the common law-第11节

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　to　argue　that　the　rules　under　discussion　arose　on　the　above　reasoning；　any　more　than　that　they　are　right；　or　would　be　generally　applied　in　this　country。

Returning　to　the　main　line　of　thought　it　will　be　instructive　to　consider　the　relation　of　manslaughter　to　murder。　One　great　difference　between　the　two　will　be　found　to　lie　in　the　degree　of　danger　attaching　to　the　act　in　the　given　state　of　facts。　If　a　man　strikes　another　with　a　small　stick　which　is　not　likely　to　kill；　and　which　he　has　no　reason　to　suppose　will　do　more　than　slight　bodily　harm；　but　which　＇6O＇　does　kill　the　other；　he　commits　manslaughter；　not　murder。　/1/　But　if　the　blow　is　struck　as　hard　as　possible　with　an　iron　bar　an　inch　thick；　it　is　murder。　/2/　So　if；　at　the　time　of　striking　with　a　switch；　the　party　knows　an　additional　fact；　by　reason　of　which　he　foresees　that　death　will　be　the　consequence　of　a　slight　blow；　as；　for　instance；　that　the　other　has　heart　disease；　the　offence　is　equally　murder。　/3/　To　explode　a　barrel　of　gunpowder　in　a　crowded　street；　and　kill　people；　is　murder；　although　the　actor　hopes　that　no　such　harm　will　be　done。　/4/　But　to　kill　a　man　by　careless　riding　in　the　same　street　would　commonly　be　manslaughter。　/5/　Perhaps；　however；　a　case　could　be　put　where　the　riding　was　so　manifestly　dangerous　that　it　would　be　murder。

To　recur　to　an　example　which　has　been　used　already　for　another　purpose：　〃When　a　workman　flings　down　a　stone　or　piece　of　timber　into　the　street；　and　kills　a　man；　this　may　be　either　misadventure；　manslaughter；　or　murder；　according　to　the　circumstances　under　which　the　original　act　was　done：　if　it　were　in　a　country　village；　where　few　passengers　are；　and　he　calls　out　to　all　people　to　have　a　care；　it　is　misadventure　only；　but　if　it　were　in　London；　or　other　populous　town；　where　people　are　continually　passing；　it　is　manslaughter；　though　he　gives　loud　warning；　and　murder；　if　he　knows　of　their　passing；　and　gives　no　warning　at　all。〃　/6/

The　law　of　manslaughter　contains　another　doctrine　＇61＇　which　should　be　referred　to　in　order　to　complete　the　understanding　of　the　general　principles　of　the　criminal　law。　This　doctrine　is；　that　provocation　may　reduce　an　offence　which　would　otherwise　have　been　murder　to　manslaughter。　According　to　current　morality；　a　man　is　not　so　much　to　blame　for　an　act　done　under　the　disturbance　of　great　excitement；　caused　by　a　wrong　done　to　himself；　as　when　he　is　calm。　The　law　is　made　to　govern　men　through　their　motives；　and　it　must；　therefore；　take　their　mental　constitution　into　account。

It　might　be　urged；　on　the　other　side；　that；　if　the　object　of　punishment　is　prevention；　the　heaviest　punishment　should　be　threatened　where　the　strongest　motive　is　needed　to　restrain；　and　primitive　legislation　seems　sometimes　to　have　gone　on　that　principle。　But　if　any　threat　will　restrain　a　man　in　a　passion；　a　threat　of　less　than　death　will　be　sufficient；　and　therefore　the　extreme　penalty　has　been　thought　excessive。

At　the　same　time　the　objective　nature　of　legal　standards　is　shown　even　here。　The　mitigation　does　not　come　from　the　fact　that　the　defendant　was　beside　himself　with　rage。　It　is　not　enough　that　he　had　grounds　which　would　have　had　the　same　effect　on　every　man　of　his　standing　and　education。　The　most　insulting　words　are　not　provocation；　although　to　this　day；　and　still　more　when　the　law　was　established；　many　people　would　rather　die　than　suffer　them　without　action。　There　must　be　provocation　sufficient　to　justify　the　passion；　and　the　law　decides　on　general　considerations　what　provocations　are　sufficient。

It　is　said　that　even　what　the　law　admits　to　be　〃provocation　does　not　extenuate　the　guilt　of　homicide；　unless　the　person　provoked　is　at　the　time　when　he　does　the　deed　＇62＇　deprived　of　the　power　of　self…control　by　the　provocation　which　he　has　received。〃　/1/　There　are　obvious　reasons　for　taking　the　actual　state　of　the　defendant's　consciousness　into　account　to　this　extent。　The　only　ground　for　not　applying　the　general　rule　is；　that　the　defendant　was　in　such　a　state　that　he　could　not　be　expected　to　remember　or　be　influenced　by　the　fear　of　punishment；　if　he　could　be；　the　ground　of　exception　disappears。　Yet　even　here；　rightly　or　wrongly；　the　law　has　gone　far　in　the　direction　of　adopting　external　tests。　The　courts　seem　to　have　decided　between　murder　and　manslaughter　on　such　grounds　as　the　nature　of　the　weapon　used；　/2/　or　the　length　of　time　between　the　provocation　and　the　act。　/3/　But　in　other　cases　the　question　whether　the　prisoner　was　deprived　of　self…control　by　passion　has　been　left　to　the　jury。　/4/

