the common law-第13节

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　which　under　the　surrounding　circumstances　is　to　hurt　or　destroy　person　or　property　by　the　mere　working　of　natural　laws。

In　larceny　the　consequences　immediately　flowing　from　the　act　are　generally　exhausted　with　little　or　no　harm　to　the　owner。　Goods　are　removed　from　his　possession　by　＇71＇　trespass；　and　that　is　all；　when　the　crime　is　complete。　But　they　must　be　permanently　kept　from　him　before　the　harm　is　done　which　the　law　seeks　to　prevent。　A　momentary　loss　of　possession　is　not　what　has　been　guarded　against　with　such　severe　penalties。　What　the　law　means　to　prevent　is　the　loss　of　it　wholly　and　forever；　as　is　shown　by　the　fact　that　it　is　not　larceny　to　take　for　a　temporary　use　without　intending　to　deprive　the　owner　of　his　property。　If　then　the　law　punishes　the　mere　act　of　taking；　it　punishes　an　act　which　will　not　of　itself　produce　the　evil　effect　sought　to　be　prevented；　and　punishes　it　before　that　effect　has　in　any　way　come　to　pass。

The　reason　is　plain　enough。　The　law　cannot　wait　until　the　property　has　been　used　up　or　destroyed　in　other　hands　than　the　owner's；　or　until　the　owner　has　died；　in　order　to　make　sure　that　the　harm　which　it　seeks　to　prevent　has　been　done。　And　for　the　same　reason　it　cannot　confine　itself　to　acts　likely　to　do　that　harm。　For　the　harm　of　permanent　loss　of　property　will　not　follow　from　the　act　of　taking；　but　only　from　the　series　of　acts　which　constitute　removing　and　keeping　the　property　after　it　has　been　taken。　After　these　preliminaries；　the　bearing　of　intent　upon　the　crime　is　easily　seen。

According　to　Mr。　Bishop；　larceny　is　〃the　taking　and　removing；　by　trespass；　of　personal　property　which　the　trespasser　knows　to　belong　either　generally　or　specially　to　another；　with　the　intent　to　deprive　such　owner　of　his　ownership　therein；　and　perhaps　it　should　be　added；　for　the　sake　of　some　advantage　to　the　trespasser；　a　proposition　on　which　the　decisions　are　not　harmonious。〃　/1/

There　must　be　an　intent　to　deprive　such　owner　of　his　＇72＇　ownership　therein；　it　is　said。　But　why？　Is　it　because　the　law　is　more　anxious　not　to　put　a　man　in　prison　for　stealing　unless　he　is　actually　wicked；　than　it　is　not　to　hang　him　for　killing　another？　That　can　hardly　be。　The　true　answer　is；　that　the　intent　is　an　index　to　the　external　event　which　probably　would　have　happened；　and　that；　if　the　law　is　to　punish　at　all；　it　must；　in　this　case；　go　on　probabilities；　not　on　accomplished　facts。　The　analogy　to　the　manner　of　dealing　with　attempts　is　plain。　Theft　may　be　called　an　attempt　to　permanently　deprive　a　man　of　his　property；　which　is　punished　with　the　same　severity　whether　successful　or　not。　If　theft　can　rightly　be　considered　in　this　way；　intent　must　play　the　same　part　as　in　other　attempts。　An　act　which　does　not　fully　accomplish　the　prohibited　result　may　be　made　wrongful　by　evidence　that　but　for　some　interference　it　would　have　been　followed　by　other　acts　co…ordinated　with　it　to　produce　that　result。　This　can　only　be　shown　by　showing　intent。　In　theft　the　intent　to　deprive　the　owner　of　his　property　establishes　that　the　thief　would　have　retained；　or　would　not　have　taken　steps　to　restore；　the　stolen　goods。　Nor　would　it　matter　that　the　thief　afterwards　changed　his　mind　and　returned　the　goods。　From　the　point　of　view　of　attempt；　the　crime　was　already　complete　when　the　property　was　carried　off。

It　may　be　objected　to　this　view；　that；　if　intent　is　only　a　makeshift　which　from　a　practical　necessity　takes　the　place　of　actual　deprivation；　it　ought　not　to　be　required　where　the　actual　deprivation　is　wholly　accomplished；　provided　the　same　criminal　act　produces　the　whole　effect。　Suppose；　for　instance；　that　by　one　and　the　same　motion　a　man　seizes　and　backs　another's　horse　over　a　precipice。　The　whole　evil　which　the　law　seeks　to　prevent　is　the　natural　and　manifestly　＇73＇　certain　consequence　of　the　act　under　the　known　circumstances。　In　such　a　case；　if　the　law　of　larceny　is　consistent　with　the　theories　here　maintained；　the　act　should　be　passed　upon　according　to　its　tendency；　and　the　actual　intent　of　the　wrong…doer　not　in　any　way　considered。　Yet　it　is　possible；　to　say　the　least；　that　even　in　such　a　case　the　intent　would　make　all　the　difference。　I　assume　that　the　act　was　without　excuse　and　wrongful；　and　that　it　would　have　amounted　to　larceny；　if　done　for　the　purpose　of　depriving　the　owner　of　his　horse。　Nevertheless；　if　it　was　done　for　the　sake　of　an　experiment；　and　without　actual　foresight　of　the　destruction；　or　evil　design　against　the　owner；　the　trespasser　might　not　be　held　a　thief。

