the commonwealth of oceana-第7节

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e　beginning　of　the　world　to　this　day；　for　if　the　commonwealths　of　Greece　came　under　the　yoke　of　the　Kings　of　Macedon；　they　were　first　broken　by　themselves。　　　　　Secondly；　that　it　is　the　government　that　has　frequently　led　mighty　monarchs　in　triumph。　　　　　Thirdly；　that　it　is　the　government；　which；　if　it　has　been　seditious；　it　has　not　been　so　from　any　imperfection　in　the　kind；　but　in　the　particular　constitution；　which；　wherever　the　like　has　happened；　must　have　been　unequal。　　　　　Fourthly；　that　it　is　the　government；　which；　if　it　has　been　anything　near　equal；　was　never　seditious；　or　let　him　show　me　what　sedition　has　happened　in　Lacedaemon　or　Venice。　　　　　Fifthly；　that　it　is　the　government；　which；　attaining　to　perfect　equality；　has　such　a　libration　in　the　frame　of　it；　that　no　man　living　can　show　which　way　any　man　or　men；　in　or　under　it；　can　contract　any　such　interest　or　power　as　should　be　able　to　disturb　the　commonwealth　with　sedition；　wherefore　an　equal　commonwealth　is　that　only　which　is　without　flaw　and　contains　in　it　the　full　perfection　of　government。　But　to　return。　　　　　By　what　has　been　shown　in　reason　and　experience；　it　may　appear；　that　though　commonwealths　in　general　be　governments　of　the　senate　proposing；　the　people　resolving；　and　the　magistracy　executing；　yet　some　are　not　so　good　at　these　orders　as　others；　through　some　impediment　or　defect　in　the　frame；　balance；　or　capacity　of　them；　according　to　which　they　are　of　divers　kinds。　　　　　The　first　division　of　them　is　into　such　as　are　single；　as　Israel；　Athens；　Lacedaemon；　etc。；　and　such　as　are　by　leagues；　as　those　of　the　Achaeans；　AEtolians；　Lycians；　Switz；　and　Hollanders。　　　　　The　second　（being　Machiavel's）　is　into　such　as　are　for　preservation；　as　Lacedaemon　and　Venice；　and　such　as　are　for　increase；　as　Athens　and　Rome；　in　which　I　can　see　no　more　than　that　the　former　takes　in　no　more　citizens　than　are　necessary　for　defence；　and　the　latter　so　many　as　are　capable　of　increase。　　　　　The　third　division　（unseen　hitherto）　is　into　equal　and　Unequal；　and　this　is　the　main　point；　especially　as　to　domestic　peace　and　tranquillity；　for　to　make　a　commonwealth　unequal；　is　to　divide　it　into　parties；　which　sets　them　at　perpetual　variance；　the　one　party　endeavoring　to　preserve　their　eminence　and　inequality　and　the　other　to　attain　to　equality；　whence　the　people　of　Rome　derived　their　perpetual　strife　with　the　nobility　and　Senate。　But　in　an　equal　commonwealth　there　can　be　no　more　strife　than　there　can　be　overbalance　in　equal　weights；　wherefore　the　Commonwealth　of　Venice；　being　that　which　of　all　others　is　the　most　equal　in　the　constitution；　is　that　wherein　there　never　happened　any　strife　between　the　Senate　and　the　people。　　　　　An　equal　commonwealth　is　such　a　one　as　is　equal　both　in　the　balance　or　foundation；　and　in　the　superstructure；　that　is　to　say；　in　her　agrarian　law　and　in　her　rotation。　　　　　An　equal　agrarian　is　a　perpetual　law；　establishing　and　preserving　the　balance　of　dominion　by　such　a　distribution；　that　no　one　man　or　number　of　men；　within　the　compass　of　the　few　or　aristocracy；　can　come　to　overpower　the　whole　people　by　their　possessions　in　lands。　　　　　As　the　agrarian　answers　to　the　foundation；　so　does　rotation　to　the　superstructures。　　　　　Equal　rotation　is　equal　vicissitude　in　government；　or　succession　to　magistracy　conferred　for　such　convenient　terms；　enjoying　equal　vacations；　as　take　in　the　whole　body　by　parts；　succeeding　others；　through　the　free　election　or　suffrage　of　the　people。　　　　　The　contrary；　whereunto　is　prolongation　of　magistracy；　which；　trashing　the　wheel　of　rotation；　destroys　the　life　or　natural　motion　of　a　commonwealth。　　　　　The　election　or　suffrage　of　the　people　is　most　free；　where　it　is　made　or　given　in　such　a　manner　that　it　can　neither　oblige　nor　disoblige　another；　nor　through　fear　of　an　enemy；　or　bashfulness　toward　a　friend；　impair　a　man's　liberty。　　　　　Wherefore；　says　Cicero；　the　tablet　or　ballot　of　the　people　of　Rome　（who　gave　their　votes　by　throwing　tablets　or　little　pieces　of　wood　secretly　into　urns　marked　for　the　negative　or　affirmative）　was　a　welcome　constitution　to　the　people；　as　that　which；　not　impairing　the　assurance　of　their　brows；　increased　the　freedom　of　their　judgment。　I　have　not　stood　upon　a　more　particular　description　of　this　ballot；　because　that　of　Venice　exemplified　in　the　model　is　of　all　others　the　most　perfect。　　　　　An　equal　commonwealth　（by　that　which　has　been　said）　is　a　government　established　upon　an　equal　agrarian；　arising　into　the　superstructures　or　three　orders；　the　Senate　debating　and　proposing；　the　people　resolving；　and　the　magistracy　executing；　by　an　equal　rotation　through　the　suffrage　of　the　people　given　by　the　ballot。　