the+critique+of+pure+reason_纯粹理性批判-第55节

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intuition。　Our　understanding　attains　in　this　way　a　sort　of　negative
extension。　That　is　to　say；　it　is　not　limited　by；　but　rather　limits；
sensibility；　by　giving　the　name　of　noumena　to　things；　not　considered
as　phenomena；　but　as　things　in　themselves。　But　it　at　the　same　time
prescribes　limits　to　itself；　for　it　confesses　itself　unable　to　cognize
these　by　means　of　the　categories；　and　hence　is　pelled　to　cogitate
them　merely　as　an　unknown　something。
　　I　find；　however；　in　the　writings　of　modern　authors；　an　entirely
different　use　of　the　expressions；　mundus　sensibilis　and
intelligibilis；　which　quite　departs　from　the　meaning　of　the
ancients…　an　acceptation　in　which；　indeed；　there　is　to　be　found　no
difficulty；　but　which　at　the　same　time　depends　on　mere　verbal
quibbling。　According　to　this　meaning；　some　have　chosen　to　call　the
plex　of　phenomena；　in　so　far　as　it　is　intuited；　mundus
sensibilis；　but　in　so　far　as　the　connection　thereof　is　cogitated
according　to　general　laws　of　thought；　mundus　intelligibilis。
Astronomy；　in　so　far　as　we　mean　by　the　word　the　mere　observation　of
the　starry　heaven；　may　represent　the　former；　a　system　of　astronomy；
such　as　the　Copernican　or　Newtonian；　the　latter。　But　such　twisting
of　words　is　a　mere　sophistical　subterfuge；　to　avoid　a　difficult
question；　by　modifying　its　meaning　to　suit　our　own　convenience。　To
be　sure；　understanding　and　reason　are　employed　in　the　cognition　of
phenomena；　but　the　question　is；　whether　these　can　be　applied　when
the　object　is　not　a　phenomenon　and　in　this　sense　we　regard　it　if　it　is
cogitated　as　given　to　the　understanding　alone；　and　not　to　the
senses。　The　question　therefore　is　whether；　over　and　above　the
empirical　use　of　the　understanding；　a　transcendental　use　is
possible；　which　applies　to　the　noumenon　as　an　object。　This　question　we
have　answered　in　the　negative。
　　When　therefore　we　say；　the　senses　represent　objects　as　they
appear；　the　understanding　as　they　are；　the　latter　statement　must　not
be　understood　in　a　transcendental；　but　only　in　an　empirical
signification；　that　is；　as　they　must　be　represented　in　the　plete
connection　of　phenomena；　and　not　according　to　what　they　may　be；
apart　from　their　relation　to　possible　experience；　consequently　not
as　objects　of　the　pure　understanding。　For　this　must　ever　remain
unknown　to　us。　Nay；　it　is　also　quite　unknown　to　us　whether　any　such
transcendental　or　extraordinary　cognition　is　possible　under　any
circumstances；　at　least；　whether　it　is　possible　by　means　of　our
categories。　Understanding　and　sensibility；　with　us；　can　determine
objects　only　in　conjunction。　If　we　separate　them；　we　have　intuitions
without　conceptions；　or　conceptions　without　intuitions；　in　both　cases；
representations；　which　we　cannot　apply　to　any　determinate　object。
　　If；　after　all　our　inquiries　and　explanations；　any　one　still
hesitates　to　abandon　the　mere　transcendental　use　of　the　categories；
let　him　attempt　to　construct　with　them　a　synthetical　proposition。　It
would；　of　course；　be　unnecessary　for　this　purpose　to　construct　an
analytical　proposition；　for　that　does　not　extend　the　sphere　of　the
understanding；　but；　being　concerned　only　about　what　is　cogitated　in
the　conception　itself；　it　leaves　it　quite　undecided　whether　the
conception　has　any　relation　to　objects；　or　merely　indicates　the
unity　of　thought…　plete　abstraction　being　made　of　the　modi　in　which
an　object　may　be　given：　in　such　a　proposition；　it　is　sufficient　for
the　understanding　to　know　what　lies　in　the　conception…　to　what　it
applies　is　to　it　indifferent。　The　attempt　must　therefore　be　made
with　a　synthetical　and　so…called　transcendental　principle；　for
example：　〃Everything　that　exists；　exists　as　substance；〃　or；
〃Everything　that　is　contingent　exists　as　an　effect　of　some　other
thing；　viz。；　of　its　cause。〃　Now　I　ask；　whence　can　the　understanding
draw　these　synthetical　propositions；　when　the　conceptions　contained
therein　do　not　relate　to　possible　experience　but　to　things　in
themselves　（noumena）？　Where　is　to　be　found　the　third　term；　which　is
always　requisite　PURE　site　in　a　synthetical　proposition；　which　may
connect　in　the　same　proposition　conceptions　which　have　no　logical
（analytical）　connection　with　each　other？　The　proposition　never　will　be
demonstrated；　nay；　more；　the　possibility　of　any　such　pure　assertion
never　can　be　shown；　without　making　reference　to　the　empirical　use　of
the　understanding；　and　thus；　ipso　facto；　pletely　renouncing　pure
and　non…sensuous　judgement。　Thus　the　conception　of　pure　and　merely
intelligible　objects　is　pletely　void　of　all　principles　of　its
application；　because　we　cannot　imagine　any　mode　in　which　they　might　be
given；　and　the　problematical　thought　which　leaves　a　place　open　for
them　serves　only；　like　a　void　space；　to　limit　the　use　of　empirical
principles；　without　containing　at　the　same　time　any　other　object　of
cognition　beyond　their　sphere。
APPENDIX
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　APPENDIX。

