the six enneads-第137节

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then　explain　the　active？　Observe　also　that　the　greater…　in　itself　perhaps　a　fixed　three　yards'　length…　will　present　itself　as　both　greater　and　less　according　to　its　external　contacts。　　　　　It　will　be　objected　that　greater　and　less　are　due　to　participation　in　greatness　and　smallness；　and　it　might　be　inferred　that　a　thing　is　active　or　passive　by　participation　in　activity　or　passivity。　　　　　This　is　the　place　for　enquiring　also　whether　the　qualities　of　the　Sensible　and　Intellectual　realms　can　be　included　under　one　head…　a　question　intended　only　for　those　who　ascribe　qualities　to　the　higher　realm　as　well　as　the　lower。　And　even　if　Ideal　Forms　of　qualities　are　not　posited；　yet　once　the　term　〃habit〃　is　used　in　reference　to　Intellect；　the　question　arises　whether　there　is　anything　common　to　that　habit　and　the　habit　we　know　in　the　lower。　　　　　Wisdom　too　is　generally　admitted　to　exist　There。　Obviously；　if　it　shares　only　its　name　with　our　wisdom；　it　is　not　to　be　reckoned　among　things　of　this　sphere；　if；　however；　the　import　is　in　both　cases　the　same；　then　Quality　is　common　to　both　realms…　unless；　of　course；　it　be　maintained　that　everything　There；　including　even　intellection；　is　Substance。　　　　　This　question；　however；　applies　to　all　the　categories：　are　the　two　spheres　irreconcilable；　or　can　they　be　co…ordinated　with　a　unity？　　　　　13。　With　regard　to　Date：　　　　　If　〃yesterday；〃　〃to…morrow；〃　〃last　year〃　and　similar　terms　denote　parts　of　time；　why　should　they　not　be　included　in　the　same　genus　as　time？　It　would　seem　only　reasonable　to　range　under　time　the　past；　present　and　future；　which　are　its　species。　But　time　is　referred　to　Quantity；　what　then　is　the　need　for　a　separate　category　of　Date？　　　　　If　we　are　told　that　past　and　future…　including　under　past　such　definite　dates　as　yesterday　and　last　year　which　must　clearly　be　subordinate　to　past　time…　and　even　the　present　〃now〃　are　not　merely　time　but　time…　when；　we　reply；　in　the　first　place；　that　the　notion　of　time…　when　involves　time；　that；　further；　if　〃yesterday〃　is　time…gone…by；　it　will　be　a　composite；　since　time　and　gone…by　are　distinct　notions：　we　have　two　categories　instead　of　the　single　one　required。　　　　　But　suppose　that　Date　is　defined　not　as　time　but　as　that　which　is　in　time；　if　by　that　which　is　in　time　is　meant　the　subject…　Socrates　in　the　proposition　〃Socrates　existed　last　year〃…　that　subject　is　external　to　the　notion　of　time；　and　we　have　again　a　duality。　　　　　Consider；　however；　the　proposition　〃Socrates…　or　some　action…　exists　at　this　time〃；　what　can　be　the　meaning　here　other　than　〃in　a　part　of　time〃？　But　if；　admitted　that　Date　is　〃a　part　of　time；〃　it　be　felt　that　the　part　requires　definition　and　involves　something　more　than　mere　time；　that　we　must　say　the　part　of　time　gone　by；　several　notions　are　massed　in　the　proposition：　we　have　the　part　which　qua　part　is　a　relative；　and　we　have　〃gone…by〃　which；　if　it　is　to　have　any　import　at　all；　must　mean　the　past：　but　this　〃past；〃　we　have　shown；　is　a　species　of　time。　　　　　It　may　be　urged　that　〃the　past〃　is　in　its　nature　indefinite；　while　〃yesterday〃　and　〃last　year〃　are　definite。　