the common law-第20节

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　other；　it　does　not　in　general　hold　him　liable　for　unintentional　injury；　unless；　possessing　such　capacity；　he　might　and　ought　to　have　foreseen　the　danger；　or；　in　other　words；　unless　a　man　of　ordinary　intelligence　and　forethought　would　have　been　to　blame　for　acting　as　he　did。　The　next　question　is；　whether　this　vague　test　is　all　that　the　law　has　to　say　upon　the　matter；　and　the　same　question　in　another　form；　by　whom　this　test　is　to　be　applied。

Notwithstanding　the　fact　that　the　grounds　of　legal　liability　are　moral　to　the　extent　above　explained；　it　must　be　borne　in　mind　that　law　only　works　within　the　sphere　of　the　senses。　If　the　external　phenomena；　the　manifest　acts　and　omissions；　are　such　as　it　requires；　it　is　wholly　indifferent　to　the　internal　phenomena　of　conscience。　A　man　may　have　as　bad　a　heart　as　he　chooses；　if　his　conduct　is　within　the　rules。　In　other　words；　the　standards　of　the　law　are　external　standards；　and；　however　much　it　may　take　moral　considerations　into　account；　it　does　so　only　for　the　purpose　of　drawing　a　line　between　such　bodily　motions　and　rests　as　it　permits；　and　such　as　it　does　not。　What　the　law　really　forbids；　and　the　only　thing　it　forbids；　is　the　act　on　the　wrong　side　of　the　line；　be　that　act　blameworthy　or　otherwise。

Again；　any　legal　standard　must；　in　theory；　be　one　which　would　apply　to　all　men；　not　specially　excepted；　under　the　same　circumstances。　It　is　not　intended　that　the　public　force　should　fall　upon　an　individual　accidentally；　or　at　the　whim　of　any　body　of　men。　The　standard；　that　is；　＇111＇　must　be　fixed。　In　practice；　no　doubt；　one　man　may　have　to　pay　and　another　may　escape；　according　to　the　different　feelings　of　different　juries。　But　this　merely　shows　that　the　law　does　not　perfectly　accomplish　its　ends。　The　theory　or　intention　of　the　law　is　not　that　the　feeling　of　approbation　or　blame　which　a　particular　twelve　may　entertain　should　be　the　criterion。　They　are　supposed　to　leave　their　idiosyncrasies　on　one　side；　and　to　represent　the　feeling　of　the　community。　The　ideal　average　prudent　man；　whose　equivalent　the　jury　is　taken　to　be　in　many　cases；　and　whose　culpability　or　innocence　is　the　supposed　test；　is　a　constant；　and　his　conduct　under　given　circumstances　is　theoretically　always　the　same。

Finally；　any　legal　standard　must；　in　theory；　be　capable　of　being　known。　When　a　man　has　to　pay　damages；　he　is　supposed　to　have　broken　the　law；　and　he　is　further　supposed　to　have　known　what　the　law　was。

If；　now；　the　ordinary　liabilities　in　tort　arise　from　failure　to　comply　with　fixed　and　uniform　standards　of　external　conduct；　which　every　man　is　presumed　and　required　to　know；　it　is　obvious　that　it　ought　to　be　possible；　sooner　or　later；　to　formulate　these　standards　at　least　to　some　extent；　and　that　to　do　so　must　at　last　be　the　business　of　the　court。　It　is　equally　clear　that　the　featureless　generality；　that　the　defendant　was　bound　to　use　such　care　as　a　prudent　man　would　do　under　the　circumstances；　ought　to　be　continually　giving　place　to　the　specific　one；　that　he　was　bound　to　use　this　or　that　precaution　under　these　or　those　circumstances。　The　standard　which　the　defendant　was　bound　to　come　up　to　was　a　standard　of　specific　acts　or　omissions；　with　reference　to　the　specific　circumstances　in　which　he　found　himself。　If　in　the　whole　department　of　＇112＇　unintentional　wrongs　the　courts　arrived　at　no　further　utterance　than　the　question　of　negligence；　and　left　every　case；　without　rudder　or　compass；　to　the　jury；　they　would　simply　confess　their　inability　to　state　a　very　large　part　of　the　law　which　they　required　the　defendant　to　know；　and　would　assert；　by　implication；　that　nothing　could　be　learned　by　experience。　But　neither　courts　nor　legislatures　have　ever　stopped　at　that　point。

》From　the　time　of　Alfred　to　the　present　day；　statutes　and　decisions　have　busied　themselves　with　defining　the　precautions　to　be　taken　in　certain　familiar　cases；　that　is；　with　substituting　for　the　vague　test　of　the　care　exercised　by　a　prudent　man；　a　precise　one　of　specific　acts　or　omissions。　The　fundamental　thought　is　still　the　same；　that　the　way　prescribed　is　that　in　which　prudent　men　are　in　the　habit　of　acting；　or　else　is　one　laid　down　for　cases　where　prudent　men　might　otherwise　be　in　doubt。

