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he　is　never　in　luck。　　But　he　would　like　to　have　an　open　council　and　to　hear

both　sides。



Hermogenes　is　of　opinion　that　there　is　no　principle　in　names；　they　may　be

changed；　as　we　change　the　names　of　slaves；　whenever　we　please；　and　the

altered　name　is　as　good　as　the　original　one。



You　mean　to　say；　for　instance；　rejoins　Socrates；　that　if　I　agree　to　call　a

man　a　horse；　then　a　man　will　be　rightly　called　a　horse　by　me；　and　a　man　by

the　rest　of　the　world？　　But；　surely；　there　is　in　words　a　true　and　a　false；

as　there　are　true　and　false　propositions。　　If　a　whole　proposition　be　true

or　false；　then　the　parts　of　a　proposition　may　be　true　or　false；　and　the

least　parts　as　well　as　the　greatest；　and　the　least　parts　are　names；　and

therefore　names　may　be　true　or　false。　　Would　Hermogenes　maintain　that

anybody　may　give　a　name　to　anything；　and　as　many　names　as　he　pleases；　and

would　all　these　names　be　always　true　at　the　time　of　giving　them？　

Hermogenes　replies　that　this　is　the　only　way　in　which　he　can　conceive　that

names　are　correct；　and　he　appeals　to　the　practice　of　different　nations；　and

of　the　different　Hellenic　tribes；　in　confirmation　of　his　view。　　Socrates

asks；　whether　the　things　differ　as　the　words　which　represent　them　differ：

Are　we　to　maintain　with　Protagoras；　that　what　appears　is？　　Hermogenes　has

always　been　puzzled　about　this；　but　acknowledges；　when　he　is　pressed　by

Socrates；　that　there　are　a　few　very　good　men　in　the　world；　and　a　great　many

very　bad；　and　the　very　good　are　the　wise；　and　the　very　bad　are　the　foolish；

and　this　is　not　mere　appearance　but　reality。　　Nor　is　he　disposed　to　say

with　Euthydemus；　that　all　things　equally　and　always　belong　to　all　men；　in

that　case；　again；　there　would　be　no　distinction　between　bad　and　good　men。　

But　then；　the　only　remaining　possibility　is；　that　all　things　have　their

several　distinct　natures；　and　are　independent　of　our　notions　about　them。　

And　not　only　things；　but　actions；　have　distinct　natures；　and　are　done　by

different　processes。　　There　is　a　natural　way　of　cutting　or　burning；　and　a

natural　instrument　with　which　men　cut　or　burn；　and　any　other　way　will

fail；this　is　true　of　all　actions。　　And　speaking　is　a　kind　of　action；　and

naming　is　a　kind　of　speaking；　and　we　must　name　according　to　a　natural

process；　and　with　a　proper　instrument。　　We　cut　with　a　knife；　we　pierce　with

an　awl；　we　weave　with　a　shuttle；　we　name　with　a　name。　　And　as　a　shuttle

separates　the　warp　from　the　woof；　so　a　name　distinguishes　the　natures　of

things。　　The　weaver　will　use　the　shuttle　well；that　is；　like　a　weaver；　and

the　teacher　will　use　the　name　well；that　is；　like　a　teacher。　　The　shuttle

will　be　made　by　the　carpenter；　the　awl　by　the　smith　or　skilled　person。　　But

who　makes　a　name？　　Does　not　the　law　give　names；　and　does　not　the　teacher

receive　them　from　the　legislator？　　He　is　the　skilled　person　who　makes　them；

and　of　all　skilled　workmen　he　is　the　rarest。　　But　how　does　the　carpenter

make　or　repair　the　shuttle；　and　to　what　will　he　look？　　Will　he　not　look　at

the　ideal　which　he　has　in　his　mind？　　And　as　the　different　kinds　of　work

differ；　so　ought　the　instruments　which　make　them　to　differ。　　The　several

kinds　of　shuttles　ought　to　answer　in　material　and　form　to　the　several　kinds

of　webs。　　And　the　legislator　ought　to　know　the　different　materials　and

forms　of　which　names　are　made　in　Hellas　and　other　countries。　　But　who　is　to

be　the　judge　of　the　proper　form？　　The　judge　of　shuttles　is　the　weaver　who

uses　them；　the　judge　of　lyres　is　the　player　of　the　lyre；　the　judge　of　ships

is　the　pilot。　　And　will　not　the　judge　who　is　able　to　direct　the　legislator

in　his　work　of　naming；　be　he　who　knows　how　to　use　the　nameshe　who　can　ask

and　answer　questionsin　short；　the　dialectician？　　The　pilot　directs　the

carpenter　how　to　make　the　rudder；　and　the　dialectician　directs　the

legislator　how　he　is　to　impose　names；　for　to　express　the　ideal　forms　of

things　in　syllables　and　letters　is　not　the　easy　task；　Hermogenes；　which　you

imagine。



'I　should　be　more　readily　persuaded；　if　you　would　show　me　this　natural

correctness　of　names。'



