the common law-第27节

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But　if　this　be　true；　liability　to　an　action　does　not　necessarily　import　wrong…　doing。　And　this　may　be　admitted　without　at　all　impairing　the　force　of　the　argument　in　the　foregoing　Lecture；　which　only　requires　that　people　should　not　be　made　to　pay　for　accidents　which　they　could　not　have　avoided。

It　is　doubtful；　however；　whether　the　ruling　of　Chief　Justice　Rolle　would　now　be　followed。　The　squib　case；　Scott　v。　Shepherd；　and　the　language　of　some　text…　books；　are　more　or　less　opposed　to　it。　/2/　If　the　latter　view　is　law；　then　an　act　must　in　general　not　only　be　dangerous；　but　one　which　would　be　blameworthy　on　the　part　of　the　average　man；　in　order　to　make　the　actor　liable。　But；　aside　from　such　exceptional　cases　as　Gilbert　v。　Stone；　the　two　tests　agree；　and　the　difference　need　not　be　considered　in　what　follows。

I　therefore　repeat；　that　experience　is　the　test　by　which　it　is　decided　whether　the　degree　of　danger　attending　given　conduct　under　certain　known　circumstances　is　sufficient　to　throw　the　risk　upon　the　party　pursuing　it。

For　instance；　experience　shows　that　a　good　many　guns　supposed　to　be　unloaded　go　off　and　hurt　people。　The　ordinarily　intelligent　and　prudent　member　of　the　community　＇150＇　would　foresee　the　possibility　of　danger　from　pointing　a　gun　which　he　had　not　inspected　into　a　crowd；　and　pulling　the　trigger；　although　it　was　said　to　be　unloaded。　Hence；　it　may　very　properly　be　held　that　a　man　who　does　such　a　thing　does　it　at　his　peril；　and　that；　if　damage　ensues；　he　is　answerable　for　it。　The　co…ordinated　acts　necessary　to　point　a　gun　and　pull　a　trigger；　and　the　intent　and　knowledge　shown　by　the　co…ordination　of　those　acts；　are　all　consistent　with　entire　blamelessness。　They　threaten　harm　to　no　one　without　further　facts。　But　the　one　additional　circumstance　of　a　man　in　the　line　and　within　range　of　the　piece　makes　the　conduct　manifestly　dangerous　to　any　one　who　knows　the　fact。　There　is　no　longer　any　need　to　refer　to　the　prudent　man；　or　general　experience。　The　facts　have　taught　their　lesson；　and　have　generated　a　concrete　and　external　rule　of　liability。　He　who　snaps　a　cap　upon　a　gun　pointed　in　the　direction　of　another　person；　known　by　him　to　be　present；　is　answerable　for　the　consequences。

The　question　what　a　prudent　man　would　do　under　given　circumstances　is　then　equivalent　to　the　question　what　are　the　teachings　of　experience　as　to　the　dangerous　character　of　this　or　that　conduct　under　these　or　those　circumstances；　and　as　the　teachings　of　experience　are　matters　of　fact；　it　is　easy　to　see　why　the　jury　should　be　consulted　with　regard　to　them。　They　are；　however；　facts　of　a　special　and　peculiar　function。　Their　only　bearing　is　on　the　question；　what　ought　to　have　been　done　or　omitted　under　the　circumstances　of　the　case；　not　on　what　was　done。　Their　function　is　to　suggest　a　rule　of　conduct。

Sometimes　courts　are　induced　to　lay　down　rules　by　facts　of　a　more　specific　nature；　as　that　the　legislature　passed　a　certain　statute；　and　that　the　case　at　bar　is　within　＇151＇　the　fair　meaning　of　its　words；　or　that　the　practice　of　a　specially　interested　class；　or　of　the　public　at　large；　has　generated　a　rule　of　conduct　outside　the　law　which　it　is　desirable　that　the　courts　should　recognize　and　enforce。　These　are　matters　of　fact；　and　have　sometimes　been　pleaded　as　such。　But　as　their　only　importance　is；　that；　if　believed；　they　will　induce　the　judges　to　lay　down　a　rule　of　conduct；　or　in　other　words　a　rule　of　law；　suggested　by　them；　their　tendency　in　most　instances　is　to　disappear　as　fast　as　the　rules　suggested　by　them　become　settled。　/1/　While　the　facts　are　uncertain；　as　they　are　still　only　motives　for　decision　upon　the　law；grounds　for　legislation；　so　to　speak；the　judges　may　ascertain　them　in　any　way　which　satisfies　their　conscience。　Thus；　courts　recognize　the　statutes　of　the　jurisdiction　judicially；　although　the　laws　of　other　jurisdictions；　with　doubtful　wisdom；　are　left　to　the　jury。　/2/　They　may　take　judicial　cognizance　of　a　custom　of　merchants。　/3/　In　former　days；　at　least；　they　might　inquire　about　it　in　pais　after　a　demurrer。　/4/　They　may　act　on　the　statement　of　a　special　jury；　as　in　the　time　of　Lord　Mansfield　and　his　successors；　or　upon　the　finding　of　a　common　jury　based　on　the　testimony　of　witnesses；　as　is　the　practice　to…day　in　this　country。　But　many　instances　will　be　found　the　text…books　which　show　that；　when　the　facts　are　ascertained；　they　soon　cease　to　be　referred　to；　and　give　place　to　a　rule　of　law。

