the common law-第14节

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nsible　theoretically；　and　which　practically　was　too　high　for　that　community。

In　some　cases；　actual　malice　or　intent；　in　the　common　meaning　of　those　words；　is　an　element　in　crime。　But　it　will　be　found　that；　when　it　is　so；　it　is　because　the　act　when　done　maliciously　is　followed　by　harm　which　would　not　have　followed　the　act　alone；　or　because　the　intent　raises　a　strong　probability　that　ail　act；　innocent　in　itself；　will　be　followed　by　other　acts　or　events　in　connection　with　which　it　will　accomplish　the　result　sought　to　be　prevented　by　the　law。

LECTURE　III。

TORTS。　　TRESPASS　AND　NEGLIGENCE。

The　object　of　the　next　two　Lectures　is　to　discover　whether　there　is　any　common　ground　at　the　bottom　of　all　liability　in　tort；　and　if　so；　what　that　ground　is。　Supposing　the　attempt　to　succeed；　it　will　reveal　the　general　principle　of　civil　liability　at　common　law。　The　liabilities　incurred　by　way　of　contract　are　more　or　less　expressly　fixed　by　the　agreement　of　the　parties　concerned；　but　those　arising　from　a　tort　are　independent　of　any　previous　consent　of　the　wrong…doer　to　bear　the　loss　occasioned　by　his　act。　If　A　fails　to　pay　a　certain　sum　on　a　certain　day；　or　to　deliver　a　lecture　on　a　certain　night；　after　having　made　a　binding　promise　to　do　so；　the　damages　which　he　has　to　pay　are　recovered　in　accordance　with　his　consent　that　some　or　all　of　the　harms　which　may　be　caused　by　his　failure　shall　fall　upon　him。　But　when　A　assaults　or　slanders　his　neighbor；　or　converts　his　neighbor's　property；　he　does　a　harm　which　he　has　never　consented　to　bear；　and　if　the　law　makes　him　pay　for　it；　the　reason　for　doing　so　must　be　found　in　some　general　view　of　the　conduct　which　every　one　may　fairly　expect　and　demand　from　every　other；　whether　that　other　has　agreed　to　it　or　not。

Such　a　general　view　is　very　hard　to　find。　The　law　did　not　begin　with　a　theory。　It　has　never　worked　one　out。　The　point　from　which　it　started　and　that　at　which　I　shall　＇78＇　try　to　show　that　it　has　arrived；　are　on　different　planes。　In　the　progress　from　one　to　the　other；　it　is　to　be　expected　that　its　course　should　not　be　straight　and　its　direction　not　always　visible。　All　that　can　be　done　is　to　point　out　a　tendency；　and　to　justify　it。　The　tendency；　which　is　our　main　concern；　is　a　matter　of　fact　to　be　gathered　from　the　cases。　But　the　difficulty　of　showing　it　is　much　enhanced　by　the　circumstance　that；　until　lately；　the　substantive　law　has　been　approached　only　through　the　categories　of　the　forms　of　action。　Discussions　of　legislative　principle　have　been　darkened　by　arguments　on　the　limits　between　trespass　and　case；　or　on　the　scope　of　a　general　issue。　In　place　of　a　theory　of　tort；　we　have　a　theory　of　trespass。　And　even　within　that　narrower　limit；　precedents　of　the　time　of　the　assize　and　jurata　have　been　applied　without　a　thought　of　their　connection　with　a　long　forgotten

procedure。

Since　the　ancient　forms　of　action　have　disappeared；　a　broader　treatment　of　the　subject　ought　to　be　possible。　Ignorance　is　the　best　of　law　reformers。　People　are　glad　to　discuss　a　question　on　general　principles；　when　they　have　forgotten　the　special　knowledge　necessary　for　technical　reasoning。　But　the　present　willingness　to　generalize　is　founded　on　more　than　merely　negative　grounds。　The　philosophical　habit　of　the　day；　the　frequency　of　legislation；　and　the　ease　with　which　the　law　may　be　changed　to　meet　the　opinions　and　wishes　of　the　public；　all　make　it　natural　and　unavoidable　that　judges　as　well　as　others　should　openly　discuss　the　legislative　principles　upon　which　their　decisions　must　always　rest　in　the　end；　and　should　base　their　judgments　upon　broad　considerations　of　policy　to　which　the　traditions　of　the　bench　would　hardly　have　tolerated　a　reference　fifty　years　ago。

＇79＇　The　business　of　the　law　of　torts　is　to　fix　the　dividing　lines　between　those　cases　in　which　a　man　is　liable　for　harm　which　he　has　done；　and　those　in　which　he　is　not。　But　it　cannot　enable　him　to　predict　with　certainty　whether　a　given　act　under　given　circumstances　will　make　him　liable；　because　an　act　will　rarely　have　that　effect　unless　followed　by　damage；　and　for　the　most　part；　if　not　always；　the　consequences　of　an　act　are　not　known；　but　only　guessed　at　as　more　or　less　probable。　All　the　rules　that　the　law　can　lay　down　beforehand　are　rules　for　determining　the　conduct　which　will　be　followed　by　liability　if　it　is　followed　by　harmthat　is；　the　conduct　which　a　man　pursues　at　his　peril。　The　only　guide　for　the　future　to　be　drawn　from　a　decision　against　a　defendant　in　an　action　of　tort　is　that　similar　acts；　under　circumstances　which　cannot　be　distinguished　except　by　the　result　from　those　of　the　defendant；　are　done　at　the　peril　of　the　actor；　that　if　he　escapes　liability；　it　is　simply　because　by　good　fortune　no　harm　comes　of　his　conduct　in　the　particular　event。

