cratylus-第33节
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to anything which is represented under an image。 I should say rather that
the image； if expressing in every point the entire reality； would no longer
be an image。 Let us suppose the existence of two objects： one of them
shall be Cratylus； and the other the image of Cratylus； and we will
suppose； further； that some God makes not only a representation such as a
painter would make of your outward form and colour； but also creates an
inward organization like yours； having the same warmth and softness； and
into this infuses motion； and soul； and mind； such as you have； and in a
word copies all your qualities； and places them by you in another form；
would you say that this was Cratylus and the image of Cratylus； or that
there were two Cratyluses？
CRATYLUS： I should say that there were two Cratyluses。
SOCRATES： Then you see； my friend； that we must find some other principle
of truth in images； and also in names； and not insist that an image is no
longer an image when something is added or subtracted。 Do you not perceive
that images are very far from having qualities which are the exact
counterpart of the realities which they represent？
CRATYLUS： Yes； I see。
SOCRATES： But then how ridiculous would be the effect of names on things；
if they were exactly the same with them！ For they would be the doubles of
them； and no one would be able to determine which were the names and which
were the realities。
CRATYLUS： Quite true。
SOCRATES： Then fear not； but have the courage to admit that one name may
be correctly and another incorrectly given； and do not insist that the name
shall be exactly the same with the thing； but allow the occasional
substitution of a wrong letter； and if of a letter also of a noun in a
sentence； and if of a noun in a sentence also of a sentence which is not
appropriate to the matter； and acknowledge that the thing may be named； and
described； so long as the general character of the thing which you are
describing is retained； and this； as you will remember； was remarked by
Hermogenes and myself in the particular instance of the names of the
letters。
CRATYLUS： Yes； I remember。
SOCRATES： Good； and when the general character is preserved； even if some
of the proper letters are wanting； still the thing is signified；well； if
all the letters are given； not well； when only a few of them are given。 I
think that we had better admit this； lest we be punished like travellers in
Aegina who wander about the street late at night： and be likewise told by
truth herself that we have arrived too late； or if not； you must find out
some new notion of correctness of names； and no longer maintain that a name
is the expression of a thing in letters or syllables； for if you say both；
you will be inconsistent with yourself。
CRATYLUS： I quite acknowledge； Socrates； what you say to be very
reasonable。
SOCRATES： Then as we are agreed thus far； let us ask ourselves whether a
name rightly imposed ought not to have the proper letters。
CRATYLUS： Yes。
SOCRATES： And the proper letters are those which are like the things？
CRATYLUS： Yes。
SOCRATES： Enough then of names which are rightly given。 And in names
which are incorrectly given； the greater part may be supposed to be made up
of proper and similar letters； or there would be no likeness； but there
will be likewise a part which is improper and spoils the beauty and
formation of the word： you would admit that？
CRATYLUS： There would be no use； Socrates； in my quarrelling with you；
since I cannot be satisfied that a name which is incorrectly given is a
name at all。
SOCRATES： Do you admit a name to be the representation of a thing？
CRATYLUS： Yes； I do。
SOCRATES： But do you not allow that some nouns are primitive； and some
derived？
CRATYLUS： Yes； I do。
SOCRATES： Then if you admit that primitive or first nouns are
representations of things； is there any better way of framing
representations than by assimilating them to the objects as much as you
can； or do you prefer the notion of Hermogenes and of many others； who say
that names are conventional； and have a meaning to those who have agreed
about them； and who have previous knowledge of the things intended by them；
and that convention is the only principle； and whether you abide by our
present convention； or make a new and opposite one； according to which you
call small great and great smallthat； they would say； makes no
difference； if you are only agreed。 Which of these two notions do you
prefer？
CRATYLUS： Representation by likeness； Socrates； is infinitely better than
representation by any chance sign。
SOCRATES： Very good： but if the name is to be like the thing； the letters
out of which the first names are composed must also be like things。
Returning to the image of the picture； I would ask； How could any one ever
compose a picture which would be like anything at all； if there were not
pigments in nature which resembled the things imitated； and out of which
the picture is composed？
CRATYLUS： Impossible。
SOCRATES： No more could names ever resemble any actually existing thing；
unless the original elements of which they are compounded bore some degree
of resemblance to the objects of which the names are the imitation： And
the original elements are letters？
CRATYLUS： Yes。
SOCRATES： Let me now invite you to consider what Hermogenes and I were
saying about sounds。 Do you agree with me that the letter rho is
expressive of rapidity； motion； and hardness？ Were we right or wrong in
saying so？
CRATYLUS： I should say that you were right。
SOCRATES： And that lamda was expressive of smoothness； and softness； and
the like？
CRATYLUS： There again you were right。
SOCRATES： And yet； as you are aware； that which is called by us sklerotes；
is by the Eretrians called skleroter。
CRATYLUS： Very true。
SOCRATES： But are the letters rho and sigma equivalents； and is there the
same significance to them in the termination rho； which there is to us in
sigma； or is there no significance to one of us？
CRATYLUS： Nay； surely there is a significance to both of us。
SOCRATES： In as far as they are like； or in as far as they are unlike？
CRATYLUS： In as far as they are like。
SOCRATES： Are they altogether alike？
CRATYLUS： Yes； for the purpose of expressing motion。
SOCRATES： And what do you say of the insertion of the lamda？ for that is
expressive not of hardness but of softness。
CRATYLUS： Why； perhaps the letter lamda is wrongly inserted； Socrates； and
should be altered into rho； as you were saying to Hermogenes and in my
opinion rightly； when you spoke of adding and subtracting letters upon
occasion。
SOCRATES： Good。 But still the word is intelligible to both of us； when I
say skleros （hard）； you know what I mean。
CRATYLUS： Yes； my dear friend； and the explanation of that is custom。
SOCRATES： And what is custom but convention？ I utter a sound which I
understand； and you know that I understand the meaning of the sound： this
is what you are saying？
CRATYLUS： Yes。
SOCRATES： And if when I speak you know my meaning； there is an indication
given by me to you？
CRATYLUS： Yes。
SOCRATES： This indication of my meaning may proceed from unlike as well as
from like； for example in the lamda of sklerotes。 But if this is true；
then you have made a convention with yourself； and the correctness of a
name turns out to be convention； since letters which are unlike are
indicative equally with those which are like； if they are sanctioned by
custom and convention。 And even supposing that you distinguish custom from
convention ever so much； still you must say that the signification of words
is given by custom and not by likeness； for custom may indicate by the
unlike as well as by the like。 But as we are agreed thus far； Cratylus
（for I shall assume that your silence gives consent）； then custom and
convention must be supposed to contribute to the indication of our
thoughts； for suppose we take the instance of number； how can you ever
imagine； my good friend； that you will find names resembling every
individual number； unless you allow that which you term convention and
agreement to have authority in determining the correctness of names？ I
quite agree with you that words should as far as possible resemble things；
but I fear that this dragging in of resemblance； as Hermogenes says； is a
shabby thing； which has to be supplemented by the mechanical aid of
convention with a view to correctness； for I believe that if we could
always； or almost always； use likenesses； which are perfectly appropriate；
this would be the most perfect state of language； as the opposite is the
most imperfect。 But let me ask you； what is the force of names； and what
is the use of them？
