the six enneads-第182节

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


ut；　if　this　is　knowledge　by　perception；　it　does　not　help　towards　the　freedom　of　the　act；　perception　gives　awareness；　not　mastery：　if　true　knowing　is　meant；　either　this　is　the　knowing　of　something　happening…　once　more　awareness…　with　the　motive…　force　still　to　seek；　or　the　reasoning　and　knowledge　have　acted　to　quell　the　appetite；　then　we　have　to　ask　to　what　this　repression　is　to　be　referred　and　where　it　has　taken　place。　If　it　is　that　the　mental　process　sets　up　an　opposing　desire　we　must　assure　ourselves　how；　if　it　merely　stills　the　appetite　with　no　further　efficiency　and　this　is　our　freedom；　then　freedom　does　not　depend　upon　act　but　is　a　thing　of　the　mind…　and　in　truth　all　that　has　to　do　with　act；　the　very　most　reasonable；　is　still　of　mixed　value　and　cannot　carry　freedom。　　　　　3。　All　this　calls　for　examination；　the　enquiry　must　bring　us　close　to　the　solution　as　regards　the　gods。　　　　　We　have　traced　self…disposal　to　will；　will　to　reasoning　and；　next　step；　to　right　reasoning；　perhaps　to　right　reasoning　we　must　add　knowledge；　for　however　sound　opinion　and　act　may　be　they　do　not　yield　true　freedom　when　the　adoption　of　the　right　course　is　the　result　of　hazard　or　of　some　presentment　from　the　fancy　with　no　knowledge　of　the　foundations　of　that　rightness。　　　　　Taking　it　that　the　presentment　of　fancy　is　not　a　matter　of　our　will　and　choice；　how　can　we　think　those　acting　at　its　dictation　to　be　free　agents？　Fancy　strictly；　in　our　use；　takes　it　rise　from　conditions　of　the　body；　lack　of　food　and　drink　sets　up　presentments；　and　so　does　the　meeting　of　these　needs；　similarly　with　seminal　abundance　and　other　humours　of　the　body。　We　refuse　to　range　under　the　principle　of　freedom　those　whose　conduct　is　directed　by　such　fancy：　the　baser　sort；　therefore；　mainly　so　guided；　cannot　be　credited　with　self…disposal　or　voluntary　act。　Self…disposal；　to　us；　belongs　to　those　who；　through　the　activities　of　the　Intellectual…Principle；　live　above　the　states　of　the　body。　The　spring　of　freedom　is　the　activity　of　Intellectual…Principle；　the　highest　in　our　being；　the　proposals　emanating　thence　are　freedom；　such　desires　as　are　formed　in　the　exercise　of　the　Intellectual　act　cannot　be　classed　as　involuntary；　the　gods；　therefore；　that　live　in　this　state；　living　by　Intellectual…Principle　and　by　desire　conformed　to　it；　possess　freedom。　　　　　4。　It　will　be　asked　how　act　rising　from　desire　can　be　voluntary；　since　desire　pulls　outward　and　implies　need；　to　desire　is　still　to　be　drawn；　even　though　towards　the　good。　　　　　Intellectual…Principle　itself　comes　under　the　doubt；　having　a　certain　nature　and　acting　by　that　nature　can　it　be　said　to　have　freedom　and　self…disposal…　in　an　act　which　it　cannot　leave　unenacted？　It　may　be　asked；　also；　whether　freedom　may　strictly　be　affirmed　of　such　beings　as　are　not　engaged　in　action。　　　　　However　that　may　be；　where　there　is　such　act　there　is　compulsion　from　without；　since；　failing　motive；　act　will　not　be　performed。　These　higher　beings；　too；　obey　their　own　nature；　where　then　is　their　freedom？　　　　　But；　on　the　other　hand；　can　there　be　talk　of　constraint　where　there　is　no　compulsion　to　obey　an　extern；　and　how　can　any　movement　towards　a　good　be　counted　compulsion？　Effort　is　free　once　it　is　towards　a　fully　recognised　good；　the　involuntary　is；　precisely；　motion　away　from　a　good　and　towards　the　enforced；　towards　something　not　recognised　as　a　good；　servitude　lies　in　being　powerless　to　move　towards　one's　good；　being　debarred　from　the　preferred　path　in　a　menial　obedience。　Hence　the　shame　of　slavedom　is　incurred　not　when　one　is　held　from　the　hurtful　but　when　the　personal　good　must　be　yielded　in　favour　of　another's。　　　　　Further；　this　objected　obedience　to　the　characteristic　nature　would　imply　a　duality；　master　and　mastered；　but　an　undivided　Principle；　a　simplex　Activity；　where　there　can　be　no　difference　of　potentiality　and　act；　must　be　free；　there　can　be　no　thought　of　〃action　according　to　the　nature；〃　in　the　sense　of　any　distinction　between　the　being　and　its　efficiency；　there　where　being　and　act　are　identical。　Where　act　is　performed　neither　because　of　another　nor　at　another's　will；　there　surely　is　freedom。　Freedom　may　of　course　be　an　inappropriate　term：　there　is　something　greater　here：　it　is　self…disposal　in　the　sense；　only；　that　there　is　no　disposal　by　the　extern；　no　outside　master　over　the　act。　　　　　In　a　principle；　act　and　essence　must　be　free。　No　doubt　Intellectual…Principle　itself　is　to　be　referred　to　a　yet　higher；　but　this　higher　is　not　extern　to　it；　Intellectual…Principle　is　within　the　Good；　possessing　its　own　good　in　virtue　of　that　indwelling；　much　more　will　it　possess　freedom　and　self…disposal　which　are　sought　only　for　the　sake　of　the　good。　