the common law-第35节

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om　the　Roman　law　as　it　filtered　to　him　through　Bracton；　but；　whatever　influence　that　may　have　had　upon　his　general　views；　the　point　decided　and　the　distinctions　touching　common　carriers　were　of　English　growth。

The　action　did　not　sound　in　contract。　The　cause　was　for　damage　to　the　goods；　and　the　plaintiff　sued　for　a　tort；　laying　an　assumpsit　by　way　of　inducement　to　a　charge　of　negligence；　as　in　the　days　of　Henry　VI。　The　plea　was　not　guilty。　But　after　verdict　for　the　plaintiff；　there　was　a　motion　in　arrest　of　judgment；　〃for　that　it　was　not　alleged　in　the　declaration　that　the　defendant　was　a　common　porter；　nor　averred　that　he　had　anything　for　his　pains。〃　Consideration　was　never　alleged　or　thought　of　in　the　primitive　assumpsit；　but　in　the　modem　action　of　contract　in　that　form　＇197＇　it　was　required。　Hence；　it　was　inferred　that；　wherever　an　assumpsit　was　laid；　even　in　all　action　of　tort　for　damage　to　property；　it　was　the　allegation　of　a　contract；　and　that　a　consideration　must　be　shown　for　the　undertaking；　although　the　contrary　had　been　decided　in　the　reign　of　Queen　Elizabeth。　/1/　But　the　motion　did　not　prevail；　and　judgment　was　given　for　the　plaintiff。　Lord　Holt　was　well　aware　that　the　use　of　an　assumpsit　was　not　confined　to　contract。　It　is　true　that　he　said；　〃The　owner's　trusting　＇the　defendant＇　with　the　goods　is　a　sufficient　consideration　to　oblige　him　to　a　careful　management；〃　or　to　return　them；　but　this　means　as　distinguished　from　a　consideration　sufficient　to　oblige　him　to　carry　them；　which　he　thought　the　defendant　would　not　have　been　bound　to　do。　He　then　expressly　says；　〃This　is　a　different　case；　for　assumpsit　does　not　only　signify　a　future　agreement；　but；　in　such　cases　as　this；　it　signifies　an　actual　entry　upon　the　thing　and　taking　the　trust　upon　himself〃；　following　the　earlier　cases　in　the　Year　Books。　/2/　This　was　enough　for　the　decision；　and　the　rule　in　Southcote's　Case　had　nothing　to　do　with　the　matter。　But　as　the　duty　of　common　carriers　by　reason　of　their　calling　was　now　supposed　to　extend　to　all　kinds　of　losses；　and　the　doctrine　of　Southcote's　Case　was　probably　supposed　to　extend　to　many　kinds　of　damage；　it　became　necessary；　in　a　general　discussion；　to　reconcile　or　elect　between　the　two　principles。

The　Chief　Justice　therefore　proceeded　to　distinguish　between　＇198＇　bailees　for　reward　exercising　a　public　employment；　such　as　common　carriers；　common　hoymen；　masters　of　ships；　&c。；　and　other　bailees；　denied　the　rule　in　Southcote's　Case　as　to　the　latter；　said　that　the　principle　of　strict　responsibility　was　confined　to　the　former　class；　and　was　applied　to　them　on　grounds　of　public　policy；　and　that　factors　were　exonerated；　not　because　they　were　mere　servants；　as　had　always　been　laid　down　（among　others；　by　himself　in　arguing　Morse　v。　Slue）；　but　because　they　were　not　within　the　reason　of　the　rule。

The　reader　who　has　followed　the　argument　so　far；　will　hardly　need　to　be　convinced　that　this　did　not　mean　the　adoption　of　the　Praetor's　Edict。　There　is　further　evidence　at　hand　if　required。

In　the　first　place；　as　we　have　seen；　there　was　a　century　of　precedents　ending　with　Morse　v。　Slue；　argued　by　Holt　himself；　in　which　the　liability　of　masters　of　ships；　hoymen；　carriers；　&c。　had　been　adjudicated。　Morse　v。　Slue　is　cited　and　relied　on；　and　there　is　no　hint　of　dissatisfaction　with　the　other　cases。　On　the　contrary；　they　furnished　the　examples　of　bailees　for　reward　exercising　a　public　calling。　The　distinction　between　bailees　for　reward　and　others　is　Chief　Justice　Popham's；　the　latter　qualification　（exercising　a　public　calling）　was　also　English；　as　has　partly　appeared　already；　and　as　will　be　explained　further　on。

In　the　next　place；　the　strict　rule　is　not　confined　to　nautae；　caupones；　and　stabularii；　nor　even　to　common　carriers；　but　is　applied　to　all　bailees　for　reward；　exercising　a　public　calling。

In　the　next　place；　the　degree　of　responsibility　is　precisely　that　of　bailees　in　general；　as　worked　out　by　the　previous　decisions；　but　quite　unlike　and　much　more　severe　＇199＇　than　that　imposed　by　the　Roman　law；　as　others　have　observed。　/1/

And；　finally；　the　exemption　from　liability　for　acts　of　God　or　the　public　enemy　is　characteristically　English；　as　will　be　proved　further　on。

