the commonwealth of oceana-第4节

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n　has　more　liberty　or　immunity　from　the　service　of　the　commonwealth　there　than　in　Constantinople。　Whether　a　commonwealth　be　monarchical　or　popular　the　freedom　is　the　same。〃　The　mountain　has　brought　forth；　and　we　have　a　little　equivocation！　For　to　say　that　a　Lucchese　has　no　more　liberty　or　immunIty　from　the　laws　of　Lucca　than　a　Turk　has　from　those　of　Constantinople；　and　to　say　that　a　Lucchese　has　no　more　liberty　or　immunity　by　the　laws　of　Lucca；　than　a　Turk　has　by　those　of　Constantinople；　are　pretty　different　speeches。　The　first　may　be　said　of　all　governments　alike；　the　second　scarce　of　any　two；　much　less　of　these；　seeing　it　is　known　that；　whereas　the　greatest　Bashaw　is　a　tenant；　as　well　of　his　head　as　of　his　estate；　at　the　will　of　his　lord；　the　meanest　Lucchese　that　has　land　is　a　freeholder　of　both；　and　not　to　be　controlled　but　by　the　law；　and　that　framed　by　every　private　man　to　no　other　end　（or　they　may　thank　themselves）　than　to　protect　the　liberty　of　every　private　man；　which　by　that　means　comes　to　be　the　liberty　of　the　commonwealth。　　　　　But　seeing　they　that　make　the　laws　in　commonwealths　are　but　men；　the　main　question　seems　to　be；　how　a　commonwealth　comes　to　be　an　empire　of　laws；　and　not　of　men？　or　how　the　debate　or　result　of　a　commonwealth　is　so　sure　to　be　according　to　reason；　seeing　they　who　debate；　and　they　who　resolve；　be　but　men？　〃And　as　often　as　reason　is　against　a　man；　so　often　will　a　man　be　against　reason。〃　　　　　This　is　thought　to　be　a　shrewd　saying；　but　will　do　no　harm；　for　be　it　so　that　reason　is　nothing　but　interest；　there　be　divers　interests；　and　so　divers　reasons。　　　　　As　first；　there　is　private　reason；　which　is　the　interest　of　a　private　man。　　　　　Secondly；　there　is　reason　of　state；　which　is　the　interest　（or　error；　as　was　said　by　Solomon）　of　the　ruler　or　rulers；　that　is　to　say；　of　the　prince；　of　the　nobility；　or　of　the　people。　　　　　Thirdly　there　is　that　reason；　which　is　the　interest　of　mankind；　or　of　the　whole。　〃Now　if　we　see　even　in　those　natural　agents　that　want　sense；　that　as　in　themselves　they　have　a　law　which　directs　them　in　the　means　whereby　they　tend　to　their　own　perfection；　so　likewise　that　another　law　there　is；　which　touches　them　as　they　are　sociable　parts　united　into　one　body；　a　law　which　binds　them　each　to　serve　to　others'　good；　and　all　to　prefer　the　good　of　the　whole；　before　whatsoever　their　own　particular；　as　when　stones；　or　heavy　things；　forsake　their　ordinary　wont　or　centre；　and　fly　upward；　as　if　they　heard　themselves　commanded　to　let　go　the　good　they　privately　wish；　and　to　relieve　the　present　distress　of　nature　in　common。〃　There　is　a　common　right；　law　of　nature；　or　interest　of　the　whole；　which　is　more　excellent；　and　so　acknowledged　to　be　by　the　agents　themselves；　than　the　right　or　interest　of　the　parts　only。　〃Wherefore；　though　it　may　be　truly　said　that　the　creatures　are　naturally　carried　forth　to　their　proper　utility　or　profit；　that　ought　not　to　be　taken　in　too　general　a　sense；　seeing　divers　of　them　abstain　from　their　own　profit；　either　in　regard　of　those　of　the　same　kind；　or　at　least　of　their　young。〃　　　　　Mankind　then　must　either　be　less　just　than　the　creature；　or　acknowledge　also　his　common　interest　to　be　common　right。　And　if　reason　be　nothing　else　but　interest；　and　the　interest　of　mankind　be　the　right　interest；　then　the　reason　of　mankind　must　be　right　reason。　Now　compute　well；　for　if　the　interest　of　popular　government　come　the　nearest　to　the　interest　of　mankind；　then　the　reason　of　popular　government　must　come　the　nearest　to　right　reason。　　　　　But　it　may　be　said　that　the　difficulty　remains　yet；　for　be　the　interest　of　popular　government　right　reason；　a　man　does　not　look　upon　reason　as　it　is　right　or　wrong　in　itself；　but　as　it　makes　for　him　or　against　him。　Wherefore；　unless　you　can　show　such　orders　of　a　government　as；　like　those　of　God　in　nature；　shall　be　able　to　constrain　this　or　that　creature　to　shake　off　that　inclination　which　is　more　peculiar　to　it；　and　take　up　that　which　regards　the　common　good　or　interest；　all　this　is　to　no　more　end　than　to　persuade　every　man　in　a　popular　government　not　to　carve　himself　of　that　which　he　desires　most；　but　to　be　mannerly　at　the　public　table；　and　give　the　best　from　himself　to　decency　and　the　common　interest。　But　that　such　orders　may　be　established　as　may；　nay　must；　give　the　upper　hand　in　all　cases　to　common　right　or　interest；　notwithstanding　the　nearness　of　that　which　sticks　to　every　man　in　private；　and　this　in　a　way　of　equal　certainty　and　facility；　is　known　even　to　girls；　being　no　other　than　those　that　are　of　common　practice　with　them　in　divers　cases。　