the six enneads-第124节
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lute Good and not merely a good being or thing； can contain nothing； since there is nothing that could be its good。 Anything it could contain must be either good to it or not good； but in the supremely and primally Good there can be nothing not good； nor can the Absolute Good be a container to the Good： containing； then； neither the good nor the not good it contains nothing and； containing nothing； it is alone： it is void of all but itself。 If the rest of being either is good… without being the absolute good… or is not good； while on the other hand the Supreme contains neither what is good nor what is not good； then； containing nothing； it is The Good by that very absence of content。 Thus we rob it of its very being as The Absolute Good if we ascribe anything to it； existence or intellect or goodness。 The only way is to make every denial and no assertion； to feign no quality or content there but to permit only the 〃It is〃 in which we pretend to no affirmation of non…existent attribute： there is an ignorant praise which； missing the true description； drags in qualities beneath the real worth and so abases； philosophy must guard against attaching to the Supreme what is later and lower： moving above all that order； it is the cause and source of all these； and is none of them。 For； once more； the nature of the Good is not such as to make it all things or a thing among all： that would range it under the same classification with them all and it would differ； thus； only by its individual quality； some specialty； some addition。 At once it becomes not a unity but a duality； there is one common element not good and another element that is good； but a combination so made up of good and not good cannot be the purely good； the primarily good； the primarily good must be that principle in which the better element has more effectively participated and so attained its goodness。 Any good thing has become so by communion； but that in which it has communion is not a thing among the things of the all； therefore the Good is not a thing of the All。 Since there is this Good in any good thing… the specific difference by which the combination becomes good… it must enter from elsewhere than the world of things： that source must be a Good absolute and isolated。 Thus is revealed to us the Primarily existent； the Good； above all that has being； good unalloyed； containing nothing in itself； utterly unmingling； all…transcending； cause of all。 Certainly neither Being nor Beauty springs from evil or from the neutral； the maker； as the more consummate； must surpass the made。 SIXTH TRACTATE。
THAT THE PRINCIPLE TRANSCENDING BEING HAS NO INTELLECTUAL ACT。 WHAT BEING HAS INTELLECTION PRIMALLY AND WHAT BEING HAS IT SECONDARILY。
1。 There is a principle having intellection of the external and another having self…intellection and thus further removed from duality。 Even the first mentioned is not without an effort towards the pure unity of which it is not so capable： it does actually contain its object； though as something other than itself。 In the self…intellective； there is not even this distinction of being： self…conversing； the subject is its own object； and thus takes the double form while remaining essentially a unity。 The intellection is the more profound for this internal possession of the object。 This principle is the primally intellective since there can be no intellection without duality in unity。 If there is no unity； perceiving principle and perceived object will be different； and the intellection； therefore； not primal： a principle concerned with something external cannot be the primally intellective since it does not possess the object as integrally its own or as itself； if it does possess the object as itself… the condition of true intellection… the two are one。 Thus ＇in order to primal intellection＇ there must be a unity in duality； while a pure unity with no counterbalancing duality can have no object for its intellection and ceases to be intellective： in other words the primally intellective must be at once simplex and something else。 But the surest way of realizing that its nature demands this combination of unity and duality is to proceed upwards from the Soul； where the distinction can be made more dearly since the duality is exhibited more obviously。 We can imagine the Soul as a double light； a lesser corresponding to the soul proper； a purer representing its intellective phase； if now we suppose this intellective light equal to the light which is to be its object； we no longer distinguish between them； the two are recognised as one： we know； indeed； that there are two； but as we see them they have become one： this gives us the relation between the intellective subject and the object of intellection ＇in the duality and unity required by that primal intellection＇： in our thought we have made the two into one； but on the other hand the one thing has become two； making itself into a duality at the moment of intellection； or； to be more exact； being dual by the fact of intellection and single by the fact that its intellectual object is itself。 2。 Thus there is the primally intellective and there is that in which intellection has taken another mode； but this indicates that what transcends the primarily intellective has no intellection； for； to have intellection； it must become an Intellectual…Principle； and； if it is to become that； it must possess an intellectual object and； as primarily intellective； it must possess that intellectual object as something within itself。 But it is not inevitable that every intellectual object should both possess the intellective principle in itself and exercise intellection： at that； it would be not merely object but subject as well and； besides； being thus dual； could not be primal： further； the intellectual principle that is to possess the intellectual object could not cohere unless there existed an essence purely intellectual； something which； while standing as intellectual object to the intellectual principle； is in its own essence neither an agent nor an object of intellection。 The intellectual object points to something beyond itself ＇to a percipient＇； and the intellectual agent has its intellection in vain unless by seizing and holding an object… since； failing that； it can have no intellection but is consummated only when it possesses itself of its natural term。 There must have been something standing consummate independently of any intellectual act； something perfect in its own essence： thus that in which this completion is inherent must exist before intellection； in other words it has no need of intellection； having been always self…sufficing： this； then； will have no intellectual act。 Thus we arrive at： a principle having no intellection； a principle having intellection primarily； a principle having it secondarily。 It may be added that； supposing The First to be intellective； it thereby possesses something ＇some object； some attribute＇： at once it ceases to be a first； it is a secondary； and not even a unity； it is a many； it is all of which it takes intellectual possession； even though its intellection fell solely upon its own content； it must still be a manifold。 3。 We may be told that nothing prevents an identity being thus multiple。 But there must be a unity underlying the aggregate： a manifold is impossible without a unity for its source or ground； or at least； failing some unity； related or unrelated。 This unity must be numbered as first before all and can be apprehended only as solitary and self…existent。 When we recognize it； resident among the mass of things； our business is to see it for what it is… present to the items but essentially distinguished from them… and； while not denying it there； to seek this underly of all no longer as it appears in those other things but as it stands in its pure identity by itself。 The identity resident in the rest of things is no doubt close to authentic identity but cannot be it； and； if the identity of unity is to be displayed beyond itself； it must also exist within itself alone。 It may be suggested that its existence takes substantial form only by its being resident among outside things： but； at this； it is itself no longer simplex nor could any coherence of manifolds occur。 On the one hand things could take substantial existence only if they were in their own virtue simplex。 On the other hand； failing a simplex； the aggregate of multiples is itself impossible： for the simplex individual thing could not exist if there were no simplex unity independent of the individual； ＇a principle of identity＇ and； not existing； much less could it enter into composition with any other such： it becomes impossible then for the compound universe； the aggregate of all； to exist； it would be the coming together of things that are not； things not merely lacking an identity of their own but utterly non…existent。 Once there is any manifold； there must be a precedent unity： since any intellection implies multiplicity in the intellective subject； the non…multiple must be without intellection； that non…multiple will be the First
