the common law-第28节

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。　Ordinary　cases　of　liability　arise　out　of　a　choice　which　was　the　proximate　cause　of　the　harm　upon　which　the　action　is　founded。　But　here　there　is　usually　no　question　of　negligence　in　guarding　the　beast。　It　is　enough　in　most；　if　not　in　all　cases；　that　the　owner　has　chosen　to　keep　it。　Experience　has　shown　that　tigers　and　bears　are　alert　to　find　means　of　escape；　and　that；　if　they　escape；　they　are　very　certain　to　do　harm　of　a　serious　nature。　The　possibility　of　a　great　danger　has　the　same　effect　as　the　probability　of　a　less　one；　and　the　law　throws　the　risk　of　＇155＇　the　venture　on　the　person　who　introduces　the　peril　into　the　community。

This　remoteness　of　the　opportunity　of　choice　goes　far　to　show　that　this　risk　is　thrown　upon　the　owner　for　other　reasons　than　the　ordinary　one　of　imprudent　conduct。　It　has　been　suggested　that　the　liability　stood　upon　remote　inadvertence。　/1/　But　the　law　does　not　forbid　a　man　to　keep　a　menagerie；　or　deem　it　in　any　way　blameworthy。　It　has　applied　nearly　as　strict　a　rule　to　dealings　which　are　even　more　clearly　beneficial　to　the　community　than　a　show　of　wild　beasts。

This　seems　to　be　one　of　those　cases　where　the　ground　of　liability　is　to　be　sought　in　policy　coupled　with　tradition；　rather　than　in　any　form　of　blameworthiness；　or　the　existence　of　such　a　chance　to　avoid　doing　the　harm　as　a　man　is　usually　allowed。　But　the　fact　that　remote　inadvertence　has　been　suggested　for　an　explanation　illustrates　what　has　been　said　about　the　difficulty　of　deciding　whether　a　given　rule　is　founded　on　special　grounds；　or　has　been　worked　out　within　the　sphere　of　negligence；　when　once　a　special　rule　has　been　laid　down。

It　is　further　to　be　noticed　that　there　is　no　question　of　the　defendant's　knowledge　of　the　nature　of　tigers；　although　without　that　knowledge　he　cannot　be　said　to　have　intelligently　chosen　to　subject　the　community　to　danger。　Here　again　even　in　the　domain　of　knowledge　the　law　applies　its　principle　of　averages。　The　fact　that　tigers　and　bears　are　：：dangerous　is　so　generally　known；　that　a　man　who　keeps　them　is　presumed　to　know　their　peculiarities。　In　other　words；　he　does　actually　know　that　he　has　an　animal　with　certain　teeth；　claws；　and　so　forth；　and　he　must　find　out　the　＇156＇　rest　of　what　an　average　member　of　the　community　would　know；　at　his　peril。

What　is　true　as　to　damages　in　general　done　by　ferocious　wild　beasts　is　true　as　to　a　particular　class　of　damages　done　by　domestic　cattle；　namely；　trespasses　upon　another's　land。　This　has　been　dealt　with　in　former　Lectures；　and　it　is　therefore　needless　to　do　more　than　to　recall　it　here；　and　to　call　attention　to　the　distinction　based　on　experience　and　policy　between　damage　which　is　and　that　which　is　not　of　a　kind　to　be　expected。　Cattle　generally　stray　and　damage　cultivated　land　when　they　get　upon　it。　They　only　exceptionally　hurt　human　beings。

I　need　not　recur　to　the　possible　historical　connection　of　either　of　these　last　forms　of　liability　with　the　noxoe　deditio；　because；　whether　that　origin　is　made　out　or　not；　the　policy　of　the　rule　has　been　accepted　as　sound；　and　carried　further　in　England　within　the　last　few　years　by　the　doctrine　that　a　man　who　brings　upon　his　land　and　keeps　there　anything　likely　to　do　mischief　if　it　escape；　must　keep　it　in　at　his　peril。　/1/　The　strictness　of　this　principle　will　vary　in　different　jurisdictions；　as　the　balance　varies　between　the　advantages　to　the　public　and　the　dangers　to　individuals　from　the　conduct　in　question。　Danger　of　harm　to　others　is　not　the　only　thing　to　be　considered；　as　has　been　said　already。　The　law　allows　some　harms　to　be　intentionally　inflicted；　and　a　fortiori　some　risks　to　be　intentionally　run。　In　some　Western　States　a　man　is　not　required　to　keep　his　cattle　fenced　in。　Some　courts　have　refused　to　follow　Rylands　v。　Fletcher。　/2/　On　the　other　hand；　the　principle　has　been　applied　to　artificial　＇157＇　reservoirs　of　water；　to　cesspools；　to　accumulations　of　snow　and　ice　upon　a　building　by　reason　of　the　form　of　its　roof；　and　to　party　walls。　/1/

In　these　cases；　as　in　that　of　ferocious　animals；　it　is　no　excuse　that　the　defendant　did　not　know；　and　could　not　have　found　out；　the　weak　point　from　which　the　dangerous　object　escaped。　The　period　of　choice　was　further　back；　and；　although　he　was　not　to　blame；　he　was　bound　at　his　peril　to　know　that　the　object　was　a　continual　threat　to　his　neighbors；　and　that　is　enough　to　throw　the　risk　of　the　business　on　him。