＇152＇　The　same　transition　is　noticeable　with　regard　to　the　teachings　of　experience。　There　are　many　cases；　no　doubt；　in　which　the　court　would　lean　for　aid　upon　a　jury；　but　there　are　also　many　in　which　the　teaching　has　been　formulated　in　specific　rules。　These　rules　will　be　found　to　vary　considerably　with　regard　to　the　number　of　concomitant　circumstances　necessary　to　throw　the　peril　of　conduct　otherwise　indifferent　on　the　actor。　As　the　circumstances　become　more　numerous　and　complex；　the　tendency　to　cut　the　knot　with　the　jury　becomes　greater。　It　will　be　useful　to　follow　a　line　of　cases　up　from　the　simple　to　the　more　complicated；　by　way　of　illustration。　The　difficulty　of　distinguishing　rules　based　on　other　grounds　of　policy　from　those　which　have　been　worked　out　in　the　field　of　negligence；　will　be　particularly　noticed。

In　all　these　cases　it　will　be　found　that　there　has　been　a　voluntary　act　on　the　part　of　the　person　to　be　charged。　The　reason　for　this　requirement　was　shown　in　the　foregoing　Lecture。　Unnecessary　though　it　is　for　the　defendant　to　have　intended　or　foreseen　the　evil　which　he　has　caused；　it　is　necessary　that　he　should　have　chosen　the　conduct　which　led　to　it。　But　it　has　also　been　shown　that　a　voluntary　act　is　not　enough；　and　that　even　a　co…ordinated　series　of　acts　or　conduct　is　often　not　enough　by　itself。　But　the　co…ordination　of　a　series　of　acts　shows　a　further　intent　than　is　necessarily　manifested　by　any　single　act；　and　sometimes　proves　with　almost　equal　certainty　the　knowledge　of　one　or　more　concomitant　circumstances。　And　there　are　cases　where　conduct　with　only　the　intent　and　knowledge　thus　necessarily　implied　is　sufficient　to　throw　the　risk　of　it　on　the　actor。

For　instance；　when　a　man　does　the　series　of　acts　called　＇153＇　walking；　it　is　assumed　for　all　purposes　of　responsibility　that　he　knows　the　earth　is　under　his　feet。　The　conduct　per　se　is　indifferent；　to　be　sure。　A　man　may　go　through　the　motions　of　walking　without　legal　peril；　if　he　chooses　to　practise　on　a　private　treadmill；　but　if　he　goes　through　the　same　motions　on　the　surface　of　the　earth；　it　cannot　be　doubted　that　he　knows　that　the　earth　is　there。　With　that　knowledge；　he　acts　at　his　peril　in　certain　respects。　If　he　crosses　his　neighbor's　boundary；　he　is　a　trespasser。　The　reasons　for　this　strict　rule　have　been　partially　discussed　in　the　last　Lecture。　Possibly　there　is　more　of　history　or　of　past　or　present　notions　of　policy　its　explanation　than　is　there　suggested；　and　at　any　rate　I　do　not　care　to　justify　the　rule。　But　it　is　intelligible。　A　man　who　walks　knows　that　he　is　moving　over　the　surface　of　the　earth；　he　knows　that　he　is　surrounded　by　private　estates　which　he　has　no　right　to　enter；　and　he　knows　that　his　motion；　unless　properly　guided；　will　carry　him　into　those　estates。　He　is　thus　warned；　and　the　burden　of　his　conduct　is　thrown　upon　himself。

But　the　act　of　walking　does　not　throw　the　peril　of　all　possible　consequences　upon　him。　He　may　run　a　man　down　in　the　street；　but　he　is　not　liable　for　that　unless　he　does　it　negligently。　Confused　as　the　law　is　with　cross…lights　of　tradition；　and　hard　as　we　may　find　it　to　arrive　at　perfectly　satisfactory　general　theory；　it　does　distinguish　in　a　pretty　sensible　way；　according　to　the　nature　and　degree　of　the　different　perils　incident　to　a　given　situation。

》From　the　simple　case　of　walking　we　may　proceed　to　the　more　complex　cases　of　dealings　with　tangible　objects　of　property。　It　may　be　said　that；　generally　speaking；　a　man　meddles　with　such　things　at　his　own　risk。　It　does　not　＇154＇　matter　how　honestly　he　may　believe　that　they　belong　to　himself；　or　are　free　to　the　public；　or　that　he　has　a　license　from　the　owner；　or　that　the　case　is　one　in　which　the　law　has　limited　the　rights　of　ownership；　he　takes　the　chance　of　how　the　fact　may　turn　out；　and　if　the　fact　is　otherwise　than　as　he　supposes；　he　must　answer　for　his　conduct。　As　has　been　already　suggested；　he　knows　that　he　is　exercising　more　or　less　dominion　over　property；　or　that　he　is　injuring　it；　he　must　make　good　his　right　if　it　is　challenged。

Whether　this　strict　rule　is　based　on　the　common　grounds　of　liability；　or　upon　some　special　consideration　of　past　or　present　policy；　policy　has　set　some　limits　to　it；　as　was　mentioned　in　the　foregoing　Lecture。

Another　case　of　conduct　which　is　at　the　risk　of　the　party　without　further　knowledge　than　it　necessarily　imports；　is　the　keeping　of　a　tiger　or　bear；　or　other　animal　of　a　species　commonly　known　to　be　ferocious。　If　such　an　animal　escapes　and　does　damage；　the　owner　is　liable　simply　on　proof　that　he　kept　it。　In　this　instance　the　comparative　remoteness　of　the　moment　of　choice　in　the　line　of　causation　from　the　effect　complained　of；　will　be　particularly　noticed。　Ordinary　cases　of　liability　arise　out　of　a　choice　which　was　the　proximate　cause　of　the　harm　upon