the+critique+of+pure+reason_纯粹理性批判-第123节

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existence　of　a　Supreme　Being；　and　the　immortality　of　the　soul。　I　am
certain；　on　the　contrary；　that　this　will　never　be　the　case。　For　on
what　ground　can　reason　base　such　synthetical　propositions；　which　do
not　relate　to　the　objects　of　experience　and　their　internal
possibility？　But　it　is　also　demonstratively　certain　that　no　one　will
ever　be　able　to　maintain　the　contrary　with　the　least　show　of
probability。　For；　as　he　can　attempt　such　a　proof　solely　upon　the　basis
of　pure　reason；　he　is　bound　to　prove　that　a　Supreme　Being；　and　a
thinking　subject　in　the　character　of　a　pure　intelligence；　are
impossible。　But　where　will　he　find　the　knowledge　which　can　enable
him　to　enounce　synthetical　judgements　in　regard　to　things　which
transcend　the　region　of　experience？　We　may；　therefore；　rest　assured
that　the　opposite　never　will　be　demonstrated。　We　need　not；　then；
have　recourse　to　scholastic　arguments；　we　may　always　admit　the　truth
of　those　propositions　which　are　consistent　with　the　speculative
interests　of　reason　in　the　sphere　of　experience；　and　form；　moreover；
the　only　means　of　uniting　the　speculative　with　the　practical　interest。
Our　opponent；　who　must　not　be　considered　here　as　a　critic　solely；　we
can　be　ready　to　meet　with　a　non　liquet　which　cannot　fail　to　disconcert
him；　while　we　cannot　deny　his　right　to　a　similar　retort；　as　we　have　on
our　side　the　advantage　of　the　support　of　the　subjective　maxim　of
reason；　and　can　therefore　look　upon　all　his　sophistical　arguments　with
calm　indifference。
　　From　this　point　of　view；　there　is　properly　no　antithetic　of　pure
reason。　For　the　only　arena　for　such　a　struggle　would　be　upon　the　field
of　pure　theology　and　psychology；　but　on　this　ground　there　can　appear
no　batant　whom　we　need　to　fear。　Ridicule　and　boasting　can　be　his
only　weapons；　and　these　may　be　laughed　at；　as　mere　child's　play。
This　consideration　restores　to　Reason　her　courage；　for　what　source
of　confidence　could　be　found；　if　she；　whose　vocation　it　is　to
destroy　error；　were　at　variance　with　herself　and　without　any
reasonable　hope　of　ever　reaching　a　state　of　permanent　repose？
　　Everything　in　nature　is　good　for　some　purpose。　Even　poisons　are
serviceable；　they　destroy　the　evil　effects　of　other　poisons
generated　in　our　system；　and　must　always　find　a　place　in　every
plete　pharmacopoeia。　The　objections　raised　against　the　fallacies
and　sophistries　of　speculative　reason；　are　objections　given　by　the
nature　of　this　reason　itself；　and　must　therefore　have　a　destination
and　purpose　which　can　only　be　for　the　good　of　humanity。　For　what
purpose　has　Providence　raised　many　objects；　in　which　we　have　the
deepest　interest；　so　far　above　us；　that　we　vainly　try　to　cognize
them　with　certainty；　and　our　powers　of　mental　vision　are　rather
excited　than　satisfied　by　the　glimpses　we　may　chance　to　seize？　It　is
very　doubtful　whether　it　is　for　our　benefit　to　advance　bold
affirmations　regarding　subjects　involved　in　such　obscurity；　perhaps　it
would　even　be　detrimental　to　our　best　interests。　But　it　is　undoubtedly
always　beneficial　to　leave　the　investigating；　as　well　as　the
critical　reason；　in　perfect　freedom；　and　permit　it　to　take　charge　of
its　own　interests；　which　are　advanced　as　much　by　its　limitation；　as　by
its　extension　of　its　views；　and　which　always　suffer　by　the
interference　of　foreign　powers　forcing　it；　against　its　natural
tendencies；　to　bend　to　certain　preconceived　designs。
　　Allow　your　opponent　to　say　what　he　thinks　reasonable；　and　bat　him
only　with　the　weapons　of　reason。　Have　no　anxiety　for　the　practical
interests　of　humanity…　these　are　never　imperilled　in　a　purely
speculative　dispute。　Such　a　dispute　serves　merely　to　disclose　the
antinomy　of　reason；　which；　as　it　has　its　source　in　the　nature　of
reason；　ought　to　be　thoroughly　investigated。　Reason　is　benefited　by
the　examination　of　a　subject　on　both　sides；　and　its　judgements　are
corrected　by　being　limited。　It　is　not　the　matter　that　may　give
occasion　to　dispute；　but　the　manner。　For　it　is　perfectly　permissible
to　employ；　in　the　presence　of　reason；　the　language　of　a　firmly
rooted　faith；　even　after　we　have　been　obliged　to　renounce　all
pretensions　to　knowledge。
　　If　we　were　to　ask　the　dispassionate　David　Hume…　a　philosopher
endowed；　in　a　degree　that　few　are；　with　a　well…balanced　judgement：
What　motive　induced　you　to　spend　so　much　labour　and　thought　in
undermining　the　consoling　and　beneficial　persuasion　that　reason　is
capable　of　assuring　us　of　the　existence；　and　presenting　us　with　a
determinate　conception　of　a　Supreme　Being？…　his　answer　would　be：
