the common law-第16节

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d　by　misfortune；　and　against　the　will　of　the　defendant；　were　held　insufficient。

In　the　reign　of　Queen　Elizabeth　it　was　held　that　where　a　man　with　a　gun　at　the　door　of　his　house　shot　at　a　fowl；　and　thereby　set　fire　to　his　own　house　and　to　the　house　of　his　neighbor；　he　was　liable　in　an　action　on　the　case　generally；　the　declaration　not　being　on　the　custom　of　the　realm；　＇88＇　〃viz。　for　negligently　keeping　his　fire。〃　〃For　the　injury　is　the　same；　although　this　mischance　was　not　by　a　common　negligence；　but　by　misadventure。〃　/1/

The　above…mentioned　instances　of　the　stick　and　shooting　at　butts　became　standard　illustrations；　they　are　repeated　by　Sir　Thomas　Raymond；　in　Bessey　v。　Olliot；　/2/　by　Sir　William　Blackstone；　in　the　famous　squib　case；　/3/　and　by　other　judges；　and　have　become　familiar　through　the　textbooks。　Sir　T。　Raymond；　in　the　above　case；　also　repeats　the　thought　and　almost　the　words　of　Littleton；　J。；　which　have　been　quoted；　and　says　further：　〃In　all　civil　acts　the　law　doth　not　so　much　regard　the　intent　of　the　actor；　as　the　loss　and　damage　of　the　party　suffering。〃　Sir　William　Blackstone　also　adopts　a　phrase　from　Dickenson　v。　Watson；　just　cited：　〃Nothing　but　inevitable　necessity〃　is　a　justification。　So　Lord　Ellenborough；　in　Leame　v。　Bray：　/4/　〃If　the　injury　were　received　from　the　personal　act　of　another；　it　was　deemed　sufficient　to　make　it　trespass〃；　or；　according　to　the　more　frequently　quoted　language　of　Grose；　J。；　in　the　same　case：　〃Looking　into　all　the　cases　from　the　Year　Book　in　the　21　H。　VII。　down　to　the　latest　decision　on　the　subject；　I　find　the　principle　to　be；　that　if　the　injury　be　done　by　the　act　of　the　party　himself　at　the　time；　or　he　be　the　immediate　cause　of　it；　though　it　happen　accidentally　or　by　misfortune；　yet　he　is　answerable　in　trespass。〃　Further　citations　are　deemed　unnecessary。

In　spite；　however；　of　all　the　arguments　which　may　be　＇89＇　urged　for　the　rule　that　a　man　acts　at　his　peril；　it　has　been　rejected　by　very　eminent　courts；　even　under　the　old　forms　of　action。　In　view　of　this　fact；　and　of　the　further　circumstance　that；　since　the　old　forms　have　been　abolished；　the　allegation　of　negligence　has　spread　from　the　action　on　the　case　to　all　ordinary　declarations　in　tort　which　do　not　allege　intent；　probably　many　lawyers　would　be　surprised　that　any　one　should　think　it　worth　while　to　go　into　the　present　discussion。　Such　is　the　natural　impression　to　be　derived　from　daily　practice。　But　even　if　the　doctrine　under　consideration　had　no　longer　any　followers；　which　is　not　the　case；　it　would　be　well　to　have　something　more　than　daily　practice　to　sustain　our　views　upon　so　fundamental　a　question；　as　it　seems　to　me　at　least；　the　true　principle　is　far　from　being　articulately　grasped　by　all　who　are　interested　in　it；　and　can　only　be　arrived　at　after　a　careful　analysis　of　what　has　been　thought　hitherto。　It　might　be　thought　enough　to　cite　the　decisions　opposed　to　the　rule　of　absolute　responsibility；　and　to　show　that　such　a　rule　is　inconsistent　with　admitted　doctrines　and　sound　policy。　But　we　may　go　further　with　profit；　and　inquire　whether　there　are　not　strong　grounds　for　thinking　that　the　common　law　has　never　known　such　a　rule；　unless　in　that　period　of　dry　precedent　which　is　so　often　to　be　found　midway　between　a　creative　epoch　and　a　period　of　solvent　philosophical　reaction。　Conciliating　the　attention　of　those　who；　contrary　to　most　modern　practitioners；　still　adhere　to　the　strict　doctrine；　by　reminding　them　once　more　that　there　are　weighty　decisions　to　be　cited　adverse　to　it；　and　that；　if　they　have　involved　an　innovation；　the　fact　that　it　has　been　made　by　such　magistrates　as　Chief　Justice　Shaw　goes　far　to　prove　that　the　change　was　politic；　I　＇9O＇　think　I　may　assert　that　a　little　reflection　will　show　that　it　was　required　not　only　by　policy；　but　by　consistency。　I　will　begin　with　the　latter。

The　same　reasoning　which　would　make　a　man　answerable　in　trespass　for　all　damage　to　another　by　force　directly　resulting　from　his　own　act；　irrespective　of　negligence　or　intent；　would　make　him　answerable　in　case　for　the　like　damage　similarly　resulting　from　the　act　of　his　servant；　in　the　course　of　the　latter's　employment。　The　discussions　of　the　company's　negligence　in　many　railway　cases　would　therefore　be　wholly　out　of　place；　for　although；　to　be　sure；　there　is　a　contract　which　would　make　the　company　liable　for　negligence；　that　contract　cannot　be　taken　to　diminish　any　liability　which　would　otherwise　exist　for　a　trespass　on　the　part　of　its　employees。