It　will　be　observed　that　the　existence　of　the　external　tests　of　liability　which　will　be　mentioned；　while　it　illustrates　the　tendency　of　the　law　of　tort　to　become　more　and　more　concrete　by　judicial　decision　and　by　statute；　does　not　interfere　with　the　general　doctrine　maintained　as　to　the　grounds　of　liability。　The　argument　of　this　Lecture；　although　opposed　to　the　doctrine　that　a　man　acts　or　exerts　force　at　his　peril；　is　by　no　means　opposed　to　the　doctrine　that　he　does　certain　particular　acts　at　his　peril。　It　is　the　coarseness；　not　the　nature；　of　the　standard　which　is　objected　to。　If；　when　the　question　of　the　defendant's　negligence　is　left　to　a　jury；　negligence　does　not　mean　the　actual　state　of　the　defendant's　mind；　but　a　failure　to　act　as　a　prudent　man　of　average　intelligence　would　have　done；　he　is　required　to　conform　to　an　objective　standard　at　his　＇113＇　peril；　even　in　that　case。　When　a　more　exact　and　specific　rule　has　been　arrived　at；　he　must　obey　that　rule　at　his　peril　to　the　same　extent。　But；　further；　if　the　law　is　wholly　a　standard　of　external　conduct；　a　man　must　always　comply　with　that　standard　at　his　peril。

Some　examples　of　the　process　of　specification　will　be　useful。　In　LL。　Alfred；　36；　/1/　providing　for　the　case　of　a　man's　staking　himself　on　a　spear　carried　by　another；　we　read；　〃Let　this　（liability）　be　if　the　point　be　three　fingers　higher　than　the　hindmost　part　of　the　shaft；　if　they　be　both　on　a　level；　。。。　be　that　without　danger。〃

The　rule　of　the　road　and　the　sailing　rules　adopted　by　Congress　from　England　are　modern　examples　of　such　statutes。　By　the　former　rule；　the　question　has　been　narrowed　from　the　vague　one；　Was　the　party　negligent？　to　the　precise　one；　Was　he　on　the　right　or　left　of　the　road？　To　avoid　a　possible　misconception；　it　may　be　observed　that；　of　course；　this　question　does　not　necessarily　and　under　all　circumstances　decide　that　of　liability；　a　plaintiff　may　have　been　on　the　wrong　side　of　the　road；　as　he　may　have　been　negligent；　and　yet　the　conduct　of　the　defendant　may　have　been　unjustifiable；　and　a　ground　of　liability。　/2/　So；　no　doubt；　a　defendant　could　justify　or　excuse　being　on　the　wrong　side；　under　some　circumstances。　The　difference　between　alleging　that　a　defendant　was　on　the　wrong　side　of　the　road；　and　that　he　was　negligent；　is　the　difference　between　an　allegation　of　facts　requiring　to　be　excused　by　a　counter　allegation　of　further　facts　to　prevent　their　being　a　ground　of　liability；　and　an　allegation　which　involves　a　conclusion　of　law；　and　denies　in　advance　the　existence　of　an　＇114＇　excuse。　Whether　the　former　allegation　ought　not　to　be　enough；　and　whether　the　establishment　of　the　fact　ought　not　to　shift　the　burden　of　proof；　are　questions　which　belong　to　the　theory　of　pleading　and　evidence；　and　could　be　answered　either　way　consistently　with　analogy。　I　should　have　no　difficulty　in　saying　that　the　allegation　of　facts　which　are　ordinarily　a　ground　of　liability；　and　which　would　be　so　unless　excused；　ought　to　be　sufficient。　But　the　forms　of　the　law；　especially　the　forms　of　pleading；　do　not　change　with　every　change　of　its　substance；　and　a　prudent　lawyer　would　use　the　broader　and　safer　phrase。

The　same　course　of　specification　which　has　been　illustrated　from　the　statute…　book　ought　also　to　be　taking　place　in　the　growth　of　judicial　decisions。　That　this　should　happen　is　in　accordance　with　the　past　history　of　the　law。　It　has　been　suggested　already　that　in　the　days　of　the　assize　and　jurata　the　court　decided　whether　the　facts　constituted　a　ground　of　liability　in　all　ordinary　cases。　A　question　of　negligence　might；　no　doubt；　have　gone　to　the　jury。　Common　sense　and　common　knowledge　are　as　often　sufficient　to　determine　whether　proper　care　has　been　taken　of　an　animal；　as　they　are　to　say　whether　A　or　B　owns　it。　The　cases　which　first　arose　were　not　of　a　kind　to　suggest　analysis；　and　negligence　was　used　as　a　proximately　simple　element　for　a　long　time　before　the　need　or　possibility　of　analysis　was　felt。　Still；　when　an　issue　of　this　sort　is　found；　the　dispute　is　rather　what　the　acts　or　omissions　of　the　defendant　were　than　on　the　standard　of　conduct。　/1/　The　＇115＇　distinction　between　the　functions　of　court　and　jury　does　not　come　in　question　until　the　parties　differ　as　to　the　standard　of　conduct。　Negligence；　like　ownership；　is　a　complex　conception。　Just　as　the　latter　imports　the　existence　of　certain　facts；　and　also　the　consequence　（protection　against　all　the　world）　which　the　law　attaches　to　those　facts；　the　former　imports　the　existence　of　certain　facts　（conduct）　and　also　the　consequence　（liability）　which　the　law　attaches　to　those　facts。　In　most　cases　the　question　is　upon　the　facts；　and　it　is　only　occasionally　that　one　arises　on　the　consequence。

It　will　have　been　noticed　how　the　judges　pass　on　the　defendant's　acts　（on　grounds　of　fault　and　public　policy）　in　the　case　of　the　thorns；　and　that　in　Weaver　v。　Ward　/1/it　is　said　that　the　facts　constituting　an　excuse；　and　showing　that　the　defendant　was　free　from　negligence；　should　have　been　spread　upon　the　record；　in　order　th