the common law-第37节

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he　will　which　wills　itself；　that　is；　the　recognition　of　its　own　personality；　is　to　be　protected。〃　/3/

The　chief　variation　from　this　view　is　that　of　Windscheid；　a　writer　now　in　vogue。　He　prefers　the　other　branch　of　the　declaration　in　the　Bill　of　Rights。　He　thinks　that　the　protection　to　possession　stands　on　the　same　grounds　as　protection　against　injuria；　that　every　one　is　the　equal　of　every　other　in　the　state；　and　that　no　one　shall　raise　himself　over　the　other。　/4/　Ihering；　to　be　sure；　a　man　of　genius；　took　an　independent　start；　and　said　that　possession　is　ownership　on　the　defensive；　and　that；　in　favor　of　the　owner；　he　who　is　exercising　ownership　in　fact　（i。　e。　the　possessor）　is　freed　from　the　necessity　of　proving　title　against　one　who　is　in　an　unlawful　position。　But　to　this　it　was　well　answered　by　Bruns；　in　his　later　work；　that　it　assumes　the　title　of　disseisors　to　be　generally　worse　than　that　of　disseisees；　which　cannot　be　taken　for　granted；　and　which　probably　is　not　true　in　fact。　/5/

It　follows　from　the　Kantian　doctrine；　that　a　man　in　possession　is　to　be　confirmed　and　maintained　in　it　until　he　is　put　out　by　an　action　brought　for　the　purpose。　Perhaps　＇209＇　another　fact　besides　those　which　have　been　mentioned　has　influenced　this　reasoning；　and　that　is　the　accurate　division　between　possessory　and　petitory　actions　or　defences　in　Continental　procedure。　/1/　When　a　defendant　in　a　possessory　action　is　not　allowed　to　set　up　title　in　himself；　a　theorist　readily　finds　a　mystical　importance　in　possession。

But　when　does　a　man　become　entitled　to　this　absolute　protection？　On　the　principle　of　Kant；　it　is　not　enough　that　he　has　the　custody　of　a　thing。　A　protection　based　on　the　sacredness　of　man's　personality　requires　that　the　object　should　have　been　brought　within　the　sphere　of　that　personality；　that　the　free　will　should　have　unrestrainedly　set　itself　into　that　object。　There　must　be　then　an　intent　to　appropriate　it；　that　is；　to　make　it　part　of　one's　self；　or　one's　own。

Here　the　prevailing　view　of　the　Roman　law　comes　in　to　fortify　principle　with　precedent。　We　are　told　that；　of　the　many　who　might　have　the　actual　charge　or　custody　of　a　thing；　the　Roman　law　recognized　as　possessor　only　the　owner；　or　one　holding　as　owner　and　on　his　way　to　become　one　by　lapse　of　time。　In　later　days　it　made　a　few　exceptions　on　practical　grounds。　But　beyond　the　pledgee　and　the　sequester　（a　receiver　appointed　by　the　court）　these　exceptions　are　unimportant　and　disputed。　/2/　Some　of　the　Roman　jurists　state　in　terms　that　depositaries　and　borrowers　have　not　possession　of　the　things　intrusted　to　them。　/3/　Whether　the　German　interpretation　of　the　sources　goes　too　far　or　not；　it　must　be　taken　account　of　in　the　examination　of　German　theories。

＇210＇　Philosophy　by　denying　possession　to　bailees　in　general　cunningly　adjusted　itself　to　the　Roman　law；　and　thus　put　itself　in　a　position　to　claim　the　authority　of　that　law　for　the　theory　of　which　the　mode　of　dealing　with　bailees　was　merely　a　corollary。　Hence　I　say　that　it　is　important　to　show　that　a　far　more　developed；　more　rational；　and　mightier　body　of　law　than　the　Roman；　gives　no　sanction　to　either　premise　or　conclusion　as　held　by　Kant　and　his　successors。

In　the　first　place；　the　English　law　has　always　had　the　good　sense　/1/　to　allow　title　to　be　set　up　in　defence　to　a　possessory　action。　In　the　assize　of　novel　disseisin；　which　which　was　a　true　possessory　action；　the　defendant　could　always　rely　on　his　title。　/2/　Even　when　possession　is　taken　or　kept　in　a　way　which　is　punished　by　the　criminal　law；　as　in　case　of　forcible　entry　and　detainer；　proof　of　title　allows　the　defendant　to　retain　it；　and　in　many　cases　has　been　held　an　answer　to　an　action　of　trespass。　So　in　trespass　for　taking　goods　the　defendant　may　set　up　title　in　himself。　There　might　seem　to　be　a　trace　of　the　distinction　in　the　general　rule；　that　the　title　cannot　be　tried　in　trespass　quare　clausum。　But　this　is　an　exception　commonly　put　on　the　ground　that　the　judgment　cannot　change　the　property；　as　trespass　for　chattels　or　trover　can。　/3/　The　rule　that　you　cannot　go　into　title　in　a　possessory　action　presupposes　great　difficulty　in　the　proof；　the　probatio　diabolica　of　the　Canon　law；　delays　in　the　process；　and　importance　of　possession　＇211＇　ad　interim；all　of　which　mark　a　stage　of　society　which　has　long　been　passed。　In　ninety…nine　cases　out　of　a　hundred；　it　is　about　as　easy　and　cheap　to　prove　at　least　a　prima　facie　title　as　it　is　to　prove　possession。

