the six enneads-第146节

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


tude　derives　its　quantity　from　number；　and　number　is　not　a　genus；　how　can　magnitude　hold　that　status？　Besides；　magnitudes；　like　numbers；　admit　of　priority　and　posteriority。　　　　　If；　then；　Quantity　be　constituted　by　a　common　element　in　both　number　and　magnitude；　we　must　ascertain　the　nature　of　this　common　element；　and　consider　it；　once　discovered；　as　a　posterior　genus；　not　as　one　of　the　Primaries：　thus　failing　of　primary　status；　it　must　be　related；　directly　or　indirectly；　to　one　of　the　Primaries。　　　　　We　may　take　it　as　clear　that　it　is　the　nature　of　Quantity　to　indicate　a　certain　quantum；　and　to　measure　the　quantum　of　the　particular；　Quantity　is　moreover；　in　a　sense；　itself　a　quantum。　But　if　the　quantum　is　the　common　element　in　number　and　magnitude；　either　we　have　number　as　a　primary　with　magnitude　derived　from　it；　or　else　number　must　consist　of　a　blending　of　Motion　and　Stability；　while　magnitude　will　be　a　form　of　Motion　or　will　originate　in　Motion；　Motion　going　forth　to　infinity　and　Stability　creating　the　unit　by　checking　that　advance。　　　　　But　the　problem　of　the　origin　of　number　and　magnitude；　or　rather　of　how　they　subsist　and　are　conceived；　must　be　held　over。　It　may；　thus；　be　found　that　number　is　among　the　primary　genera；　while　magnitude　is　posterior　and　composite；　or　that　number　belongs　to　the　genus　Stability；　while　magnitude　must　be　consigned　to　Motion。　But　we　propose　to　discuss　all　this　at　a　later　stage。　　　　　14。　Why　is　Quality；　again；　not　included　among　the　Primaries？　Because　like　Quantity　it　is　a　posterior；　subsequent　to　Substance。　Primary　Substance　must　necessarily　contain　Quantity　and　Quality　as　its　consequents；　it　cannot　owe　its　subsistence　to　them；　or　require　them　for　its　completion：　that　would　make　it　posterior　to　Quality　and　Quantity。　　　　　Now　in　the　case　of　composite　substances…　those　constituted　from　diverse　elements…　number　and　qualities　provide　a　means　of　differentiation：　the　qualities　may　be　detached　from　the　common　core　around　which　they　are　found　to　group　themselves。　But　in　the　primary　genera　there　is　no　distinction　to　be　drawn　between　simples　and　composites；　the　difference　is　between　simples　and　those　entities　which　complete　not　a　particular　substance　but　Substance　as　such。　A　particular　substance　may　very　well　receive　completion　from　Quality；　for　though　it　already　has　Substance　before　the　accession　of　Quality；　its　particular　character　is　external　to　Substance。　But　in　Substance　itself　all　the　elements　are　substantial。　　　　　Nevertheless；　we　ventured　to　assert　elsewhere　that　while　the　complements　of　Substance　are　only　by　analogy　called　qualities；　yet　accessions　of　external　origin　and　subsequent　to　Substance　are　really　qualities；　that；　further；　the　properties　which　inhere　in　substances　are　their　activities　＇Acts＇；　while　those　which　are　subsequent　are　merely　modifications　＇or　Passions＇：　we　now　affirm　that　the　attributes　of　the　particular　substance　are　never　complementary　to　Substance　＇as　such＇；　an　accession　of　Substance　does　not　come　to　the　substance　of　man　qua　man；　he　is；　on　the　contrary；　Substance　in　a　higher　degree　before　he　arrives　at　differentiation；　just　as　he　is　already　〃living　being〃　before　he　passes　into　the　rational　species。　　　　　15。　How　then　do　the　four　genera　complete　Substance　without　qualifying　it　or　even　particularizing　it？　　　　　It　has　been　observed　that　Being　is　primary；　and　it　is　clear　that　none　of　the　four…　Motion；　Stability；　Difference；　Identity…　is　distinct　from　it。　That　this　Motion　does　not　produce　Quality　is　doubtless　also　clear；　but　a　word　or　two　will　make　it　clearer　still。　　　　　If　Motion　is　the　Act　of　Substance；　and　Being　and　the　Primaries　in　general　are　its　Act；　then　Motion　is　not　an　accidental　attribute：　as　the　Act　of　what　is　necessarily　actual　＇what　necessarily　involves　Act＇；　it　is　no　longer　to　be　considered　as　the　complement　of　Substance　but　as　Substance　itself。　For　this　reason；　then；　it　has　not　been　assigned　to　a　posterior　class；　or　referred　to　Quality；　but　has　been　made　contemporary　with　Being。　　　　　The　truth　is　not　that　Being　first　is　and　then　takes　Motion；　first　is　and　then　acquires　Stability：　neither　Stability　nor　Motion　is　a　mere　modification　of　Being。　Similarly；　Identity　and　Difference　are　not　later　additions：　Being　did　not　grow　into　plurality；　its　very　unity　was　a　plurality；　but　plurality　implies　Difference；　and　unity…in…plurality　involves　Identity。　　　　　Substance　＇Real　Being＇　requires　no　more　than　these　five　constituents；　but　when　we　have　to　turn　to　the　lower　sphere；　we　find　other　principles　giving　rise　no　longer　to　Substance　（as　such）　but　to　quantitative　Substance　and　qualitative：　these　other　principles　may　be　regarded　as　genera　but　not　primary　genera。　　　　　