aeroplanes and dirigibles of war-第42节

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factory　in　Germany；　（now　devoting　its　energies　to　the　production

of　these　craft；　although　in　happier　days　its　normal　complement　of

4；000　men　were　responsible　for　the　production　of　another

commercial　article）　possesses　facilities　for　turning　out　30

complete　aeroplanes　per　week；　according　to　the　statement　of　its

managing　director。　　But　it　is　averred　that　this　statement　is

purposely　misleading；　inasmuch　as　during　the　first　fortnight　of

the　campaign　it　was　producing　over　50　aeroplanes　per　week。　　It

must　be　remembered　that　Germany　is　responsible　for　the　supply　of

the　majority　of　such　craft　for　the　Austnan　armies；　that　country

purchasing　these　vessels　in　large　numbers；　because　in　the　early

days　of　the　conflict　it　was　notoriously　weak　in　this　arm。　　Since

the　declaration　of　war　strenuous　efforts　have　been　made　to　remedy

this　state　of　affairs；　particularly　upon　the　unexpected

revelation　of　Russia's　aerial　strength。



It　is　computed　that　upon　the　outbreak　of　war　the　various　Powers

were　in　the　position　to　show　an　aggregate　of　4；980　aircraft　of

all　descriptions；　both　for　active　service　and　reserve。　　This　is　a

colossal　fleet；　but　it　serves　to　convey　in　a　graphic　manner　the

importance　attached　to　the　adrial　vessel　by　the　respective

belligerents。　　So　far　as　Germany　is　concerned　she　is　sorely　in

need　of　additional　machines。　　Her　fleet　of　the　air　has　lost　its

formidable　character；　owing　to　the　fact　that　it　has　to　be　divided

between　two　frontiers；　while　she　has　been　further　weakened　by　the

enormous　lengths　of　the　two　battle…fronts。



Russia　has　been　able　to　concentrate　her　aerial　force；　which　has

proved　of　incalculable　value　to　the　Grand　Duke　Nicholas；　who　has

expressed　his　appreciation　of　the　services　rendered　by　his

fliers。　　The　French　likewise　have　been　favoured　by　Fortune　in

this　respect。　　Their　aerial　navy　is　likewise　concentrated　upon

a　single　frontier；　although　a　pronounced　proportion　has　been

reserved　for　service　upon　the　Mediterranean　sea…board　for

co…operation　with　the　fleet。　　France　suffers；　however；　to　a

certain　degree　from　the　length　of　her　battle…line；　which　is　over

200　miles　in　length。　　The　French　aerial　fleet　has　been

particularly　active　in　the　Vosges　and　the　Argonne；　where　the

difficult；　mountainous；　and　densely　wooded　country　has　rendered

other　systems　of　observation　of　the　enemy's　movements　a　matter　of

extreme　difficulty。　　The　Germans　have　laboured　under　a　similar

handicap　in　this　territory；　and　have　likewise　been　compelled　to

centre　a　considerable　proportion　of　their　aerial　fleet　upon　this

corner　of　the　extended　battlefield。



It　is　in　this　region　that　the　greatest　wastage　has　been　manifest。

I　have　been　informed　by　one　correspondent　who　is　fighting　in　this

sternly　contested　area；　that　at　one　time　a　daily　loss　of　ten

German　machines　was　a　fair　average；　while　highwater　mark　was

reached；　so　far　as　his　own　observations　and　ability　to　glean

information　were　concerned　by　the　loss　of　19　machines　during　a

single　day。　　The　French　wastage；　while　not　so　heavy　upon　the

average；　has　been　considerable　at　times。



The　term　wastage　is　somewhat　misleading；　if　not　erroneous。　　It

does　not　necessarily　imply　the　total　loss　of　a　machine；　such　as

its　descent　upon　hostile　territory；　but　includes　damage　to

machines；　no　matter　how　slight；　landing　within　their　own　lines。　　

In　the　difficult　country　of　the　Vosges　many　aeroplanes　have　come

to　earth　somewhat　heavily；　and　have　suffered　such　damage　as　to

render　them　inoperative；　compelling　their　removal　from　the

effective　list　until　they　have　undergone　complete　overhaul　or

reconstruction。　　Upon　occasions　this　wastage　has　been　so

pronounced　that　the　French　aviators；　including　some　of　the

foremost　fliers　serving　with　the　forces；　have　been　without　a

machine　and　have　been　compelled　to　wait　their　turn。



I　am　informed　that　one　day　four　machines；　returning　from　a

reconnaissance　in　force；　crashed　successively　to　the　ground；　and

each　had　to　be　hauled　away　to　the　repair　sheds；　necessitating

withdrawal　from　service　for　several　days。　　Unfortunately　the

French；　owing　to　their　decision　to　rule　out　certain　machines　as

unsuited　to　military　service；　have　not　yet　perfected　their

organisation　for　making　good　this　wastage；　although　latterly　it

has　been　apprecably　reduced　by　greater　care　among　the　aviators　in

handling　their　vessels。



The　fast　vessels　of　the　French　aerial　fleet　have　proved