In　the　next　place；　and　this　was　the　importance　of　the　last　Lecture　to　this　subject；　the　common　law　has　always　given　the　possessory　remedies　to　all　bailees　without　exception。　The　right　to　these　remedies　extends　not　only　to　pledgees；　lessees；　and　those　having　a　lien；　who　exclude　their　bailor；　but　to　simple　bailees；　as　they　have　been　called；　who　have　no　interest　in　the　chattels；　no　right　of　detention　as　against　the　owner；　and　neither　give　nor　receive　a　reward。　/1/

Modern　German　statutes　have　followed　in　the　same　path　so　far　as　to　give　the　possessory　remedies　to　tenants　and　some　others。　Bruns　says；　as　the　spirit　of　the　Kantian　theory　required　him　to　say；　that　this　is　a　sacrifice　of　principle　to　convenience。　/2/　But　I　cannot　see　what　is　left　of　a　principle　which　avows　itself　inconsistent　with　convenience　and　the　actual　course　of　legislation。　The　first　call　of　a　theory　of　law　is　that　it　should　fit　the　facts。　It　must　explain　the　observed　course　of　legislation。　And　as　it　is　pretty　certain　that　men　will　make　laws　which　seem　to　them　convenient　without　troubling　themselves　very　much　what　principles　are　encountered　by　their　legislation；　a　principle　which　defies　convenience　is　likely　to　wait　some　time　before　it　finds　itself　permanently　realized。

It　remains；　then；　to　seek　for　some　ground　for　the　protection　of　possession　outside　the　Bill　of　Rights　or　the　Declaration　of　Independence；　which　shall　be　consistent　with　the　larger　scope　given　to　the　conception　in　modern　law。

＇212＇　The　courts　have　said　but　little　on　the　subject。　It　was　laid　down　in　one　case　that　it　was　an　extension　of　the　protection　which　the　law　throws　around　the　person；　and　on　that　ground　held　that　trespass　quare　clausum　did　not　pass　to　an　assignee　in　bankruptcy。　/1/　So　it　has　been　said；　that　to　deny　a　bankrupt　trover　against　strangers　for　goods　coming　to　his　possession　after　his　bankruptcy　would　be　〃an　invitation　to　all　the　world　to　scramble　for　the　possession　of　them〃；　and　reference　was　made　to　〃grounds　of　policy　and　convenience。〃　/2/　I　may　also　refer　to　the　cases　of　capture；　some　of　which　will　be　cited　again。　In　the　Greenland　whale…fishery；　by　the　English　custom；　if　the　first　striker　lost　his　hold　on　the　fish；　and　it　was　then　killed　by　another；　the　first　had　no　claim；　but　he　had　the　whole　if　he　kept　fast　to　the　whale　until　it　was　struck　by　the　other；　although　it　then　broke　from　the　first　harpoon。　By　the　custom　in　the　Gallipagos；　on　the　other　hand；　the　first　striker　had　half　the　whale；　although　control　of　the　line　was　lost。　/3/　Each　of　these　customs　has　been　sustained　and　acted　on　by　the　English　courts；　and　Judge　Lowell　has　decided　in　accordance　with　still　a　third；　which　gives　the　whale　to　the　vessel　whose　iron　first　remains　in　it；　provided　claim　be　made　before　cutting　in。　/4/　The　ground　as　put　by　Lord　Mansfield　is　simply　that；　were　it　not　for　such　customs；　there　must　be　a　sort　of　warfare　perpetually　subsisting　between　the　adventurers。　/5/　If　courts　adopt　different　rules　on　similar　facts；　according　to　the　point　at　which　men　will　fight　in　the　＇213＇　several　cases；　it　tends；　so　far　as　it　goes；　to　shake　an　a　priori　theory　of　the　matter。

Those　who　see　in　the　history　of　law　the　formal　expression　of　the　development　of　society　will　be　apt　to　think　that　the　proximate　ground　of　law　must　be　empirical；　even　when　that　ground　is　the　fact　that　a　certain　ideal　or　theory　of　government　is　generally　entertained。　Law；　being　a　practical　thing；　must　found　itself　on　actual　forces。　It　is　quite　enough；　therefore；　for　the　law；　that　man；　by　an　instinct　which　he　shares　with　the　domestic　dog；　and　of　which　the　seal　gives　a　most　striking　example；　will　not　allow　himself　to　be　dispossessed；　either　by　force　or　fraud；　of　what　he　holds；　without　trying　to　get　it　back　again。　/1/　Philosophy　may　find　a　hundred　reasons　to　justify　the　instinct；　but　it　would　be　totally　immaterial　if　it　should　condemn　it　and　bid　us　surrender　without　a　murmur。　As　long　as　the　instinct　remains；　it　will　be　more　comfortable　for　the　law　to　satisfy　it　in　an　orderly　manner；　than　to　leave　people　to　themselves。　If　it　should　do　otherwise；　it　would　become　a　matter　for　pedagogues；　wholly　devoid　of　reality。

I　think　we　are　now　in　a　position　to　begin　the　analysis　of　possession。　It　will　be　instructive　to　say　a　word　in　the　first　place　upon　a　preliminary　question　which　has　been　debated　with　much　zeal　in　Germany。　Is　possession　a　fact　or　a　right？　This　question　must　be　taken　to　mean；　by　possession　and　right；　what　the　law　means　by　those　words；　and　not　something　else　which　philosophers　or　moralists　may　mean　by　them；　for　as　lawyers　we　have　nothing　to　do　with　either；　except　in　a　legal　sense。　If　this

had　always　been　borne　steadily　in　mind；　the　question　would　hardly　have　been　asked。

＇214＇　A　legal　right　is　nothing　but　a　permission　to　exercise　certa