the+critique+of+pure+reason_纯粹理性批判-第110节

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contain　different　species；　and　these　again　different　subspecies；　and
as　each　of　the　latter　must　itself　contain　a　sphere　（must　be　of　a
certain　extent；　as　a　conceptus　munis）；　reason　demands　that　no
species　or　sub…species　is　to　be　considered　as　the　lowest　possible。　For
a　species　or　sub…species；　being　always　a　conception；　which　contains
only　what　is　mon　to　a　number　of　different　things；　does　not
pletely　determine　any　individual　thing；　or　relate　immediately　to
it；　and　must　consequently　contain　other　conceptions；　that　is；　other
sub…species　under　it。　This　law　of　specification　may　be　thus　expressed：
entium　varietates　non　temere　sunt　minuendae。
　　But　it　is　easy　to　see　that　this　logical　law　would　likewise　be
without　sense　or　application；　were　it　not　based　upon　a
transcendental　law　of　specification；　which　certainly　does　not
require　that　the　differences　existing　phenomena　should　be　infinite
in　number；　for　the　logical　principle；　which　merely　maintains　the
indeterminateness　of　the　logical　sphere　of　a　conception；　in　relation
to　its　possible　division；　does　not　authorize　this　statement；　while
it　does　impose　upon　the　understanding　the　duty　of　searching　for
subspecies　to　every　species；　and　minor　differences　in　every
difference。　For；　were　there　no　lower　conceptions；　neither　could
there　be　any　higher。　Now　the　understanding　cognizes　only　by　means　of
conceptions；　consequently；　how　far　soever　it　may　proceed　in
division；　never　by　mere　intuition；　but　always　by　lower　and　lower
conceptions。　The　cognition　of　phenomena　in　their　plete
determination　（which　is　possible　only　by　means　of　the　understanding）
requires　an　unceasingly　continued　specification　of　conceptions；　and
a　progression　to　ever　smaller　differences；　of　which　abstraction　bad
been　made　in　the　conception　of　the　species；　and　still　more　in　that
of　the　genus。
　　This　law　of　specification　cannot　be　deduced　from　experience；　it
can　never　present　us　with　a　principle　of　so　universal　an
application。　Empirical　specification　very　soon　stops　in　its
distinction　of　diversities；　and　requires　the　guidance　of　the
transcendental　law；　as　a　principle　of　the　reason…　a　law　which
imposes　on　us　the　necessity　of　never　ceasing　in　our　search　for
differences；　even　although　these　may　not　present　themselves　to　the
senses。　That　absorbent　earths　are　of　different　kinds　could　only　be
discovered　by　obeying　the　anticipatory　law　of　reason；　which　imposes
upon　the　understanding　the　task　of　discovering　the　differences
existing　between　these　earths；　and　supposes　that　nature　is　richer　in
substances　than　our　senses　would　indicate。　The　faculty　of　the
understanding　belongs　to　us　just　as　much　under　the　presupposition　of
differences　in　the　objects　of　nature；　as　under　the　condition　that
these　objects　are　homogeneous；　because　we　could　not　possess
conceptions；　nor　make　any　use　of　our　understanding；　were　not　the
phenomena　included　under　these　conceptions　in　some　respects
dissimilar；　as　well　as　similar；　in　their　character。
　　Reason　thus　prepares　the　sphere　of　the　understanding　for　the
operations　of　this　faculty：　1。　By　the　principle　of　the　homogeneity
of　the　diverse　in　higher　genera；　2。　By　the　principle　of　the　variety　of
the　homogeneous　in　lower　species；　and；　to　plete　the　systematic
unity；　it　adds；　3。　A　law　of　the　affinity　of　all　conceptions　which
prescribes　a　continuous　transition　from　one　species　to　every　other
by　the　gradual　increase　of　diversity。　We　may　term　these　the　principles
of　the　homogeneity；　the　specification；　and　the　continuity　of　forms。
The　latter　results　from　the　union　of　the　two　former；　inasmuch　as　we
regard　the　systematic　connection　as　plete　in　thought；　in　the　ascent
to　higher　genera；　as　well　as　in　the　descent　to　lower　species。　For
all　diversities　must　be　related　to　each　other；　as　they　all　spring　from
one　highest　genus；　descending　through　the　different　gradations　of　a