exceptionally　valuable。　　With　these　craft　speeds　of　95　and　100

miles　or　more　per　hour　have　been　attained　under　favourable

conditions；　and　pace　has　proved　distinctly　advantageous；　inasmuch

as　it　gives　the　French　aviators　a　superiority　of　about　40　per

cent　over　the　average　German　machine。　　It　was　the　activity　and

daring　of　the　French　fliers　upon　these　high　speed　machines　which

induced　the　German　airmen　to　change　their　tactics。　　Individual

effort　and　isolated　raiding　operations　were　abandoned　in　favour

of　what　might　be　described　as　combined　or　squadron　attack。　　Six

or　eight　machines　advancing　together　towards　the　French　lines

somewhat　nonplussed　these　fleet　French　mosquito　craft；　and　to

a　certain　degree　nullified　their　superiority　in　pace。　　Speed

was　discounted；　for　the　simple　reason　that　the　enemy　when　so

massed　evinced　a　disposition　to　fight　and　to　follow　harassing

tactics　when　one　of　the　slowest　French　machines　ventured　into

the　air。



It　is　interesting　to　observe　that　aerial　operations；　now　that

they　are　being　conducted　upon　what　may　be　termed　methodical　lines

as　distinct　from　corsair　movements；　are　following　the　broad

fundamental　principles　of　naval　tactics。　　Homogeneous　squadrons；

that　is；　squadrons　composed　of　vessels　of　similar　type　and　armament；

put　out　and　follow　roughly　the　〃single　line　ahead〃　formation。

Upon　sighting　the　enemy　there　is　the　manoeuvring　for　position

advantage　which　must　accrue　to　the　speedier　protagonist。　　One

then；　witnesses　what　might　almost　be　described　as　an　application

of　the　process　of　capping　the　line　or　〃crossing　the　'T。'〃　This

tends　to　throw　the　slower　squadron　into　confusion　by　bending　it

back　upon　itself；　meanwhile　exposing　it　to　a　demoralizing　fire。



The　analogy　is　not　precisely　correct　but　sufficiently　so　to

indicate　that　aerial　battles　will　be　fought　much　upon　the　same

lines；　as　engagements　between　vessels　upon　the　water。　　If　the

manoeuvres　accomplish　nothing　beyond　breaking　up　and　scattering

the　foe；　the　result　is　satisfactory　in　as　much　as　in　this　event

it　is　possible　to　exert　a　driving　tendency　and　to　force　him　back

upon　the　lines　of　the　superior　force；　when　the　scattered　vessels

may　be　brought　within　the　zone　of　spirited　fire　from　the　ground。



Attacks　in　force　are　more　likely　to　prove　successful　than

individual　raiding　tactics；　as　recent　events　upon　the　battlefield

of　Europe　have　demonstrated　more　or　less　convincingly。　　An　attack

in　force　is　likely　to　cause　the　defenders　upon　the　ground　beneath

to　lose　their　heads　and　to　fire　wildly　and　at　random；　with　the

result　that　the　airmen　may　achieve　their　object　with　but　little

damage　to　themselves。　　This　method　of　attacking　in　force　was

essayed　for　the　first　time　by　the　British　aerial　fleet；　which

perhaps　is　not　surprising；　seeing　that　the　machines　are　manned

and　the　operations　supervised　by　officers　who　have　excelled　in

naval　training；　and　who　are　skilled　in　such　movements。



No　doubt　this　practice；　combined　with　the　daring　of　the　British

aviators；　contributed　very　materially　to　the　utter　demoralisation

of　the　German　aerial　forces；　and　was　responsible　for　that

hesitancy　to　attack　a　position　in　the　vicinity　of　the　British

craft　which　became　so　manifest　in　the　course　of　a　few　weeks　after

the　outbreak　of　hostilities。



One　of　the　foremost　military　experts　of　the　United　States；　who

passed　some　time　in　the　fighting　zone；　expressed　his　opinion　that

the　British　aerial　force　is　the　most　efficient　among　the

belligerents　when　considered　as　a　unit；　the　French　flier　being

described　by　the　same　authority　as　most　effective　when　acting

individually；　owing　to　personal　intrepidity。　　As　a　scout　the

French　aviator　is　probably　unequalled；　because　he　is　quick　to

perceive　and　to　collect　the　data　required；　and　when　provided　with

a　fast　machine　is　remarkably　nimble　and　venturesome　in　the　air。　　

The　British　aviators；　however；　work　as　a　whole；　and　in　the

particular　phases　where　such　tactics　are　profitable　have

established　incontestable　superiority。　　At　first　the　German

aerial　force　appeared　to　possess　no　settled　system　of　operation。

Individual　effort　was　pronounced；　but　it　lacked　method。　　The

Germans　have；　however；　profited　from　the　lessons　taught　by　their

antagonists；　and　now　are　emulating　their　tactics；　but　owing　to

their　imperfect　training　and　knowledge　the　results　they　achieve

appear　to　be　negligible。



The　dirigible　still　remains　an　unknown　quantity　in　these

activities；　although　strange　to　relate；　in　the　early　days　of　the

war；　the　work