cratylus-第8节

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representation　of　a　man　or　woman：why　may　not　names　then　equally　give　a

representation　true　and　right　or　false　and　wrong？　　Cratylus　admits　that

pictures　may　give　a　true　or　false　representation；　but　denies　that　names

can。　　Socrates　argues；　that　he　may　go　up　to　a　man　and　say　'this　is　year

picture；'　and　again；　he　may　go　and　say　to　him　'this　is　your　name'in　the

one　case　appealing　to　his　sense　of　sight；　and　in　the　other　to　his　sense　of

hearing；may　he　not？　　'Yes。'　　Then　you　will　admit　that　there　is　a　right　or

a　wrong　assignment　of　names；　and　if　of　names；　then　of　verbs　and　nouns；　and

if　of　verbs　and　nouns；　then　of　the　sentences　which　are　made　up　of　them；　and

comparing　nouns　to　pictures；　you　may　give　them　all　the　appropriate　sounds；

or　only　some　of　them。　　And　as　he　who　gives　all　the　colours　makes　a　good

picture；　and　he　who　gives　only　some　of　them；　a　bad　or　imperfect　one；　but

still　a　picture；　so　he　who　gives　all　the　sounds　makes　a　good　name；　and　he

who　gives　only　some　of　them；　a　bad　or　imperfect　one；　but　a　name　still。　　The

artist　of　names；　that　is；　the　legislator；　may　be　a　good　or　he　may　be　a　bad

artist。　　'Yes；　Socrates；　but　the　cases　are　not　parallel；　for　if　you

subtract　or　misplace　a　letter；　the　name　ceases　to　be　a　name。'　　Socrates

admits　that　the　number　10；　if　an　unit　is　subtracted；　would　cease　to　be　10；

but　denies　that　names　are　of　this　purely　quantitative　nature。　　Suppose　that

there　are　two　objectsCratylus　and　the　image　of　Cratylus；　and　let　us

imagine　that　some　God　makes　them　perfectly　alike；　both　in　their　outward

form　and　in　their　inner　nature　and　qualities：　　then　there　will　be　two

Cratyluses；　and　not　merely　Cratylus　and　the　image　of　Cratylus。　　But　an

image　in　fact　always　falls　short　in　some　degree　of　the　original；　and　if

images　are　not　exact　counterparts；　why　should　names　be？　if　they　were；　they

would　be　the　doubles　of　their　originals；　and　indistinguishable　from　them；

and　how　ridiculous　would　this　be！　　Cratylus　admits　the　truth　of　Socrates'

remark。　　But　then　Socrates　rejoins；　he　should　have　the　courage　to

acknowledge　that　letters　may　be　wrongly　inserted　in　a　noun；　or　a　noun　in　a

sentence；　and　yet　the　noun　or　the　sentence　may　retain　a　meaning。　　Better　to

admit　this；　that　we　may　not　be　punished　like　the　traveller　in　Egina　who

goes　about　at　night；　and　that　Truth　herself　may　not　say　to　us；　'Too　late。'　

