the common law-第15节

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iability　to　an　action　as　a　sanction；　or；　in　other　words；　as　a　penalty　for　disobedience。　It　follows　from　this；　according　to　the　prevailing　views　of　penal　law；　that　such　liability　ought　only　to　be　based　upon　personal　fault；　and　Austin　accepts　that　conclusion；　with　its　corollaries；　one　of　which　is　that　negligence　means　a　state　of　the　party's　mind。　/1/　These　doctrines　will　be　referred　to　later；　so　far　as　necessary。

The　other　theory　is　directly　opposed　to　the　foregoing。　It　seems　to　be　adopted　by　some　of　the　greatest　common　law　authorities；　and　requires　serious　discussion　before　it　can　be　set　aside　in　favor　of　any　third　opinion　which　may　be　maintained。　According　to　this　view；　broadly　stated；　under　the　common　law　a　man　acts　at　his　peril。　It　may　be　held　as　a　sort　of　set…off；　that　he　is　never　liable　for　omissions　except　in　consequence　of　some　duty　voluntarily　undertaken。　But　the　whole　and　sufficient　ground　for　such　liabilities　as　he　does　incur　outside　the　last　class　is　supposed　to　be　that　he　has　voluntarily　acted；　and　that　damage　has　ensued。　If　the　act　was　voluntary；　it　is　totally　immaterial　that　the　detriment　which　followed　from　it　was　neither　intended　nor　due　to　the　negligence　of　the　actor。

In　order　to　do　justice　to　this　way　of　looking　at　the　subject；　we　must　remember　that　the　abolition　of　the　common…law　forms　of　pleading　has　not　changed　the　rules　of　substantive　law。　Hence；　although　pleaders　now　generally　＇83＇　allege　intent　or　negligence；　anything　which　would　formerly　have　been　sufficient　to　charge　a　defendant　in　trespass　is　still　sufficient；　notwithstanding　the　fact　that　the　ancient　form　of　action　and　declaration　has　disappeared。

In　the　first　place；　it　is　said；　consider　generally　the　protection　given　by　the　law　to　property；　both　within　and　outside　the　limits　of　the　last…named　action。　If　a　man　crosses　his　neighbor's　boundary　by　however　innocent　a　mistake；　or　if　his　cattle　escape　into　his　neighbor's　field；　he　is　said　to　be　liable　in　trespass　quare　clausum　fregit。　If　an　auctioneer　in　the　most　perfect　good　faith；　and　in　the　regular　course　of　his　business；　sells　goods　sent　to　his　rooms　for　the　purpose　of　being　sold；　he　may　be　compelled　to　pay　their　full　value　if　a　third　person　turns　out　to　be　the　owner；　although　he　has　paid　over　the　proceeds；　and　has　no　means　of　obtaining　indemnity。

Now　suppose　that；　instead　of　a　dealing　with　the　plaintiff's　property；　the　case　is　that　force　has　proceeded　directly　from　the　defendant's　body　to　the　plaintiff's　body；　it　is　urged　that；　as　the　law　cannot　be　less　careful　of　the　persons　than　of　the　property　of　its　subjects；　the　only　defences　possible　are　similar　to　those　which　would　have　been　open　to　an　alleged　trespass　on　land。　You　may　show　that　there　was　no　trespass　by　showing　that　the　defendant　did　no　act；　as　where　he　was　thrown　from　his　horse　upon　the　plaintiff；　or　where　a　third　person　took　his　hand　and　struck　the　plaintiff　with　it。　In　such　cases　the　defendant's　body　is　file　passive　instrument　of　an　external　force；　and　the　bodily　motion　relied　on　by　the　plaintiff　is　not　his　act　at　all。　So　you　may　show　a　justification　or　excuse　in　the　conduct　of　the　plaintiff　himself。　But　if　no　such　excuse　is　shown；　and　the　defendant　has　voluntarily　acted；　he　must　answer　＇84＇　for　the　consequences；　however　little　intended　and　however　unforeseen。　If；　for　instance；　being　assaulted　by　a　third　person；　the　defendant　lifted　his　stick　and　accidentally　hit　the　plaintiff；　who　was　standing　behind　him；　according　to　this　view　he　is　liable；　irrespective　of　any　negligence　toward　the　party　injured。