For　example；　two　of　them　have　a　cake　yet　undivided；　which　was　given　between　them：　that　each　of　them　therefore　might　have　that　which　is　due；　〃Divide；〃　says　one　to　the　other；　〃and　I　will　choose；　or　let　me　divide；　and　you　shall　choose。〃　If　this　be　but　once　agreed　upon；　it　is　enough；　for　the　divident；　dividing　unequally；　loses；　in　regard　that　the　other　takes　the　better　half。　Wherefore　she　divides　equally；　and　so　both　have　right。　〃Oh；　the　depth　of　the　wisdom　of　God。〃　And　yet　〃by　the　mouths　of　babes　and　sucklings　has　He　set　forth　His　strength；〃　that　which　great　philosophers　are　disputing　upon　in　vain　is　brought　to　light　by　two　harmless　girls；　even　the　whole　mystery　of　a　commonwealth；　which　lies　only　in　dividing　and　choosing。　Nor　has　God　（if　his　works　in　nature　be　understood）　left　so　much　to　mankind　to　dispute　upon　as　who　shall　divide　and　who　choose；　but　distributed　them　forever　into　two　orders；　whereof　the　one　has　the　natural　right　of　dividing；　and　the　other　of　choosing。　　　　　For　example：　A　commonwealth　is　but　a　civil　society　of　men：　let　us　take　any　number　of　men　（as　twenty）　and　immediately　make　a　commonwealth。　Twenty　men　（if　they　be　not　all　idiots；　perhaps　if　they　be）　can　never　come　so　together　but　there　will　be　such　a　difference　in　them　that　about　a　third　will　be　wiser；　or　at　least　less　foolish　than　all　the　rest；　these　upon　acquaintance；　though　it　be　but　small；　will　be　discovered；　and；　as　stags　that　have　the　largest　heads；　lead　the　herd；　for　while　the　six；　discoursing　and　arguing　one　with　another；　show　the　eminence　of　their　parts；　the　fourteen　discover　things　that　they　never　thought　on；　or　are　cleared　in　divers　truths　which　had　formerly　perplexed　them。　Wherefore；　in　matter　of　common　concernment；　difficulty；　or　danger；　they　hang　upon　their　lips；　as　children　upon　their　fathers；　and　the　influence　thus　acquired　by　the　six；　the　eminence　of　whose　parts　are　found　to　be　a　stay　and　comfort　to　the　fourteen；　is　the　authority　of　the　fathers。　Wherefore　this　can　be　no　other　than　a　natural　aristocracy　diffused　by　God　throughout　the　whole　body　of　mankind　to　this　end　and　purpose；　and　therefore　such　as　the　people　have　not　only　a　natural　but　a　positive　obligation　to　make　use　of　as　their　guides；　as　where　the　people　of　Israel　are　commanded　to　〃take　wise　men；　and　understanding；　and　known　among　their　tribes；　to　be　made　rulers　over　them。〃　The　six　then　approved　of；　as　in　the　present　case；　are　the　senate；　not　by　hereditary　right；　or　in　regard　of　the　greatness　of　their　estates　only；　which　would　tend　to　such　power　as　might　force　or　draw　the　people；　but　by　election　for　their　excellent　parts；　which　tends　to　the　advancement　of　the　influence　of　their　virtue　or　authority　that　leads　the　people。　Wherefore　the　office　of　the　senate　is　not　to　be　commanders；　but　counsellors；　of　the　people；　and　that　which　is　proper　to　counsellors　is　first　to　debate；　and　afterward　to　give　advice　in　the　business　whereupon　they　have　debated；　whence　the　decrees　of　the　senate　are　never　laws；　nor　so　called；　and　these　being　maturely　framed；　it　is　their　duty　to　propose　in　the　case　to　the　people。　Wherefore　the　senate　is　no　more　than　the　debate　of　the　commonwealth。　But　to　debate　is　to　discern　or　put　a　difference　between　things　that；　being　alike；　are　not　the　same；　or　it　is　separating　and　weighing　this　reason　against　that；　and　that　reason　against　this；　which　is　dividing。　　　　　The　senate　then　having　divided；　who　shall　choose？　Ask　the　girls：　for　if　she　that　divided　must　have　chosen　also；　it　had　been　little　worse　for　the　other　in　case　she　had　not　divided　at　all；　but　kept　the　whole　cake　to　herself；　in　regard　that　being　to　choose；　too；　she　divided　accordingly。　Wherefore　if　the　senate　have　any　further　power　than　to　divide；　the　commonwealth　can　never　be　equal。　But　in　a　commonwealth　consisting　of　a　single　council；　there　is　no　other　to　choose　than　that　which　divided；　whence　it　is；　that　such　a　council　fails　not　to　scramble　　that　is；　to　be　factious；　there　being　no　other　dividing　of　the　cake　in　that　case　but　among　themselves。　　　　　Nor　is　there　any　remedy　but　to　have　another　council　to　choose。　The　wisdom　of　the　few　may　be　the　light　of　mankind；　but　the　interest　of　the　few　is　not　the　profit　of　mankind　nor　of　a　commonwealth。　Wherefore；　seeing　we　have　granted　interest　to　be　reason；　they　must　not　choose　lest　it　put　out　their　light。　But　as　the　council　dividing　consists　of　the　wisdom　of　the　commonwealth；　so　the　assembly　or　council　choosing　should　consist　of　the　interest　of　the　commonwealth：　as　the　wisdom　of　the　commonwealth　is　in　the　aristocracy；　so　the　interest　of　the　commonwealth　is　in　the　whole　body　of　the　people。　And　whereas　this；　in　case　the　commonwealth　consist　of　a　whole　nation；　is　too　unwieldy　a　body　to　be　assembled