Indeed　I　cannot；　but　I　see　that　you　have　advanced；　for　you　now　admit　that

there　is　a　correctness　of　names；　and　that　not　every　one　can　give　a　name。　

But　what　is　the　nature　of　this　correctness　or　truth；　you　must　learn　from

the　Sophists；　of　whom　your　brother　Callias　has　bought　his　reputation　for

wisdom　rather　dearly；　and　since　they　require　to　be　paid；　you；　having　no

money；　had　better　learn　from　him　at　second…hand。　　'Well；　but　I　have　just

given　up　Protagoras；　and　I　should　be　inconsistent　in　going　to　learn　of

him。'　　Then　if　you　reject　him　you　may　learn　of　the　poets；　and　in　particular

of　Homer；　who　distinguishes　the　names　given　by　Gods　and　men　to　the　same

things；　as　in　the　verse　about　the　river　God　who　fought　with　Hephaestus；

'whom　the　Gods　call　Xanthus；　and　men　call　Scamander；'　or　in　the　lines　in

which　he　mentions　the　bird　which　the　Gods　call　'Chalcis；'　and　men

'Cymindis；'　or　the　hill　which　men　call　'Batieia；'　and　the　Gods　'Myrinna's

Tomb。'　　Here　is　an　important　lesson；　for　the　Gods　must　of　course　be　right

in　their　use　of　names。　　And　this　is　not　the　only　truth　about　philology

which　may　be　learnt　from　Homer。　　Does　he　not　say　that　Hector's　son　had　two

names



'Hector　called　him　Scamandrius；　but　the　others　Astyanax'？



Now；　if　the　men　called　him　Astyanax；　is　it　not　probable　that　the　other　name

was　conferred　by　the　women？　　And　which　are　more　likely　to　be　rightthe

wiser　or　the　less　wise；　the　men　or　the　women？　　Homer　evidently　agreed　with

the　men：　　and　of　the　name　given　by　them　he　offers　an　explanation；the　boy

was　called　Astyanax　（'king　of　the　city'）；　because　his　father　saved　the

city。　　The　names　Astyanax　and　Hector；　moreover；　are　really　the　same；the

one　means　a　king；　and　the　other　is　'a　holder　or　possessor。'　　For　as　the

lion's　whelp　may　be　called　a　lion；　or　the　horse's　foal　a　foal；　so　the　son

of　a　king　may　be　called　a　king。　　But　if　the　horse　had　produced　a　calf；　then

that　would　be　called　a　calf。　　Whether　the　syllables　of　a　name　are　the　same

or　not　makes　no　difference；　provided　the　meaning　is　retained。　　For　example；

the　names　of　letters；　whether　vowels　or　consonants；　do　not　correspond　to

their　sounds；　with　the　exception　of　epsilon；　upsilon；　omicron；　omega。　　The

name　Beta　has　three　letters　added　to　the　soundand　yet　this　does　not　alter

the　sense　of　the　word；　or　prevent　the　whole　name　having　the　value　which　the

legislator　intended。　　And　the　same　may　be　said　of　a　king　and　the　son　of　a

king；　who　like　other　animals　resemble　each　other　in　the　course　of　nature；

the　words　by　which　they　are　signified　may　be　disguised；　and　yet　amid

differences　of　sound　the　etymologist　may　recognise　the　same　notion；　just　as

the　physician　recognises　the　power　of　the　same　drugs　under　different

disguises　of　colour　and　smell。　　Hector　and　Astyanax　have　only　one　letter

alike；　but　they　have　the　same　meaning；　and　Agis　（leader）　is　altogether

different　in　sound　from　Polemarchus　（chief　in　war）；　or　Eupolemus　（good

warrior）；　but　the　two　words　present　the　same　idea　of　leader　or　general；

like　the　words　Iatrocles　and　Acesimbrotus；　which　equally　denote　a

physician。　　The　son　succeeds　the　father　as　the　foal　succeeds　the　horse；　but

when；　out　of　the　course　of　nature；　a　prodigy　occurs；　and　the　offspring　no

longer　resembles　the　parent；　then　the　names　no　longer　agree。　　This　may　be

illustrated　by　the　case　of　Agamemnon　and　his　son　Orestes；　of　whom　the

former　has　a　name　significant　of　his　patience　at　the　siege　of　Troy；　while

the　name　of　the　latter　indicates　his　savage；　man…of…the…mountain　nature。　

Atreus　again；　for　his　murder　of　Chrysippus；　and　his　cruelty　to　Thyestes；　is

rightly　named　Atreus；　which；　to　the　eye　of　the　etymologist；　is　ateros

（destructive）；　ateires　（stubborn）；　atreotos　（fearless）；　and　Pelops　is　o　ta

pelas　oron　（he　who　sees　what　is　near　only）；　because　in　his　eagerness　to　win

Hippodamia；　he　was　unconscious　of　the　remoter　consequences　which　the　murder

of　Myrtilus　would　entail　upon　his　race。　　The　name　Tantalus；　if　slightly

changed；　offers　two　etymologies；　either　apo　tes　tou　lithou　talanteias；　or

apo　tou　talantaton　einai；　signifying　at　once　the　hanging　of　the　stone　over

his　head　in　the　world　below；　and　the　misery　which　he　brought　upon　his

country。　　And　the　name　of　his　father；　Zeus；　Dios；　Zenos；　has　an　excellent

meaning；　though　hard　to　be　understood；　because　really　a　sentence　which　is

divided　into　two　parts　（Zeus；　Dios）。　　For　he；　being　the　lord　and　king　of

all；　is　the　author　of　our　being；　and　in　him　all　live：　　this　is　implied　in

the　double　form；　Dios；　Zenos；　which　being　put　together　and　interpreted　is

di　on　ze　panta。　　There　may；　at　first　sight；　appear　to　be　some　irreverence

in　calling　him　the　son　of　Cronos；　who　is　a　proverb　for　stupidity；　but　the

meaning　is　that　Zeus　himself　is　the　son　of　a　mighty　intellect；　Kronos；

quasi　koros；　not　in　the　sense　of　a　youth；　but　quasi　to　katharon　kai

akeraton　tou　nouthe　pure　and　garnished　mind；　which　i