the common law-第29节

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ally　intended　to　burn　it　down。　If　so；　the　length　of　the　chain　of　physical　causes　intervening　is　of　no　importance；　and　has　no　bearing　on　the　case。

But　the　choice　may　have　stopped　one　step　farther　back。　The　defendant　may　have　intended　to　light　a　fire　on　his　own　land；　and　may　not　have　intended　to　burn　the　house。　Then　the　nature　of　the　intervening　and　concomitant　physical　causes　becomes　of　the　highest　importance。　The　question　will　be　the　degree　of　danger　attending　the　contemplated　（and　therefore　chosen）　effect　of　the　defendant's　conduct　under　the　circumstances　known　to　him。　If　this　was　very　plain　and　very　great；　as；　for　instance；　if　his　conduct　consisted　in　lighting　stubble　near　a　haystack　close　to　the　house；　and　if　the　manifest　circumstances　were　that　the　house　was　of　wood；　the　stubble　very　dry；　and　the　wind　in　a　dangerous　quarter；　the　court　would　probably　rule　that　he　was　liable。　If　the　defendant　lighted　an　ordinary　fire　in　a　fireplace　in　an　adjoining　house；　having　no　knowledge　that　the　fireplace　was　unsafely　constructed；　the　court　would　probably　rule　that　he　was　not　liable。　Midway；　complicated　and　doubtful　cases　would　go　to　the　jury。

But　the　defendant　may　not　even　have　intended　to　set　the　fire；　and　his　conduct　and　intent　may　have　been　simply　to　fire　a　gun；　or；　remoter　still；　to　walk　across　a　room；　in　doing　which　he　involuntarily　upset　a　bottle　of　acid。　So　that　cases　may　go　to　the　jury　by　reason　of　the　remoteness　＇161＇　of　the　choice　in　the　series　of　events；　as　well　as　because　of　the　complexity　of　the　circumstances　attending　the　act　or　conduct。　The　difference　is；　perhaps；　rather　dramatic　than　substantial。

But　the　philosophical　analysis　of　every　wrong　begins　by　determining　what　the　defendant　has　actually　chosen；　that　is　to　say；　what　his　voluntary　act　or　conduct　has　been；　and　what　consequences　he　has　actually　contemplated　as　flowing　from　them；　and　then　goes　on　to　determine　what　dangers　attended　either　the　conduct　under　the　known　circumstances；　or　its　contemplated　consequence　under　the　contemplated　circumstances。

Take　a　case　like　the　glancing　of　Sir　Walter　Tyrrel's　arrow。　If　an　expert　marksman　contemplated　that　the　arrow　would　hit　a　certain　person；　cadit　qucoestio。　If　he　contemplated　that　it　would　glance　in　the　direction　of　another　person；　but　contemplated　no　more　than　that；　in　order　to　judge　of　his　liability　we　must　go　to　the　end　of　his　fore…　sight；　and；　assuming　the　foreseen　event　to　happen；　consider　what　the　manifest　danger　was　then。　But　if　no　such　event　was　foreseen；　the　marksman　must　be　judged　by　the　circumstances　known　to　him　at　the　time　of　shooting。

The　theory　of　torts　may　be　summed　up　very　simply。　At　the　two　extremes　of　the　law　are　rules　determined　by　policy　without　reference　of　any　kind　to　morality。　Certain　harms　a　man　may　inflict　even　wickedly；　for　certain　others　he　must　answer；　although　his　conduct　has　been　prudent　and　beneficial　to　the　community。

But　in　the　main　the　law　started　from　those　intentional　wrongs　which　are　the　simplest　and　most　pronounced　cases；　as　well　as　the　nearest　to　the　feeling　of　revenge　which　leads　to　self…redress。　It　thus　naturally　adopted　the　vocabulary；　＇162＇　and　in　some　degree　the　tests；　of　morals。　But　as　the　law　has　grown；　even　when　its　standards　have　continued　to　model　themselves　upon　those　of　morality；　they　have　necessarily　become　external；　because　they　have　considered；　not　the　actual　condition　of　the　particular　defendant；　but　whether　his　conduct　would　have　been　wrong　in　the　fair　average　member　of　the　community；　whom　he　is　expected　to　equal　at　his　peril。

In　general；　this　question　will　be　determined　by　considering　the　degree　of　danger　attending　the　act　or　conduct　under　the　known　circumstances。　If　there　is　danger　that　harm　to　another　will　follow；　the　act　is　generally　wrong　in　the　sense　of　the　law。

But　in　some　cases　the　defendant's　conduct　may　not　have　been　morally　wrong；　and　yet　he　may　have　chosen　to　inflict　the　harm；　as　where　he　has　acted　in　fear　of　his　life。　In　such　cases　he　will　be　liable；　or　not；　according　as　the　law　makes　moral　blameworthiness；　within　the　limits　explained　above；　the　ground　of　liability；　or　deems　it　sufficient　if　the　defendant　has　had　reasonable　warning　of　danger　before　acting。　This　distinction；　however；　is　generally　unimportant；　and　the　known　tendency　of　the　act　under　the　known　circumstances　to　do　harm　may　be　accepted　as　the　general　test　of　conduct。

The　tendency　of　a　given　act　to　cause　harm　under　given　circumstances　must　be　determined　by　experience。　And　experience　either　at　first　hand　or　through　the　voice　of　the　jury　is　continually　working　out　concrete　rules；　which　in　form　are　still　more　external　and　still　more　remote　from　a　reference　to　the　moral　condition　of　the　defendant；　than　even　the　test　of　the　prudent　man　which　makes　the　first　stage　of　the　division　between　law　and　morals。　It　does　this　in　the　domain　＇163＇　of　wrongs　described　as　intentional；　as　systematically　as　in　those　styled　unintentional　or　negligent。