And；　errors　excepted；　we　may　still　affirm　that　a　name　to　be　correct　must

have　proper　letters；　which　bear　a　resemblance　to　the　thing　signified。　　I

must　remind　you　of　what　Hermogenes　and　I　were　saying　about　the　letter　rho

accent；　which　was　held　to　be　expressive　of　motion　and　hardness；　as　lambda

is　of　smoothness；and　this　you　will　admit　to　be　their　natural　meaning。　

But　then；　why　do　the　Eritreans　call　that　skleroter　which　we　call　sklerotes？

We　can　understand　one　another；　although　the　letter　rho　accent　is　not

equivalent　to　the　letter　s：　　why　is　this？　　You　reply；　because　the　two

letters　are　sufficiently　alike　for　the　purpose　of　expressing　motion。　　Well；

then；　there　is　the　letter　lambda；　what　business　has　this　in　a　word　meaning

hardness？　　'Why；　Socrates；　I　retort　upon　you；　that　we　put　in　and　pull　out

letters　at　pleasure。'　　And　the　explanation　of　this　is　custom　or　agreement：　

we　have　made　a　convention　that　the　rho　shall　mean　s　and　a　convention　may

indicate　by　the　unlike　as　well　as　by　the　like。　　How　could　there　be　names

for　all　the　numbers　unless　you　allow　that　convention　is　used？　　Imitation　is

a　poor　thing；　and　has　to　be　supplemented　by　convention；　which　is　another

poor　thing；　although　I　agree　with　you　in　thinking　that　the　most　perfect

form　of　language　is　found　only　where　there　is　a　perfect　correspondence　of

sound　and　meaning。　　But　let　me　ask　you　what　is　the　use　and　force　of　names？　

'The　use　of　names；　Socrates；　is　to　inform；　and　he　who　knows　names　knows

things。'　　Do　you　mean　that　the　discovery　of　names　is　the　same　as　the

discovery　of　things？　　'Yes。'　　But　do　you　not　see　that　there　is　a　degree　of

deception　about　names？　　He　who　first　gave　names；　gave　them　according　to　his

conception；　and　that　may　have　been　erroneous。　　'But　then；　why；　Socrates；　is

language　so　consistent？　all　words　have　the　same　laws。'　　Mere　consistency　is

no　test　of　truth。　　In　geometrical　problems；　for　example；　there　may　be　a

flaw　at　the　beginning；　and　yet　the　conclusion　may　follow　consistently。　

And；　therefore；　a　wise　man　will　take　especial　care　of　first　principles。　

But　are　words　really　consistent；　are　there　not　as　many　terms　of　praise

which　signify　rest　as　which　signify　motion？　　There　is　episteme；　which　is

connected　with　stasis；　as　mneme　is　with　meno。　　Bebaion；　again；　is　the

expression　of　station　and　position；　istoria　is　clearly　descriptive　of　the

stopping　istanai　of　the　stream；　piston　indicates　the　cessation　of　motion；

and　there　are　many　words　having　a　bad　sense；　which　are　connected　with　ideas

of　motion；　such　as　sumphora；　amartia；　etc。：　　amathia；　again；　might　be

explained；　as　e　ama　theo　iontos　poreia；　and　akolasia　as　e　akolouthia　tois

pragmasin。　　Thus　the　bad　names　are　framed　on　the　same　principle　as　the

good；　and　other　examples　might　be　given；　which　would　favour　a　theory　of

rest　rather　than　of　motion。　　'Yes；　but　the　greater　number　of　words　express

motion。'　　Are　we　to　count　them；　Cratylus；　and　is　correctness　of　names　to　be

determined　by　the　voice　of　a　majority？



Here　is　another　point：　　we　were　saying　that　the　legislator　gives　names；　and

therefore　we　must　suppose　that　he　knows　the　things　which　he　names：　　but　how

can　he　have　learnt　things　from　names　before　there　were　any　names？　　'I

believe；　Socrates；　that　some　power　more　than　human　first　gave　things　their

names；　and　that　these　were　necessarily　true　names。'　　Then　how　came　the

giver　of　names　to　contradict　himself；　and　to　make　some　names　expressive　of

rest；　and　others　of　motion？　　'I　do　not　suppose　that　he　did　make　them　both。'　

Then　which　did　he　makethose　which　are　expressive　of　rest；　or　those　which

are　expressive　of　motion？。。。But　if　some　names　are　true　and　others　false；　we

can　only　decide　between　them；　not　by　counting　words；　but　by　appealing　to

things。　　And；　if　so；　we　must　allow　that　things　may　be　known　without　names；

for　names；　as　we　have　several　times　admitted；　are　the　images　of　things；　and

the　higher　knowledge　is　of　things；　and　is　not　to　be　derived　from　names；　and

though　I　do　not　doubt　that　the　inventors　of　language　gave　names；　under　the

idea　that　all　things　are　in　a　state　of　motion　and　flux；　I　believe　that　they

were　mistaken；　and　that　having　fallen　into　a　whirlpool　themselves；　they　are

trying　to　drag　us　after　them。　　For　is　there　not　a　true　beauty　and　a　true

good；　which　is　always　beautiful　and　always　good？　　Can　the　thing　beauty　be

vanishing　away　from　us　while　the　words　are　yet　in　our　mouths？　　And　they

could　not　be　known　by　any　one　if　they　are　always　passing　awayfor　if　they

are　always　passing　away；　the　observer　has　no　opportunity　of　observing　their

state。　　Whether　the　doctrine　of　the　flux　or　of　the　eternal　nature　be　the

truer；　is　hard　to　determine。　　But　no　man　of　sense　will　put　himself；　or　the

education　of　his　mind；　in　the　power　of　names：　　he　will　not　condemn　himself

to　be　an　unreal　thing；　nor　will　he　believe　that　everything　is　in　a　flux

like　the　water　in　a　leaky　vessel；　or　that　the　world　is　a　man　who　has　a

running　at　the　nose。　　This　doctrine　may　be　true；　Cratylus；　but　is　also　very

likely　to　be　untrue；　and　therefore　I　would　have　you　reflect　while　you　are

young；　and　find　out　the　truth；　and　when　you　know　come　and　tell　me。　　'I　have

thought；　Socrates；　and　after　a　good　deal　of　thinking　I　incline　to

Heracleitus。'　　Then　another　day；　my　friend；　you　shall　give　me　a　lesson。　

'Very　good；　Socrates；　and　I　hope　that　you　will　continue　to　study　these

things　yourself。'



。。。



We　may　now　consider　（I）　how　far　Plato　in　the　Cratylus　has　discovered　the

true　principles　of　language；　and　then　（II）　proceed　to　compare　modern

speculations　respecting　the　origin　and　nature　of　language　with　the

anticipations　of　his　genius。



I。　　（1）　Plato　is　aware　that　language　is　not　the　work　of　chance；　nor　does　he

deny　that　there　is　a　natural　fitness　in　names。　　He　only　insists　that　this

natural　fitness　shall　be　intelligibly　explained。　　But　he　has　no　idea　that

language　is　a　natural　organism。　　He　would　have　heard　with　surprise　that

languages　are　the　common　work　of　whole　nations　in　a　primitive　or　semi…

barbarous　age。　　How；　he　would　probably　have　argued；　could　men　devoid　of　art

have　contrived　a　structure　of　such　complexity？　　No　answer　could　have　been

given　to　this　question；　either　in　ancient　or　in　modern　times；　until　the

nature　of　primitive　antiquity　had　been　thoroughly　studied；　and　the

instincts　of　man　had　been　shown　to　exist　in　greater　force；　when　his　state

approaches　more　nearly　to　that　of　children　or　animals。　　The　philosophers　of

the　last　century；　after　their　manner；　would　have　vainly　endeavoured　to

trace　the　process　by　which　proper　names　were　converted　into　common；　and

would　have　shown　how　the　last　effort　of　a