Nothing　but　the　desire　of　teaching　reason　to　know　its　own　powers
better；　and；　at　the　same　time；　a　dislike　of　the　procedure　by　which
that　faculty　was　pelled　to　support　foregone　conclusions；　and
prevented　from　confessing　the　internal　weaknesses　which　it　cannot
but　feel　when　it　enters　upon　a　rigid　self…examination。　If；　on　the
other　hand；　we　were　to　ask　Priestley…　a　philosopher　who　had　no　taste
for　transcendental　speculation；　but　was　entirely　devoted　to　the
principles　of　empiricism…　what　his　motives　were　for　overturning
those　two　main　pillars　of　religion…　the　doctrines　of　the　freedom　of
the　will　and　the　immortality　of　the　soul　（in　his　view　the　hope　of　a
future　life　is　but　the　expectation　of　the　miracle　of　resurrection）…
this　philosopher；　himself　a　zealous　and　pious　teacher　of　religion；
could　give　no　other　answer　than　this：　I　acted　in　the　interest　of
reason；　which　always　suffers；　when　certain　objects　are　explained　and
judged　by　a　reference　to　other　supposed　laws　than　those　of　material
nature…　the　only　laws　which　we　know　in　a　determinate　manner。　It
would　be　unfair　to　decry　the　latter　philosopher；　who　endeavoured　to
harmonize　his　paradoxical　opinions　with　the　interests　of　religion；　and
to　undervalue　an　honest　and　reflecting　man；　because　he　finds　himself
at　a　loss　the　moment　he　has　left　the　field　of　natural　science。　The
same　grace　must　be　accorded　to　Hume；　a　man　not　less　well…disposed；　and
quite　as　blameless　in　his　moral　character；　and　who　pushed　his　abstract
speculations　to　an　extreme　length；　because；　as　he　rightly　believed；
the　object　of　them　lies　entirely　beyond　the　bounds　of　natural　science；
and　within　the　sphere　of　pure　ideas。
　　What　is　to　be　done　to　provide　against　the　danger　which　seems　in
the　present　case　to　menace　the　best　interests　of　humanity？　The
course　to　be　pursued　in　reference　to　this　subject　is　a　perfectly　plain
and　natural　one。　Let　each　thinker　pursue　his　own　path；　if　he　shows
talent；　if　be　gives　evidence　of　profound　thought；　in　one　word；　if　he
shows　that　he　possesses　the　power　of　reasoning…　reason　is　always　the
gainer。　If　you　have　recourse　to　other　means；　if　you　attempt　to
coerce　reason；　if　you　raise　the　cry　of　treason　to　humanity；　if　you
excite　the　feelings　of　the　crowd；　which　can　neither　understand　nor
sympathize　with　such　subtle　speculations…　you　will　only　make
yourselves　ridiculous。　For　the　question　does　not　concern　the　advantage
or　disadvantage　which　we　are　expected　to　reap　from　such　inquiries；　the
question　is　merely　how　far　reason　can　advance　in　the　field　of
speculation；　apart　from　all　kinds　of　interest；　and　whether　we　may
depend　upon　the　exertions　of　speculative　reason；　or　must　renounce
all　reliance　on　it。　Instead　of　joining　the　batants；　it　is　your　part
to　be　a　tranquil　spectator　of　the　struggle…　a　laborious　struggle　for
the　parties　engaged；　but　attended；　in　its　progress　as　well　as　in　its
result；　with　the　most　advantageous　consequences　for　the　interests　of
thought　and　knowledge。　It　is　absurd　to　expect　to　be　enlightened　by
Reason；　and　at　the　same　time　to　prescribe　to　her　what　side　of　the
question　she　must　adopt。　Moreover；　reason　is　sufficiently　held　in
check　by　its　own　power；　the　limits　imposed　on　it　by　its　own　nature　are
sufficient；　it　is　unnecessary　for　you　to　place　over　it　additional
guards；　as　if　its　power　were　dangerous　to　the　constitution　of　the
intellectual　state。　In　the　dialectic　of　reason　there　is　no　victory
gained　which　need　in　the　least　disturb　your　tranquility。
　　The　strife　of　dialectic　is　a　necessity　of　reason；　and　we　cannot
but　wish　that　it　had　been　conducted　long　ere　this　with　that　perfect
freedom　which　ought　to　be　its　essential　condition。　In　this　case；　we
should　have　had　at　an　earlier　period　a　matured　and　profound　criticism；
which　must　have　put　an　end　to　all　dialectical　disputes；　by　exposing
the　illusions　and　prejudices　in　which　they　originated。
　　There　is　in　human　nature　an　unworthy　propensity…　a　propensity　which；
like　everything　that　springs　from　nature；　must　in　its　final　purpose　be
conducive　to　the　good　of　humanity…　to　conceal　our　real　sentiments；　and
to　give　expression　only　to　certain　received　opinions；　which　are
regarded　as　at　once　safe　and　promotive　of　the　mon　good。　It　is　true；
this　tendency；　not　only　to　conceal　our　real　sentiments；　but　to　profess
those　which　may　gain　us　favour　in　the　eyes　of　society；　has　not　only
civilized；　but；　in　a　certain　measure；　moralized　us；　as　no　one　can
break　through　the　outward　covering　of　respectability；　honour；　and
morality；　and　thus　the　seemingly…good　examples　which　we　which　we　see
around　us　form　an　excellent　school　for　moral　improvement；　so　long　as
our　belief　in　their　genuineness　remains　unshaken。　But　this　di