For　though　rotation　may　be　without　the　ballot；　and　the　ballot　without　rotation；　yet　the　ballot　not　only　as　to　the　ensuing　model　includes　both；　but　is　by　far　the　most　equal　way；　for　which　cause　under　the　name　of　the　ballot　I　shall　hereafter　understand　both　that　and　rotation　too。　　　　　Now　having　reasoned　the　principles　of　an　equal　commonwealth；　I　should　come　to　give　an　instance　of　such　a　one　in　experience；　if　I　could　find　it；　but　if　this　work　be　of　any　value；　it　lies　in　that　it　is　the　first　example　of　a　commonwealth　that　is　perfectly　equal。　For　Venice；　though　it　comes　the　nearest；　yet　is　a　commonwealth　for　preservation；　and　such　a　one；　considering　the　paucity　of　citizens　taken　in；　and　the　number　not　taken　in；　is　externally　unequal；　and　though　every　commonwealth　that　holds　provinces　must　in　that　regard　be　such；　yet　not　to　that　degree。　Nevertheless；　Venice　internally；　and　for　her　capacity；　is　by　far　the　most　equal；　though　it　has　not；　in　my　judgment；　arrived　at　the　full　perfection　of　equality；　both　because　her　laws　supplying　the　defect　of　an　agrarian　are　not　so　clear　nor　effectual　at　the　foundation；　nor　her　superstructures；　by　the　virtue　of　her　ballot　or　rotation；　exactly　librated；　in　regard　that　through　the　paucity　of　her　citizens　her　greater　magistracies　are　continually　wheeled　through　a　few　hands；　as　is　confessed　by　Janotti；　where　he　says；　that　if　a　gentleman　comes　once　to　be　Savio　di　terra　ferma；　it　seldom　happens　that　he　fails　from　thenceforward　to　be　adorned　with　some　one　of　the　greater　magistracies；　as　Savi　di　mare；　Savi　di　terra　ferma；　Savi　Grandi；　counsellors；　those　of　the　decemvirate　or　dictatorian　council；　the　aurogatori；　or　censors；　which　require　no　vacation　or　interval。　Wherefore　if　this　in　Venice；　or　that　in　Lacedaemon；　where　the　kings　were　hereditary；　and　the　Senators　（though　elected　by　the　people）　for　life；　cause　no　inequality　（which　is　hard　to　be　conceived）　in　a　commonwealth　for　preservation；　or　such　a　one　as　consists　of　a　few　citizens；　yet　is　it　manifest　that　it　would　cause　a　very　great　one　in　a　commonwealth　for　increase；　or　consisting　of　the　many；　which；　by　engrossing　the　magistracies　in　a　few　hands；　would　be　obstructed　in　their　rotation。　　　　　But　there　be　who　say　（and　think　it　a　strong　objection）　that；　let　a　commonwealth　be　as　equal　as　you　can　imagine；　two　or　three　men　when　all　is　done　will　govern　it；　and　there　is　that　in　it　which；　notwithstanding　the　pretended　sufficiency　of　a　popular　State；　amounts　to　a　plain　confession　of　the　imbecility　of　that　policy；　and　of　the　prerogative　of　monarchy；　forasmuch　as　popular　governments　in　difficult　cases　have　had　recourse　to　dictatorian　power；　as　in　Rome。　　　　　To　which　I　answer；　that　as　truth　is　a　spark　to　which　objections　are　like　bellows；　so　in　this　respect　our　commonwealth　shines；　for　the　eminence　acquired　by　suffrage　of　the　people　in　a　commonwealth；　especially　if　it　be　popular　and　equal；　can　be　ascended　by　no　other　steps　than　the　universal　acknowledgment　of　virtue：　and　where　men　excel　in　virtue；　the　commonwealth　is　stupid　and　unjust；　if　accordingly　they　do　not　excel　in　authority。　Wherefore　this　is　both　the　advantage　of　virtue；　which　has　her　due　encouragement；　and　of　the　commonwealth；　which　has　her　due　services。　These　are　the　philosophers　which　Plato　would　have　to　be　princes；　the　princes　which　Solomon　would　have　to　be　mounted；　and　their　steeds　are　those　of　authority；　not　empire；　or；　if　they　be　buckled　to　the　chariot　of　empire；　as　that　of　the　dictatorian　power；　like　the　chariot　of　the　sun；　it　is　glorious　for　terms　and　vacations　or　intervals。　And　as　a　commonwealth　is　a　government　of　laws　and　not　of　men；　so　is　this　the　principality　of　virtue；　and　not　of　man；　if　that　fail　or　set　in　one；　it　rises　in　another　who　is　created　his　immediate　successor。　And　this　takes　away　that　vanity　from　under　the　sun；　which　is　an　error　proceeding　more　or　less　from　all　other　rulers　under　heaven　but　an　equal　commonwealth。　　　　　These　things　considered；　it　will　be　convenient　in　this　place　to　speak　a　word　to　such　as　go　about　to　insinuate　to　the　nobility　or　gentry　a　fear　of　the　people；　or　to　the　people　a　fear　of　the　nobility　or　gentry；　as　if　their　interests　were　destructive　to　each　other。　When　indeed　an　army　may　as　well　consist　of　soldiers　without　officers；　or　of　officers　without　soldiers；　as　a　commonwealth；　especially　such　a　one　as　is　capable　of　greatness；　of　a　people　without　a　gentry；　or　of　a　gentry　without　a　people。　Wherefore　this；　though　not　always　so　intended；　as　may　appear　by　Machiavel；　who　else　would　be　guilty；　is　a　pernicious　error。　There　is　something　first　in　the　making　of　a　commonwealth；　then　in　the　governing　of　it；　and　last　of　all