the common law-第24节

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d　the　knowledge　of　another's　presence　within　hearing；　still　the　act　has　no　determinate　character。　The　elements　which　make　it　immoral　are　the　knowledge　that　the　statement　is　false；　and　the　intent　that　it　shall　be　acted　on。

The　principal　question　then　is；　whether　this　intent　can　be　reduced　to　the　same　terms　as　it　has　been　in　other　cases。　There　is　no　difficulty　in　the　answer。　It　is　perfectly　clear　that　the　intent　that　a　false　representation　should　be　acted　on　would　be　conclusively　established　by　proof　that　the　defendant　knew　that　the　other　party　intended　to　act　upon　it。　If　the　defendant　foresaw　the　consequence　of　his　acts；　he　is　chargeable；　whether　his　motive　was　a　desire　to　induce　the　other　party　to　act；　or　simply　an　unwillingness　for　private　reasons　to　state　the　truth。　If　the　defendant　knew　a　present　fact　（the　other　party's　intent）；　which；　according　to　common　experience；　made　it　likely　that　his　act　would　have　the　harmful　consequence；　he　is　chargeable；　whether　he　in　fact　foresaw　the　consequence　or　not。

In　this　matter　the　general　conclusion　follows　from　a　single　instance。　For　the　moment　it　is　admitted　that　in　one　case　knowledge　of　a　present　fact；　such　as　the　other　party's　intent　to　act　on　the　false　statement；　dispenses　with　proof　of　an　intent　to　induce　him　to　act　upon　it；　it　is　admitted　that　the　lesser　element　is　all　that　is　necessary　in　the　larger　compound。　For　intent　embraces　knowledge　sufficing　for　foresight；　as　has　been　shown。　Hence；　when　you　prove　intent　you　prove　knowledge；　and　intent　may　often　＇134＇　be　the　easier　to　prove　of　the　two。　But　when　you　prove　knowledge　you　do　not　prove　intent。

It　may　be　said；　however；　that　intent　is　implied　or　presumed　in　such　a　case　as　has　been　supposed。　But　this　is　only　helping　out　a　false　theory　by　a　fiction。　It　is　very　much　like　saying　that　a　consideration　is　presumed　for　an　instrument　under　seal；　which　is　merely　a　way　of　reconciling　the　formal　theory　that　all　contracts　must　have　a　consideration　with　the　manifest　fact　that　sealed　instruments　do　not　require　one。　Whenever　it　is　said　that　a　certain　thing　is　essential　to　liability；　but　that　it　is　conclusively　presumed　from　something　else；　there　is　always　ground　for　suspicion　that　the　essential　clement　is　to　be　found　in　that　something　else；　and　not　in　what　is　said　to　be　presumed　from　it。

With　regard　to　the　intent　necessary　to　deceit；　we　need　not　stop　with　the　single　instance　which　has　been　given。　The　law　goes　no　farther　than　to　require　proof　either　of　the　intent；　or　that　the　other　party　was　justified　in　inferring　such　intention。　So　that　the　whole　meaning　of　the　requirement　is；　that　the　natural　and　manifest　tendency　of　the　representation；　under　the　known　circumstances；　must　have　been　to　induce　the　opinion　that　it　was　made　with　a　view　to　action；　and　so　to　induce　action　on　the　faith　of　it。　The　standard　of　what　is　called　intent　is　thus　really　an　external　standard　of　conduct　under　the　known　circumstances；　and　the　analysis　of　the　criminal　law　holds　good　here。

Nor　is　this　all。　The　law　pursuing　its　course　of　specification；　as　explained　in　the　last　Lecture；　decides　what　is　the　tendency　of　representations　in　certain　cases；as；　for　instance；　that　a　horse　is　sound　at　the　time　of　making　a　＇135＇　sale；　or；　in　general；　of　any　statement　of　fact　which　it　is　known　the　other　party　intends　to　rely　on。　Beyond　these　scientific　rules　lies　the　vague　realm　of　the　jury。

The　other　moral　element　in　deceit　is　knowledge　that　the　statement　was　false。　With　this　I　am　not　strictly　concerned；　because　all　that　is　necessary　is　accomplished　when　the　elements　of　risk　are　reduced　to　action　and　knowledge。　But　it　will　aid　in　the　general　object　of　showing　that　the　tendency　of　the　law　everywhere　is　to　transcend　moral　and　reach　external　standards；　if　this　knowledge　of　falsehood　can　be　transmuted　into　a　formula　not　necessarily　importing　guilt；　although；　of　course；　generally　accompanied　by　it　in　fact。　The　moment　we　look　critically　at　it；　we　find　the　moral　side　shade　away。

