the commonwealth of oceana-第6节

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herefore　the　function　of　this　Council；　which　is　very　rare　in　a　senate；　was　executive；　and　consisted　in　the　administration　of　the　law　made；　and　whereas　the　Council　itself　is　often　understood　in　Scripture　by　the　priest　and　the　Levite；　there　is　no　more　in　that　save　only　that　the　priests　and　the　Levites；　who　otherwise　had　no　power　at　all；　being　in　the　younger　years　of　this　commonwealth；　those　that　were　best　studied　in　the　laws　were　the　most　frequently　elected　into　the　Sanhedrim。　For　the　courts；　consisting　of　three…and…twenty　elders　sitting　in　the　gates　of　every　city；　and　the　triumvirates　of　judges　constituted　almost　in　every　village；　which　were　parts　of　the　executive　magistracy　subordinate　to　the　Sanhedrim；　I　shall　take　them　at　better　leisure；　and　in　the　larger　discourse；　but　these　being　that　part　of　this　commonwealth　which　was　instituted　by　Moses　upon　the　advice　of　Jethro　the　priest　of　Midian　（as　I　conceive　a　heathen）；　are　to　me　a　sufficient　warrant　even　from　God　himself；　who　confirmed　them；　to　make　further　use　of　human　prudence；　wherever　I　find　it　bearing　a　testimony　to　itself；　whether　in　heathen　commonwealths　or　others；　and　the　rather；　because　so　it　is；　that　we　who　have　the　holy　Scriptures；　and　in　them　the　original　of　a　commonwealth；　made　by　the　same　hand　that　made　the　world；　are　either　altogether　blind　or　negligent　of　it；　while　the　heathens　have　all　written　theirs；　as　if　they　had　had　no　other　copy；　as；　to　be　more　brief　in　the　present　account　of　that　which　you　shall　have　more　at　large　hereafter：　　　　　Athens　consisted　of　the　Senate　of　the　Bean　proposing；　of　the　Church　or　Assembly　of　the　people　resolving；　and　too　often　debating；　which　was　the　ruin　of　it；　as　also　of　the　Senate　of　the　Areopagus；　the　nine　archons；　with　divers　other　magistrates；　executing。　　　　　Lacedaemon　consisted　of　the　Senate　proposing；　of　the　Church　or　congregation　of　the　people　resolving　only；　and　never　debating；　which　was　the　long　life　of　it；　and　of　the　two　kings；　the　court　of　the　ephors；　with　divers　other　magistrates；　executing。　　　　　Carthage　consisted　of　the　Senate　proposing　and　sometimes　resolving　too；　of　the　people　resolving　and　sometimes　debating　too；　for　which　fault　she　was　reprehended　by　Aristotle；　and　she　had　her　suffetes；　and　her　hundred　men；　with　other　magistrates；　executing。　　　　　Rome　consisted　of　the　Senate　proposing；　the　concio　or　people　resolving；　and　too　often　debating；　which　caused　her　storms；　as　also　of　the　consuls；　censors；　aediles；　tribunes；　praetors；　quaestors；　and　other　magistrates；　executing。　　　　　Venice　consists　of　the　Senate；　or　pregati；　proposing；　and　sometimes　resolving　too；　of　the　great　Council　or　Assembly　of　the　people；　in　whom　the　result　is　constitutively；　as　also　of　the　doge；　the　signory；　the　censors；　the　dieci；　the　quazancies；　and　other　magistrates；　executing。　　　　　The　proceeding　of　the　Commonwealths　of　Switzerland　and　Holland　is　of　a　like　nature；　though　after　a　more　obscure　manner；　for　the　sovereignties；　whether　cantons；　provinces；　or　cities；　which　are　the　people；　send　their　deputies；　commissioned　and　instructed　by　themselves　（wherein　they　reserve　the　result　in　their　own　power）；　to　the　provincial　or　general　convention；　or　Senate；　where　the　deputies　debate；　but　have　no　other　power　of　result　than　what　was　conferred　upon　them　by　the　people；　or　is　further　conferred　by　the　same　upon　further　occasion。　And　for　the　executive　part　they　have　magistrates　or　judges　in　every　canton；　province；　or　city；　besides　those　which　are　more　public；　and　relate　to　the　league；　as　for　adjusting　controversies　between　one　canton；　province；　or　city　and　another；　or　the　like　between　such　persons　as　are　not　of　the　same　canton；　province；　or　city。　　　　　But　that　we　may　observe　a　little　further　how　the　heathen　politicians　have　written；　not　only　out　of　nature；　but　as　it　were　out　of　Scripture：　as　in　the　Commonwealth　of　Israel；　God　is　said　to　have　been　king；　so　the　commonwealth　where　the　law　is　king；　is　said　by　Aristotle　to　be　〃the　kingdom　of　God。〃　And　where　by　the　lusts　or　passions　of　men　a　power　is　set　above　that　of　the　law　deriving　from　reason；　which　is　the　dictate　of　God；　God　in　that　sense　is　rejected　or　deposed　that　he　should　not　reign　over　them；　as　he　was　in　Israel。　And　yet　Leviathan　will　have　it　that　〃by　reading　of　these　Greek　and　Latin　＇he　might　as　well　in　this　sense　have　said　Hebrew＇　authors；　young　men；　and　all　others　that　are　unprovided　of　the　antidote　of　solid　reason；　receiving　a　strong　and　delightful　impression　of　the　great　exploits　of　war　achieved　by　the　conductors　of　their　armies；　receive　withal　a　pleasing　idea　of　all　they　have　done　besides；　and　imagine　their　great　prosperity　not　to　have　proceeded　from　the　emulation　of　particular　men；　but　from　the　virtue　of　their　popular　form　of　government；　not　considering　the　frequent　seditions　and　civil　wars　produced　by　the　imperfection　of　their　polity。