More　than　this；　the　same　reasoning　would　make　a　defendant　responsible　for　all　damage；　however　remote；　of　which　his　act　could　be　called　the　cause。　So　long；　at　least；　as　only　physical　or　irresponsible　agencies；　however　unforeseen；　co…　operated　with　the　act　complained　of　to　produce　the　result；　the　argument　which　would　resolve　the　case　of　accidentally　striking　the　plaintiff；　when　lifting　a　stick　in　necessary　self…defence；　adversely　to　the　defendant；　would　require　a　decision　against　him　in　every　case　where　his　act　was　a　factor　in　the　result　complained　of。　The　distinction　between　a　direct　application　of　force；　and　causing　damage　indirectly；　or　as　a　more　remote　consequence　of　one's　act；　although　it　may　determine　whether　the　form　of　action　should　be　trespass　or　case；　docs　not　touch　the　theory　of　responsibility；　if　that　theory　be　that　a　man　acts　at　his　peril。

＇91＇　As　was　said　at　the　outset；　if　the　strict　liability　is　to　be　maintained　at　all；　it　must　be　maintained　throughout。　A　principle　cannot　be　stated　which　would　retain　the　strict　liability　in　trespass　while　abandoning　it　in　case。　It　cannot　be　said　that　trespass　is　for　acts　alone；　and　case　for　consequences　of　those　acts。　All　actions　of　trespass　are　for　consequences　of　acts；　not　for　the　acts　themselves。　And　some　actions　of　trespass　are　for　consequences　more　remote　from　the　defendant's　act　than　in　other　instances　where　the　remedy　would　be　case。

An　act　is　always　a　voluntary　muscular　contraction；　and　nothing　else。　The　chain　of　physical　sequences　which　it　sets　in　motion　or　directs　to　the　plaintiff's　harm　is　no　part　of　it；　and　very　generally　a　long　train　of　such　sequences　intervenes。　An　example　or　two　will　make　this　extremely　clear。

When　a　man　commits　an　assault　and　battery　with　a　pistol；　his　only　act　is　to　contract　the　muscles　of　his　arm　and　forefinger　in　a　certain　way；　but　it　is　the　delight　of　elementary　writers　to　point　out　what　a　vast　series　of　physical　changes　must　take　place　before　the　harm　is　done。　Suppose　that；　instead　of　firing　a　pistol；　he　takes　up　a　hose　which　is　discharging　water　on　the　sidewalk；　and　directs　it　at　the　plaintiff；　he　does　not　even　set　in　motion　the　physical　causes　which　must　co…operate　with　his　act　to　make　a　battery。　Not　only　natural　causes；　but　a　living　being；　may　intervene　between　the　act　and　its　effect。　Gibbons　v。　Pepper；　/1/　which　decided　that　there　was　no　battery　when　a　man's　horse　was　frightened　by　accident　or　a　third　person　and　ran　away　with　him；　and　ran　over　the　plaintiff；　takes　the　distinction　that；　if　the　rider　by　spurring　is　the　cause　of　＇92＇　the　accident；　then　he　is　guilty。　In　Scott　v。　Shepherd；　/1/　already　mentioned；　trespass　was　maintained　against　one　who　had　thrown　a　squib　into　a　crowd；　where　it　was　tossed　from　hand　to　hand　in　self…defence　until　it　burst　and　injured　the　plaintiff。　Here　even　human　agencies　were　a　part　of　the　chain　between　the　defendant's　act　and　the　result；　although　they　were　treated　as　more　or　less　nearly　automatic；　in　order　to　arrive　at　the　decision。

Now　I　repeat；　that；　if　principle　requires　us　to　charge　a　man　in　trespass　when　his　act　has　brought　force　to　bear　on　another　through　a　comparatively　short　train　of　intervening　causes；　in　spite　of　his　having　used　all　possible　care；　it　requires　the　same　liability；　however　numerous　and　unexpected　the　events　between　the　act　and　the　result。　If　running　a　man　down　is　a　trespass　when　the　accident　can　be　referred　to　the　rider's　act　of　spurring；　why　is　it　not　a　tort　in　every　case；　as　was　argued　in　Vincent　v。　Stinehour；　/2/　seeing　that　it　can　always　be　referred　more　remotely　to　his　act　of　mounting　and　taking　the　horse　out？

Why　is　a　man　not　responsible　for　the　consequences　of　an　act　innocent　in　its　direct　and　obvious　effects；　when　those　consequences　would　not　have　followed　but　for　the　intervention　of　a　series　of　extraordinary；　although　natural；　events？　The　reason　is；　that；　if　the　intervening　events　are　of　such　a　kind　that　no　foresight　could　have　been　expected　to　look　out　for　them；　the　defendant　is　not　to　blame　for　having　failed　to　do　so。　It　seems　to　be　admitted　by　the　English　judges　that；　even　on　the　question　whether　the　acts　of　leaving　dry　trimmings　in　hot　weather　by　the　side　of　a　railroad；　and　then　sending　an　engine　over　the　track；　are　＇93＇　negligent；that　is；　are　a　ground　of　liability；the　consequences　which　might　reasonably　be　anticipated　are　material。　/1/　Yet　these　are　acts　which；　under　the　circumstances；　can　hardly　be　called　innocent　in　their　natural　and　obvious　effects。　The　same　doctrine　has　been　applied　to　acts　in　violation　of　statute　which　could　not　reasonably　have　been　expected　to　lead　to　the　result　complained　of。　/2/

But　there　is　no　difference　in　principle　between　the　case　where　a　natural　cause　or　physical　factor　intervenes　after　the　act　in　some　way　not　t