As　the　object　of　this　Lecture　is　not　to　give　an　outline　of　the　criminal　law；　but　to　explain　its　general　theory；　I　shall　only　consider　such　offences　as　throw　some　special　light　upon　the　subject；　and　shall　treat　of　those　in　such　order　as　seems　best　fitted　for　that　purpose。　It　will　now　be　useful　to　take　up　malicious　mischief；　and　to　compare　the　malice　required　to　constitute　that　offence　with　the　malice　aforethought　of　murder。

The　charge　of　malice　aforethought　in　an　indictment　for　murder　has　been　shown　not　to　mean　a　state　of　the　defendant's　mind；　as　is　often　thought；　except　in　the　sense　that　he　knew　circumstances　which　did　in　fact　make　his　conduct　dangerous。　It　is；　in　truth；　an　allegation　like　that　of　negligence；　which　asserts　that　the　party　accused　did　not　＇63＇　come　up　to　the　legal　standard　of　action　under　the　circumstances　in　which　he　found　himself；　and　also　that　there　was　no　exceptional　fact　or　excuse　present　which　took　the　case　out　of　the　general　rule。　It　is　an　averment　of　a　conclusion　of　law　which　is　permitted　to　abridge　the　facts　（positive　and　negative）　on　which　it　is　founded。

When　a　statute　punishes　the　〃wilfully　and　maliciously〃　injuring　another's　property；　it　is　arguable；　if　not　clear；　that　something　more　is　meant。　The　presumption　that　the　second　word　was　not　added　without　some　meaning　is　seconded　by　the　unreasonableness　of　making　every　wilful　trespass　criminal。　/1/　If　this　reasoning　prevails；　maliciously　is　here　used　in　its　popular　sense；　and　imports　that　the　motive　for　the　defendant's　act　was　a　wish　to　harm　the　owner　of　the　property；　or　the　thing　itself；　if　living；　as　an　end；　and　for　the　sake　of　the　harm。　Malice　in　this　sense　has　nothing　in　common　with　the　malice　of　murder。

Statutory　law　need　not　profess　to　be　consistent　with　itself；　or　with　the　theory　adopted　by　judicial　decisions。　Hence　there　is　strictly　no　need　to　reconcile　such　a　statute　with　the　principles　which　have　been　explained。　But　there　is　no　inconsistency。　Although　punishment　must　be　confined　to　compelling　external　conformity　to　a　rule　of　conduct；　so　far　that　it　can　always　be　avoided　by　avoiding　or　doing　certain　acts　as　required；　with　whatever　intent　or　for　whatever　motive；　still　the　prohibited　conduct　may　not　be　hurtful　unless　it　is　accompanied　by　a　particular　state　of　feeling。

Common　disputes　about　property　are　satisfactorily　settled　by　compensation。　But　every　one　knows　that　sometimes　secret　harm　is　done　by　neighbor　to　neighbor　out　of　＇64＇　pure　malice　and　spite。　The　damage　can　be　paid　for；　but　the　malignity　calls　for　revenge；　and　the　difficulty　of　detecting　the　authors　of　such　wrongs；　which　are　always　done　secretly；　affords　a　ground　for　punishment；　even　if　revenge　is　thought　insufficient。

How　far　the　law　will　go　in　this　direction　it　is　hard　to　say。　The　crime　of　arson　is　defined　to　be　the　malicious　and　wilful　burning　of　the　house　of　another　man；　and　is　generally　discussed　in　close　connection　with　malicious　mischief。　It　has　been　thought　that　the　burning　was　not　malicious　where　a　prisoner　set　fire　to　his　prison；　not　from　a　desire　to　consume　the　building；　but　solely　to　effect　his　escape。　But　it　seems　to　be　the　better　opinion　that　this　is　arson；　/1/　in　which　case　an　intentional　burning　is　malicious　within　the　meaning　of　the　rule。　When　we　remember　that　arson　was　the　subject　of　one　of　the　old　appeals　which　take　us　far　back　into　the　early　law；　/2/　we　may　readily　understand　that　only　intentional　burnings　were　redressed　in　that　way。　/3/　The　appeal　of　arson　was　brother　to　the　appeal　de　pace　et　plagis。　As　the　latter　was　founded　on　a　warlike　assault；　the　former　supposed　a　house…firing　for　robbery　or　revenge；　/4/　such　as　that　by　which　Njal　perished　in　the　Icelandic　Saga。　But　this　crime　seems　to　have　had　the　same　history　as　others。　As　soon　as　intent　is　admitted　to　be　sufficient；　the　law　is　on　the　high…road　to　an　external　standard。　A　man　who　intentionally　sets　fire　to　his　own　house；　which　is　so　near　to　other　houses　that　the　fire　will　manifestly　endanger　them；　is　guilty　of　arson　if　one　of　the　other　houses　is　burned　in　consequence。　/5/　In　this　case；　an　act　which　would　not　＇65＇　have　been　arson；　taking　only　its　immediate　consequences　into　account；　becomes　arson　by　reason　of　more　remote　consequences　which　were　manifestly　likely　to　follow；　whether　they　were　actually　intended　or　not。　If　that　may　be　the　effect　of　setting　fire　to　things　which　a　man　has　a　right　to　burn；　so　far　as　they　alone　are　concerned；　why；　on　principle；　should　it　not　be　the　effect　of　any　other　act　which　is　equally　likely　under　the　surrounding　circumstances　to　cause　the　same　harm。　/1/　Cases　may　easily　be　imagined　where　firing　a　gun；　or　making　a　chemical　mixture；　or　piling　up　oiled　rags；　or　twenty　other　things；　might　b