the six enneads-第150节

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　a　principle　of　measurement；　the　〃measure〃　will　be　present　in　the　measurer。　　　　　Place　is　the　limit　of　the　surrounding　space；　and　thus　is　present　in　that　space。　　　　　The　truth　is；　however；　that　the　〃Substance〃　of　our　enquiry　may　be　apprehended　in　directly　opposite　ways：　it　may　be　determined　by　one　of　the　properties　we　have　been　discussing；　by　more　than　one；　by　all　at　once；　according　as　they　answer　to　the　notions　of　Matter；　Form　and　the　Couplement。　　　　　6。　Granted；　it　may　be　urged；　that　these　observations　upon　the　nature　of　Substance　are　sound；　we　have　not　yet　arrived　at　a　statement　of　its　essence。　Our　critic　doubtless　expects　to　see　this　〃Sensible〃：　but　its　essence；　its　characteristic　being；　cannot　be　seen。　　　　　Do　we　infer　that　fire　and　water　are　not　Substance？　They　certainly　are　not　Substance　because　they　are　visible。　Why；　then？　Because　they　possess　Matter？　No。　Or　Form？　No。　Nor　because　they　involve　a　Couplement　of　Matter　and　Form。　Then　why　are　they　Substance？　By　existing。　But　does　not　Quantity　exist；　and　Quality？　This　anomaly　is　to　be　explained　by　an　equivocation　in　the　term　〃existence。〃　　　　　What；　then；　is　the　meaning　of　〃existence〃　as　applied　to　fire；　earth　and　the　other　elements？　What　is　the　difference　between　this　existence　and　existence　in　the　other　categories？　It　is　the　difference　between　being　simply…　that　which　merely　is…　and　being　white。　But　surely　the　being　qualified　by　〃white〃　is　the　same　as　that　having　no　qualification？　It　is　not　the　same：　the　latter　is　Being　in　the　primary　sense；　the　former　is　Being　only　by　participation　and　in　a　secondary　degree。　Whiteness　added　to　Being　produces　a　being　white；　Being　added　to　whiteness　produces　a　white　being：　thus；　whiteness　becomes　an　accident　of　Being；　and　Being　an　accident　of　whiteness。　　　　　The　case　is　not　equivalent　to　predicating　white　of　Socrates　and　Socrates　of　white：　for　Socrates　remains　the　same；　though　white　would　appear　to　have　a　different　meaning　in　the　two　propositions；　since　in　predicating　Socrates　of　white　we　include　Socrates　in　the　＇whole＇　sphere　of　whiteness；　whereas　in　the　proposition　〃Socrates　is　white〃　whiteness　is　plainly　an　attribute　of　Socrates。　　　　　〃Being　is　white〃　implies；　similarly；　that　Being　possesses　whiteness　as　an　attribute；　while　in　the　proposition　〃whiteness　is　Being　＇or；　is　a　being＇〃　Being　is　regarded　as　comprising　whiteness　in　its　own　extension。　　　　　In　sum；　whiteness　has　existence　because　it　is　bound　up　with　Being　and　present　in　it：　Being　is；　thus；　the　source　of　its　existence。　Being　is　Being　on　its　own　account；　but　the　white　is　due　to　whiteness…　not　because　it　is　〃present　in〃　whiteness；　but　because　whiteness　is　present　in　it。　　　　　The　Being　of　the　Sensible　resembles　the　white　in　not　originating　in　itself。　It　must　therefore　be　regarded　as　dependent　for　its　being　upon　the　Authentic　Being；　as　white　is　dependent　upon　the　Authentic　Whiteness；　and　the　Authentic　Whiteness　dependent　for　its　whiteness　upon　participation　in　that　Supreme　Being　whose　existence　is　underived。　　　　　7。　But　Matter；　it　may　be　contended；　is　the　source　of　existence　to　the　Sensible　things　implanted　in　it。　From　what　source；　then；　we　retort；　does　Matter　itself　derive　existence　and　being？　　　　　That　Matter　is　not　a　Primary　we　have　established　elsewhere。　If　it　be　urged　that　other　things　can　have　no　subsistence　without　being　implanted　in　Matter；　we　admit　the　claim　for　Sensible　things。　But　though　Matter　be　prior　to　these；　it　is　not　thereby　precluded　from　being　posterior　to　many　things…posterior；　in　fact；　to　all　the　beings　of　the　Intellectual　sphere。　Its　existence　is　but　a　pale　reflection；　and　less　complete　than　that　of　the　things　implanted　in　it。　These　are　Reason…Principles　and　more　directly　derived　from　Being：　Matter　has　of　itself　no　Reason…Principle　whatever；　it　is　but　a　shadow　of　a　Principle；　a　vain　attempt　to　achieve　a　Principle。　　　　　But；　our　critic　may　pursue；　Matter　gives　existence　to　the　things　implanted　in　it；　just　as　Socrates　gives　existence　to　the　whiteness　implanted　in　himself？　We　reply　that　the　higher　being　gives　existence　to　the　lower；　the　lower　to　the　higher　never。　　　　　But　once　concede　that　Form　is　higher　in　the　scale　of　Being　than　Matter；　and　Matter　can　no　longer　be　regarded　as　a　common　ground　of　both；　nor　Substance　as　a　genus　embracing　Matter；　Form　and　the　Couplement。　True；　these　will　have　many　common　properties；　to　which　we　have　already　referred；　but　their　being　＇or　existence＇　will　nonetheless　be　different。　