　　　Of　the　Equivocal　Nature　or　Amphiboly　of　the　Conceptions　of
　　　　　Reflection　from　the　Confusion　of　the　Transcendental　with
　　　　　the　Empirical　use　of　the　Understanding。

　　Reflection　（reflexio）　is　not　occupied　about　objects　themselves；
for　the　purpose　of　directly　obtaining　conceptions　of　them；　but　is　that
state　of　the　mind　in　which　we　set　ourselves　to　discover　the　subjective
conditions　under　which　we　obtain　conceptions。　It　is　the
consciousness　of　the　relation　of　given　representations　to　the
different　sources　or　faculties　of　cognition；　by　which　alone　their
relation　to　each　other　can　be　rightly　determined。　The　first　question
which　occurs　in　considering　our　representations　is　to　what　faculty
of　cognition　do　they　belong？　To　the　understanding　or　to　the　senses？
Many　judgements　are　admitted　to　be　true　from　mere　habit　or
inclination；　but；　because　reflection　neither　precedes　nor　follows；
it　is　held　to　be　a　judgement　that　has　its　origin　in　the　understanding。
All　judgements　do　not　require　examination；　that　is；　investigation　into
the　grounds　of　their　truth。　For；　when　they　are　immediately　certain
（for　example：　〃Between　two　points　there　can　be　only　one　straight
line〃）；　no　better　or　less　mediate　test　of　their　truth　can　be　found
than　that　which　they　themselves　contain　and　express。　But　all
judgement；　nay；　all　parisons　require　reflection；　that　is；　a
distinction　of　the　faculty　of　cognition　to　which　the　given　conceptions
belong。　The　act　whereby　I　pare　my　representations　with　the
faculty　of　cognition　which　originates　them；　and　whereby　I
distinguish　whether　they　are　pared　with　each　other　as　belonging
to　the　pure　understanding　or　to　sensuous　intuition；　I　term
transcendental　reflection。　Now；　the　relations　in　which　conceptions　can
stand　to　each　other　are　those　of　identity　and　difference；　agreement
and　opposition；　of　the　internal　and　external；　finally；　of　the
determinable　and　the　determining　（matter　and　form）。　The　proper
determination　of　these　relations　rests　on　the　question；　to　what
faculty　of　cognition　they　subjectively　belong；　whether　to
sensibility　or　understanding？　For；　on　the　manner　in　which　we　solve
this　question　depends　the　manner　in　which　we　must　cogitate　these
relations。
　　Before　constructing　any　objective　judgement；　we　pare　the
conceptions　that　are　to　be　placed　in　the　judgement；　and　observe
whether　there　exists　identity　（of　many　representations　in　one
conception）；　if　a　general　judgement　is　to　be　constructed；　or
difference；　if　a　particular；　whether　there　is　agreement　when
affirmative；　and　opposition　when　negative　judgements　are　to　be
constructed；　and　so　on。　For　this　reason　we　ought　to　call　these
conceptions；　conceptions　of　parison　（conceptus　parationis）。
But　as；　when　the　question　is　not　as　to　the　logical　form；　but　as　to　the
content　of　conceptions；　that　is　to　say；　whether　the　things
themselves　are　identical　or　different；　in　agreement　or　opposition；　and
so　on；　the　things　can　have　a　twofold　relation　to　our　faculty　of
cognition；　to　wit；　a　relation　either　to　sensibility　or　to　the
understanding；　and　as　on　this　relation　depends　their　relation　to
each　other；　transcendental　reflection；　that　is；　the　relation　of
given　representations　to　one　or　the　other　faculty　of　cognition；　can
alone　determine　this　latter　relation。　Thus　we　shall　not　be　able　to
discover　whether　the　things　are　identical　or　different；　in　agreement
or　opposition；　etc。；　from　the　mere　conception　of　the　things　by　means
of　parison　（paratio）；　but　only　by　distinguishing　the　mode　of
cognition　to　which　they　belong；　in　other　words；　by　means　of
transcendental　reflection。　We　may；　therefore；　with　justice　say；　that
logical　reflection　is　mere　parison；　for　in　it　no　account　is　taken
of　the　faculty　of　cognition　to　which　the　given　conceptions　belong；　and
they　are　consequently；　as　far　as　regards　their　origin；　to　be　treated
as　homogeneous；　while　transcendental　reflection　（which　applies　to
the　objects　themselves）　contains　the　ground　of　the　possibility　of
objective　parison　of　representations　with　each　other；　and　is
therefore　very　different　from　the　former；　because　the　faculties　of
cognition　to　which　they　belong　are　not　even　the　same。　Transcendental
reflection　is　a　duty　which　no　one　can　neglect　who　wishes　to
establish　an　a　priori　judgement　upon　things。　We　shall　now　proceed　to
fulfil　this　duty；　a