the common law-第39节

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t　seems　to　be　implied；　the　object　would　not　truly　be　brought　under　the　personality　of　the　possessor。

The　grounds　for　rejecting　the　criteria　of　the　Roman　law　have　been　shown　above。　Let　us　begin　afresh。　Legal　duties　are　logically　antecedent　to　legal　rights。　What　may　be　their　relation　to　moral　rights　if　there　are　any；　and　whether　moral　rights　are　not　in　like　manner　logically　the　offspring　of　moral　duties；　are　questions　which　do　not　concern　us　here。　These　are　for　the　philosopher；　who　approaches　the　law　from　without　as　part　of　a　larger　series　of　human　manifestations。　The　business　of　the　jurist　is　to　make　known　the　content　of　the　law；　that　is；　to　work　upon　it　from　within；　or　logically；　arranging　and　distributing　it；　in　order；　from　its　stemmum　genus　to　its　infima　species；　so　far　as　practicable。　Legal　duties　then　come　before　legal　＇220＇　rights。　To　put　it　more　broadly；　and　avoid　the　word　duty；　which　is　open　to　objection；　the　direct　working　of　the　law　is　to　limit　freedom　of　action　or　choice　on　the　part　of　a　greater　or　less　number　of　persons　in　certain　specified　ways；　while　the　power　of　removing　or　enforcing　this　limitation　which　is　generally　confided　to　certain　other　private　persons；　or；　in　other　words；　a　right　corresponding　to　the　burden；　is　not　a　necessary　or　universal　correlative。　Again；　a　large　part　of　the　advantages　enjoyed　by　one　who　has　a　right　are　not　created　by　the　law。　The　law　does　not　enable　me　to　use　or　abuse　this　book　which　lies　before　me。　That　is　a　physical　power　which　I　have　without　the　aid　of　the　law。　What　the　law　does　is　simply　to　prevent　other　men　to　a　greater　or　less　extent　from　interfering　with　my　use　or　abuse。　And　this　analysis　and　example　apply　to　the　case　of　possession；　as　well　as　to　ownership。

Such　being　the　direct　working　of　the　law　in　the　case　of　possession；　one　would　think　that　the　animus　or　intent　most　nearly　parallel　to　its　movement　would　be　the　intent　of　which　we　are　in　search。　If　what　the　law　does　is　to　exclude　others　from　interfering　with　the　object；　it　would　seem　that　the　intent　which　the　law　should　require　is　an　intent　to　exclude　others。　I　believe　that　such　an　intent　is　all　that　the　common　law　deems　needful；　and　that　on　principle　no　more　should　be　required。

It　may　be　asked　whether　this　is　not　simply　the　animus　domini　looked　at　from　the　other　side。　If　it　were；　it　would　nevertheless　be　better　to　look　at　the　front　of　the　shield　than　at　the　reverse。　But　it　is　not　the　same　if　we　give　to　the　animus　domini　the　meaning　which　the　Germans　give　it；　and　which　denies　possession　to　bailees　in　general。　The　intent　to　appropriate　or　deal　with　a　thing　as　owner　can　＇221＇　hardly　exist　without　an　intent　to　exclude　others；　and　something　more；　but　the　latter　may　very　well　be　where　there　is　no　intent　to　hold　as　owner。　A　tenant　for　years　intends　to　exclude　all　persons；　including　the　owner；　until　the　end　of　his　term；　yet　he　has　not　the　animus　domini　in　the　sense　explained。　Still　less　has　a　bailee　with　a　lien；　who　does　not　even　mean　to　use；　but　only　to　detain　the　thing　for　payment。　But；　further；　the　common　law　protects　a　bailee　against　strangers；　when　it　would　not　protect　him　against　the　owner；　as　in　the　case　of　a　deposit　or　other　bailment　terminable　at　pleasure；　and　we　may　therefore　say　that　the　intent　even　to　exclude　need　not　be　so　extensive　as　would　be　implied　in　the　animus　domini。　If　a　bailee　intends　to　exclude　strangers　to　the　title；　it　is　enough　for　possession　under　our　law；　although　he　is　perfectly　ready　to　give　the　thing　up　to　its　owner　at　any　moment；　while　it　is　of　the　essence　of　the　German　view　that　the　intent　must　not　be　relative；　but　an　absolute；　self…regarding　intent　to　take　the　benefit　of　the　thing。　Again；　if　the　motives　or　wishes；　and　even　the　intentions；　most　present　to　the　mind　of　a　possessor；　were　all　self…　regarding；　it　would　not　follow　that　the　intent　toward　others　was　not　the　important　thing　in　the　analysis　of　the　law。　But；　as　we　have　seen；　a　depositary　is　a　true　possessor　under　the　common…law　theory；　although　his　intent　is　not　self…regarding；　and　he　holds　solely　for　the　benefit　of　the　owner。

There　is　a　class　of　cases　besides　those　of　bailees　and　tenants；　which　will　probably；　although　not　necessarily；　be　decided　one　way　or　the　other；　as　we　adopt　the　test　of　an　intent　to　exclude；　or　of　the　animus　domini。　Bridges　v。　Hawkesworth　/1/　will　serve　as　a　starting…point。　There；　＇222＇　a　pocket…book　was　dropped　on　the　floor　of　a　shop　by　a　customer；　and　picked　up　by　another　customer　before　the　shopkeeper　knew　of　it。　Common…law　judges　and　civilians　would　agree　that　the　finder　got　possession　first；　and　so　could　keep　it　as　against　the　shopkeeper。　For　the　shopkeeper；　not　knowing　of　the　thing；　could　not　have　the　intent　to　appropriate　it；　and；　having　invited　the　public　to　his　shop；　he　could　not　have　the　intent　to　exclude　them　from　it。　But　suppose　the　pocket…book　had　been　dropped　in　a　private　room；　how　should　the　case　be　decided？　There　can　be　no　animus　domini　unless　the　thing　is　known　of；　but　an　intent　to　exclude　others　from　it　may　be　contained　in　the　larger　intent　to　exclude　others　from　the　place　where　it　is；　without　any　knowledge　of　the　object's　existence。