We　reply；　first；　that　we　demand　some　place　in　our　classification　for　the　past：　secondly；　that　〃yesterday；〃　as　definite　past；　is　necessarily　definite　time。　But　definite　time　implies　a　certain　quantity　of　time：　therefore；　if　time　is　quantitative；　each　of　the　terms　in　question　must　signify　a　definite　quantity。　　　　　Again；　if　by　〃yesterday〃　we　are　expected　to　understand　that　this　or　that　event　has　taken　Place　at　a　definite　time　gone　by；　we　have　more　notions　than　ever。　Besides；　if　we　must　introduce　fresh　categories　because　one　thing　acts　in　another…　as　in　this　case　something　acts　in　time…　we　have　more　again　from　its　acting　upon　another　in　another。　This　point　will　be　made　plain　by　what　follows　in　our　discussion　of　Place。　　　　　14。　The　Academy　and　the　Lyceum　are　places；　and　parts　of　Place；　just　as　〃above；〃　〃below；〃　〃here〃　are　species　or　parts　of　Place；　the　difference　is　of　minuter　delimitation。　　　　　If　then　〃above；〃　〃below；〃　〃the　middle〃　are　places…　Delphi；　for　example；　is　the　middle　＇of　the　earth＇…　and　〃near…the…middle〃　is　also　a　place…　Athens；　and　of　course　the　Lyceum　and　the　other　places　usually　cited；　are　near　the　middle…　what　need　have　we　to　go　further　and　seek　beyond　Place；　admitting　as　we　do　that　we　refer　in　every　instance　to　a　place？　　　　　If；　however；　we　have　in　mind　the　presence　of　one　thing　in　another；　we　are　not　speaking　of　a　single　entity；　we　are　not　expressing　a　single　notion。　　　　　Another　consideration：　when　we　say　that　a　man　is　here；　we　present　a　relation　of　the　man　to　that　in　which　he　is；　a　relation　of　the　container　to　the　contained。　Why　then　do　we　not　class　as　a　relative　whatever　may　be　produced　from　this　relation？　　　　　Besides；　how　does　〃here〃　differ　from　〃at　Athens〃？　The　demonstrative　〃here〃　admittedly　signifies　place；　so；　then；　does　〃at　Athens〃：　〃at　Athens〃　therefore　belongs　to　the　category　of　Place。　　　　　Again；　if　〃at　Athens〃　means　〃is　at　Athens；〃　then　the　〃is〃　as　well　as　the　place　belongs　to　the　predicate；　but　this　cannot　be　right：　we　do　not　regard　〃is　a　quality〃　as　predicate；　but　〃a　quality。〃　　　　　Furthermore；　if　〃in　time；〃　〃in　place〃　are　to　be　ranged　under　a　category　other　than　that　applying　to　time　and　place；　why　not　a　separate　category　for　〃in　a　vessel〃？　Why　not　distinct　categories　for　〃in　Matter；〃　〃in　a　subject；〃　〃a　part　in　a　whole；〃　〃a　whole　in　its　parts；〃　〃a　genus　in　its　species；〃　〃a　species　in　a　genus〃？　We　are　certainly　on　the　way　to　a　goodly　number　of　categories。　　　　　15。　The　〃category　of　Action〃：　　　　　The　quantum　has　been　regarded　as　a　single　genus　on　the　ground　that　Quantity　and　Number　are　attributes　of　Substance　and　posterior　to　it；　the　quale　has　been　regarded　as　another　genus　because　Quality　is　an　attribute　of　Substance：　on　the　same　principle　it　is　maintained　that　since　activity　is　an　attribute　of　Substance；　Action　constitutes　yet　another　genus。　　　　　Does　then　the　action　constitute　the　genus；　or　the　activity　from　which　the　action　springs；　in　the　same　way　as　Quality　is　the　genus　from　which　the　quale　is　derived？　Perhaps　activity；　action　and　agent　should　all　be　embraced　under　a　single　head？　