I　now　pass　to　cases　one　degree　more　complex　than　those　so　far　considered。　In　these　there　must　be　another　concomitant　circumstance　known　to　the　party　in　addition　to　those　of　which　the　knowledge　is　necessarily　or　practically　proved　by　his　conduct。　The　cases　which　naturally　suggest　themselves　again　concern　animals。　Experience　as　interpreted　by　the　English　law　has　shown　that　dogs；　rams；　and　bulls　are　in　general　of　a　tame　and　mild　nature；　and　that；　if　any　one　of　them　does　by　chance　exhibit　a　tendency　to　bite；　butt；　or　gore；　it　is　an　exceptional　phenomenon。　Hence　it　is　not　the　law　that　a　man　keeps　dogs；　rams；　bulls；　and　other　like　tame　animals　at　his　peril　as　to　the　personal　damages　which　they　may　inflict；　unless　he　knows　or　has　notice　that　the　particular　animal　kept　by　him　has　the　abnormal　tendency　which　they　do　sometimes　show。　The　law　has；　however；　been　brought　a　little　nearer　to　actual　experience　by　statute　in　many　jurisdictions。

Now　let　us　go　one　step　farther　still。　A　man　keeps　an　unbroken　and　unruly　horse；　knowing　it　to　be　so。　That　is　not　enough　to　throw　the　risk　of　its　behavior　on　him。　The　＇158＇　tendency　of　the　known　wildness　is　not　dangerous　generally；　but　only　under　particular　circumstances。　Add　to　keeping；　the　attempt　to　break　the　horse；　still　no　danger　to　the　public　is　disclosed。　But　if　the　place　where　the　owner　tries　to　break　it　is　a　crowded　thoroughfare；　the　owner　knows　an　additional　circumstance　which；　according　to　common　experience；　makes　this　conduct　dangerous；　and　therefore　must　take　the　risk　of　what　harm　may　be　done。　/1/　On　the　other　hand；　if　a　man　who　was　a　good　rider　bought　a　horse　with　no　appearance　of　vice　and　mounted　it　to　ride　home；　there　would　be　no　such　apparent　danger　as　to　make　him　answerable　if　the　horse　became　unruly　and　did　damage。　/2/　Experience　has　measured　the　probabilities　and　draws　the　line　between　the　two　cases。

Whatever　may　be　the　true　explanation　of　the　rule　applied　to　keeping　tigers；　or　the　principle　of　Rylands　v。　Fletcher；　in　the　last　cases　we　have　entered　the　sphere　of　negligence；　and；　if　we　take　a　case　lying　somewhere　between　the　two　just　stated；　and　add　somewhat　to　the　complexity　of　the　circumstances；　we　shall　find　that　both　conduct　and　standard　would　probably　be　left　without　much　discrimination　to　the　jury；　on　the　broad　issue　whether　the　defendant　had　acted　as　a　prudent　man　would　have　done　under　the　circumstances。

As　to　wrongs　called　malicious　or　intentional　it　is　not　necessary　to　mention　the　different　classes　a　second　time；　and　to　find　them　a　place　in　this　series。　As　has　been　seen；　they　vary　in　the　number　of　circumstances　which　must　be　known。　Slander　is　conduct　which　is　very　generally　at　the　risk　of　＇159＇　the　speaker；　because；　as　charges　of　the　kind　with　which　it　deals　are　manifestly　detrimental；　the　questions　which　practically　arise　for　the　most　part　concern　the　defence　of　truth　or　privilege。　Deceit　requires　more；　but　still　simple　facts。　Statements　do　not　threaten　the　harm　in　question　unless　they　are　made　under　such　circumstances　as　to　naturally　lead　to　action；　and　are　made　on　insufficient　grounds。

It　is　not；　however；　without　significance；　that　certain　wrongs　are　described　in　language　importing　intent。　The　harm　in　such　cases　is　most　frequently　done　intentionally；　if　intent　to　cause　a　certain　harm　is　shown；　there　need　to　prove　knowledge　of　facts　which　made　it　that　harm　would　follow。　Moreover；　it　is　often　much　easier　to　prove　intent　directly；　than　to　prove　the　knowledge　which　would　make　it　unnecessary。

The　cases　in　which　a　man　is　treated　as　the　responsible　cause　of　a　given　harm；　on　the　one　hand；　extend　beyond　those　in　which　his　conduct　was　chosen　in　actual　contemplation　of　that　result；　and　in　which；　therefore；　he　may　be　to　have　chosen　to　cause　that　harm；　and；　on　the　other　hand；　they　do　not　extend　to　all　instances　where　the　damages　would　not　have　happened　but　for　some　remote　election　his　part。　Generally　speaking；　the　choice　will　be　found　to　have　extended　further　than　a　simple　act；　and　to　co…ordinated　acts　into　conduct。　Very　commonly　it　will　have　extended　further　still；　to　some　external　consequence。　But　generally；　also；　it　will　be　found　to　have　stopped　short　of　the　consequence　complained　of。

The　question　in　each　case　is　whether　the　actual　choice；　or；　in　other　words；　the　actually　contemplated　result；　was　near　enough　to　the　remoter　result　complained　of　to　throw　the　peril　of　it　upon　the　actor。

＇160＇　Many　of　the　cases　which　have　been　put　thus　far　are　cases　where　the　proximate　cause　of　the　loss　was　intended　to　be　produced　by　the　defendant。　But　it　will　be　seen　that　the　same　result　may　be　caused　by　a　choice　at　different　points。　For　instance；　a　man　is　sued　for　having　caused　his　neighbor's　house　to　burn　down。　The　simplest　case　is；　that　he　actually　intended　to　burn　it　down。　If　so；　the　length　of　the　chain　of　physical　causes　intervening　is　of　n