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of　the　world…　we　must　place　it　in　a　time　at　an　infinite　distance
from　any　given　moment；　for；　otherwise；　it　must　be　dependent　on　some
other　and　higher　existence。　Such　an　existence　is；　in　this　case；　too
large　for　our　empirical　conception；　and　unattainable　by　the
continued　regress　of　any　synthesis。
　　But　if　we　believe　that　everything　in　the　world…　be　it　condition　or
conditioned…　is　contingent；　every　given　existence　is　too　small　for　our
conception。　For　in　this　case　we　are　pelled　to　seek　for　some　other
existence　upon　which　the　former　depends。
　　We　have　said　that　in　all　these　cases　the　cosmological　idea　is　either
too　great　or　too　small　for　the　empirical　regress　in　a　synthesis；　and
consequently　for　every　possible　conception　of　the　understanding。　Why
did　we　not　express　ourselves　in　a　manner　exactly　the　reverse　of　this
and；　instead　of　accusing　the　cosmological　idea　of　over　stepping　or
of　falling　short　of　its　true　aim；　possible　experience；　say　that；　in
the　first　case；　the　empirical　conception　is　always　too　small　for　the
idea；　and　in　the　second　too　great；　and　thus　attach　the　blame　of
these　contradictions　to　the　empirical　regress？　The　reason　is　this。
Possible　experience　can　alone　give　reality　to　our　conceptions；　without
it　a　conception　is　merely　an　idea；　without　truth　or　relation　to　an
object。　Hence　a　possible　empirical　conception　must　be　the　standard
by　which　we　are　to　judge　whether　an　idea　is　anything　more　than　an　idea
and　fiction　of　thought；　or　whether　it　relates　to　an　object　in　the
world。　If　we　say　of　a　thing　that　in　relation　to　some　other　thing　it　is
too　large　or　too　small；　the　former　is　considered　as　existing　for　the
sake　of　the　latter；　and　requiring　to　be　adapted　to　it。　Among　the
trivial　subjects　of　discussion　in　the　old　schools　of　dialectics　was
this　question：　〃If　a　ball　cannot　pass　through　a　hole；　shall　we　say
that　the　ball　is　too　large　or　the　hole　too　small？〃　In　this　case　it
is　indifferent　what　expression　we　employ；　for　we　do　not　know　which
exists　for　the　sake　of　the　other。　On　the　other　hand；　we　cannot　say：
〃The　man　is　too　long　for　his　coat〃；　but：　〃The　coat　is　too　short　for
the　man。〃
　　We　are　thus　led　to　the　well…founded　suspicion　that　the
cosmological　ideas；　and　all　the　conflicting　sophistical　assertions
connected　with　them；　are　based　upon　a　false　and　fictitious
conception　of　the　mode　in　which　the　object　of　these　ideas　is　presented
to　us；　and　this　suspicion　will　probably　direct　us　how　to　expose　the
illusion　that　has　so　long　led　us　astray　from　the　truth。

　　　　　　SECTION　VI。　Transcendental　Idealism　as　the　Key　to　the
　　　　　　　　　　　　Solution　of　Pure　Cosmological　Dialectic。

　　In　the　transcendental　aesthetic　we　proved　that　everything　intuited
in　space　and　time；　all　objects　of　a　possible　experience；　are　nothing
but　phenomena；　that　is；　mere　representations；　and　that　these；　as
presented　to　us…　as　extended　bodies；　or　as　series　of　changes…　have
no　self…subsistent　existence　apart　from　human　thought。　This　doctrine　I
call　Transcendental　Idealism。*　The　realist　in　the　transcendental　sense
regards　these　modifications　of　our　sensibility；　these　mere
representations；　as　things　subsisting　in　themselves。

　　*I　have　elsewhere　termed　this　theory　formal　idealism；　to　distinguish
it　from　material　idealism；　which　doubts　or　denies　the　existence　of
external　things。　To　avoid　ambiguity；　it　seems　advisable　in　many
cases　to　employ　this　term　instead　of　that　mentioned　in　the　text。