But　while　the　law　is　thus　continually　adding　to　its　specific　rules；　it　does　not　adopt　the　coarse　and　impolitic　principle　that　a　man　acts　always　at　his　peril。　On　the　contrary；　its　concrete　rules；　as　well　as　the　general　questions　addressed　to　the　jury；　show　that　the　defendant　must　have　had　at　least　a　fair　chance　of　avoiding　the　infliction　of　harm　before　he　becomes　answerable　for　such　a　consequence　of　his　conduct。　And　it　is　certainly　arguable　that　even　a　fair　chance　to　avoid　bringing　harm　to　pass　is　not　sufficient　to　throw　upon　a　person　the　peril　of　his　conduct；　unless；　judged　by　average　standards；　he　is　also　to　blame　for　what　he　does。

＇164＇　LECTURE　V。

THE　BAILEE　AT　COMMON　LAW。

So　far　the　discussion　has　been　confined　to　the　general　principles　of　liability；　and　to　the　mode　of　ascertaining　the　point　at　which　a　man　begins　to　act　at　his　own　peril。　But　it　does　not　matter　to　a　man　whether　he　acts　at　his　own　peril　or　not；　unless　harm　comes　of　it；　and　there　must　always　be　some　one　within　reach　of　the　consequences　of　the　act　before　any　harm　can　be　done。　Furthermore；　and　more　to　the　point；　there　are　certain　forms　of　harm　which　are　not　likely　to　be　suffered；　and　which　can　never　be　complained　of　by　any　one　except　a　person　who　stands　in　a　particular　relation　to　the　actor　or　to　some　other　person　or　thing。　Thus　it　is　neither　a　harm　nor　a　wrong　to　take　fish　from　a　pond　unless　the　pond　is　possessed　or　owned　by　some　one；　and　then　only　to　the　possessor　or　owner。　It　is　neither　a　harm　nor　a　wrong　to　abstain　from　delivering　a　bale　of　wool　at　a　certain　time　and　place；　unless　a　binding　promise　has　been　made　so　to　deliver　it；　and　then　it　is　a　wrong　only　to　the　promisee。

The　next　thing　to　be　done　is　to　analyze　those　special　relations　out　of　which　special　rights　and　duties　arise。　The　chief　of　themand　I　mean　by　the　word　〃relations〃　relations　of　fact　simplyare　possession　and　contract；　and　I　shall　take　up　those　subjects　successively。

The　test　of　the　theory　of　possession　which　prevails　in　any　system　of　law　is　to　be　found　in　its　mode　of　dealing　＇165＇　who　have　a　thing　within　their　power；　but　not　own　it；　or　assert　the　position　of　an　owner　for　with　regard　to　it；　bailees；　in　a　word。　It　is　therefore；　as　a　preliminary　to　understanding　the　common…law　theory　of　possession；　to　study　the　common　law　with　regard　to　bailees。

The　state　of　things　which　prevailed　on　the　border　between　England　and　Scotland　within　recent　times；　and　which　is　brought　back　in　the　flesh　by　the　ballad　of　the　Fray　O'Suport；　is　very　like　that　which　in　an　earlier　century　left　its　skeleton　in　the　folk…laws　of　Germany　and　England。　Cattle　were　the　principal　property　known；　and　cattle…stealing　the　principal　form　of　wrongful　taking　of　property。　Of　law　there　was　very　little；　and　what　there　was　depended　almost　wholly　upon　the　party　himself　to　enforce。　The　Salic　Law　of　the　fifth　century　and　the　Anglo…Saxon　laws　of　Alfred　are　very　full　in　their　directions　about　following　the　trail。　If　the　cattle　were　come　up　with　before　three　days　were　gone；　the　pursuer　had　the　fight　to　take　and　keep　them；　subject　only　to　swearing　that　he　lost　them　against　his　will。　If　more　than　three　days　went　by　before　the　cattle　were　found；　the　defendant　might　swear；　if　he　could；　to　facts　which　would　disprove　the　claimant's　loss。

This　procedure　was　in　truth　a　legal　procedure；　but　it　depended　for　its　beginning　and　for　its　execution　on　the　party　making　the　claim。　From　its　〃executive〃　nature；　it　could　hardly　have　been　started　by　any　other　than　the　person　on　the　spot；　in　whose　keeping　the　cattle　were。　The　oath　was　to　the　effect　that　the　party　had　lost　possession　against　his　will。　But　if　all　that　a　man　had　to　swear　was　that　he　had　lost　possession　against　his　will；　it　is　a　natural　conclusion　that　the　right　to　take　the　oath　and　make　use　of　＇166＇　the　procedure　depended　on　possession；　and　not　on　ownership。　Possession　was　not　merely　sufficient；　but　it　was　essential。　Only　he　who　was　in　possession　could　say　that　he　had　lost　the　property　against　his　will；　just　as　only　he　who　was　on　the　spot　could　follow　the　cattle。　/1/

This；　so　far　as　known；　was　the　one　means　afforded　by　the　early　law　of　our　race　for　the　recovery　of　property　lost　against　one's　will。　So　that；　in　a　word；　this　procedure；　modelled　on　the　self…redress　natural　to　the　case　which　gave　rise　to　it；　wa