16。　As　for　Relation；　manifestly　an　offshoot；　how　can　it　be　included　among　primaries？　Relation　is　of　thing　ranged　against　thing；　it　is　not　self…pivoted；　but　looks　outward。　　　　　Place　and　Date　are　still　more　remote　from　Being。　Place　denotes　the　presence　of　one　entity　within　another；　so　that　it　involves　a　duality；　but　a　genus　must　be　a　unity；　not　a　composite。　Besides；　Place　does　not　exist　in　the　higher　sphere；　and　the　present　discussion　is　concerned　with　the　realm　of　True　Being。　　　　　Whether　time　is　There；　remains　to　be　considered。　Apparently　it　has　less　claim　than　even　Place。　If　it　is　a　measurement；　and　that　a　measurement　of　Motion；　we　have　two　entities；　the　whole　is　a　composite　and　posterior　to　Motion；　therefore　it　is　not　on　an　equal　footing　with　Motion　in　our　classification。　　　　　Action　and　Passivity　presuppose　Motion；　if；　then；　they　exist　in　the　higher　sphere；　they　each　involve　a　duality；　neither　is　a　simplex。　　　　　Possession　is　a　duality；　while　Situation；　as　signifying　one　thing　situated　in　another；　is　a　threefold　conception。　　　　　17。　Why　are　not　beauty；　goodness　and　the　virtues；　together　with　knowledge　and　intelligence；　included　among　the　primary　genera？　　　　　If　by　goodness　we　mean　The　First…　what　we　call　the　Principle　of　Goodness；　the　Principle　of　which　we　can　predicate　nothing；　giving　it　this　name　only　because　we　have　no　other　means　of　indicating　it…　then　goodness；　clearly；　can　be　the　genus　of　nothing：　this　principle　is　not　affirmed　of　other　things；　if　it　were；　each　of　these　would　be　Goodness　itself。　The　truth　is　that　it　is　prior　to　Substance；　not　contained　in　it。　If；　on　the　contrary；　we　mean　goodness　as　a　quality；　no　quality　can　be　ranked　among　the　primaries。　　　　　Does　this　imply　that　the　nature　of　Being　is　not　good？　Not　good；　to　begin　with；　in　the　sense　in　which　The　First　is　good；　but　in　another　sense　of　the　word：　moreover；　Being　does　not　possess　its　goodness　as　a　quality　but　as　a　constituent。　　　　　But　the　other　genera　too；　we　said；　are　constituents　of　Being；　and　are　regarded　as　genera　because　each　is　a　common　property　found　in　many　things。　If　then　goodness　is　similarly　observed　in　every　part　of　Substance　or　Being；　or　in　most　parts；　why　is　goodness　not　a　genus；　and　a　primary　genus？　Because　it　is　not　found　identical　in　all　the　parts　of　Being；　but　appears　in　degrees；　first；　second　and　subsequent；　whether　it　be　because　one　part　is　derived　from　another…　posterior　from　prior…　or　because　all　are　posterior　to　the　transcendent　Unity；　different　parts　of　Being　participating　in　it　in　diverse　degrees　corresponding　to　their　characteristic　natures。　　　　　If　however　we　must　make　goodness　a　genus　as　well　＇as　a　transcendent　source＇；　it　will　be　a　posterior　genus；　for　goodness　is　posterior　to　Substance　and　posterior　to　what　constitutes　the　generic　notion　of　Being；　however　unfailingly　it　be　found　associated　with　Being；　but　the　Primaries；　we　decided；　belong　to　Being　as　such；　and　go　to　form　Substance。　　　　　This　indeed　is　why　we　posit　that　which　transcends　Being；　since　Being　and　Substance　cannot　but　be　a　plurality；　necessarily　comprising　the　genera　enumerated　and　therefore　forming　a　one…and…many。　　　　　It　is　true　that　we　do　not　hesitate　to　speak　of　the　goodness　inherent　in　Being〃　when　we　are　thinking　of　that　Act　by　which　Being　tends；　of　its　nature；　towards　the　One：　thus；　we　affirm　goodness　of　it　in　the　sense　that　it　is　thereby　moulded　into　the　likeness　of　The　Good。　But　if　this　〃goodness　inherent　in　Being〃　is　an　Act　directed　toward　The　Good；　it　is　the　life　of　Being：　but　this　life　is　Motion；　and　Motion　is　already　one　of　the　genera。　　　　　18。　To　pass　to　the　consideration　of　beauty：　　　　　If　by　beauty　we　mean　the　primary　Beauty；　the　same　or　similar　arguments　will　apply　here　as　to　goodness：　and　if　the　beauty　in　the　Ideal…Form　is；　as　it　were；　an　effulgence　＇from　that　primary　Beauty＇；　we　may　observe　that　it　is　not　identical　in　all　participants　and　that　an　effulgence　is　necessarily　a　posterior。　　　　　If　we　mean　the　beauty　which　identifies　itself　with　Substance；　this　has　been　covered　in　our　treatment　of　Substance。　　　　　If；　again；　we　mean　beauty　in　relation　to　ourselves　as　spectators　in　whom　it　produces　a　certain　experience；　this　Act　＇of　production＇　is　Motion…　and　none　the　less　Motion　by　being　directed　towards　Absolute　Beauty。　　　　　Knowledge　again；　is　Motion　originating　in　the　self；　it　is　the　observation　of　Being…　an　Act；　not　a　State：　hence　it　too　falls　under　Motion；　or　perhaps　more　suitably　under　Stability；　or　even　under　both；　if　under　both；　knowledge　must　be　thought　of　as　a　complex；　and　if　a　complex；　is　posterior。　　　　　Intelligence；　since　it　connotes　intelligent　Being　and　comprises　the　tot