the common law-第26节

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Other　isolated　instances　like　the　last　might；　perhaps；　be　found　in　different　parts　of　the　law；　in　which　actual　malevolence　would　affect　a　man's　liability　for　his　conduct。　Again；　in　trover　for　the　conversion　of　another's　chattel；　where　the　dominion　exercised　over　it　was　of　a　slight　and　ambiguous　＇144＇　nature；　it　has　been　said　that　the　taking　must　be　〃with　the　intent　of　exercising　an　ownership　over　the　chattel　inconsistent　with　the　real　owner's　right　of　possession。〃　/l　/　But　this　seems　to　be　no　more　than　a　faint　shadow　of　the　doctrine　explained　with　regard　to　larceny；　and　does　not　require　any　further　or　special　discussion。　Trover　is　commonly　understood　to　go；　like　larceny；　on　the　plaintiff's　being　deprived　of　his　property；　although　in　practice　every　possessor　has　the　action；　and；　generally　speaking；　the　shortest　wrongful　withholding　of　possession　is　a　conversion。

Be　the　exceptions　more　or　less　numerous；　the　general　purpose　of　the　law　of　torts　is　to　secure　a　man　indemnity　against　certain　forms　of　harm　to　person；　reputation；　or　estate；　at　the　hands　of　his　neighbors；　not　because　they　are　wrong；　but　because　they　are　harms。　The　true　explanation　of　the　reference　of　liability　to　a　moral　standard；　in　the　sense　which　has　been　explained；　is　not　that　it　is　for　the　purpose　of　improving　men's　hearts；　but　that　it　is　to　give　a　man　a　fair　chance　to　avoid　doing　the　harm　before　he　is　held　responsible　for　it。　It　is　intended　to　reconcile　the　policy　of　letting　accidents　lie　where　they　fall；　and　the　reasonable　freedom　of　others　with　the　protection　of　the　individual　from　injury。

But　the　law　does　not　even　seek　to　indemnify　a　man　from　all　harms。　An　unrestricted　enjoyment　of　all　his　possibilities　would　interfere　with　other　equally　important　enjoyments　on　the　part　of　his　neighbors。　There　are　certain　things　which　the　law　allows　a　man　to　do；　notwithstanding　the　fact　that　he　foresees　that　harm　to　another　will　follow　from　them。　He　may　charge　a　man　with　crime　if　the　charge　is　true。　He　may　establish　himself　in　business　where　he　foresees　that　＇145＇　of　his　competition　will　be　to　diminish　the　custom　of　another　shopkeeper；　perhaps　to　ruin　him。　He　may　a　building　which　cuts　another　off　from　a　beautiful　prospect；　or　he　may　drain　subterranean　waters　and　thereby　drain　another's　well；　and　many　other　cases　might　be　put。

As　any　of　these　things　may　be　done　with　foresight　of　their　evil　consequences；　it　would　seem　that　they　might　be　done　with　intent；　and　even　with　malevolent　intent；　to　produce　them。　The　whole　argument　of　this　Lecture　and　the　preceding　tends　to　this　conclusion。　If　the　aim　of　liability　is　simply　to　prevent　or　indemnify　from　harm　so　far　as　is　consistent　with　avoiding　the　extreme　of　making　a　man　answer　for　accident；　when　the　law　permits　the　harm　to　be　knowingly　inflicted　it　would　be　a　strong　thing　if　the　presence　of　malice　made　any　difference　in　its　decisions。　That　might　happen；　to　be　sure；　without　affecting　the　general　views　maintained　here；　but　it　is　not　to　be　expected；　and　the　weight　of　authority　is　against　it。

As　the　law；　on　the　one　hand；　allows　certain　harms　to　be　inflicted　irrespective　of　the　moral　condition　of　him　who　inflicts　them；　so；　at　the　other　extreme；　it　may　on　grounds　of　policy　throw　the　absolute　risk　of　certain　transactions　on　the　person　engaging　in　them；　irrespective　of　blameworthiness　in　any　sense。　Instances　of　this　sort　have　been　mentioned　in　the　last　Lecture；　/1/　and　will　be　referred　to　again。

Most　liabilities　in　tort　lie　between　these　two　extremes；　and　are　founded　on　the　infliction　of　harm　which　the　defendant　had　a　reasonable　opportunity　to　avoid　at　the　time　of　the　acts　or　omissions　which　were　its　proximate　cause。　Rut　as　fast　as　specific　rules　are　worked　out　in　place　of　the　＇146＇　vague　reference　to　the　conduct　of　the　average　man；　they　range　themselves　alongside　of　other　specific　rules　based　on　public　policy；　and　the　grounds　from　which　they　spring　cease　to　be　manifest。　So　that；　as　will　be　seen　directly；　rules　which　seem　to　lie　outside　of　culpability　in　any　sense　have　sometimes　been　referred　to　remote　fault；　while　others　which　started　from　the　general　notion　of　negligence　may　with　equal　ease　be　referred　to　some　extrinsic　ground　of　policy。

Apart　from　the　extremes　just　mentioned；　it　is　now　easy　to　see　how　the　point　at　which　a　man's　conduct　begins　to　be　at　his　own　peril　is　generally　fixed。　When　the　principle　is　understood　on　which　that　point　is　determined　by　the　law　of　torts；　we　possess　a　common　ground　of　classification；　and　a　key　to　the　whole　subject；　so　far　as　tradition　has　not　swerved　the　law　from　a　consistent　theory。　It　has　been　made　pretty　clear　from　what　precedes；　that　I　find　that　ground　in　knowledge　of　circumstances　accompanying　an　act　or　conduct　indifferent　but　for　those　circumstances。