The　arguments　for　the　doctrine　under　consideration　are；　for　the　most　part；　drawn　from　precedent；　but　it　is　sometimes　supposed　to　be　defensible　as　theoretically　sound。　Every　man；　it　is　said；　has　an　absolute　right　to　his　person；　and　so　forth；　free　from　detriment　at　the　hands　of　his　neighbors。　In　the　cases　put；　the　plaintiff　has　done　nothing；　the　defendant；　on　the　other　hand；　has　chosen　to　act。　As　between　the　two；　the　party　whose　voluntary　conduct　has　caused　the　damage　should　suffer；　rather　than　one　who　has　had　no　share　in　producing　it。

We　have　more　difficult　matter　to　deal　with　when　we　turn　to　the　pleadings　and　precedents　in　trespass。　The　declaration　says　nothing　of　negligence；　and　it　is　clear　that　the　damage　need　not　have　been　intended。　The　words　vi　et　armis　and　contra　pacere；　which　might　seem　to　imply　intent；　are　supposed　to　have　been　inserted　merely　to　give　jurisdiction　to　the　king's　court。　Glanvill　says　it　belongs　to　the　sheriff；　in　case　of　neglect　on　the　part　of　lords　of　franchise；　to　take　cognizance　of　melees；　blows；　and　even　wounds；　unless　the　accuser　add　a　charge　of　breach　of　the　king's　peace　（nisi　accusator　adjiciat　de　pace　Domini　Regis　infracta）。　/1/　Reeves　observes；　〃In　this　distinction　between　the　sheriff's　jurisdiction　and　that　of　the　king；　we　see　the　reason　of　the　allegation　in　modern　indictments　and　writs；　vi　et　amis；　of　'the　king's　crown　and　dignity；'　'the　king's　＇85＇　peace；'　and　'the　peace；'this　last　expression　being　sufficient；　after　the　peace　of　the　sheriff　had　ceased　to　be　distinguished　as　a　separate　jurisdiction。〃　/1/

Again；　it　might　be　said　that；　if　the　defendant's　intent　or　neglect　was　essential　to　his　liability；　the　absence　of　both　would　deprive　his　act　of　the　character　of　a　trespass；　and　ought　therefore　to　be　admissible　under　the　general　issue。　But　it　is　perfectly　well　settled　at　common　law　that　〃Not　guilty〃　only　denies　the　act。　/2/

Next　comes　the　argument　from　authority。　I　will　begin　with　an　early　and　important　case。　/3/　It　was　trespass　quare　clausum。　The　defendant　pleaded　that　he　owned　adjoining　land；　upon　which　was　a　thorn　hedge；　that　he　cut　the　thorns；　and　that　they；　against　his　will　（ipso　invito）；　fell　on　the　plaintiff's　land；　and　the　defendant　went　quickly　upon　the　same；　and　took　them；　which　was　the　trespass　complained　of。　And　on　demurrer　judgment　was　given　for　the　plaintiff。　The　plaintiff's　counsel　put　cases　which　have　been　often　repeated。　One　of　them；　Fairfax；　said：　〃There　is　a　diversity　between　an　act　resulting　in　a　felony；　and　one　resulting　in　a　trespass　。。。。　If　one　is　cutting　trees；　and　the　boughs　fall　on　a　man　and　wound　him；　in　this　case　he　shall　have　an　action　of　trespass；　&c。；　and　also；　sir；　if　one　is　shooting　at　butts；　and　his　bow　shakes　in　his　hands；　and　kills　a　man；　ipso　invito；　it　is　no　felony；　as　has　been　said；　＇86＇　&c。；　but　if　he　wounds　one　by　shooting；　he　shall　have　a　good　action　of　trespass　against　him；　and　yet　the　shooting　was　lawful；　&c。；　and　the　wrong　which　the　other　receives　was　against　his　will；　&c。；　and　so　here；　&c。〃　Brian；　another　counsel；　states　the　whole　doctrine；　and　uses　equally　familiar　illustrations。　〃When　one　does　a　thing；　he　is　bound　to　do　it　in　such　a　way　that　by　his　act　no　prejudice　or　damage　shall　be　done　to　&c。　As　if　I　am　building　a　house；　and　when　the　timber　is　being　put　up　a　piece　of　timber　falls　on　my　neighbor's　house　and　breaks　his　house；　he　shall　have　a　good　action；　&c。；　and　yet　the　raising　of　the　house　was　lawful；　and　the　timber　fell；　me　invito；　&c。　And　so　if　one　assaults　me　and　I　cannot　escape；　and　I　in　self…defence　lift　my　stick　to　strike　him；　and　in　lifting　it　hit　a　man　who　is　behind　me；　in　this　case　he　shall　have　an　action　against　me；　yet　my　raising　my　stick　was

