the six enneads-第89节

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xperience　her　own。　　　　　In　sum；　the　living　body　may　be　said　to　desire　of　its　own　motion　in　a　fore…desiring　with；　perhaps；　purpose　as　well；　Nature　desires　for；　and　because　of；　that　living　body；　granting　or　withholding　belongs　to　another　again；　the　higher　soul。　　　　　21。　That　this　is　the　phase　of　the　human　being　in　which　desire　takes　its　origin　is　shown　by　observation　of　the　different　stages　of　life；　in　childhood；　youth；　maturity；　the　bodily　desires　differ；　health　or　sickness　also　may　change　them；　while　the　＇psychic＇　faculty　is　of　course　the　same　through　all：　the　evidence　is　clear　that　the　variety　of　desire　in　the　human　being　results　from　the　fact　that　he　is　a　corporeal　entity；　a　living　body　subject　to　every　sort　of　vicissitude。　　　　　The　total　movement　of　desire　is　not　always　stirred　simultaneously　with　what　we　call　the　impulses　to　the　satisfaction　even　of　the　lasting　bodily　demands；　it　may　refuse　assent　to　the　idea　of　eating　or　drinking　until　reason　gives　the　word：　this　shows　us　desire…　the　degree　of　it　existing　in　the　living　body…　advancing　towards　some　object；　with　Nature　＇the　lower　soul…phase＇　refusing　its　co…operation　and　approval；　and　as　sole　arbiter　between　what　is　naturally　fit　and　unfit；　rejecting　what　does　not　accord　with　the　natural　need。　　　　　We　may　be　told　that　the　changing　state　of　the　body　is　sufficient　explanation　of　the　changing　desires　in　the　faculty；　but　that　would　require　the　demonstration　that　the　changing　condition　of　a　given　entity　could　effect　a　change　of　desire　in　another；　in　one　which　cannot　itself　gain　by　the　gratification；　for　it　is　not　the　desiring　faculty　that　profits　by　food；　liquid；　warmth；　movement；　or　by　any　relief　from　overplenty　or　any　filling　of　a　void；　all　such　services　touch　the　body　only。　　　　　22。　And　as　regards　vegetal　forms？　Are　we　to　imagine　beneath　the　leading　principle　＇the　〃Nature〃　phase＇　some　sort　of　corporeal　echo　of　it；　something　that　would　be　tendency　or　desire　in　us　and　is　growth　in　them？　Or　are　we　to　think　that；　while　the　earth　＇which　nourishes　them＇　contains　the　principle　of　desire　by　virtue　of　containing　soul；　the　vegetal　realm　possesses　only　this　latter　reflection　of　desire？　　　　　The　first　point　to　be　decided　is　what　soul　is　present　in　the　earth。　　　　　Is　it　one　coming　from　the　sphere　of　the　All；　a　radiation　upon　earth　from　that　which　Plato　seems　to　represent　as　the　only　thing　possessing　soul　primarily？　Or　are　we　to　go　by　that　other　passage　where　he　describes　earth　as　the　first　and　oldest　of　all　the　gods　within　the　scope　of　the　heavens；　and　assigns　to　it；　as　to　the　other　stars；　a　soul　peculiar　to　itself？　　　　　It　is　difficult　to　see　how　earth　could　be　a　god　if　it　did　not　possess　a　soul　thus　distinct：　but　the　whole　matter　is　obscure　since　Plato's　statements　increase　or　at　least　do　not　lessen　the　perplexity。　It　is　best　to　begin　by　facing　the　question　as　a　matter　of　reasoned　investigation。　　　　　That　earth　possesses　the　vegetal　soul　may　be　taken　as　certain　from　the　vegetation　upon　it。　But　we　see　also　that　it　produces　animals；　why　then　should　we　not　argue　that　it　is　itself　animated？　And；　animated；　no　small　part　of　the　All；　must　it　not　be　plausible　to　assert　that　it　possesses　an　Intellectual…Principle　by　which　it　holds　its　rank　as　a　god？　If　this　is　true　of　every　one　of　the　stars；　why　should　it　not　be　so　of　the　earth；　a　living　part　of　the　living　All？　We　cannot　think　of　it　as　sustained　from　without　by　an　alien　soul　and　incapable　of　containing　one　appropriate　to　itself。　　　　　Why　should　those　fiery　globes　be　receptive　of　soul；　and　the　earthly　globe　not？　The　stars　are　equally　corporeal；　and　they　lack　the　flesh；　blood；　muscle；　and　pliant　material　of　earth；　which；　besides；　is　of　more　varied　content　and　includes　every　form　of　body。　If　the　earth's　immobility　is　urged　in　objection；　the　answer　is　that　this　refers　only　to　spatial　movement。　　　　　But　how　can　perception　and　sensation　＇implied　in　ensoulment＇　be　supposed　to　occur　in　the　earth？　　　　　How　do　they　occur　in　the　stars？　Feeling　does　not　belong　to　fleshy　matter：　soul　to　have　perception　does　not　require　body；　body；　on　the　contrary；　requires　soul　to　maintain　its　being　and　its　efficiency；　judgement　＇the　foundation　of　perception＇　belongs　to　the　soul　which　overlooks　the　body；　and；　from　what　is　experienced　there；　forms　its　decisions。　　　　　But；　we　will　be　asked　to　say　what　are　the　experiences；　within　the　earth；　upon　which　the　earth…soul　is　thus　to　form　its　decisions：　certainly　vegetal　forms；　in　so　far　as　they　belong　to　earth　have　no　sensation　or　perception：　in　what　then；　and　through　what；　does　such　sensation　take　place；　for　sensation　without　organs　is　too　rash　a　notion。　