The　inconsistency；　if　there　is　one；　seems　to　be　explained　by　the　way　in　which　the　law　has　grown。　The　distinctions　of　the　common　law　as　to　theft　are　not　those　of　a　broad　theory　of　legislation；　they　are　highly　technical；　and　very　largely　dependent　upon　history　for　explanation。　/1/

The　type　of　theft　is　taking　to　one's　own　user　It　used　to　be；　and　sometimes　still　is；　thought　that　the　taking　must　be　lucri　catesa；　for　the　sake　of　some　advantage　to　the　thief。　In　such　cases　the　owner　is　deprived　of　his　property　by　the　thief's　keeping　it；　not　by　its　destruction；　and　the　permanence　of　his　loss　can　only　be　judged　of　beforehand　by　the　intent　to　keep。　The　intent　is　therefore　always　necessary；　and　it　is　naturally　stated　in　the　form　of　a　self…regarding　intent。　It　was　an　advance　on　the　old　precedents　when　it　was　decided　that　the　intent　to　deprive　the　owner　of　his　property　was　sufficient。　As　late　as　1815　the　English　judges　stood　only　six　to　five　in　favor　of　the　proposition　＇74＇　that　it　was　larceny　to　take　a　horse　intending　to　kill　it　for　no　other　purpose　than　to　destroy　evidence　against　a　friend。　/1/　Even　that　case；　however；　did　not　do　away　with　the　universality　of　intent　as　a　test；　for　the　destruction　followed　the　taking；　and　it　is　an　ancient　rule　that　the　criminality　of　the　act　must　be　determined　by　the　state　of　things　at　the　time　of　the　taking；　and　not　afterwards。　Whether　the　law　of　larceny　would　follow　what　seems　to　be　the　general　principle　of　criminal　law；　or　would　be　held　back　by　tradition；　could　only　be　decided　by　a　case　like　that　supposed　above；　where　the　same　act　accomplishes　both　taking　and　destruction。　As　has　been　suggested　already；　tradition　might　very　possibly　prevail。

Another　crime　in　which　the　peculiarities　noticed　in　larceny　are　still　more　clearly　marked；　and　at　the　same　time　more　easily　explained；　is　burglary。　It　is　defined　as　breaking　and　entering　any　dwelling…house　by　night　with　intent　to　commit　a　felony　therein。　/2/　The　object　of　punishing　such　a　breaking　and　entering　is　not　to　prevent　trespasses；　even　when　committed　by　night；　but　only　such　trespasses　as　are　the　first　step　to　wrongs　of　a　greater　magnitude；　like　robbery　or　murder。　/3/　In　this　case　the　function　of　intent　when　proved　appears　more　clearly　than　in　theft；　but　it　is　precisely　similar。　It　is　an　index　to　the　probability　of　certain　future　acts　which　the　law　seeks　to　prevent。　And　here　the　law　gives　evidence　that　this　is　the　true　explanation。　For　if　the　apprehended　act　did　follow；　then　it　is　no　longer　necessary　to　allege　that　the　breaking　and　entering　was　with　that　intent。　An　indictment　for　burglary　which　charges　that　＇75＇　the　defendant　broke　into　a　dwelling…house　and　stole　certain　property；　is　just　as　good　as　one　which　alleges　that　he　broke　in　with　intent　to　steal。　/1/

It　is　believed　that　enough　has　now　been　said　to　explain　the　general　theory　of　criminal　liability；　as　it　stands　at　common　law。　The　result　may　be　summed　up　as　follows。　All　acts　are　indifferent　per　se。

In　the　characteristic　type　of　substantive　crime　acts　are　rendered　criminal　because　they　are　done　finder　circumstances　in　which　they　will　probably　cause　some　harm　which　the　law　seeks　to　prevent。

The　test　of　criminality　in　such　cases　is　the　degree　of　danger　shown　by　experience　to　attend　that　act　under　those　circumstances。

In　such　cases　the　mens　rea；　or　actual　wickedness　of　the　party；　is　wholly　unnecessary；　and　all　reference　to　the　state　of　his　consciousness　is　misleading　if　it　means　anything　more　than　that　the　circumstances　in　connection　with　which　the　tendency　of　his　act　is　judged　are　the　circumstances　known　to　him。　Even　the　requirement　of　knowledge　is　subject　to　certain　limitations。　A　man　must　find　out　at　his　peril　things　which　a　reasonable　and　prudent　man　would　have　inferred　from　the　things　actually　known。　In　some　cases；　especially　of　statutory　crimes；　he　must　go　even　further；　and；　when　he　knows　certain　facts；　must　find　out　at　his　peril　whether　the　other　facts　are　present　which　would　make　the　act　criminal。　A　man　who　abducts　a　girl　from　her　parents　in　England　must　find　out　at　his　peril　whether　she　is　under　sixteen。

＇76＇　In　some　cases　it　may　be　that　the　consequence　of　the　act；　under　the　circumstances；　must　be　actually　foreseen；　if　it　is　a　consequence　which　a　prudent　man　would　not　have　foreseen。　The　reference　to　the　prudent　man；　as　a　standard；　is　the　only　form　in　which　blameworthiness　as　such　is　an　element　of　crime；　and　what　would　be　blameworthy　in　such　a　man　is　an　element；first；　as　a　survival　of　true　moral　standards；　second；　because　to　punish　what　would　not　be　blameworthy　in　an　average　member　of　the　community　would　be　to　enforce　a　standard　which　was　indefensible　theoretically；　and　which　practically　was　too　high　for　that　community。

In　some　cases；　actua