the common law-第19节

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　Blackstone；　in　Scott　v。　Shepherd；　are　both　taken　from　dissenting　opinions。　In　the　latter　case　it　is　pretty　clear　that　the　majority　of　the　court　considered　that　to　repel　personal　danger　by　instantaneously　tossing　away　a　squib　thrown　by　another　upon　one's　stall　was　not　a　trespass；　although　a　new　motion　was　thereby　imparted　to　the　squib；　and　the　plaintiff's　eye　was　put　out　in　consequence。　The　last　case　cited　above；　in　stating　the　arguments　for　absolute　responsibility；　was　Leame　v。　Bray。　/2/　The　question　under　discussion　was　whether　the　action　（for　running　down　the　plaintiff）　should　not　have　been　case　rather　than　trespass；　the　defendant　founding　his　objection　to　trespass　on　the　ground　that　the　injury　happened　through　his　neglect；　but　was　not　done　wilfully。　There　was　therefore　no　question　of　absolute　responsibility　for　one's　acts　＇105＇　before　the　court；　as　negligence　was　admitted；　and　the　language　used　is　all　directed　simply　to　the　proposition　that　the　damage　need　not　have　been　done　intentionally。

In　Wakeman　v。　Robinson；　/1/another　runaway　case；　there　was　evidence　that　the　defendant　pulled　the　wrong　rein；　and　that　he　ought　to　have　kept　a　straight　course。　The　jury　were　instructed　that；　if　the　injury　was　occasioned　by　an　immediate　act　of　the　defendant；　it　was　immaterial　whether　the　act　was　wilful　or　accidental。　On　motion　for　a　new　trial；　Dallas；　C。　J。　said；　〃If　the　accident　happened　entirely　without　default　on　the　part　of　the　defendant；　or　blame　imputable　to　him；　the　action　does　not　lie　。。。。The　accident　was　clearly　occasioned　by　the　default　of　the　defendant。　The　weight　of　evidence　was　all　that　way。　I　am　now　called　upon　to　grant　a　new　trial；　contrary　to　the　justice　of　the　case；　upon　the　ground；　that　the　jury　were　not　called　on　to　consider　whether　the　accident　was　unavoidable；　or　occasioned　by　the　fault　of　the　defendant。　There　can　be　no　doubt　that　the　learned　judge　who　presided　would　have　taken　the　opinion　of　the　jury　on　that　ground；　if　he　had　been　requested　so　to　do。〃　This　language　may　have　been　inapposite　under　the　defendant's　plea　（the　general　issue）；　but　the　pleadings　were　not　adverted　to；　and　the　doctrine　is　believed　to　be　sound。

In　America　there　have　been　several　decisions　to　the　point。　In　Brown　v。　Kendall；　/2/　Chief　Justice　Shaw　settled　the　question　for　Massachusetts。　That　was　trespass　for　assault　and　battery；　and　it　appeared　that　the　defendant；　while　trying　to　separate　two　fighting　dogs；　had　raised　his　stick　over　his　shoulder　in　the　act　of　striking；　and　had　accidentally　hit　the　plaintiff　in　the　eye；　inflicting　upon　him　a　＇106＇　severe　injury。　The　case　was　stronger　for　the　plaintiff　than　if　the　defendant　had　been　acting　in　self…defence；　but　the　court　held　that；　although　the　defendant　was　bound　by　no　duty　to　separate　the　dogs；　yet；　if　he　was　doing　a　lawful　act；　he　was　not　liable　unless　he　was　wanting　in　the　care　which　men　of　ordinary　prudence　would　use　under　the　circumstances；　and　that　the　burden　was　on　the　plaintiff　to　prove　the　want　of　such　care。

In　such　a　matter　no　authority　is　more　deserving　of　respect　than　that　of　Chief　Justice　Shaw；　for　the　strength　of　that　great　judge　lay　in　an　accurate　appreciation　of　the　requirements　of　the　community　whose　officer　he　was。　Some；　indeed　many；　English　judges　could　be　named　who　have　surpassed　him　in　accurate　technical　knowledge；　but　few　have　lived　who　were　his　equals　in　their　understanding　of　the　grounds　of　public　policy　to　which　all　laws　must　ultimately　be　referred。　It　was　this　which　made　him；　in　the　language　of　the　late　Judge　Curtis；　the　greatest　magistrate　which　this　country　has　produced。

Brown　v。　Kendall　has　been　followed　in　Connecticut；　/1/　in　a　case　where　a　man　fired　a　pistol；　in　lawful　self…defence　as　he　alleged；　and　hit　a　bystander。　The　court　was　strongly　of　opinion　that　the　defendant　was　not　answerable　on　the　general　principles　of　trespass；　unless　there　was　a　failure　to　use　such　care　as　was　practicable　under　the　circumstances。　The　foundation　of　liability　in　trespass　as　well　as　case　was　said　to　be　negligence。　The　Supreme　Court　of　the　United　States　has　given　the　sanction　of　its　approval　to　the　same　doctrine。　/2/　The　language　of　Harvey　v。　Dunlop　/3/　has　been　＇107＇　quoted；　and　there　is　a　case　in　Vermont　which　tends　in　the　same　direction。　/1/

