　of　the　so…called　possession　of　rights　in　our　law；　as　in　the　Roman；　occurs　with　regard　to　easements。　An　easement　is　capable　of　possession　in　a　certain　sense。　A　man　may　use　land　in　a　certain　way；　with　the　intent　to　exclude　all　others　from　using　it　in　any　way　inconsistent　with　his　own　use；　but　no　further。　If　this　be　true　possession；　however；　it　is　a　limited　possession　of　land；　not　of　a　right；　as　others　have　shown。　But　where　an　easement　has　been　actually　created；　whether　by　deed　or　prescription；　although　it　is　undoubtedly　true　that　any　possessor　of　the　dominant　estate　would　be　protected　in　its　enjoyment；　it　has　not　been　so　protected　in　the　past　on　the　ground　that　the　easement　was　in　itself　an　object　of　possession；　but　by　the　survival　of　precedents　explained　in　a　later　＇241＇　Lecture。　Hence；　to　test　the　existence　of　a　mere　possession　of　this　sort　which　the　law　will　protect；　we　will　take　the　case　of　a　way　used　de　facto　for　four　years；　but　in　which　no　easement　has　yet　been　acquired；　and　ask　whether　the　possessor　of　the　quasi　dominant　tenement　would　be　protected　in　his　use　as　against　third　persons。　It　is　conceivable　that　he　should　be；　but　I　believe　that　he　would　not。　/2/

The　chief　objection　to　the　doctrine　seems　to　be；　that　there　is　almost　a　contradiction　between　the　assertions　that　one　man　has　a　general　power　and　intent　to　exclude　the　world　from　dealing　with　the　land；　and　that　another　has　the　power　to　use　it　in　a　particular　way；　and　to　exclude　the　from　interfering　with　that。　The　reconciliation　of　the　two　needs　somewhat　artificial　reasoning。　However；　it　should　be　borne　in　mind　that　the　question　in　every　case　is　not　what　was　the　actual　power　of　the　parties　concerned；　but　what　was　their　manifested　power。　If　the　latter　stood　thus　balanced；　the　law　might　recognize　a　kind　of　split　possession。　But　if　it　does　not　recognize　it　until　a　right　is　acquired；　then　the　protection　of　a　disseisor　in　the　use　of　an　easement　must　still　be　explained　by　a　reference　to　the　facts　mentioned　in　the　Lecture　referred　to。

The　consequences　attached　to　possession　are　substantially　those　attached　to　ownership；　subject　to　the　question　the　continuance　of　possessory　rights　which　I　have　touched　upon　above。　Even　a　wrongful　possessor　of　a　＇242＇　chattel　may　have　full　damages　for　its　conversion　by　a　stranger　to　the　title；　or　a　return　of　the　specific　thing。　/1/

It　has　been　supposed；　to　be　sure；　that　a　〃special　property〃　was　necessary　in　order　to　maintain　replevin　/2/　or　trover。　/3/　But　modern　cases　establish　that　possession　is　sufficient；　and　an　examination　of　the　sources　of　our　law　proves　that　special　property　did　not　mean　anything　more。　It　has　been　shown　that　the　procedure　for　the　recovery　of　chattels　lost　against　one's　will；　described　by　Bracton；　like　its　predecessor　on　the　Continent；　was　based　upon　possession。　Yet　Bracton；　in　the　very　passage　in　which　he　expressly　makes　that　statement；　uses　a　phrase　which；　but　for　the　explanation；　would　seem　to　import　ownership；〃Poterit　rem　suam　petere。〃　/4/　The　writs　of　later　days　used　the　same　language；　and　when　it　was　objected；　as　it　frequently　was；　to　a　suit　by　a　bailee　for　a　taking　of　bona　et　catalla　sua；　that　it　should　have　been　for　bona　in　custodia　sua　existentia；　it　was　always　answered　that　those　in　the　Chancery　would　not　frame　a　writ　in　that　form。　/5/

The　substance　of　the　matter　was；　that　goods　in　a　man's　possession　were　his　（sua）；　within　the　meaning　of　the　writ。　But　it　was　very　natural　to　attempt　a　formal　reconciliation　between　that　formal　word　and　the　fact　by　saying　that；　although　the　plaintiff　had　not　the　general　property　in　the　＇243＇　chattels；　yet　he　had　a　property　as　against　strangers；　/1/　or　a　special　property。　This　took　place；　and；　curiously　enough；　two　of　the　earliest　instances　in　which　I　have　found　the　latter　phrase　used　are　cases　of　a　depositary；　/2/　and　a　borrower。　/3/　Brooke　says　that　a　wrongful　taker　〃has　title　against　all　but　the　true　owner。〃　/4/　In　this　sense　the　special　property　was　better　described　as　a　〃possessory　property；〃　as　it　was；　in　deciding　that；　in　an　indictment　for　larceny；　the　property　could　be　laid　in　the　bailee　who　suffered　the　trespass。　/5/

I　have　explained　the　inversion　by　which　a　bailee's　right　of　action　against　third　persons　was　supposed　to　stand　on　his　responsibility　over；　although　in　truth　it　was　the　foundation　of　that　responsibility；　and　arose　simply　from　his　possession。　The　step　was　short；　from　saying　that　bailees　could　sue　because　they　were　answerable　over；　/6/　to　saying　that　they　had　the　property　as　against　strangers；　or　a　special　property；　because　they　were　answerable　over；　/7/　and　that　they　could　sue　because　they　had　a　special　property　and　were　answerable　over。　/8/　And　thus　the　notion　that　special　property　meant　something　more　than　possession；　and　was　a　requisite　to　maintaining　an　action；　got　into　the　law。

The　error　was　made　easier　by　a　different　use　of　the　phrase　in　a　different　connection。　A　bailee　was　in　general　liable　for　goods　stolen　from　his　custody；　whether　he　had　a　lien　or　not。　But　the