the vested interests and the common man-第1节

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The　Vested　Interests　and　the　Common　Man　
by　Thorstein　Veblen　
1919　
　
　
Chapter　1　
　
The　Instability　of　Knowledge　and　Belief　
　
　　　　As　is　true　of　any　other　point　of　view　that　may　be　
characteristic　of　any　other　period　of　history；　so　also　the　modern　
point　of　view　is　a　matter　of　habit。　It　is　common　to　the　modern　
civilised　peoples　only　in　so　far　as　these　peoples　have　come　
through　substantially　the　same　historical　experience　and　have　
thereby　acquired　substantially　the　same　habits　of　thought　and　
have　fallen　into　somewhat　the　same　prevalent　frame　of　mind。　This　
modern　point　of　view；　therefore；　is　limited　both　in　time　and　
space。　It　is　characteristic　of　the　modern　historical　era　and　of　
such　peoples　as　lie　within　the　range　of　that　peculiar　
civilisation　which　marks　off　the　modern　world　from　what　has　gone　
before　and　from　what　still　prevails　outside　of　its　range。　In　
other　words；　it　is　a　trait　of　modern　Christendom；　of　Occidental　
civilisation　as　it　has　run　within　the　past　few　centuries。　This　
general　statement　is　not　vitiated　by　the　fact　that　there　has　been　
some　slight　diffusion　of　these　modern　and　Western　ideas　outside　
of　this　range　in　recent　times。　
　　　　By　historical　accident　it　happens　that　the　modern　point　of　
view　has　reached　its　maturest　formulation　and　prevails　with　the　
least　faltering　among　the　French　and　English…speaking　peoples；　so　
that　these　peoples　may　be　said　to　constitute　the　center　of　
diffusion　for　that　system　of　ideas　which　is　called　the　modern　
point　of　view。　Outward　from　this　broad　center　the　same　range　of　
ideas　prevail　throughout　Christendom；　but　they　prevail　with　less　
singleness　of　conviction　among　the　peoples　who　are　culturally　
more　remote　from　this　center；　increasingly　so　with　each　farther　
remove。　These　others　have　carried　over　a　larger　remainder　of　the　
habits　of　thought　of　an　earlier　age；　and　have　carried　them　over　
in　a　better　state　of　preservation。　It　may　also　be　that　these　
others；　or　some　of　them；　have　acquired　habits　of　thought　of　a　new　
order　which　do　not　altogether　fit　into　that　system　of　ideas　that　
is　commonly　spoken　of　as　the　modern　point　of　view。　That　such　is　
the　case　need　imply　neither　praise　nor　blame。　It　is　only　that；　by　
common　usage；　these　remainders　of　ancient　habits　of　thought　and　
these　newer　preconceptions　that　do　not　fit　into　the　framework　of　
West…European　conventional　thinking　are　not　ordinarily　rated　as　
intrinsic　to　the　modern　point　of　view。　They　need　not　therefore　be　
less　to　the　purpose　as　a　guide　and　criterion　of　human　living；　it　
is　only　that　they　are　alien　to　those　purposes　which　are　
considered　to　be　of　prime　consequence　in　civilised　life　as　it　is　
guided　and　tested　by　the　constituent　principles　of　the　modern　
point　of　view。　
　　　　What　is　spoken　of　as　a　point　of　view　is　always　a　composite　
affair；　some　sort　of　a　rounded　and　balanced　system　of　principles　
and　standards；　which　are　taken　for　granted；　at　least　
provisionally；　and　which　serve　as　a　base　of　reference　and　
legitimation　in　all　questions　of　deliberate　opinion。　So　when　any　
given　usage　or　any　line　of　conduct　or　belief　is　seen　and　approved　
from　the　modern　point　of　view；　it　comes　to　the　same　as　saying　
that　these　things　are　seen　and　accepted　in　the　light　of　those　
principles　which　modern　men　habitually　consider　to　be　final　and　
sufficient。　They　are　principles　of　right；　equity；　propriety；　
duty；　perhaps　of　knowledge；　belief；　and　taste。　
　　　　It　is　evident　that　these　principles　and　standards　of　what　is　
right；　good；　true；　and　beautiful；　will　vary　from　one　age　to　
another　and　from　one　people　to　another；　in　response　to　the　
varying　conditions　of　life；　inasmuch　as　these　principles　are　
always　of　the　nature　of　habit；　although　the　variation　will　of　
course　range　only　within　the　limits　of　that　human　nature　that　
finds　expression　in　these　same　principles　of　right；　good；　truth；　
and　beauty。　So　also；　it　will　be　found　that　something　in　the　way　
of　a　common　measure　of　truth　and　sufficiency　runs　through　any　
such　body　of　principles　that　are　accepted　as　final　and　
self…evident　at　any　given　time　and　place；　　in　case　this　
habitual　body　of　principles　has　reached　such　a　degree　of　poise　
and　consistency　that　they　can　fairly　be　said　to　constitute　a　
stable　point　of　view。　It　is　only　because　there　is　such　a　degree　
of　consistency　and　such　a　common　measure　of　validity　among　the　
commonly　accepted　principles　of　conduct　and　belief　today；　that　it　
is　possible　to　speak　intelligently　of　the　modern　point　of　view；　
and　to　contrast　it　with　any　other　point　of　view　which　may　have　