But；　on　the　one　hand；　the　action…　unlike　activity…　tends　to　comport　the　agent；　and　on　the　other；　it　signifies　being　in　some　activity　and　therefore　Being…in…Act　＇actual　as　distinct　from　potential　Being＇。　Consequently　the　category　will　be　one　of　Act　rather　than　of　Action。　　　　　Act　moreover　incontestably　manifests　itself　in　Substance；　as　was　found　to　be　the　case　with　Quality：　it　is　connected　with　Substance　as　being　a　form　of　motion。　But　Motion　is　a　distinct　genus：　for；　seeing　that　Quality　is　a　distinct　attribute　of　Substance；　and　Quality　a　distinct　attribute；　and　Relative　takes　its　being　from　the　relation　of　one　substance　to　another；　there　can　be　no　reason　why　Motion；　also　an　attribute　of　Substance；　should　not　also　constitute　a　distinct　genus。　　　　　16。　If　it　be　urged　that　Motion　is　but　imperfect　Act；　there　would　be　no　objection　to　giving　priority　to　Act　and　subordinating　to　it　Motion　with　its　imperfection　as　a　species：　Act　would　thus　be　predicated　of　Motion；　but　with　the　qualification　〃imperfect。〃　　　　　Motion　is　thought　of　as　imperfect；　not　because　it　is　not　an　Act；　but　because；　entirely　an　Act；　it　yet　entails　repetition　＇lacks　finality＇。　It　repeats；　not　in　order　that　it　may　achieve　actuality…　it　is　already　actual…　but　that　it　may　attain　a　goal　distinct　from　itself　and　posterior：　it　is　not　the　motion　itself　that　is　then　consummated　but　the　result　at　which　it　aims。　Walking　is　walking　from　the　outset；　when　one　should　traverse　a　racecourse　but　has　not　yet　done　so；　the　deficiency　lies　not　in　the　walking…　not　in　the　motion…　but　in　the　amount　of　walking　accomplished；　no　matter　what　the　amount；　it　is　walking　and　motion　already：　a　moving　man　has　motion　and　a　cutter　cuts　before　there　is　any　question　of　Quantity。　And　just　as　we　can　speak　of　Act　without　implying　time；　so　we　can　of　Motion；　except　in　the　sense　of　motion　over　a　defined　area；　Act　is　timeless；　and　so　is　Motion　pure　and　simple。　　　　　Are　we　told　that　Motion　is　necessarily　in　time；　inasmuch　as　it　involves　continuity？　But；　at　this；　sight；　never　ceasing　to　see；　will　also　be　continuous　and　in　time。　Our　critic；　it　is　true；　may　find　support　in　that　principle　of　proportion　which　states　that　you　may　make　a　division　of　no　matter　what　motion；　and　find　that　neither　the　motion　nor　its　duration　has　any　beginning　but　that　the　division　may　be　continued　indefinitely　in　the　direction　of　the　motion's　origin：　this　would　mean　that　a　motion　just　begun　has　been　in　progress　from　an　infinity　of　time；　that　it　is　infinite　as　regards　its　beginning。　　　　　Such　then　is　the　result　of　separating　Act　from　Motion：　Act；　we　aver；　is　timeless；　yet　we　are　forced　to　maintain　not　only　that　time　is　necessary　to　quantitative　motion；　but；　unreservedly；　that　Motion　is　quantitative　in　its　very　nature；　though　indeed；　if　it　were　a　case　of　motion　occupying　a　day　or　some　other　quantity　of　time；　the　exponents　of　this　view　would　be　the　first　to　admit　that　Quantity　is　present　to　Motion　only　by　way　of　accident。　　　　　In　sum；　just　as　Act　is　timeless；　so　there　is　no　reason　why　Motion　also　should　not　primarily　be　timeless；　time　attaching　to　it　only　in　so　far　as　it　happens　to　have　such　and　such　an　extension。　　　　　Ti