Acting　towards　the　good；　it　must　all　the　more　possess　self…disposal　for　by　that　Act　it　is　directed　towards　the　Principle　from　which　it　proceeds；　and　this　its　act　is　self…centred　and　must　entail　its　very　greatest　good。　　　　　5。　Are　we；　however；　to　make　freedom　and　self…disposal　exclusive　to　Intellectual…Principle　as　engaged　in　its　characteristic　Act；　Intellectual…Principle　unassociated；　or　do　they　belong　also　to　soul　acting　under　that　guidance　and　performing　act　of　virtue？　　　　　If　freedom　is　to　be　allowed　to　soul　in　its　Act；　it　certainly　cannot　be　allowed　in　regard　to　issue；　for　we　are　not　master　of　events：　if　in　regard　to　fine　conduct　and　all　inspired　by　Intellectual…Principle；　that　may　very　well　be　freedom；　but　is　the　freedom　ours？　　　　　Because　there　is　war；　we　perform　some　brave　feat；　how　is　that　our　free　act　since　had　there　been　no　war　it　could　not　have　been　performed？　So　in　all　cases　of　fine　conduct；　there　is　always　some　impinging　event　leading　out　our　quality　to　show　itself　in　this　or　that　act。　And　suppose　virtue　itself　given　the　choice　whether　to　find　occasion　for　its　exercise…　war　evoking　courage；　wrong；　so　that　it　may　establish　justice　and　good　order；　poverty　that　it　may　show　independence…　or　to　remain　inactive；　everything　going　well；　it　would　choose　the　peace　of　inaction；　nothing　calling　for　its　intervention；　just　as　a　physician　like　Hippocrates　would　prefer　no　one　to　stand　in　need　of　his　skill。　　　　　If　thus　virtue　whose　manifestation　requires　action　becomes　inevitably　a　collaborator　under　compulsion；　how　can　it　have　untrammelled　self…disposal？　　　　　Should　we；　perhaps；　distinguish　between　compulsion　in　the　act　and　freedom　in　the　preceding　will　and　reasoning？　　　　　But　in　setting　freedom　in　those　preceding　functions；　we　imply　that　virtue　has　a　freedom　and　self…disposal　apart　from　all　act；　then　we　must　state　what　is　the　reality　of　the　self…disposal　attributed　to　virtue　as　state　or　disposition。　Are　we　to　put　it　that　virtue　comes　in　to　restore　the　disordered　soul；　taming　passions　and　appetites？　In　what　sense；　at　that；　can　we　hold　our　goodness　to　be　our　own　free　act；　our　fine　conduct　to　be　uncompelled？　In　that　we　will　and　adopt；　in　that　this　entry　of　virtue　prepares　freedom　and　self…disposal；　ending　our　slavery　to　the　masters　we　have　been　obeying。　If　then　virtue　is；　as　it　were；　a　second　Intellectual…Principle；　and　heightens　the　soul　to　Intellectual　quality；　then；　once　more；　our　freedom　is　found　to　lie　not　in　act　but　in　Intellectual…Principle　immune　from　act。　　　　　6。　How　then　did　we　come　to　place　freedom　in　the　will　when　we　made　out　free　action　to　be　that　produced…　or　as　we　also　indicated；　suppressed…　at　the　dictate　of　will？　　　　　If　what　we　have　been　saying　is　true　and　our　former　statement　is　consistent　with　it；　the　case　must　stand　thus：　　　　　Virtue　and　Intellectual…Principle　are　sovereign　and　must　be　held　the　sole　foundation　of　our　self…disposal　and　freedom；　both　then　are　free；　Intellectual…Principle　is　self…confined：　Virtue；　in　its　government　of　the　soul　which　it　seeks　to　lift　into　goodness；　would　wish　to　be　free；　in　so　far　as　it　does　so　it　is　free　and　confers　freedom；　but　inevitably　experiences　and　actions　are　forced　upon　it　by　its　governance：　these　it　has　not　planned　for；　yet　when　they　do　arise　it　will　watch　still　for　its　sovereignty　calling　these　also　to　judgement。　Virtue　does　not　follow　upon　occurrences　as　a　saver　of　the　emperilled；　at　its　discretion　it　sacrifices　a　man；　it　may　decree　the　jettison　of　life；　means；　children；　country　even；　it　looks　to　its　own　high　aim　and　not　to　the　safeguarding　of　anything　lower。　Thus　our　freedom　of　act；　our　self…disposal；　must　be　referred　not　to　the　doing；　not　to　the　external　thing　done　but　to　the　inner　activity；　to　the　Intellection；　to　virtue's　own　vision。　　　　　So　understood；　virtue　is　a　mode　of　Intellectual…Principle；　a　mode　not　involving　any　of　the　emotions　or　passions　controlled　by　its　reasonings；　since　such　experiences；　amenable　to　morality　and　discipline；　touch　closely…　we　read…　on　body。　　　　　This　makes　it　all　the　more　evident　that　the　unembodied　is　the　free；　to　this　our　self…disposal　is　to　be　referred；　herein　lies　our　will　which　remains　free　and　self…disposing　in　spite　of　any　orders　which　it　may　necessarily　utter　to　meet　the　external。　All　then　that　issues　from　will　and　is　the　effect　of　will　is　our　free　action；　and　in　the　highest　degree　all　that　lies　outside　of　the　corporeal　is　purely　within　the　scope　of　will；　all　that　will　adopts　and　brings；　unimpeded；　into　existence。　　　　　The　contemplating　Intellect；　the　first　or　highest；　has　self…disposal　to　the　point　that　its　operation　is　utterly　independent；