　　It　would　be　unjust　to　accuse　us　of　holding　the　long…decried　theory
of　empirical　idealism；　which；　while　admitting　the　reality　of　space；
denies；　or　at　least　doubts；　the　existence　of　bodies　extended　in　it；
and　thus　leaves　us　without　a　sufficient　criterion　of　reality　and
illusion。　The　supporters　of　this　theory　find　no　difficulty　in
admitting　the　reality　of　the　phenomena　of　the　internal　sense　in
time；　nay；　they　go　the　length　of　maintaining　that　this　internal
experience　is　of　itself　a　sufficient　proof　of　the　real　existence　of
its　object　as　a　thing　in　itself。
　　Transcendental　idealism　allows　that　the　objects　of　external
intuition…　as　intuited　in　space；　and　all　changes　in　time…　as
represented　by　the　internal　sense；　are　real。　For；　as　space　is　the　form
of　that　intuition　which　we　call　external；　and；　without　objects　in
space；　no　empirical　representation　could　be　given　us；　we　can　and　ought
to　regard　extended　bodies　in　it　as　real。　The　case　is　the　same　with
representations　in　time。　But　time　and　space；　with　all　phenomena
therein；　are　not　in　themselves　things。　They　are　nothing　but
representations　and　cannot　exist　out　of　and　apart　from　the　mind。
Nay；　the　sensuous　internal　intuition　of　the　mind　（as　the　object　of
consciousness）；　the　determination　of　which　is　represented　by　the
succession　of　different　states　in　time；　is　not　the　real；　proper
self；　as　it　exists　in　itself…　not　the　transcendental　subject…　but　only
a　phenomenon；　which　is　presented　to　the　sensibility　of　this；　to　us；
unknown　being。　This　internal　phenomenon　cannot　be　admitted　to　be　a
self…subsisting　thing；　for　its　condition　is　time；　and　time　cannot　be
the　condition　of　a　thing　in　itself。　But　the　empirical　truth　of
phenomena　in　space　and　time　is　guaranteed　beyond　the　possibility　of
doubt；　and　sufficiently　distinguished　from　the　illusion　of　dreams　or
fancy…　although　both　have　a　proper　and　thorough　connection　in　an
experience　according　to　empirical　laws。　The　objects　of　experience　then
are　not　things　in　themselves；　but　are　given　only　in　experience；　and
have　no　existence　apart　from　and　independently　of　experience。　That
there　may　be　inhabitants　in　the　moon；　although　no　one　has　ever
observed　them；　must　certainly　be　admitted；　but　this　assertion　means
only；　that　we　may　in　the　possible　progress　of　experience　discover　them
at　some　future　time。　For　that　which　stands　in　connection　with　a
perception　according　to　the　laws　of　the　progress　of　experience　is
real。　They　are　therefore　really　existent；　if　they　stand　in　empirical
connection　with　my　actual　or　real　consciousness；　although　they　are　not
in　themselves　real；　that　is；　apart　from　the　progress　of　experience。
　　There　is　nothing　actually　given…　we　can　be　conscious　of　nothing　as
real；　except　a　perception　and　the　empirical　progression　from　it　to
other　possible　perceptions。　For　phenomena；　as　mere　representations；
are　real　only　in　perception；　and　perception　is；　in　fact；　nothing　but
the　reality　of　an　empirical　representation；　that　is；　a　phenomenon。
To　call　a　phenomenon　a　real　thing　prior　to　perception　means　either
that　we　must　meet　with　this　phenomenon　in　the　progress　of
experience；　or　it　means　nothing　at　all。　For　I　can　say　only　of　a
thing　in　itself　that　it　exists　without　relation　to　the　senses　and
experience。　But　we　are　speaking　here　merely　of　phenomena　in　space
and　time；　both　of　which　are　determinations　of　sensibility；　and　not
of　things　in　themselves。　It　follows　that　phenomena　are　not　things　in
themselves；　but　are　mere　representations；　which　if　not　given　in　us…　in
perception…　are　non…existent。
　　The　faculty　of　sensuous　intuition　is　properly　a　receptivity…　a
capacity　of　being　affected　in　a　certain　manner　by　representations；　the
relation　of　which　to　each　other　is　a　pure　intuition　of　space　and　time…
the　pure　forms　of　sensibility。　These　representations；　in　so　far　as
they　are　connected　and　determinable　in　this　relation　（in　space　and
time）　according　to　laws　of　the　unity　of　experience；　are　called
objects。　The　non…sensuous　cause　of　these　representations　is　pletely
unknown　to　us　and　hence　cannot　be　intuited　as　an　object。　For　such　an
object　could　not　be　represented　either　in　space　or　in　time；　and
without　these　conditions　intuition　or　representation　is　impossible。　We
may；　at　the　same　time；　term　the　non…sensuous　cause　of　phenomena　the
transcendental　object…　but　merely　as　a　mental　correlate　to
sensibility；　considered　as　a　receptivity。　To　this　transcendental
object　we　may　attribute　the　whole　connection　and　extent　of　our
possible　perceptions；　and　say　that　it　is　given　and　exists　in　itself
prior　to　all　experience。　But　the　phenomena；　corresponding　to　it；　are
not　given　as　things　in　themselves；　but　in　experience　alone。　For　they
are　mere　representations；　receiving　from　perceptions　alone
significance　and　relation　to　a　real　object；　under　the　condition　that
this　or　that　perception…　indicating　an　object…　is　in　plete
connection　with　all　others　in　accordance　with　the　rules　of　the　unity
of　experience。　Thus　we　can　say：　〃The　things　that　really　existed　in
past　time　are　given　in　the　transcendental　object　of　experience。〃　But
these　are　to　me　real　objects；　only　in　so　far　as　I　can　represent　to
my　own　mind；　that　a　regressive　series　of　possible　perceptions…
following　the　indications　of　history；　or　the　footsteps　of　cause　and
effect…　in　accordance　with　empirical　laws…　that；　in　one　word；　the
course　of　the　world　conducts　us　to　an　elapsed　series　of　time　as　the
condition　of　the　present　time。　This　series　in　past　time　is　represented
as　real；　not　in　itself；　but　only　in　connection　with　a　possible
experience。　Thus；　when　I　say　that　certain　events　occurred　in　past
time；　I　merely　assert　the　possibility　of　prolonging　the　chain　of
experience；　from　the　present　perception；　upwards　to　the　conditions
that　determine　it　according　to　time。
　　If　I　r