the six enneads-第142节
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e principles being also genera； and some genera also principles？ And do both the sets of categories we have been examining imply that only some principles are genera and some genera principles？ or does one of them presuppose that all that belongs to the class of genera belongs also to the class of principles？ Since； however； we affirm that Being is not a unity… the reason for this affirmation is stated by Plato and others… these questions become imperative； once we are satisfied as to the number of genera to be posited and the grounds for our choice。 The subject of our enquiry； then； is the Existent or Existents； and it presents immediately two problems demanding separate analysis： What do we mean by the Existent？ This is naturally the first question to be examined。 What is that which； often taken for Being ＇for the Existent＇； is in our view Becoming and never really Being？ Note however that these concepts are not to be taken as distinguished from each other in the sense of belonging to a genus； Something； divided into Being and Becoming； and we must not suppose that Plato took this view。 It would be absurd to assign Being to the same genus as non…Being： this would be to make one genus of Socrates and his portrait。 The division here ＇between what has Being and what is in Becoming＇ means a definite marking…off； a setting asunder； leading to the assertion that what takes the appearance of Being is not Being and implying that the nature of True Being has been quite misapprehended。 Being； we are taught； must have the attribute of eternity； must be so constituted as never to belie its own nature。 This； then； is the Being of which we shall treat； and in our investigation we shall assume that it is not a unity： subsequently we ask leave to say something on the nature of Becoming and on what it is that comes to be； that is； on the nature of the world of Sense。 2。 In asserting that Being is not a unity； we do not mean to imply a definite number of existences； the number may well be infinite： we mean simply that it is many as well as one； that it is； so to speak； a diversified unity； a plurality in unity。 It follows that either the unity so regarded is a unity of genus under which the Existents； involving as they do plurality as well as unity； stand as species； or that while there are more genera than one； yet all are subordinate to a unity； or there may be more genera than one； though no one genus is subordinate to any other； but all with their own subordinates… whether these be lesser genera； or species with individuals for their subordinates… all are elements in one entity； and from their totality the Intellectual realm… that which we know as Being… derives its constitution。 If this last is the truth； we have here not merely genera； but genera which are at the same time principles of Being。 They are genera because they have subordinates… other genera； and successively species and individuals； they are also principles； since from this plurality Being takes its rise； constituted in its entirety from these its elements。 Suppose； however； a greater number of origins which by their mere totality comprised； without possessing any subordinates； the whole of Being； these would be first…principles but not genera： it would be as if one constructed the sensible world from the four elements… fire and the others； these elements would be first principles； but they would not be genera； unless the term 〃genus〃 is to be used equivocally。 But does this assertion of certain genera which are at the same time first…principles imply that by combining the genera； each with its subordinates； we find the whole of Being in the resultant combination？ But then； taken separately； their existence will not be actual but only potential； and they will not be found in isolation。 Suppose； on the other hand； we ignore the genera and combine the particulars： what then becomes of the ignored genera？ They will； surely； exist in the purity of their own isolation； and the mixtures will not destroy them。 The question of how this result is achieved may be postponed。 For the moment we take it as agreed that there are genera as distinct from principles of Being and that； on another plane； principles ＇elements＇ are opposed to compounds。 We are thus obliged to show in what relation we speak of genera and why we distinguish them instead of summing them under a unity； for otherwise we imply that their coalescence into a unity is fortuitous； whereas it would be more plausible to dispense with their separate existence。 If all the genera could be species of Being； all individuals without exception being immediately subordinate to these species； then such a unification becomes feasible。 But that supposition bespeaks annihilation for the genera： the species will no longer be species； plurality will no longer be subordinated to unity； everything must be the unity； unless there exist some thing or things outside the unity。 The One never becomes many… as the existence of species demands… unless there is something distinct from it： it cannot of itself assume plurality； unless we are to think of it as being broken into pieces like some extended body： but even so； the force which breaks it up must be distinct from it： if it is itself to effect the breaking up… or whatever form the division may take… then it is itself previously divided。 For these and many other reasons we must abstain from positing a single genus； and especially because neither Being nor Substance can be the predicate of any given thing。 If we do predicate Being； it is only as an accidental attribute； just as when we predicate whiteness of a substance； we are not predicating the Absolute Whiteness。 3。 We assert； then； a plurality of Existents； but a plurality not fortuitous and therefore a plurality deriving from a unity。 But even admitting this derivation from a unity… a unity however not predicated of them in respect of their essential being… there is； surely； no reason why each of these Existents； distinct in character from every other； should not in itself stand as a separate genus。 Is； then； this unity external to the genera thus produced； this unity which is their source though it cannot be predicated of them in respect of their essence？ it is indeed external； the One is beyond； it cannot； therefore； be included among the genera： it is the ＇transcendent＇ source； while they stand side by side as genera。 Yet surely the one must somehow be included ＇among the genera＇？ No： it is the Existents we are investigating； not that which is beyond Existence。 We pass on； then； to consider that which is included； and find to our surprise the cause included with the things it causes： it is surely strange that causes and effects should be brought into the same genus。 But if the cause is included with its effects only in the sense in which a genus is included with its subordinates； the subordinates being of a different order； so that it cannot be predicated of them whether as their genus or in any other relation； these subordinates are obviously themselves genera with subordinates of their own： you may； for example； be the cause of the operation of walking； but the walking is not subordinate to you in the relation of species to genus； and if walking had nothing prior to it as its genus； but had posteriors； then it would be a ＇primary＇ genus and rank among the Existents。 Perhaps； however； it must be utterly denied that unity is even the cause of other things； they should be considered rather as its parts or elements… if the terms may be allowed；… their totality constituting a single entity which our thinking divides。 All unity though it be； it goes by a wonderful power out into everything； it appears as many and becomes many when there is a motion； the fecundity of its nature causes the One to be no longer one； and we； displaying what we call its parts； consider them each as a unity and make them into 〃genera；〃 unaware of our failure to see the whole at once。 We display it； then； in parts； though； unable to restrain their natural tendency to coalesce； we bring these parts together again； resign them to the whole and allow them to become a unity； or rather to be a unity。 All this will become clearer in the light of further consideration… when； that is to say； we have ascertained the number of the genera； for thus we shall also discover their causes。 It is not enough to deny； we must advance by dint of thought and comprehension。 The way is clear： 4。 If we had to ascertain the nature of body and the place it holds in the universe； surely we should take some sample of body； say stone； and examine into what constituents it may be divided。 There would be what we think of as the substrate of stone； its quantity… in this case； a magnitude； its quality… for example； the colour of stone。 As with stone； so with every other body： we should see that in this thing； body； there are three distinguishable characteristics… the pseudo…substance； the quantity； the quality… though they all make one and are only logically trisected； the three being found to constitute the unit thing； body。 If motion were equally inherent in its constitution； we should include this as well； and the four