In　McAvoy　v。　Medina；　/1/　a　pocket…book　had　been　left　upon　a　barber's　table；　and　it　was　held　that　the　barber　had　a　better　right　than　the　finder。　The　opinion　is　rather　obscure。　It　takes　a　distinction　between　things　voluntarily　placed　on　a　table　and　things　dropped　on　the　floor；　and　may　possibly　go　on　the　ground　that；　when　the　owner　leaves　a　thing　in　that　way；　there　is　an　implied　request　to　the　shopkeeper　to　guard　it；　which　will　give　him　a　better　right　than　one　who　actually　finds　it　before　him。　This　is　rather　strained；　however；　and　the　court　perhaps　thought　that　the　barber　had　possession　as　soon　as　the　customer　left　the　shop。　A　little　later；　in　a　suit　for　a　reward　offered　to　the　finder　of　a　pocket…book；　brought　by　one　who　discovered　it　where　the　owner　had　left　it；　on　a　desk　for　the　use　of　customers　in　a　bank　outside　the　teller's　counter；　the　same　court　said　that　this　was　not　the　finding　of　a　lost　article；　and　that　〃the　occupants　of　the　banking　house；　and　not　＇223＇　the　plaintiff；　were　the　proper　depositaries　of　an　article　so　left。〃　/l　/　This　language　might　seem　to　imply　that　the　plaintiff　was　not　the　person　who　got　possession　first　after　the　defendant；　and　that；　although　the　floor　of　a　shop　may　be　likened　to　a　street；　the　public　are　to　be　deemed　excluded　from　the　shop's　desks；　counters；　and　tables　except　for　the　specific　use　permitted。　Perhaps；　however；　the　case　only　decides　that　the　pocket…book　was　not　lost　within　the　condition　of　the　offer。

I　should　not　have　thought　it　safe　to　draw　any　conclusion　from　wreck　cases　in　England；　which　are　mixed　up　with　questions　of　prescription　and　other　rights。　But　the　precise　point　seems　to　have　been　adjudicated　here。　For　it　has　been　held　that；　if　a　stick　of　timber　comes　ashore　on　a　man's　land；　he　thereby　acquires　a　〃right　of　possession〃　as　against　an　actual　finder　who　enters　for　the　purpose　of　removing　it。　/2/　A　right　of　possession　is　said　to　be　enough　for　trespass；　but　the　court　seems　to　have　meant　possession　by　the　phrase；　inasmuch　as　Chief　Justice　Shaw　states　the　question　to　be　which　of　the　parties　had　〃the　preferable　claim；　by　mere　naked　possession；　without　other　title；〃　and　as　there　does　not　seem　to　have　been　any　right　of　possession　in　the　case　unless　there　was　actual　possession。

In　a　criminal　case；　the　property　in　iron　taken　from　the　bottom　of　a　canal　by　a　stranger　was　held　well　laid　in　the　canal　company；　although　it　does　not　appear　that　the　company　knew　of　it；　or　had　any　lien　upon　it。　/3/

＇224＇　The　only　intent　concerning　the　thing　discoverable　in　such　instances　is　the　general　intent　which　the　occupant　of　land　has　to　exclude　the　public　from　the　land；　and　thus；　as　a　consequence；　to　exclude　them　from　what　is　upon　it。

The　Roman　lawyers　would　probably　have　decided　all　these　cases　differently；　although　they　cannot　be　supposed　to　have　worked　out　the　refined　theories　which　have　been　built　upon　their　remains。　/1/

I　may　here　return　to　the　case　of　goods　in　a　chest　delivered　under　lock　and　key；　or　in　a　bale；　and　the　like。　It　is　a　rule　of　the　criminal　law；　that；　if　a　bailee　of　such　a　chest　or　bale　wrongfully　sells　the　entire　chest　or　bale；　he　does　not　commit　larceny；　but　if　he　breaks　bulk　he　does；　because　in　the　former　case　he　does　not；　and　in　the　latter　he　does；　commit　a　trespass。　/2/　The　reason　sometimes　offered　is；　that；　by　breaking　bulk；　the　bailee　determines　the　bailment；　and　that　the　goods　at　once　revest　in　the　possession　of　the　bailor。　This　is；　perhaps；　an　unnecessary；　as　well　as　inadequate　fiction。　/3/　The　rule　comes　from　the　Year　Books；　and　the　theory　of　the　Year　Books　was；　that；　although　the　chest　was　delivered　to　the　bailee；　the　goods　inside　of　it　were　not；　and　this　theory　was　applied　to　civil　as　well　as　criminal　cases。　The　bailor　has　the　power　and　intent　to　exclude　the　bailee　from　the　goods；　and　therefore　may　be　said　to　be　in　possession　of　them　as　against　the　bailee。　/4/

＇225＇　On　the　other　hand；　a　case　in　Rhode　Island　/1/　is　against　the　view　here　taken。　A　man　bought　a　safe；　and　then；　wishing　to　sell　it　again；　sent　it　to　the　defendant；　and　gave　him　leave　to　keep　his　books　in　it　until　sold。　The　defendant　found　some　bank…