the six enneads-第60节

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；　not　a　haphazard　but　precisely　where　there　is　need　of　the　incoming　or　outgoing　of　some　certain　Ideal…form；　the　compound　being　deficient　through　the　absence　of　a　particular　principle　whose　presence　will　complete　it。　　　　　But　the　reason　is　that　the　fundamental　nature　of　Matter　can　take　no　increase　by　anything　entering　it；　and　no　decrease　by　any　withdrawal：　what　from　the　beginning　it　was；　it　remains。　It　is　not　like　those　things　whose　lack　is　merely　that　of　arrangement　and　order　which　can　be　supplied　without　change　of　substance　as　when　we　dress　or　decorate　something　bare　or　ugly。　　　　　But　where　the　bringing　to　order　must　cut　through　to　the　very　nature；　the　base　original　must　be　transmuted：　it　can　leave　ugliness　for　beauty　only　by　a　change　of　substance。　Matter；　then；　thus　brought　to　order　must　lose　its　own　nature　in　the　supreme　degree　unless　its　baseness　is　an　accidental：　if　it　is　base　in　the　sense　of　being　Baseness　the　Absolute；　it　could　never　participate　in　order；　and；　if　evil　in　the　sense　of　being　Evil　the　Absolute；　it　could　never　participate　in　good。　　　　　We　conclude　that　Matter's　participation　in　Idea　is　not　by　way　of　modification　within　itself：　the　process　is　very　different；　it　is　a　bare　seeming。　Perhaps　we　have　here　the　solution　of　the　difficulty　as　to　how　Matter；　essentially　evil；　can　be　reaching　towards　The　Good：　there　would　be　no　such　participation　as　would　destroy　its　essential　nature。　Given　this　mode　of　pseudo…participation…　in　which　Matter　would；　as　we　say；　retain　its　nature；　unchanged；　always　being　what　it　has　essentially　been…　there　is　no　longer　any　reason　to　wonder　as　to　how　while　essentially　evil；　it　yet　participates　in　Idea：　for；　by　this　mode；　it　does　not　abandon　its　own　character：　participation　is　the　law；　but　it　participates　only　just　so　far　as　its　essence　allows。　Under　a　mode　of　participation　which　allows　it　to　remain　on　its　own　footing；　its　essential　nature　stands　none　the　less；　whatsoever　the　Idea；　within　that　limit；　may　communicate　to　it：　it　is　by　no　means　the　less　evil　for　remaining　immutably　in　its　own　order。　If　it　had　authentic　participation　in　The　Good　and　were　veritably　changed；　it　would　not　be　essentially　evil。　　　　　In　a　word；　when　we　call　Matter　evil　we　are　right　only　if　we　mean　that　it　is　not　amenable　to　modification　by　The　Good；　but　that　means　simply　that　it　is　subject　to　no　modification　whatever。　　　　　12。　This　is　Plato's　conception：　to　him　participation　does　not；　in　the　case　of　Matter；　comport　any　such　presence　of　an　Ideal…form　in　a　Substance　to　be　shaped　by　it　as　would　produce　one　compound　thing　made　up　of　the　two　elements　changing　at　the　same　moment；　merging　into　one　another；　modified　each　by　the　other。　　　　　In　his　haste　to　his　purpose　he　raises　many　difficult　questions；　but　he　is　determined　to　disown　that　view；　he　labours　to　indicate　in　what　mode　Matter　can　receive　the　Ideal…forms　without　being；　itself；　modified。　The　direct　way　is　debarred　since　it　is　not　easy　to　point　to　things　actually　present　in　a　base　and　yet　leaving　that　base　unaffected：　he　therefore　devises　a　metaphor　for　participation　without　modification；　one　which　supports；　also；　his　thesis　that　all　appearing　to　the　senses　is　void　of　substantial　existence　and　that　the　region　of　mere　seeming　is　vast。　　　　　Holding；　as　he　does；　that　it　is　the　patterns　displayed　upon　Matter　that　cause　all　experience　in　living　bodies　while　the　Matter　itself　remains　unaffected；　he　chooses　this　way　of　stating　its　immutability；　leaving　us　to　make　out　for　ourselves　that　those　very　patterns　impressed　upon　it　do　not　comport　any　experience；　any　modification；　in　itself。　　　　　In　the　case；　no　doubt；　of　the　living　bodies　that　take　one　pattern　or　shape　after　having　borne　another；　it　might　be　said　that　there　was　a　change；　the　variation　of　shape　being　made　verbally　equivalent　to　a　real　change：　but　since　Matter　is　essentially　without　shape　or　magnitude；　the　appearing　of　shape　upon　it　can　by　no　freedom　of　phrase　be　described　as　a　change　within　it。　On　this　point　one　must　have　〃a　rule　for　thick　and　thin〃　one　may　safely　say　that　the　underlying　Kind　contains　nothing　whatever　in　the　mode　commonly　supposed。　　　　　But　if　we　reject　even　the　idea　of　its　really　containing　at　least　the　patterns　upon　it；　how　is　it；　in　any　sense；　a　recipient？　　　　　The　answer　is　that　in　the　metaphor　cited　we　have　some　reasonably　adequate　indication　of　the　impassibility　of　Matter　coupled　with　the　presence　upon　it　of　what　may　be　described　as　images　of　things　not　present。　　　　　But　we　cannot　leave　the　point　of　its　impassibility　without　a　warning　against　allowing　ourselves　to　be　deluded　by　sheer　custom　of　speech。　　　　　