Besides；　what　would　this　sense…perception　profit　the　soul？　It　could　not　be　necessary　to　knowledge：　surely　the　consciousness　of　wisdom　suffices　to　beings　which　have　nothing　to　gain　from　sensation？　　　　　This　argument　is　not　to　be　accepted：　it　ignores　the　consideration　that；　apart　from　all　question　of　practical　utility；　objects　of　sense　provide　occasion　for　a　knowing　which　brings　pleasure：　thus　we　ourselves　take　delight　in　looking　upon　sun；　stars；　sky；　landscape；　for　their　own　sake。　But　we　will　deal　with　this　point　later：　for　the　present　we　ask　whether　the　earth　has　perceptions　and　sensations；　and　if　so　through　what　vital　members　these　would　take　place　and　by　what　method：　this　requires　us　to　examine　certain　difficulties；　and　above　all　to　decide　whether　earth　could　have　sensation　without　organs；　and　whether　this　would　be　directed　to　some　necessary　purpose　even　when　incidentally　it　might　bring　other　results　as　well。　　　　　23。　A　first　principle　is　that　the　knowing　of　sensible　objects　is　an　act　of　the　soul；　or　of　the　living　conjoint；　becoming　aware　of　the　quality　of　certain　corporeal　entities；　and　appropriating　the　ideas　present　in　them。　　　　　This　apprehension　must　belong　either　to　the　soul　isolated；　self…acting；　or　to　soul　in　conjunction　with　some　other　entity。　　　　　Isolated；　self…acting；　how　is　it　possible？　Self…acting；　it　has　knowledge　of　its　own　content；　and　this　is　not　perception　but　intellection：　if　it　is　also　to　know　things　outside　itself　it　can　grasp　them　only　in　one　of　two　ways：　either　it　must　assimilate　itself　to　the　external　objects；　or　it　must　enter　into　relations　with　something　that　has　been　so　assimilated。　　　　　Now　as　long　as　it　remains　self…centred　it　cannot　assimilate：　a　single　point　cannot　assimilate　itself　to　an　external　line：　even　line　cannot　adapt　itself　to　line　in　another　order；　line　of　the　intellectual　to　line　of　the　sensible；　just　as　fire　of　the　intellectual　and　man　of　the　intellectual　remain　distinct　from　fire　and　man　of　the　sensible。　Even　Nature；　the　soul…phase　which　brings　man　into　being；　does　not　come　to　identity　with　the　man　it　shapes　and　informs：　it　has　the　faculty　of　dealing　with　the　sensible；　but　it　remains　isolated；　and；　its　task　done；　ignores　all　but　the　intellectual　as　it　is　itself　ignored　by　the　sensible　and　utterly　without　means　of　grasping　it。　　　　　Suppose　something　visible　lying　at　a　distance：　the　soul　sees　it；　now；　admitting　to　the　full　that　at　first　only　the　pure　idea　of　the　thing　is　seized…　a　total　without　discerned　part…　yet　in　the　end　it　becomes　to　the　seeing　soul　an　object　whose　complete　detail　of　colour　and　form　is　known：　this　shows　that　there　is　something　more　here　than　the　outlying　thing　and　the　soul；　for　the　soul　is　immune　from　experience；　there　must　be　a　third；　something　not　thus　exempt；　and　it　is　this　intermediate　that　accepts　the　impressions　of　shape　and　the　like。　　　　　This　intermediate　must　be　able　to　assume　the　modifications　of　the　material　object　so　as　to　be　an　exact　reproduction　of　its　states；　and　it　must　be　of　the　one　elemental…stuff：　it；　thus；　will　exhibit　the　condition　which　the　higher　principle　is　to　perceive；　and　the　condition　must　be　such　as　to　preserve　something　of　the　originating　object；　and　yet　not　be　identical　with　it：　the　essential　vehicle　of　knowledge　is　an　intermediary　which；　as　it　stands　between　the　soul　and　the　originating　object；　will；　similarly；　present　a　condition　midway　between　the　two　spheres；　of　sense　and　the　intellectual…linking　the　extremes；　receiving　from　one　side　to　exhibit　to　the　other；　in　virtue　of　being　able　to　assimilate　itself　to　each。　As　an　instrument　by　which　something　is　to　receive　knowledge；　it　cannot　be　identical　with　either　the　knower　or　the　known：　but　it　must　be　apt　to　likeness　with　both…　akin　to　the　external　object　by　its　power　of　being　affected；　and　to　the　internal；　the　knower；　by　the　fact　that　the　modification　it　takes　becomes　an　idea。　　　　　If　this　theory　of　ours　is　sound；　bodily　organs　are　necessary　to　sense…perception；　as　is　further　indicated　by　the　reflection　that　the　soul　entirely　freed　of　body　can　apprehend　nothing　in　the　order　of　sense。　　　　　The　organ　must　be　either　the　body　entire　or　some　member　set　apart　for　a　particular　function；　thus　touch　for　one；　vision　for　another。　The　tools　of　craftsmanship　will　be　seen　to　be　intermediaries　between　the　judging　worker　and　the　judged　object；　disclosing　to　the　experimenter　the　particular　character　of　the　matter　under　investigation：　thus　a　ruler；　representing　at　once　the　straightness　which　is　in　the　mind　and　the　straightness　of　a　plank；　is　used　as　an　intermediary　by　which　the　operator　proves　his　work。　　　　　Some　questions　of　detail　remain　for　consideration　elsewhere：　Is　it　necessary　that　t