prevailed　earlier　or　elsewhere；　as；　e。g。；　in　the　Middle　Ages　or　
in　Pagan　Antiquity。　
　　　　The　Romans　were　given　to　saying。　Tempora　mutantur；　and　the　
Spanish　have　learned　to　speak　indulgently　in　the　name　of　
Costumbres　del　pais。　The　common　law　of　the　English…speaking　
peoples　does　not　coincide　at　all　points　with　what　was　
indefeasibly　right　and　good　in　the　eyes　of　the　Romans；　and　still　
less　do　its　principles　countenance　all　the　vagaries　of　the　Mosaic　
code。　Yet；　each　and　several；　in　their　due　time　and　institutional　
setting；　these　have　all　been　tried　and　found　valid　and　have　
approved　themselves　as　securely　and　eternally　right　and　good　in　
principle。　
　　　　Evidently　these　principles；　which　so　are　made　to　serve　as　
standards　of　validity　in　law　and　custom；　knowledge　and　belief；　
are　of　the　nature　of　canons；　established　rules；　and　have　the　
authority　of　precedent；　prescription。　They　have　been　defined　by　
the　attrition　of　use　and　wont　and　disputation；　and　they　are　
accepted　in　a　somewhat　deliberate　manner　by　common　consent；　and　
are　upheld　by　a　deliberate　public　opinion　as　to　what　is　right　and　
seemly。　In　the　popular　apprehension；　and　indeed　in　the　
apprehension　of　the　trained　jurists　and　scholars　for　the　time　
being；　these　constituent　principles　of　the　accepted　point　of　view　
are　〃fundamentally　and　eternally　right　and　good。〃　But　this　
perpetuity　with　which　they　so　are　habitually　invested　in　the　
popular　apprehension；　in　their　time；　is　evidently　such　a　
qualified　perpetuity　only　as　belongs　to　any　settled　outgrowth　of　
use　and　wont。　They　are　of　an　institutional　character　and　they　are　
endowed　with　that　degree　of　perpetuity　only　that　belongs　to　any　
institution。　So　soon　as　a　marked　change　of　circumstances　comes　
on；　　a　change　of　a　sufficiently　profound；　enduring　and　
comprehensive　character；　such　as　persistently　to　cross　or　to　go　
beyond　those　lines　of　use　and　wont　out　of　which　these　settled　
principles　have　emerged；　　then　these　principles　and　their　
standards　of　validity　and　finality　must　presently　undergo　a　
revision；　such　as　to　bring　on　a　new　balance　of　principles；　
embodying　the　habits　of　thought　enforced　by　a　new　situation；　and　
expressing　itself　in　a　revised　scheme　of　authoritative　use　and　
wont；　law　and　custom。　In　the　transition　from　the　medieval　to　the　
modern　point　of　view；　e。　g。；　there　is　to　be　seen　such　a　pervasive　
change　in　men's　habitual　outlook；　answering　to　the　compulsion　of　
a　new　range　of　circumstances　which　then　came　to　condition　the　
daily　life　of　the　peoples　of　Christendom。　In　this　mutation　of　the　
habitual　outlook；　between　medieval　and　modern　times；　the　contrast　
is　perhaps　most　neatly　shown　in　the　altered　standards　of　
knowledge　and　belief；　rather　than　in　the　settled　domain　of　law　
and　morals。　Not　that　the　mutation　of　habits　which　then　overtook　
the　Western　world　need　have　been　less　wide　or　less　effectual　in　
matters　of　conduct；　but　the　change　which　has　taken　effect　in　
science　and　philosophy；　between　the　fourteenth　century　and　the　
nineteenth；　e。　g。；　appears　to　have　been　of　a　more　recognizable　
character；　more　easily　defined　in　succinct　and　convincing　terms。　
It　has　also　quite　generally　attracted　the　attention　of　those　men　
who　have　interested　themselves　in　the　course　of　historical　
events；　and　it　has　therefore　become　something　of　a　commonplace　in　
any　standard　historical　survey　of　modern　civilisation　to　say　that　
the　scheme　of　knowledge　and　belief　underwent　a　visible　change　
between　the　Middle　Ages　and　modern　times。　
　　　　It　will　also　be　found　true　that　the　canons　of　knowledge　and　
belief；　the　principles　governing　what　is　fact　and　what　is　
credible；　are　more　intimately　and　intrinsically　involved　in　the　
habitual　behavior　of　the　human　spirit　than　any　factors　of　human　
habit　in　other　bearings。　Such　is　necessarily　the　case；　because　
the　principles　which　guide　and　limit　knowledge　and　belief　are　the　
ways　and　means　by　which　men　take　stock　of　what　is　to　be　done　and　
by　which　they　take　thought　of　how　it　is　to　be　done。　It　is　by　the　
use　of　their　habitual　canons　of　knowledge　and　belief；　that　men　
construct　those　canons　of　conduct　which　serve　as　guide　and　
standards　in　practical　life。　Men　do　not　pass　appraisal　on　matters　
which　lie　beyond　the　reach　of　their　knowledge　and　belief；　nor　do　
they　formulate　rules　to　govern　the　game　of　life　beyond　that　
limit。　
　　　　So；　congenitally　blind　persons　do　not　build　color　schemes；　
nor　will　a　man　without　an　〃ear　for　music〃　become　a　master　of　
musical　composition。　So　also；　〃the　medieval　mind〃　took　no　thought　
and　made　no　provision　for　those　later…arisen　exigencies　of　life　
and　those　lat