Supposing　it　now　to　be　conceded　that　the　general　notion　upon　which　liability　to　an　action　is　founded　is　fault　or　blameworthiness　in　some　sense；　the　question　arises；　whether　it　is　so　in　the　sense　of　personal　moral　shortcoming；　as　would　practically　result　from　Austin's　teaching。　The　language　of　Rede；　J。；　which　has　been　quoted　from　the　Year　Book；　gives　a　sufficient　answer。〃　In　trespass　the　intent〃　（we　may　say　more　broadly；　the　defendant's　state　of　mind）　〃cannot　be　construed。〃　Suppose　that　a　defendant　were　allowed　to　testify　that；　before　acting；　he　considered　carefully　what　would　be　the　conduct　of　a　prudent　man　under　the　circumstances；　and；　having　formed　the　best　judgment　he　could；　acted　accordingly。　If　the　story　was　believed；　it　would　be　conclusive　against　the　defendant's　negligence　judged　by　a　moral　standard　which　would　take　his　personal　characteristics　into　account。　But　supposing　any　such　evidence　to　have　got　before　the　jury；　it　is　very　clear　that　the　court　would　say；　Gentlemen；　the　question　is　not　whether　the　defendant　thought　his　conduct　was　that　of　a　prudent　man；　but　whether　you　think　it　was。　/2/

Some　middle　point　must　be　found　between　the　horns　of　this　dilemma。

＇108　The　standards　of　the　law　are　standards　of　general　application。　The　law　takes　no　account　of　the　infinite　varieties　of　temperament；　intellect；　and　education　which　make　the　internal　character　of　a　given　act　so　different　in　different　men。　It　does　not　attempt　to　see　men　as　God　sees　them；　for　more　than　one　sufficient　reason。　In　the　first　place；　the　impossibility　of　nicely　measuring　a　man's　powers　and　limitations　is　far　clearer　than　that　of　ascertaining　his　knowledge　of　law；　which　has　been　thought　to　account　for　what　is　called　the　presumption　that　every　man　knows　the　law。　But　a　more　satisfactory　explanation　is；　that；　when　men　live　in　society；　a　certain　average　of　conduct；　a　sacrifice　of　individual　peculiarities　going　beyond　a　certain　point；　is　necessary　to　the　general　welfare。　If；　for　instance；　a　man　is　born　hasty　and　awkward；　is　always　having　accidents　and　hurting　himself　or　his　neighbors；　no　doubt　his　congenital　defects　will　be　allowed　for　in　the　courts　of　Heaven；　but　his　slips　are　no　less　troublesome　to　his　neighbors　than　if　they　sprang　from　guilty　neglect。　His　neighbors　accordingly　require　him；　at　his　proper　peril；　to　come　up　to　their　standard；　and　the　courts　which　they　establish　decline　to　take　his　personal　equation　into　account。

The　rule　that　the　law　does；　in　general；　determine　liability　by　blameworthiness；　is　subject　to　the　limitation　that　minute　differences　of　character　are　not　allowed　for。　The　law　considers；　in　other　words；　what　would　be　blameworthy　in　the　average　man；　the　man　of　ordinary　intelligence　and　prudence；　and　determines　liability　by　that。　If　we　fall　below　the　level　in　those　gifts；　it　is　our　misfortune；　so　much　as　that　we　must　have　at　our　peril；　for　the　reasons　just　given。　But　he　who　is　intelligent　and　prudent　does　not　act　at　his　peril；　in　theory　of　law。　On　the　contrary；　it　is　＇109＇　only　when　he　fails　to　exercise　the　foresight　of　which　he　is　capable；　or　exercises　it　with　evil　intent；　that　he　is　answerable　for　the　consequences。

There　are　exceptions　to　the　principle　that　every　man　is　presumed　to　possess　ordinary　capacity　to　avoid　harm　to　his　neighbors；　which　illustrate　the　rule；　and　also　the　moral　basis　of　liability　in　general。　When　a　man　has　a　distinct　defect　of　such　a　nature　that　all　can　recognize　it　as　making　certain　precautions　impossible；　he　will　not　be　held　answerable　for　not　taking　them。　A　blind　man　is　not　required　to　see　at　his　peril；　and　although　he　is；　no　doubt；　bound　to　consider　his　infirmity　in　regulating　his　actions；　yet　if　he　properly　finds　himself　in　a　certain　situation；　the　neglect　of　precautions　requiring　eyesight　would　not　prevent　his　recovering　for　an　injury　to　himself；　and；　it　may　be　presumed；　would　not　make　him　liable　for　injuring　another。　So　it　is　held　that；　in　cases　where　he　is　the　plaintiff；　an　infant　of　very　tender　years　is　only　bound　to　take　the　precautions　of　which　an　infant　is　capable；　the　same　principle　may　be　cautiously　applied　where　he　is　defendant。　/1/　Insanity　is　a　more　difficult　matter　to　deal　with；　and　no　general　rule　can　be　laid　down　about　it。　There　is　no　doubt　that　in　many　cases　a　man　may　be　insane；　and　yet　perfectly　capable　of　taking　the　precautions；　and　of　being　influenced　by　the　motives；　which　the　circumstances　demand。　But　if　insanity　of　a　pronounced　type　exists；　manifestly　incapacitating　the　sufferer　from　complying　with　the　rule　which　he　has　broken；　good　sense　would　require　it　to　be　admitted　as　an　excuse。

Taking　the　qualification　last　established　in　connection　with　the　general　proposition　previously　laid　down；　it　will　＇110＇　now　be　assumed　that；　on　the　one　hand；　the　law　presumes　or　requires　a　man　to　possess　ordinary　capacity　to　avoid　harming　his　neighbors；　unless　a　clear　and　manifest　incapacity　be　shown；　but　that；　on　the　other；　it　does　not　in　general　hold　him　liable　for　unintentional　injury；　unless；　possessing　such　cap