But　it　is　worth　remarking；　before　that　criterion　is　discussed；　that　a　possible　common　ground　is　reached　at　the　preceding　step　in　the　descent　from　malice　through　intent　and　foresight。　Foresight　is　a　possible　common　denominator　of　wrongs　at　the　two　extremes　of　malice　and　negligence。　The　purpose　of　the　law　is　to　prevent　or　secure　a　man　indemnity　from　harm　at　the　hands　of　his　neighbors；　so　far　as　consistent　with　other　considerations　which　have　been　mentioned；　and　excepting；　of　course；　such　harm　as　it　permits　to　be　intentionally　inflicted。　When　a　man　foresees　that　harm　will　result　from　his　conduct；　the　principle　which　exonerates　him　from　accident　no　longer　applies；　and　he　is　liable。　But；　as　has　been　shown；　he　is　bound　to　foresee　＇147＇　whatever　a　prudent　and　intelligent　man　would　have　foreseen；　and　therefore　he　is　liable　for　conduct　from　which　such　a　man　would　have　foreseen　that　harm　was　liable　to　follow。

Accordingly；　it　would　be　possible　to　state　all　cases　of　negligence　in　terms　of　imputed　or　presumed　foresight。　It　would　be　possible　even　to　press　the　presumption　further；　applying　the　very　inaccurate　maxim；　that　every　man　is　presumed　to　intend　the　natural　consequences　of　his　own　acts；　and　this　mode　of　expression　will；　in　fact；　be　found　to　have　been　occasionally　used；　/1/　more　especially　in　the　criminal　law；　where　the　notion　of　intent　has　a　stronger　foothold。　/2/　The　latter　fiction　is　more　remote　and　less　philosophical　than　the　former；　but；　after　all；　both　are　equally　fictions。　Negligence　is　not　foresight；　but　precisely　the　want　of　it；　and　if　foresight　were　presumed；　the　ground　of　the　presumption；　and　therefore　the　essential　element；　would　be　the　knowledge　of　facts　which　made　foresight　possible。

Taking　knowledge；　then；　as　the　true　starting…point；　the　next　question　is　how　to　determine　the　circumstances　necessary　to　be　known　in　any　given　case　in　order　to　make　a　man　liable　for　the　consequences　of　his　act。　They　must　be　such　as　would　have　led　a　prudent　man　to　perceive　danger；　although　not　necessarily　to　foresee　the　specific　harm。　But　this　is　a　vague　test。　How　is　it　decided　what　those　circumstances　are？　The　answer　must　be；　by　experience。


But　there　is　one　point　which　has　been　left　ambiguous　in　the　preceding　Lecture　and　here；　and　which　must　be　touched　upon。　It　has　been　assumed　that　conduct　which　＇148＇　the　man　of　ordinary　intelligence　would　perceive　to　be　dangerous　under　the　circumstances；　would　be　blameworthy　if　pursued　by　him。　It　might　not　be　so；　however。　Suppose　that；　acting　under　the　threats　of　twelve　armed　men；　which　put　him　in　fear　of　his　life；　a　man　enters　another's　close　and　takes　a　horse。　In　such　a　case；　he　actually　contemplates　and　chooses　harm　to　another　as　the　consequence　of　his　act。　Yet　the　act　is　neither　blameworthy　nor　punishable。　But　it　might　be　actionable；　and　Rolle；　C。　J。　ruled　that　it　was　so　in　Gilbert　v。　Stone。　/1/　If　this　be　law；　it　goes　the　full　length　of　deciding　that　it　is　enough　if　the　defendant　has　had　a　chance　to　avoid　inflicting　the　harm　complained　of。　And　it　may　well　be　argued　that；　although　he　does　wisely　to　ransom　his　life　as　he　best　may；　there　is　no　reason　why　he　should　be　allowed　to　intentionally　and　permanently　transfer　his　misfortunes　to　the　shoulders　of　his　neighbors。

It　cannot　be　inferred；　from　the　mere　circumstance　that　certain　conduct　is　made　actionable；　that　therefore　the　law　regards　it　as　wrong；　or　seeks　to　prevent　it。　Under　our　mill　acts　a　man　has　to　pay　for　flowing　his　neighbor's　lands；　in　the　same　way　that　he　has　to　pay　in　trover　for　converting　his　neighbor's　goods。　Yet　the　law　approves　and　encourages　the　flowing　of　lands　for　the　erection　of　mills。

Moral　predilections　must　not　be　allowed　to　influence　our　minds　in　settling　legal　distinctions。　If　we　accept　the　test　of　the　liability　alone；　how　do　we　distinguish　between　trover　and　the　mill　acts？　Or　between　conduct　which　is　prohibited；　and　that　which　is　merely　taxed？　The　only　distinction　which　I　can　see　is　in　the　difference　of　the　collateral　consequences　attached　to　the　two　classes　of　conduct。　In　the　one；　the　maxim　in　pari　delicto　potior　est　＇149＇　conditio　defendentis；　and　the　invalidity　of　contracts　contemplating　it；　show　that　the　conduct　is　outside　the　protection　of　the　law。　In　the　other；　it　is　otherwise。　/1/　This　opinion　is　confirmed　by　the　fact；　that　almost　the　only　cases　in　which　the　distinction　between　prohibition　and　taxation　comes　up　concern　the　application　of　these　maxims。

But　if　this　be　true；　liability　to　an　action　does　not　necessarily　import　wr