When　a　higher　being　comes　into　contact　with　a　lower；　the　lower；　though　first　in　the　natural　order；　is　yet　posterior　in　the　scale　of　Reality：　consequently；　if　Being　does　not　belong　in　equal　degrees　to　Matter；　to　Form　and　to　the　Couplement；　Substance　can　no　longer　be　common　to　all　three　in　the　sense　of　being　their　genus：　to　their　posteriors　it　will　bear　a　still　different　relation；　serving　them　as　a　common　base　by　being　bound　up　with　all　alike。　Substance；　thus；　resembles　life；　dim　here；　clearer　there；　or　portraits　of　which　one　is　an　outline；　another　more　minutely　worked。　By　measuring　Being　by　its　dim　manifestation　and　neglecting　a　fuller　revelation　elsewhere；　we　may　come　to　regard　this　dim　existence　as　a　common　ground。　　　　　But　this　procedure　is　scarcely　permissible。　Every　being　is　a　distinct　whole。　The　dim　manifestation　is　in　no　sense　a　common　ground；　just　as　there　is　no　common　ground　in　the　vegetal；　the　sensory　and　the　intellectual　forms　of　life。　　　　　We　conclude　that　the　term　〃Being〃　must　have　different　connotations　as　applied　to　Matter；　to　Form　and　to　both　conjointly；　in　spite　of　the　single　source　pouring　into　the　different　streams。　　　　　Take　a　second　derived　from　a　first　and　a　third　from　the　second：　it　is　not　merely　that　the　one　will　rank　higher　and　its　successor　be　poorer　and　of　lower　worth；　there　is　also　the　consideration　that；　even　deriving　from　the　same　source；　one　thing；　subjected　in　a　certain　degree　to　fire；　will　give　us　an　earthen　jar；　while　another；　taking　less　of　the　heat；　does　not　produce　the　jar。　　　　　Perhaps　we　cannot　even　maintain　that　Matter　and　Form　are　derived　from　a　single　source；　they　are　clearly　in　some　sense　different。　　　　　8。　The　division　into　elements　must；　in　short；　be　abandoned；　especially　in　regard　to　Sensible　Substance；　known　necessarily　by　sense　rather　than　by　reason。　We　must　no　longer　look　for　help　in　constituent　parts；　since　such　parts　will　not　be　substances；　or　at　any　rate　not　sensible　substances。　　　　　Our　plan　must　be　to　apprehend　what　is　constant　in　stone；　earth；　water　and　the　entities　which　they　compose…　the　vegetal　and　animal　forms；　considered　purely　as　sensibles…　and　to　confine　this　constant　within　a　single　genus。　Neither　Matter　nor　Form　will　thus　be　overlooked；　for　Sensible　Substance　comports　them；　fire　and　earth　and　the　two　intermediaries　consist　of　Matter　and　Form；　while　composite　things　are　actually　many　substances　in　one。　They　all；　moreover；　have　that　common　property　which　distinguishes　them　from　other　things：　serving　as　subjects　to　these　others；　they　are　never　themselves　present　in　a　subject　nor　predicated　of　any　other　thing。　Similarly；　all　the　characteristics　which　we　have　ascribed　to　Substance　find　a　place　in　this　classification。　　　　　But　Sensible　Substance　is　never　found　apart　from　magnitude　and　quality：　how　then　do　we　proceed　to　separate　these　accidents？　If　we　subtract　them…　magnitude；　figure；　colour；　dryness；　moistness…　what　is　there　left　to　be　regarded　as　Substance　itself？　All　the　substances　under　consideration　are；　of　course；　qualified。　　　　　There　is；　however；　something　in　relation　to　which　whatever　turns　Substance　into　qualified　Substance　is　accidental：　thus；　the　whole　of　fire　is　not　Substance；　but　only　a　part　of　it…　if　the　term　〃part〃　be　allowed。　　　　　What　then　can　this　〃part〃　be？　Matter　may　be　suggested。　But　are　we　actually　to　maintain　that　the　particular　sensible　substance　consists　of　a　conglomeration　of　qualities　and　Matter；　while　Sensible　Substance　as　a　whole　is　merely　the　sum　of　these　coagulations　in　the　uniform　Matter；　each　one　separately　forming　a　quale　or　a　quantum　or　else　a　thing　of　many　qualities？　Is　it　true　to　say　that　everything　whose　absence　leaves　subsistence　incomplete　is　a　part　of　the　particular　substance；　while　all　that　is　accidental　to　the　substance　already　existent　takes　independent　rank　and　is　not　submerged　in　the　mixture　which　constitutes　this　so…called　substance？　　　　　I　decline　to　allow　that　whatever　combines　in　this　way　with　anything　else　is　Substance　if　it　helps　to　produce　a　single　mass　having　quantity　and　quality；　whereas　taken　by　itself　and　divorced　from　this　complementary　function　it　is　a　quality：　not　everything　which　composes　the　amalgam　is　Substance；　but　only　the　amalgam　as　a　whole。　　　　　And　let　no　one　take　exception　on　the　ground　that　we　produce　Sensible　Substance　from　non…substances。　The　whole　amalgam　itself　is　not　True　Substance；　it　is　merely　an　imitation　of　that　True　Substance　which　has　Being　apart　from　its　concomitants；　these　indeed　being　derived　from　it　as　the　possessor　of　True　Being。　In　the　lower　realm　the　case　is　different：　the　underlying　ground　is　sterile；　and　from　its　inability　to　produce　fails　to　attain　to　the　status　of　Being；　it　remains　a　shadow；　and　on　this　shadow　is　traced　a　sketch…　the　world　of　Appearance。　　　　　9。　So　much　for　one　of　the　genera…　the　〃Substance；〃　so　called；　of　the　Sensible　realm。　　　　　But　wh