But　it　has　been　partially　shown　in　this　Lecture　that　the　law　of　to…day　has　made　the　carrier's　burden　heavier　than　it　was　in　the　time　of　the　Year　Books。　Southcote's　Case；　and　the　earlier　authorities　which　have　been　cited；　all　refer　to　a　loss　by　robbery；　theft；　or　trespass；　and　hold　the　bailee　liable；　where；　in　theory　at　least；　he　has　a　remedy　over。　It　was　with　reference　to　such　cases；　as　has　been　seen；　that　the　rule　arose；　although　it　is　not　improbable　that　it　would　have　been　applied　to　an　unexplained　loss；　the　writ　against　innkeepers　reads　absque　subtractionie　seu　amissione　custodire。　In　later　times；　the　principle　may　have　been　extended　from　loss　by　theft　to　loss　by　destruction。　In　Symons　v。　Darknoll　/2/　（4　Car。　I。）；　already　cited　as　decided　on　the　authority　of　Southcote's　Case；　the　goods　were　spoiled；　not　stolen；　and　probably　had　not　even　perished　in　specie。　Before　this　time；　the　old　rule　had　become　an　arbitrary　precedent；　followed　according　to　its　form　with　little　thought　of　its　true　intent。

The　language　of　Coggs　v。　Bernard　is；　that　〃the　law　charges　the　person　thus　intrusted　to　carry　goods　as　against　all　events　but　acts　of　God　and　the　enemies　of　the　king。〃　This　was　adopted　by　solemn　decision　in　Lord　Mansfield's　time；　and　it　is　now　settled　that　the　common　carrier　〃is　liable　for　all　losses　which　do　not　fall　within　the　excepted　＇200＇　cases。〃　/1/　That　is　to　say；　he　has　become　an　insurer　to　that　extent；　not　only　against　the　disappearance　or　destruction；　but　against　all　forms　of　damage　to　the　goods　except　as　excepted　above。

The　process　by　which　this　came　to　pass　has　been　traced　above；　but　a　few　words　may　be　added　here。　The　Year　Books；　even　in　dealing　with　the　destruction　（as　distinguished　from　the　conversion）　of　chattels　in　the　hands　of　a　bailee；　always　state　his　liability　as　based　upon　his　fault；　although　it　must　be　admitted　that　the　language　is　used　alio　intuitu。　/2/　A　jettison；　in　tempest；　seems　to　have　been　a　good　plea　for　a　factor　in　the　time　of　Edward　III。；　/3/　but　that　cannot　be　relied　on　for　an　analogy。　The　argument　from　the　Marshal's　case　/4/　is　stronger。　There　it　appears　to　have　been　thought　that　burning　of　the　prison　was　as　good　an　excuse　for　an　escape　as　a　release　by　alien　enemies。　This　must　refer　to　an　accidental　fire；　and　would　seem　to　imply　that　he　was　not　liable　in　that　event；　if　not　in　fault。　The　writs　in　the　Register　against　bailees　to　keep　or　carry　goods；　all　have　the　general　allegation　of　negligence；　and　so　do　the　older　precedents　of　declarations；　so　far　as　I　have　observed；　whether　stating　the　custom　of　the　realm　or　not。　/5/　But　a　bailee　was　answerable　for　goods　wrongfully　taken　from　him；　as　an　innkeeper　was　for　goods　stolen　from　his　inn；　irrespective　of　negligence。　/6/

It　is　true　that　the　Marshal's　case　speaks　of　his　negligent　＇201＇　keeping　when　the　prisoners　were　released　by　rebels；　（although　that　was　far　less　likely　to　result　from　negligence；　one　would　think；　than　a　fire　in　the　prison；）　and　that　after　Lord　Coke's　time　negligence　was　alleged；　although　the　goods　had　been　lost　by　wrongful　taking。　So　the　writ　against　innkeepers　is　pro　defectu　hujusmodi　hospitatorum。　In　these　instances；　neglect　only　means　a　failure　de　facto　to　keep　safely。　As　was　said　at　a　much　later　date；　〃everything　is　a　negligence　in　a　carrier　or　hoyman　that　the　law　does　not　excuse。〃　/1/　The　allegation　is　simply　the　usual　allegation　of　actions　on　the　case；　and　seems　to　have　extended　itself　from　the　earlier　declarations　for　damage；　when　case　supplanted　detinue　and　the　use　of　the　former　action　became　universal。　It　can　hardly　have　been　immaterial　to　the　case　for　which　it　was　first　introduced。　But　the　short　reason　for　disbelieving　that　there　was　any　warrant　in　the　old　law　for　making　the　carrier　an　insurer　against　damage　is；　that　there　seem　to　be　no　early　cases　in　which　bailees　were　held　to　such　a　responsibility；　and　that　it　was　not　within　the　principle　on　which　they　were　made　answerable　for　a　loss　by　theft。

Having　traced　the　process　by　which　a　common　carrier　has　been　made　an　insurer；　it　only　remains　to　say　a　word　upon　the　origin　of　the　admitted　exceptions　from　the　risk　assumed。　It　has　been　seen　already　how　loss　by　the　public　enemy　came　to　be　mentioned　by　Chief　Justice　Holt。　It　is　the　old　distinction　taken　in　the　Marshal's　case　that　there　the　bailee　has　no　remedy　over。

With　regard　to　the　act　of　God；　it　was　a　general　principle；　not　peculiar　to　carriers　nor　to　bailees；　that　a　duty　was　＇202＇　discharged　if　an　act　of　God　made　it　impossible　of　performance。　Lord　Coke　mentions　the　case　of　jettison　from　a　Gravesend　barge；　/1/　and　another　of　a　party　bound　to　keep　and　maintain　sea…walls　from　overflowing；　as　subject　to　the　same　limitation；　/2/　and　a　similar　statement　as　to　contracts　in　general　will　be　found　in　the　Year　Books。　/3/　It　is　another　form　of　the　principle　which　has　been　laboriously　reargued　in　our　own　day；　that　parties　are　excused　from　the　performance　of　a　contract　which　has　become　impossible　before　breach　from　the　perishing　of　the　thing；　or　from　change　of　circumstances　the　cont