lawful　in　self…defence；　and　I　hit　him；　me　invito；　&c。；　and　so　here；　&C。〃


〃Littleton；　J。　to　the　same　intent；　and　if　a　man　is　damaged　he　ought　to　be　recompensed　。。。。　If　your　cattle　come　on　my　land　and　eat　my　grass；　notwithstanding　you　come　freshly　and　drive　them　out；　you　ought　to　make　amends　for　what　your　cattle　have　done；　be　it　more　or　less　。。。。　And；　sir；　if　this　should　be　law　that　he　might　enter　and　take　the　thorns；　for　the　same　reason；　if　he　cut　a　large　tree；　he　might　come　with　his　wagons　and　horses　to　carry　the　trees　off；　which　is　not　reason；　for　perhaps　he　has　corn　or　other　crops　growing；　&c。；　and　no　more　here；　for　the　law　is　all　one　in　great　things　and　small　。。。。　Choke；　C。　J。　to　the　same　intent；　for　when　the　principal　thing　was　not　lawful；　that　which　depends　upon　it　was　not　lawful；　for　when　he　cut　the　thorns　and　they　fell　on　my　land；　＇87＇　this　falling　was　not　lawful；　and　therefore　his　coming　to　take　them　out　was　not　lawful。　As　to　what　was　said　about　their　falling　in　ipso　invito；　that　is　no　plea；　but　he　ought　to　show　that　he　could　not　do　it　in　any　other　way；　or　that　he　did　all　that　was　in　his　power　to　keep　them　out。〃

Forty　years　later；　/1/　the　Year　Books　report　Rede；　J。　as　adopting　the　argument　of　Fairfax　in　the　last　case。　In　trespass；　he　says；　〃the　intent　cannot　be　construed；　but　in　felony　it　shall　be。　As　when　a　man　shoots　at　butts　and　kills　a　man；　it　is　not　felony　et　il　ser　come　n'avoit　l'entent　de　luy　tuer；　and　so　of　a　tiler　on　a　house　who　with　a　stone　kills　a　man　unwittingly；　it　is　not　felony。　/2/　But　when　a　man　shoots　at　the　butts　and　wounds　a　man；　though　it　is　against　his　will；　he　shall　be　called　a　trespasser　against　his　intent。〃

There　is　a　series　of　later　shooting　cases；　Weaver　v。　Ward；　/3/　Dickenson　v。　Watson；　/4/　and　Underwood　v。　Hewson；　/5/　followed　by　the　Court　of　Appeals　of　New　York　in　Castle　v。　Duryee；　/6/　in　which　defences　to　the　effect　that　the　damage　was　done　accidentally　and　by　misfortune；　and　against　the　will　of　the　defendant；　were　held　insufficient。

In　the　reign　of　Q