the common law-第18节

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r　or　assumpsit　as　it　would　have　been　to　compel　a　surrender　of　the　thing。　But　the　question　whether　the　defendant　has　subsequently　paid　over　the　proceeds　of　the　sale　of　a　chattel　to　a　third　person；　cannot　affect　the　rights　of　the　true　owner　of　the　＇99＇　chattel。　In　the　supposed　case　of　an　auctioneer；　for　instance；　if　he　had　paid　the　true　owner；　it　would　have　been　an　answer　to　his　bailor's　claim。　If　he　has　paid　his　bailor　instead；　he　has　paid　one　whom　he　was　not　bound　to　pay；　and　no　general　principle　requires　that　this　should　be　held　to　divest　the　plaintiff's　right。

Another　consideration　affecting　the　argument　that　the　law　as　to　trespasses　upon　property　establishes　a　general　principle；　is　that　the　defendant's　knowledge　or　ignorance　of　the　plaintiff's　title　is　likely　to　lie　wholly　in　his　own　breast；　and　therefore　hardly　admits　of　satisfactory　proof。　Indeed；　in　many　cases　it　cannot　have　been　open　to　evidence　at　all　at　the　time　when　the　law　was　settled；　before　parties　were　permitted　to　testify。　Accordingly；　in　Basely　v。　Clarkson；　/1/　where　the　defence　set　up　to　an　action　of　trespass　quare　clausum　was　that　the　defendant　in　mowing　his　own　land　involuntarily　and　by　mistake　mowed　down　some　of　the　plaintiff's　grass；　the　plaintiff　had　judgment　on　demurrer。　〃For　it　appears　the　fact　was　voluntary；　and　his　intention　and　knowledge　are　not　traversable；　they　can't　be　known。〃

This　language　suggests　that　it　would　be　sufficient　to　explain　the　law　of　trespass　upon　property　historically；　without　attempting　to　justify　it。　For　it　seems　to　be　admitted　that　if　the　defendant's　mistake　could　be　proved　it　might　be　material。　/2/　It　will　be　noticed；　further；　that　any　general　argument　from　the　law　of　trespass　upon　laud　to　that　governing　trespass　against　the　person　is　shown　to　be　misleading　by　the　law　as　to　cattle。　The　owner　is　bound　at　his　peril　＇100＇　to　keep　them　off　his　neighbor's　premises；　but　he　is　not　bound　at　his　peril　in　all　cases　to　keep　them　from　his　neighbor's　person。

The　objections　to　such　a　decision　as　supposed　in　the　case　of　an　auctioneer　do　not　rest　on　the　general　theory　of　liability；　but　spring　altogether　from　the　special　exigencies　of　commerce。　It　does　not　become　unjust　to　hold　a　person　liable　for　unauthorized　intermeddling　with　another's　property；　until　there　arises　the　practical　necessity　for　rapid　dealing。　But　where　this　practical　necessity　exists；　it　is　not　surprising　to　find；　and　we　do　find；　a　different　tendency　in　the　law。　The　absolute　protection　of　property；　however　natural　to　a　primitive　community　more　occupied　in　production　than　in　exchange；　is　hardly　consistent　with　the　requirements　of　modern　business。　Even　when　the　rules　which　we　have　been　considering　were　established；　the　traffic　of　the　public　markets　was　governed　by　more　liberal　principles。　On　the　continent　of　Europe　it　was　long　ago　decided　that　the　policy　of　protecting　titles　must　yield　to　the　policy　of　protecting　trade。　Casaregis　held　that　the　general　principle　nemo　plus　juris　in　alium　transferre　potest　quam　ipse　habet　must　give　way　in　mercantile　transactions　to　possession　vaut　titre。　/1/　In　later　times；　as　markets　overt　have　lost　their　importance；　the　Factors'　Acts　and　their　successive　amendments　have　tended　more　and　more　in　the　direction　of　adopting　the　Continental　doctrine。

I　must　preface　the　argument　from　precedent　with　a　reference　to　what　has　been　said　already　in　the　first　Lecture　about　early　forms　of　liability；　and　especially　about　＇101＇　the　appeals。　It　was　there　shown　that　the　appeals　de　pace　et　plagis　and　of　mayhem　became　the　action　of　trespass；　and　that　those　appeals　and　the　early　actions　of　trespass　were　always；　so　far　as　appears；　for　intentional　wrongs。　/1/

The　contra　pacem　in　the　writ　of　trespass　was　no　doubt　inserted　to　lay　a　foundation　for　the　king's　writ；　but　there　seems　to　be　no　reason　to　attribute　a　similar　purpose　to　vi　et　armis；　or　cum　vi　sua；　as　it　was　often　put。　Glanvill　says　that　wounds　are　within　the　sheriff's　jurisdiction；　unless　the　appellor　adds　a　charge　of　breach　of　the　king's　peace。　/2/　Yet　the　wounds　are　given　vi　et　armis　as　much　in　the　one　case　as　in　the　other。　Bracton　says　that　the　lesser　wrongs　described　by　him　belong　to　the　king's　jurisdiction；　〃because　they　are　sometimes　against　the　peace　of　our　lord　the　king；〃　/3/　while；　as　has　been　observed；　they　were　supposed　to　be　always　committed　intentionally。　It　might　even　perhaps　be　inferred　that　the　allegation　contra　pacem　was　originally　material；　and　it　will　be　remembered　that　trespasses　formerly　involved　the　liability　to　pay　a　fine　to　the　king。　/4/