The　question　is；　what　known　circumstances　are　enough　throw　the　risk　of　a　statement　upon　him　who　makes　it；　if　it　induces　another　man　to　act；　and　it　turns　out　untrue。　Now；　it　is　evident　that　a　man　may　take　the　risk　of　his　statement　by　express　agreement；　or　by　an　implied　one　which　the　law　reads　into　his　bargain。　He　may　in　legal　language　warrant　the　truth　of　it；　and　if　it　is　not　true；　the　law　treats　it　as　a　fraud；　just　as　much　when　he　makes　it　fully　believing　it；　as　when　he　knows　that　it　is　untrue；　and　means　to　deceive。　If；　in　selling　a　horse；　the　seller　warranted　him　to　be　only　five　years　old；　and　in　fact　he　was　thirteen；　the　seller　could　be　sued　for　a　deceit　at　common　law；　although　he　thought　the　horse　was　only　five。　/1/　The　common…law　liability　for　the　truth　of　statements　is；　therefore；　more　extensive　than　the　sphere　of　actual　moral　fraud。　But；　again；　it　is　enough　in　general　if　a　representation　＇136＇　is　made　recklessly；　without　knowing　whether　it　is　true　or　false。　Now　what　does　〃recklessly〃　mean。　It　does　not　mean　actual　personal　indifference　to　the　truth　of　the　statement。　It　means　only　that　the　data　for　the　statement　were　so　far　insufficient　that　a　prudent　man　could　not　have　made　it　without　leading　to　the　inference　that　he　was　indifferent。　That　is　to　say；　repeating　an　analysis　which　has　been　gone　through　with　before；　it　means　that　the　law；　applying　a　general　objective　standard；　determines　that；　if　a　man　makes　his　statement　on　those　data；　he　is　liable；　whatever　was　the　state　of　his　mind；　and　although　he　individually　may　have　been　perfectly　free　from　wickedness　in　making　it。

Hence　similar　reasoning　to　that　which　has　been　applied　already　to　intent　may　be　applied　to　knowledge　of　falsity。　Actual　knowledge　may　often　be　easier　to　prove　than　that　the　evidence　was　insufficient　to　warrant　the　statement；　and　when　proved　it　contains　the　lesser　element。　But　as　soon　as　the　lesser　element　is　shown　to　be　enough；　it　is　shown　that　the　law　is　ready　to　apply　an　external　or　objective　standard　here　also。

Courts　of　equity　have　laid　down　the　doctrine　in　terms　which　are　so　wholly　irrespective　of　the　actual　moral　condition　of　the　defendant　as　to　go　to　an　opposite　extreme。　It　is　said　that　〃when　a　representation　in　a　matter　of　business　is　made　by　one　man　to　another　calculated　to　induce　him　to　adapt　his　conduct　to　it；　it　is　perfectly　immaterial　whether　the　representation　is　made　knowing　it　to　be　untrue；　or　whether　it　is　made　believing　it　to　be　true；　if；　in　fact；　it　was　untrue。〃　/1/

Perhaps　the　actual　decisions　could　be　reconciled　on　a　＇137＇　narrower　principle；　but　the　rule　just　stated　goes　the　length　of　saying　that　in　business　matters　a　man　makes　every　statement　（of　a　kind　likely　to　be　acted　on）　at　his　peril。　This　seems　hardly　justifiable　in　policy。　The　moral　starting　point　of　liability　in　general　should　never　be　forgotten；　and　the　law　cannot　without　disregarding　it　hold　a　man　answerable　for　statements　based　on　facts　which　would　have　convinced　a　wise　and　prudent　man　of　their　truth。　The　public　advantage　and　necessity　of　freedom　in　imparting　information；　which　privileges　even　the　slander　of　a　third　person；　ought　a　fortiori；　it　seems　to　me；　to　privilege　statements　made　at　the　request　of　the　party　who　complains　of　them。

The　common　law；　at　any　rate；　preserves　the　reference　to　morality　by　making　fraud　the　ground　on　which　it　goes。　It　does　not　hold　that　a　man　always　speaks　at　his　peril。　But　starting　from　the　moral　ground；　it　works　out　an　external　standard　of　what　would　be　fraudulent　in　the　average　prudent　member　of　the　community；　and　requires　every　member　at　his　peril　to　avoid　that。　As　in　other　cases；　it　is　gradually　accumulating　precedents　which　decide　that　certain　statements　under　certain　circumstances　are　at　the　peril　of　the　party　who　makes　them。

The　elements　of　deceit　which　throw　the　risk　of　his　conduct　upon　a　party　are　these。　First；　making　a　statement　of　facts　purporting　to　be　serious。　Second；　the　known　presence　of　another　within　hearing。　Third；　known　facts　sufficient　to　warrant　the　expectation　or　suggest　the　probability　that　the　other　party　will　act　on　the　statement。　（What　facts　are　sufficient　has　been　specifically　determined　by　the　courts　in　some　instances；　in　others；　no　doubt；　the　question　would　go　to　the　jury　on　the　principles　heretofore　explained。）　Fourth；　the　＇138＇　falsehood　of　the　statement。　This　must　be　known；　or　else　the　known　evidence　concerning　the　matter　of　the　statement　must　be　such　as　would　not　warrant　belief　according　to　the　ordinary　course　of　human　experience。　（On　this　point　also　the　court　may　be　found　to　lay　down　specific　rules　in　some　cases。　/1/）

I　next　take　up　the　law　of　slander。　It　has　often　been　said　that　malice　is　one　of　the　elements　of　liability；　and　the　doctrine　is　commonly　stated　in　this　way：　that　malice　must　exist；　but　that　it　is　presumed　by　law　from　the　mere　speaking　of　the　words；　that　again　you　may　rebut　this　presumption　of　malice　by　showing　that　the　words　were　spoken　under　circumstances　which　made　the　communication　privileged；　as；　for　instance；　by　a　lawyer　in　the　necessary　course　of　his　argument；　or　by　a　person　answering　in　good　faith　to　inquiries　as　to　the　character　of　a　former　servant；…　and　then；　it　is　said；　the　plaintiff　may　meet　this　defence　in　some　cases　by　showing　that　the　words　were　spoken　with　act