Plato　speaks　of　Matter　as　becoming　dry；　wet；　inflamed；　but　we　must　remember　the　words　that　follow：　〃and　taking　the　shape　of　air　and　of　water〃：　this　blunts　the　expressions　〃becoming　wet；　becoming　inflamed〃；　once　we　have　Matter　thus　admitting　these　shapes；　we　learn　that　it　has　not　itself　become　a　shaped　thing　but　that　the　shapes　remain　distinct　as　they　entered。　We　see；　further；　that　the　expression　〃becoming　inflamed〃　is　not　to　be　taken　strictly：　it　is　rather　a　case　of　becoming　fire。　Becoming　fire　is　very　different　from　becoming　inflamed；　which　implies　an　outside　agency　and；　therefore；　susceptibility　to　modification。　Matter；　being　itself　a　portion　of　fire；　cannot　be　said　to　catch　fire。　To　suggest　that　the　fire　not　merely　permeates　the　matter；　but　actually　sets　it　on　fire　is　like　saying　that　a　statue　permeates　its　bronze。　　　　　Further；　if　what　enters　must　be　an　Ideal…Principle　how　could　it　set　Matter　aflame？　But　what　if　it　is　a　pattern　or　condition？　No：　the　object　set　aflame　is　so　in　virtue　of　the　combination　of　Matter　and　condition。　　　　　But　how　can　this　follow　on　the　conjunction　when　no　unity　has　been　produced　by　the　two？　　　　　Even　if　such　a　unity　had　been　produced；　it　would　be　a　unity　of　things　not　mutually　sharing　experiences　but　acting　upon　each　other。　And　the　question　would　then　arise　whether　each　was　effective　upon　the　other　or　whether　the　sole　action　was　not　that　of　one　（the　form）　preventing　the　other　＇the　Matter＇　from　slipping　away？　　　　　But　when　any　material　thing　is　severed；　must　not　the　Matter　be　divided　with　it？　Surely　the　bodily　modification　and　other　experience　that　have　accompanied　the　sundering；　must　have　occurred；　identically；　within　the　Matter？　　　　　This　reasoning　would　force　the　destructibility　of　Matter　upon　us：　〃the　body　is　dissolved；　then　the　Matter　is　dissolved。〃　We　would　have　to　allow　Matter　to　be　a　thing　of　quantity；　a　magnitude。　But　since　it　is　not　a　magnitude　it　could　not　have　the　experiences　that　belong　to　magnitude　and；　on　the　larger　scale；　since　it　is　not　body　it　cannot　know　the　experiences　of　body。　　　　　In　fact　those　that　declare　Matter　subject　to　modification　may　as　well　declare　it　body　right　out。　　　　　13。　Further；　they　must　explain　in　what　sense　they　hold　that　Matter　tends　to　slip　away　from　its　form　＇the　Idea＇。　Can　we　conceive　it　stealing　out　from　stones　and　rocks　or　whatever　else　envelops　it？　　　　　And　of　course　they　cannot　pretend　that　Matter　in　some　cases　rebels　and　sometimes　not。　For　if　once　it　makes　away　of　its　own　will；　why　should　it　not　always　escape？　If　it　is　fixed　despite　itself；　it　must　be　enveloped　by　some　Ideal…Form　for　good　and　all。　This；　however；　leaves　still　the　question　why　a　given　portion　of　Matter　does　not　remain　constant　to　any　one　given　form：　the　reason　lies　mainly　in　the　fact　that　the　Ideas　are　constantly　passing　into　it。　　　　　In　what　sense；　then；　is　it　said　to　elude　form？　　　　　By　very　nature　and　for　ever？　　　　　But　does　not　this　precisely　mean　that　it　never　ceases　to　be　itself；　in　other　words　that　its　one　form　is　an　invincible　formlessness？　In　no　other　sense　has　Plato's　dictum　any　value　to　those　that　invoke　it。　　　　　Matter　＇we　read＇　is　〃the　receptacle　and　nurse　of　all　generation。〃　　　　　Now　if　Matter　is　such　a　receptacle　and　nurse；　all　generation　is　distinct　from　it；　and　since　all　the　changeable　lies　in　the　realm　of　generation；　Matter；　existing　before　all　generation；　must　exist　before　all　change。　　　　　〃Receptacle〃　and　〃nurse〃；　then　it　〃retains　its　identity；　it　is　not　subject　to　modification。　Similarly　if　it　is〃　＇as　again　we　read＇　〃the　ground　on　which　individual　things　appear　and　disappear；〃　and　so；　too；　if　it　is　a　〃place；　a　base。〃　Where　Plato　describes　and　identifies　it　as　〃a　ground　to　the　ideas〃　he　is　not　attributing　any　state　to　it；　he　is　probing　after　its　distinctive　manner　of　being。　　　　　And　what　is　that？　　　　　This　which　we　think　of　as　a　Nature…Kind　cannot　be　included　among　Existents　but　must　utterly　rebel　from　the　Essence　of　Real　Beings　and　be　therefore　wholly　something　other　than　they…　for　they　are　Reason…Principles　and　possess　Authentic　Existence…　it　must　inevitably；　by　virtue　of　that　difference；　retain　its　integrity　to　the　point　of　being　permanently　closed　against　them　and；　more；　of　rejecting　close　participation　in　any　image　of　them。　　　　　Only　on　these　terms　can　it　be　completely　different：　once　it　took　any　Idea　to　hearth　and　home；　it　would　become　a　new　thing；　for　it　would　cease　to　be　the　thing　apart；　the　ground　of　all　else；　the　receptacle　of　absolutely　any　and　every　form。　If　there　is　to　be　a　ceaseless　coming　into　it　and　going　out　from　it；　itself　must　be　unmoved　and　immune　in　all　the　come　and　go。　The　entrant　Idea　will　enter　as　an　image；　the　untrue　entering　the　untruth。　　　　　But；　at