If　it　be　true　that　trespass　was　originally　confined　to　intentional　wrongs；　it　is　hardly　necessary　to　consider　the　argument　drawn　from　the　scope　of　the　general　issue。　In　form　it　was　a　mitigation　of　the　strict　denial　de　verbo　in　verbum　of　the　ancient　procedure；　to　which　the　inquest　given　by　the　king's　writ　was　unknown。　/5/　The　strict　form　seems　to　have　lasted　in　England　some　time　after　the　trial　of　the　issue　by　recognition　was　introduced。　/6/　When　＇102＇　a　recognition　was　granted；　the　inquest　was；　of　course；　only　competent　to　speak　to　the　facts；　as　has　been　said　above。　/1/　When　the　general　issue　was　introduced；　trespass　was　still　confined　to　intentional　wrongs。

We　may　now　take　up　the　authorities。　It　will　be　remembered　that　the　earlier　precedents　are　of　a　date　when　the　assize　and　jurata　had　not　given　place　to　the　modern　jury。　These　bodies　spoke　from　their　own　knowledge　to　an　issue　defined　by　the　writ；　or　to　certain　familiar　questions　of　fact　arising　in　the　trial　of　a　cause；　but　did　not　hear　the　whole　case　upon　evidence　adduced。　Their　function　was　more　limited　than　that　which　has　been　gained　by　the　jury；　and　it　naturally　happened　that；　when　they　had　declared　what　the　defendant　had　done；　the　judges　laid　down　the　standard　by　which　those　acts　were　to　be　measured　without　their　assistance。　Hence　the　question　in　the　Year　Books　is　not　a　loose　or　general　inquiry　of　the　jury　whether　they　think　the　alleged　trespasser　was　negligent　on　such　facts　as　they　may　find；　but　a　well…defined　issue　of　law；　to　be　determined　by　the　court；　whether　certain　acts　set　forth　upon　the　record　are　a　ground　of　liability。　It　is　possible　that　the　judges　may　have　dealt　pretty　strictly　with　defendants；　and　it　is　quite　easy　to　pass　from　the　premise　that　defendants　have　been　held　trespassers　for　a　variety　of　acts；　without　mention　of　neglect；　to　the　conclusion　that　any　act　by　which　another　was　damaged　will　make　the　actor　chargeable。　But　a　more　exact　scrutiny　of　the　early　books　will　show　that　liability　in　general；　then　as　later；　was　＇103＇　founded　on　the　opinion　of　the　tribunal　that　the　defendant　ought　to　have　acted　otherwise；　or；　in　other　words；　that　he　was　to　blame。

Returning　first　to　the　case　of　the　thorns　in　the　Year　Book；　/1/　it　will　be　seen　that　the　falling　of　the　thorns　into　the　plaintiff's　close；　although　a　result　not　wished　by　the　defendant；　was　in　no　other　sense　against　his　will。　When　he　cut　the　thorns；　he　did　an　act　which　obviously　and　necessarily　would　have　that　consequence；　and　he　must　be　taken　to　have　foreseen　and　not　to　have　prevented　it。　Choke；　C。　J。　says；　〃As　to　what　was　said　about　their　falling　in；　ipso　invito；　that　is　no　plea；　but　he　ought　to　show　that　he　could　not　do　it　in　any　other　way；　or　that　he　did　all　in　his　power　to　keep　them　out〃；　and　both　the　judges　put　the　unlawfulness　of　the　entry　upon　the　plaintiff's　land　as　a　consequence　of　the　unlawfulness　of　dropping　the　thorns　there。　Choke　admits　that；　if　the　thorns　or　a　tree　had　been　blown　over　upon　the　plaintiff's　land；　the　defendant　might　have　entered　to　get　them。　Chief　Justice　Crew　says　of　this　case；　in　Millen　v。　Fawdry；　/2/　that　the　opinion　was　that　〃trespass　lies；　because　he　did　not　plead　that　he　did　his　best　endeavor　to　hinder　their　falling　there；　yet　this　was　a　hard　case。〃　The　statements　of　law　by　counsel　in　argument　may　be　left　on　one　side；　although　Brian　is　quoted　and　mistaken　for　one　of　the　judges　by　Sir　William　Blackstone；　in　Scott　v。　Shepherd。

The　principal　authorities　are　the　shooting　cases；　and；　as　shooting　is　an　extra…　hazardous　act；　it　would　not　be　surprising　if　it　should　be　held　that　men　do　it　at　their　peril　in　public　places。　The　liability　has　been　put　on　the　general　ground　of　fault；　however；　wherever　the　line　of　necessary　＇104＇　precaution　may　be　drawn。　In　Weaver　v。　Ward；　/1/　the　defendant　set　up　that　the　plaintiff　and　he　were　skirmishing　in　a　trainband；　and　that　when　discharging　his　piece　he　wounded　the　plaintiff　by　accident　and　misfortune；　and　against　his　own　will。　On　demurrer；　the　court　says　that　〃no　man　shall　be　excused　of　a　trespass；　。。。　except　it　may　be　judged　utterly　without　his　fault。　As　if　a　man　by　force　take　my　hand　and　strike　you；　or　if　here　the　defendant　had　said；　that　the　plaintiff　ran　cross　his　piece　when　it　was　discharging；　or　had　set　forth　the　case　with　the　circumstances　so　as　it　had　appeared　to　the　court　that　it　had　been　inevitable；　and　that　the　defendant　had　committed　no　negligence　to　give　occasion　to　the　hurt。〃　The　later　cases　simply　follow　Weaver　v。　Ward。

The　quotations　which　were　made　above　in　favor　of　the　strict　doctrine　from　Sir　T。　Raymond；　in　Bessey　v。　Olliot；　and　from　Sir　William　Blackstone；　in　Scott　v。　Shepherd；　are　both　taken　from　dissenting　opinions。　In　the　latter　case　it　is