If；　therefore；　there　is　any　common　ground　for　all　liability　in　tort；　we　shall　best　find　it　by　eliminating　the　event　as　it　actually　turns　out；　and　by　considering　only　the　principles　on　which　the　peril　of　his　conduct　is　thrown　upon　the　actor。　We　are　to　ask　what　are　the　elements；　on　the　defendant's　side；　which　must　all　be　present　before　liability　is　possible；　and　the　presence　of　which　will　commonly　make　him　liable　if　damage　follows。

The　law　of　torts　abounds　in　moral　phraseology。　It　has　much　to　say　of　wrongs；　of　malice；　fraud；　intent；　and　negligence。　Hence　it　may　naturally　be　supposed　that　the　risk　of　a　man's　conduct　is　thrown　upon　him　as　the　result　of　some　moral　short…coming。　But　while　this　notion　has　been　＇80＇　entertained；　the　extreme　opposite　will　be　found　to　have　been　a　far　more　popular　opinion；I　mean　the　notion　that　a　man　is　answerable　for　all　the　consequences　of　his　acts；　or；　in　other　words；　that　he　acts　at　his　peril　always；　and　wholly　irrespective　of　the　state　of　his　consciousness　upon　the　matter。

To　test　the　former　opinion　it　would　be　natural　to　take　up　successively　the　several　words；　such　as　negligence　and　intent；　which　in　the　language　of　morals　designate　various　well…understood　states　of　mind；　and　to　show　their　significance　in　the　law。　To　test　the　latter；　it　would　perhaps　be　more　convenient　to　consider　it　under　the　head　of　the　several　forms　of　action。　So　many　of　our　authorities　are　decisions　under　one　or　another　of　these　forms；　that　it　will　not　be　safe　to　neglect　them；　at　least　in　the　first　instance；　and　a　compromise　between　the　two　modes　of　approaching　the　subject　may　be　reached　by　beginning　with　the　action　of　trespass　and　the　notion　of　negligence　together；　leaving　wrongs　which　are　defined　as　intentional　for　the　next　Lecture。

Trespass　lies　for　unintentional；　as　well　as　for　intended　wrongs。　Any　wrongful　and　direct　application　of　force　is　redressed　by　that　action。　It　therefore　affords　a　fair　field　for　a　discussion　of　the　general　principles　of　liability　for　unintentional　wrongs　at　common　law。　For　it　can　hardly　be　supposed　that　a　man's　responsibility　for　the　consequences　of　his　acts　varies　as　the　remedy　happens　to　fall　on　one　side　or　the　other　of　the　penumbra　which　separates　trespass　from　the　action　on　the　case。　And　the　greater　part　of　the　law　of　torts　will　be　found　under　one　or　the　other　of　those　two　heads。

It　might　be　hastily　assumed　that　the　action　on　the　case　＇81＇　is　founded　on　the　defendant's　negligence。　But　if　that　be　so；　the　same　doctrine　must　prevail　in　trespass。　It　might　be　assumed　that　trespass　is　founded　on　the　defendant's　having　caused　damage　by　his　act；　without　regard　to　negligence。　But　if　that　be　true；　the　law　must　apply　the　same　criterion　to　other　wrongs　differing　from　trespass　only　in　some　technical　point；　as；　for　instance；　that　the　property　damaged　was　in　the　defendant's　possession。　Neither　of　the　above　assumptions；　however；　can　be　hastily　permitted。　It　might　very　well　be　argued　that　the　action　on　the　case　adopts　the　severe　rule　just　suggested　for　trespass；　except　when　the　action　is　founded　on　a　contract。　Negligence；　it　might　be　said；　had　nothing　to　do　with　the　common…law　liability　for　a　nuisance；　and　it　might　be　added　that；　where　negligence　was　a　ground　of　liability；　a　special　duty　had　to　be　founded　in　the　defendant's　super　se　assumpsit；　or　public　calling。　/1/　On　the　other　hand；　we　shall　see　what　can　be　said　for　the　proposition；　that　even　in　trespass　there　must　at　least　be　negligence。　But　whichever　argument　prevails　for　the　one　form　of　action　must　prevail　for　the　other。　The　discussion　may　therefore　be　shortened　on　its　technical　side；　by　confining　it　to　trespass　so　far　as　may　be　practicable　without　excluding　light　to　be　got　from　other　parts　of　the　law。

As　has　just　been　hinted；　there　are　two　theories　of　the　common…law　liability　for　unintentional　harm。　Both　of　them　seem　to　receive　the　implied　assent　of　popular　textbooks；　and　neither　of　them　is　wanting　in　plausibility　and　the　semblance　of　authority。

The　first　is　that　of　Austin；　which　is　essentially　the　theory　of　a　criminalist。　According　to　him；　the　characteristic　＇82＇　feature　of　law；　properly　so　called；　is　a　sanction　or　detriment　threatened　and　imposed　by　the　sovereign　for　disobedience　to　the　sovereign's　commands。　As　the　greater　part　of　the　law　only　makes　a　man　civilly　answerable　for　breaking　it；　Austin　is　compelled　to　regard　the　liability　to　an　action　as　a　sanction；　or；　in　other　words；　as　a　penalty　for　disobedience。　It　follows　f