〃　Where；　first；　the　blame　he　lays　to　the　heathen　authors；　is　in　his　sense　laid　to　the　Scripture；　and　whereas　he　holds　them　to　be　young　men；　or　men　of　no　antidote　that　are　of　like　opinions；　it　should　seem　that　Machiavel；　the　sole　retriever　of　this　ancient　prudence；　is　to　his　solid　reason　a　beardless　boy　that　has　newly　read　Livy。　And　how　solid　his　reason　is；　may　appear　where　he　grants　the　great　prosperity　of　ancient　commonwealths；　which　is　to　give　up　the　controversy。　For　such　an　effect　must　have　some　adequate　cause；　which　to　evade　he　insinuates　that　it　was　nothing　else　but　the　emulation　of　particular　men；　as　if　so　great　an　emulation　could　have　been　generated　without　as　great　virtue；　so　great　virtue　without　the　best　education；　and　best　education　without　the　best　law；　or　the　best　laws　any　otherwise　than　by　the　excellency　of　their　polity。　　　　　But　if　some　of　these　commonwealths；　as　being　less　perfect　in　their　polity　than　others；　have　been　more　seditious；　it　is　not　more　an　argument　of　the　infirmity　of　this　or　that　commonwealth　in　particular；　than　of　the　excellency　of　that　kind　of　polity　in　general；　which　if　they；　that　have　not　altogether　reached；　have　nevertheless　had　greater　prosperity；　what　would　befall　them　that　should　reach？　　　　　In　answer　to　which　question　let　me　invite　Leviathan；　who　of　all　other　governments　gives　the　advantage　to　monarchy　for　perfection；　to　a　better　disquisition　of　it　by　these　three　assertions。　　　　　The　first；　that　the　perfection　of　government　lies　upon　such　a　libration　in　the　frame　of　it；　that　no　man　or　men　in　or　under　it　can　have　the　interest；　or；　having　the　interest；　can　have　the　power　to　disturb　it　with　sedition。　　　　　The　second；　that　monarchy；　reaching　the　perfection　of　the　kind；　reaches　not　to　the　perfection　of　government；　but　must　have　some　dangerous　flaw　in　it。　　　　　The　third；　that　popular　government；　reaching　the　perfection　of　the　kind；　reaches　the　perfection　of　government；　and　has　no　flaw　in　it。　　　　　The　first　assertion　requires　no　proof。　　　　　For　the　proof　of　the　second；　monarchy；　as　has　been　shown；　is　of　two　kinds：　the　one　by　arms；　the　other　by　a　nobility　and　there　is　no　other　kind　in　art　or　nature；　for　if　there　have　'been　anciently　some　governments　called　kingdoms；　as　one　of　the　Goths　in　Spain；　and　another　of　the　Vandals　in　Africa；　where　the　King　ruled　without　a　nobility　and　by　a　council　of　the　people　only　it　is　expressly　said　by　the　authors　that　mention　them　that　the；　kings　were　but　the　captains；　and　that　the　people　not　only　gave　them　laws；　but　deposed　them　as　often　as　they　pleased。　Nor　is　it　possible　in　reason　that　it　should　be　otherwise　in　like　cases；　wherefore　these　were　either　no　monarchies；　or　had　greater　flaws　in　them　than　any　other。　　　　　But　for　a　monarchy　by　arms；　as　that　of　the　Turk　（which；　of　all　models　that　ever　were；　comes　up　to　the　perfection　of　the　kind）；　it　is　not　in　the　wit　or　power　of　man　to　cure　it　of　this　dangerous　flaw；　that　the　Janizaries　have　frequent　interest　and　perpetual　power　to　raise　sedition；　and　to　tear　the　magistrate；　even　the　prince　himself；　in　pieces。　Therefore　the　monarchy　of　Turkey　is　no　perfect　government。　　　　　And　for　a　monarchy　by　nobility；　as　of　late　in　Oceana　（which　of　all　other　models；　before　the　declination　of　it；　came　up　to　the　perfection　in　that　kind）；　it　was　not　in　the　power　or　wit　of　man　to　cure　it　of　that　dangerous　flaw；　that　the　nobility　had　frequent　interest　and　perpetual　power　by　their　retainers　and　tenants　to　raise　sedition；　and　（whereas　the　Janizaries　occasion　this　kind　of　calamity　no　sooner　than　they　make　an　end　of　it）　to　levy　a　lasting　war；　to　the　vast　effusion　of　blood；　and　that　even　upon　occasions　wherein　the　people；　but　for　their　dependence　upon　their　lords；　had　no　concernment；　as　in　the　feud　of　the　Red　and　White。　The　like　has　been　frequent　in　Spain；　France；　Germany；　and　other　monarchies　of　this　kind；　wherefore　monarchy　by　a　nobility　is　no　perfect　government。　　　　　For　the　proof　of　the　third　assertion：　Leviathan　yields　it　to　me；　that　there　is　no　other　commonwealth　but　monarchical　or　popular；　wherefore　if　no　monarchy　be　a　perfect　government；　then　either　there　is　no　perfect　government；　or　it　must　be　popular；　for　which　kind　of　constitution　I　have　something　more　to　say　than　Leviathan　has　said　or　ever　will　be　able　to　say　for　monarchy。　As；　　　　　First；　that　it　is　the　government　that　was　never　conquered　by　any　monarch；　from　the　beginning　of　the　world　to　this　day；　for　if　the　commonwealths　of　Greece　came　under　the　yoke　of　the