the+critique+of+pure+reason_纯粹理性批判-第125节

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fashion　of　thought　places　such　writings　in　their　hands；　will　the
so…called　convictions　of　their　youth　stand　firm？　The　young　thinker；
who　has　in　his　armoury　none　but　dogmatical　weapons　with　which　to
resist　the　attacks　of　his　opponent；　and　who　cannot　detect　the　latent
dialectic　which　lies　in　his　own　opinions　as　well　as　in　those　of　the
opposite　party；　sees　the　advance　of　illusory　arguments　and　grounds
of　proof　which　have　the　advantage　of　novelty；　against　as　illusory
grounds　of　proof　destitute　of　this　advantage；　and　which；　perhaps；
excite　the　suspicion　that　the　natural　credulity　of　his　youth　has
been　abused　by　his　instructors。　He　thinks　he　can　find　no　better
means　of　showing　that　he　has　out　grown　the　discipline　of　his
minority　than　by　despising　those　well…meant　warnings；　and；　knowing
no　system　of　thought　but　that　of　dogmatism；　he　drinks　deep　draughts　of
the　poison　that　is　to　sap　the　principles　in　which　his　early　years　were
trained。
　　Exactly　the　opposite　of　the　system　here　remended　ought　to　be
pursued　in　academical　instruction。　This　can　only　be　effected；　however；
by　a　thorough　training　in　the　critical　investigation　of　pure　reason。
For；　in　order　to　bring　the　principles　of　this　critique　into　exercise
as　soon　as　possible；　and　to　demonstrate　their　perfect　even　in　the
presence　of　the　highest　degree　of　dialectical　illusion；　the　student
ought　to　examine　the　assertions　made　on　both　sides　of　speculative
questions　step　by　step；　and　to　test　them　by　these　principles。　It
cannot　be　a　difficult　task　for　him　to　show　the　fallacies　inherent　in
these　propositions；　and　thus　he　begins　early　to　feel　his　own　power
of　securing　himself　against　the　influence　of　such　sophistical
arguments；　which　must　finally　lose；　for　him；　all　their　illusory　power。
And；　although　the　same　blows　which　overturn　the　edifice　of　his
opponent　are　as　fatal　to　his　own　speculative　structures；　if　such　he
has　wished　to　rear；　he　need　not　feel　any　sorrow　in　regard　to　this
seeming　misfortune；　as　he　has　now　before　him　a　fair　prospect　into
the　practical　region　in　which　he　may　reasonably　hope　to　find　a　more
secure　foundation　for　a　rational　system。
　　There　is；　accordingly；　no　proper　polemic　in　the　sphere　of　pure
reason。　Both　parties　beat　the　air　and　fight　with　their　own　shadows；　as
they　pass　beyond　the　limits　of　nature；　and　can　find　no　tangible
point　of　attack…　no　firm　footing　for　their　dogmatical　conflict。
Fight　as　vigorously　as　they　may；　the　shadows　which　they　hew　down；
immediately　start　up　again；　like　the　heroes　in　Walhalla；　and　renew　the
bloodless　and　unceasing　contest。
　　But　neither　can　we　admit　that　there　is　any　proper　sceptical
employment　of　pure　reason；　such　as　might　be　based　upon　the　principle
of　neutrality　in　all　speculative　disputes。　To　excite　reason　against
itself；　to　place　weapons　in　the　hands　of　the　party　on　the　one　side
as　well　as　in　those　of　the　other；　and　to　remain　an　undisturbed　and
sarcastic　spectator　of　the　fierce　struggle　that　ensues；　seems；　from
the　dogmatical　point　of　view；　to　be　a　part　fitting　only　a　malevolent
disposition。　But；　when　the　sophist　evidences　an　invincible　obstinacy
and　blindness；　and　a　pride　which　no　criticism　can　moderate；　there　is
no　other　practicable　course　than　to　oppose　to　this　pride　and　obstinacy
similar　feelings　and　pretensions　on　the　other　side；　equally　well　or
ill　founded；　so　that　reason；　staggered　by　the　reflections　thus
forced　upon　it；　finds　it　necessary　to　moderate　its　confidence　in
such　pretensions　and　to　listen　to　the　advice　of　criticism。　But　we
cannot　stop　at　these　doubts；　much　less　regard　the　conviction　of　our
ignorance；　not　only　as　a　cure　for　the　conceit　natural　to　dogmatism；
but　as　the　settlement　of　the　disputes　in　which　reason　is　involved　with
itself。　On　the　contrary；　scepticism　is　merely　a　means　of　awakening
reason　from　its　dogmatic　dreams　and　exciting　it　to　a　more　careful
investigation　into　its　own　powers　and　pretensions。　But；　as
scepticism　appears　to　be　the　shortest　road　to　a　permanent　peace　in　the
domain　of　philosophy；　and　as　it　is　the　track　pursued　by　the　many　who
aim　at　giving　a　philosophical　colouring　to　their　contemptuous
dislike　of　all　inquiries　of　this　kind；　I　think　it　necessary　to　present
to　my　readers　this　mode　of　thought　in　its　true　light。

