the common law-第21节

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ng　that　the　defendant　was　free　from　negligence；　should　have　been　spread　upon　the　record；　in　order　that　the　court　might　judge。　A　similar　requirement　was　laid　down　with　regard　to　the　defence　of　probable　cause　in　an　action　for　malicious　prosecution。　/2/　And　to　this　day　the　question　of　probable　cause　is　always　passed　on　by　the　court。　Later　evidence　will　be　found　in　what　follows。

There　is；　however；　an　important　consideration；　which　has　not　yet　been　adverted　to。　It　is　undoubtedly　possible　that　those　who　have　the　making　of　the　law　should　deem　it　〃wise　to　put　the　mark　higher　in　some　cases　than　the　point　established　by　common　practice　at　which　blameworthiness　begins。　For　instance；　in　Morris　v。　Platt；　/2/　the　court；　while　declaring　in　the　strongest　terms　that；　in　general；　＇116＇　negligence　is　the　foundation　of　liability　for　accidental　trespasses；　nevertheless　hints　that；　if　a　decision　of　the　point　were　necessary；　it　might　hold　a　defendant　to　a　stricter　rule　where　the　damage　was　caused　by　a　pistol；　in　view　of　the　danger　to　the　public　of　the　growing　habit　of　carrying　deadly　weapons。　Again；　it　might　well　seem　that　to　enter　a　man's　house　for　the　purpose　of　carrying　a　present；　or　inquiring　after　his　health　when　he　was　ill；　was　a　harmless　and　rather　praiseworthy　act；　although　crossing　the　owner's　boundary　was　intentional。　It　is　not　supposed　that　an　action　would　lie　at　the　present　day　for　such　a　cause；　unless　the　defendant　had　been　forbidden　the　house。　Yet　in　the　time　of　Henry　VIII。　it　was　said　to　be　actionable　if　without　license；　〃for　then　under　that　color　my　enemy　might　be　in　my　house　and　kill　me。〃　/1/　There　is　a　clear　case　where　public　policy　establishes　a　standard　of　overt　acts　without　regard　to　fault　in　any　sense。　In　like　manner；　policy　established　exceptions　to　the　general　prohibition　against　entering　another's　premises；　as　in　the　instance　put　by　Chief　Justice　Choke　in　the　Year　Book；　of　a　tree　being　blown　over　upon　them；　or　when　the　highway　became　impassable；　or　for　the　purpose　of　keeping　the　peace。　/2/

Another　example　may　perhaps　be　found　in　the　shape　which　has　been　given　in　modern　times　to　the　liability　for　animals；　and　in　the　derivative　principle　of　Rylands　v。　Fletcher；　/3/　that　when　a　person　brings　on　his　lands；　and　collects　and　keeps　there；　anything　likely　to　do　mischief　if　it　escapes；　he　must　keep　it　in　at　his　peril；　and；　if　he　does　not　do　so；　is　prima　facie　answerable　for　all　the　＇117＇　damage　which　is　the　natural　consequence　of　its　escape。　Cases　of　this　sort　do　not　stand　on　the　notion　that　it　is　wrong　to　keep　cattle；　or　to　have　a　reservoir　of　water；　as　might　have　been　thought　with　more　plausibility　when　fierce　and　useless　animals　only　were　in　question。　/1/　It　may　even　be　very　much　for　the　public　good　that　the　dangerous　accumulation　should　be　made　（a　consideration　which　might　influence　the　decision　in　some　instances；　and　differently　in　different　jurisdictions）；　but　as　there　is　a　limit　to　the　nicety　of　inquiry　which　is　possible　in　a　trial；　it　may　be　considered　that　the　safest　way　to　secure　care　is　to　throw　the　risk　upon　the　person　who　decides　what　precautions　shall　be　taken。　The　liability　for　trespasses　of　cattle　seems　to　lie　on　the　boundary　line　between　rules　based　on　policy　irrespective　of　fault；　and　requirements　intended　to　formulate　the　conduct　of　a　prudent　man。

It　has　been　shown　in　the　first　Lecture　how　this　liability　for　cattle　arose　in　the　early　law；　and　how　far　the　influence　of　early　notions　might　be　traced　in　the　law　of　today；　Subject　to　what　is　there　said；　it　is　evident　that　the　early　discussions　turn　on　the　general　consideration　whether　the　owner　is　or　is　not　to　blame。　/2/　But　they　do　not　stop　there：　they　go　on　to　take　practical　distinctions；　based　on　common　experience。　Thus；　when　the　defendant　chased　sheep　out　of　his　land　with　a　dog；　and　as　soon　as　the　sheep　were　out　called　in　his　dog；　but　the　dog　pursued　them　into　adjoining　land；　the　chasing　of　the　sheep　beyond　the　defendant's　line　was　held　no　trespass；　because　〃the　nature　of　a　dog　is　such　that　he　cannot　be　ruled　suddenly。〃　/3/

＇118＇　It　was　lawful　in　ploughing　to　turn　the　horses　on　adjoining　land；　and　if　while　so　turning　the　beasts　took　a　mouthful　of　grass；　or　subverted　the　soil　with　the　plough；　against　the　will　of　the　driver；　he　had　a　good　justification；　because　the　law　will　recognize　that　a　man　cannot　at　every　instant　govern　his　cattle　as　he　will。　/1/　So　it　was　said　that；　if　a　man　be　driving　cattle　through　a　town；　and　one　of　them　goes　into　another　man's　house；　and　he　follows　him；　trespass　does　not　lie　for　this。　/2/　So　it　was　said　by　Doderidge；　J。；　in　the　same　case；　that　if　deer　come　into　my　land　out　of　the　forest；　and　I　chase　them　with　dogs；　it　is　excuse　enough　for　me　to　wind　my　horn　to　recall　the　dogs；　because　by　this　the　warden　of　the　forest　has　notice　that　a　deer　is　being　chased。　/3/