　　　　　Scepticism　not　a　Permanent　State　for　Human　Reason。

　　The　consciousness　of　ignorance…　unless　this　ignorance　is
recognized　to　be　absolutely　necessary　ought；　instead　of　forming　the
conclusion　of　my　inquiries；　to　be　the　strongest　motive　to　the
pursuit　of　them。　All　ignorance　is　either　ignorance　of　things　or　of　the
limits　of　knowledge。　If　my　ignorance　is　accidental　and　not
necessary；　it　must　incite　me；　in　the　first　case；　to　a　dogmatical
inquiry　regarding　the　objects　of　which　I　am　ignorant；　in　the　second；
to　a　critical　investigation　into　the　bounds　of　all　possible　knowledge。
But　that　my　ignorance　is　absolutely　necessary　and　unavoidable；　and
that　it　consequently　absolves　from　the　duty　of　all　further
investigation；　is　a　fact　which　cannot　be　made　out　upon　empirical
grounds…　from　observation…　but　upon　critical　grounds　alone；　that　is；
by　a　thoroughgoing　investigation　into　the　primary　sources　of
cognition。　It　follows　that　the　determination　of　the　bounds　of　reason
can　be　made　only　on　a　priori　grounds；　while　the　empirical　limitation
of　reason；　which　is　merely　an　indeterminate　cognition　of　an
ignorance　that　can　never　be　pletely　removed；　can　take　place　only
a　posteriori。　In　other　words；　our　empirical　knowledge　is　limited　by
that　which　yet　remains　for　us　to　know。　The　former　cognition　of　our
ignorance；　which　is　possible　only　on　a　rational　basis；　is　a　science；
the　latter　is　merely　a　perception；　and　we　cannot　say　how　far　the
inferences　drawn　from　it　may　extend。　If　I　regard　the　earth；　as　it
really　appears　to　my　senses；　as　a　flat　surface；　I　am　ignorant　how
far　this　surface　extends。　But　experience　teaches　me　that；　how　far
soever　I　go；　I　always　see　before　me　a　space　in　which　I　can　proceed
farther；　and　thus　I　know　the　limits…　merely　visual…　of　my　actual
knowledge　of　the　earth；　although　I　am　ignorant　of　the　limits　of　the
earth　itself。　But　if　I　have　got　so　far　as　to　know　that　the　earth　is
a　sphere；　and　that　its　surface　is　spherical；　I　can　cognize　a　priori
and　determine　upon　principles；　from　my　knowledge　of　a　small　part　of
this　surface…　say　to　the　extent　of　a　degree…　the　diameter　and
circumference　of　the　earth；　and　although　I　am　ignorant　of　the
objects　which　this　surface　contains；　I　have　a　perfect　knowledge　of　its
limits　and　extent。
　　The　sum　of　all　the　possible　objects　of　our　cognition　seems　to　us
to　be　a　level　surface；　with　an　apparent　horizon…　that　which　forms
the　limit　of　its　extent；　and　which　has　been　termed　by　us　the　idea　of
unconditioned　totality。　To　reach　this　limit　by　empirical　means　is
impossible；　and　all　attempts　to　determine　it　a　priori　according　to　a
principle；　are　alike　in　vain。　But　all　the　questions　raised　by　pure
reason　relate　to　that　which　lies　beyond　this　horizon；　or；　at　least；　in
its　boundary　line。
　　The　celebrated　David　Hume　was　one　of　those　geographers　of　human
reason　who　believe　that　they　have　given　a　sufficient　answer　to　all
such　questions　by　declaring　them　to　lie　beyond　the　horizon　of　our
knowledge…　a　horizon　which；　however；　Hume　was　unable　to　determine。　His
attention　especially　was　directed　to　the　principle　of　causality；　and
he　remarked　with　perfect　justice　that　the　truth　of　this　principle；　and
even　the　objective　validity　of　the　conception　of　a　cause；　was　not
monly　based　upon　clear　insight；　that　is；　upon　a　priori　cognition。
Hence　he　concluded　that　this　law　does　not　derive　its　authority　from
its　universality　and　necessity；　but　merely　from　its　general
applicability　in　the　course　of　experience；　and　a　kind　of　subjective
necessity　thence　arising；　which　he　termed　habit。　From　the　inability　of
reason　to　establish　this　principle　as　a　necessary　law　for　the
acquisition　of　all　experience；　he　inferred　the　nullity　of　all　the
attempts　of　reason　to　pass　the　region　of　the　empirical。
　　This　procedure　of　subjecting　the　facta　of　reason　to　examination；
and；　if　necessary；　to　disapproval；　may　be　termed　the　censura　of
reason。　This　censura　must　inevitably　lead　us　to　doubts　regarding　all
transcendent　employment　of　principles。　But　this　is　only　the　second
step　in　our　inquiry。　The　first　step　in　regard　to　the　subjects　of
pure　reason；　and　which　marks　the　infancy　of　that　faculty；　is　that　of
dogmatism。　The　second；　which　we　have　just　mentioned；　is　that　of
scepticism；　and　it　gives　evidence　that　our　judgement　has　been　improved
by　experience。　But　a　third　step　is　necessary…　indicative　of　the
maturity　and　manhood　of　the　judgement；　which　now　lays　a　firm
foundation　upon　universal　and　necessary　principles。　This　is　the　period
of　criticism；　in　which　we　do　not　examine　the　facta　of　reason；　but
reason　itself；　in　the　whole　extent　of　its　powers；　and　in　regard　to　its
capability　of　a　priori　cognition；　and　thus　we　determine　not　merely　the
empirical　and　ever…shifting　bounds　of　our　knowledge；　but　its　necessary
and　eternal　limits。　We　demonstrate　from　indubitable　principles；　not
merely　our　ignorance　in　respect　to　this　or　that　subject；　but　in　regard
to　all　possible　questions　of　a　certain　class。　Thus　scepticism　is