The　very　case　of　Mason　v。　Keeling；　/4/　which　is　referred　to　in　the　first　Lecture　for　its　echo　of　primitive　notions；　shows　that　the　working　rules　of　the　law　had　long　been　founded　on　good　sense。　With　regard　to　animals　not　then　treated　as　property；　which　in　the　main　were　the　wilder　animals；　the　law　was　settled　that；　〃if　they　are　of　a　tame　nature；　there　must　be　notice　of　the　ill　quality；　and　the　law　takes　notice；　that　a　dog　is　not　of　a　fierce　nature；　but　rather　the　contrary。〃　/5/　If　the　animals　〃are　such　as　are　naturally　＇119＇　mischievous　in　their　kind；　he　shall　answer　for　hurt　done　by　them；　without　any　notice。〃　/1/　The　latter　principle　has　been　applied　to　the　case　of　a　bear；　/2/　and　amply　accounts　for　the　liability　of　the　owner　of　such　animals　as　horses　and　oxen　in　respect　of　trespasses　upon　land；　although；　as　has　been　seen；　it　was　at　one　time　thought　to　stand　upon　his　ownership。　It　is　said　to　be　the　universal　nature　of　cattle　to　stray；　and；　when　straying　in　cultivated　land；　to　do　damage　by　trampling　down　and　eating　the　crops；　whereas　a　dog　does　no　harm。　It　is　also　said　to　be　usual　and　easy　to　restrain　them。　/3/　If；　as　has　been　suggested；　the　historical　origin　of　the　rule　was　different；　it　does　not　matter。

Following　the　same　line　of　thought；　the　owner　of　cattle　is　not　held　absolutely　answerable　for　all　damage　which　they　may　do　the　person。　According　to　Lord　Holt　in　the　alcove　opinion；　these　animals；　〃which　are　not　so　familiar　to　mankind〃　as　dogs；　〃the　owner　ought　to　confine；　and　take　all　reasonable　caution　that　they　do　no　mischief。。。。　But　。。。　if　the　owner　puts　a　horse　or　an　ox　to　grass　in　his　field；　which　is　adjoining　to　the　highway；　and　the　horse　or　the　ox　breaks　the　hedge　and　runs　into　the　highway；　and　kicks　or　gores　some　passenger；　an　action　will　not　lie　against　the　owner；　otherwise；　if　he　had　notice　that　they　had　done　such　a　thing　before。〃

＇120＇　Perhaps　the　most　striking　authority　for　the　position　that　the　judge's　duties　are　not　at　an　end　when　the　question　of　negligence　is　reached；　is　shown　by　the　discussions　concerning　the　law　of　bailment。　Consider　the　judgment　in　Coggs　v。　Bernard；　/1/　the　treatises　of　Sir　William　Jones　and　Story；　and　the　chapter　of　Kent　upon　the　subject。　They　are　so　many　attempts　to　state　the　duty　of　the　bailee　specifically；　according　to　the　nature　of　the　bailment　and　of　the　object　bailed。　Those　attempts；　to　be　sure；　were　not　successful；　partly　because　they　were　attempts　to　engraft　upon　the　native　stock　a　branch　of　the　Roman　law　which　was　too　large　to　survive　the　process；　but　more　especially　because　the　distinctions　attempted　were　purely　qualitative；　and　were　therefore　useless　when　dealing　with　a　jury。　/2/　To　instruct　a　jury　that　they　must　find　the　defendant　guilty　of　gross　negligence　before　he　can　be　charged；　is　open　to　the　reproach　that　for　such　a　body　the　word　〃gross〃　is　only　a　vituperative　epithet。　But　it　would　not　be　so　with　a　judge　sitting　in　admiralty　without　a　jury。　The　Roman　law　and　the　Supreme　Court　of　the　United　States　agree　that　the　word　means　something。　/3/　Successful　or　not；　it　is　enough　for　the　present　argument　that　the　attempt　has　been　made。

The　principles　of　substantive　law　which　have　been　established　by　the　courts　are　believed　to　have　been　somewhat　obscured　by　having　presented　themselves　oftenest　in　the　form　of　rulings　upon　the　sufficiency　of　evidence。　When　a　judge　rules　that　there　is　no　evidence　of　negligence；　he　does　something　more　than　is　embraced　in　an　ordinary　ruling　that　there　is　no　evidence　of　a　fact。　He　rules　that　＇121＇　acts　or　omissions　proved　or　in　question　do　not　constitute　a　ground　of　legal　liability；　and　in　this　way　the　law　is　gradually　enriching　itself　from　daily　life；　as　it　should。　Thus；　in　Crafton　v。　Metropolitan　Railway　Co。；　/1/　the　plaintiff　slipped　on　the　defendant's　stairs　and　was　severely　hurt。　The　cause　of　his　slipping　was　that　the　brass　nosing　of　the　stairs　had　been　worn　smooth　by　travel　over　it；　and　a　builder　testified　that　in　his　opinion　the　staircase　was　unsafe　by　reason　of　this　circumstance　and　the　absence　of　a　hand…rail。　There　was　nothing　to　contradict　this　except　that　great　numbers　of　persons　had　passed　over　the　stairs　and　that　no　accident　had　happened　there；　and　the　plaintiff　had　a　verdict。　The　court　set　the　verdict　aside；　and　ordered　a　nonsuit。　The　ruling　was　in　form　that　there　was　no　evidence　of　negligence　to　go　to　the　jury；　but　this　was　obviously　equivalent　to　saying；　and　did　in　fact　mean；　that　the　railroa