more　and　more　extended　determination。
　　We　may　illustrate　the　systematic　unity　produced　by　the　three　logical
principles　in　the　following　manner。　Every　conception　may　be　regarded
as　a　point；　which；　as　the　standpoint　of　a　spectator；　has　a　certain
horizon；　which　may　be　said　to　enclose　a　number　of　things　that　may　be
viewed；　so　to　speak；　from　that　centre。　Within　this　horizon　there
must　be　an　infinite　number　of　other　points；　each　of　which　has　its
own　horizon；　smaller　and　more　circumscribed；　in　other　words；　every
species　contains　sub…species；　according　to　the　principle　of
specification；　and　the　logical　horizon　consists　of　smaller　horizons
（subspecies）；　but　not　of　points　（individuals）；　which　possess　no
extent。　But　different　horizons　or　genera；　which　include　under　them
so　many　conceptions；　may　have　one　mon　horizon；　from　which；　as
from　a　mid…point；　they　may　be　surveyed；　and　we　may　proceed　thus；
till　we　arrive　at　the　highest　genus；　or　universal　and　true　horizon；
which　is　determined　by　the　highest　conception；　and　which　contains
under　itself　all　differences　and　varieties；　as　genera；　species；　and
subspecies。
　　To　this　highest　standpoint　I　am　conducted　by　the　law　of　homogeneity；
as　to　all　lower　and　more　variously…determined　conceptions　by　the　law
of　specification。　Now　as　in　this　way　there　exists　no　void　in　the　whole
extent　of　all　possible　conceptions；　and　as　out　of　the　sphere　of
these　the　mind　can　discover　nothing；　there　arises　from　the
presupposition　of　the　universal　horizon　above　mentioned；　and　its
plete　division；　the　principle：　Non　datur　vacuum　formarum。　This
principle　asserts　that　there　are　not　different　primitive　and　highest
genera；　which　stand　isolated；　so　to　speak；　from　each　other；　but　all
the　various　genera　are　mere　divisions　and　limitations　of　one　highest
and　universal　genus；　and　hence　follows　immediately　the　principle：
Datur　continuum　formarum。　This　principle　indicates　that　all
differences　of　species　limit　each　other；　and　do　not　admit　of
transition　from　one　to　another　by　a　saltus；　but　only　through　smaller
degrees　of　the　difference　between　the　one　species　and　the　other。　In
one　word；　there　are　no　species　or　sub…species　which　（in　the　view　of
reason）　are　the　nearest　possible　to　each　other；　intermediate　species
or　sub…species　being　always　possible；　the　difference　of　which　from
each　of　the　former　is　always　smaller　than　the　difference　existing
between　these。
　　The　first　law；　therefore；　directs　us　to　avoid　the　notion　that
there　exist　different　primal　genera；　and　enounces　the　fact　of
perfect　homogeneity；　the　second　imposes　a　check　upon　this　tendency
to　unity　and　prescribes　the　distinction　of　sub…species；　before
proceeding　to　apply　our　general　conceptions　to　individuals。　The
third　unites　both　the　former；　by　enouncing　the　fact　of　homogeneity
as　existing　even　in　the　most　various　diversity；　by　means　of　the
gradual　transition　from　one　species　to　another。　Thus　it　indicates　a
relationship　between　the　different　branches　or　species；　in　so　far　as
they　all　spring　from　the　same　stem。
　　But　this　logical　law　of　the　continuum　specierum　（formarum　logicarum）
presupposes　a　transcendental　principle　（lex　continui　in　natura）；
without　which　the　understanding　might　be　led　into　error；　by
following　the　guidance　of　the　former；　and　thus　perhaps　pursuing　a　path
contrary　to　that　prescribed　by　nature。　This　law　must；　consequently；　be
based　upon　pure　transcendental；　and　not　upon　empirical；
considerations。　For；　in　the　latter　case；　it　would　e　later　than
the　system；　whereas　it　is　really　itself　the　parent　of　all　that　is
systematic　in　our　cognition　of　nature。　These　principles　are　not　mere
hypotheses　employed　for　the　purpose　of　experimenting　upon　nature；
although　when　any　such　connection　is　discovered；　it　forms　a　solid
ground　for　regarding　the　hypothetical　unity　as　valid　in　the　sphere
of　nature…　and　thus　they　are　in　this　respect　not　without　their　use。
But　we　go　farther；　and　maintain　that　it　is　manifest　that　these
principles　of　parsimony　in　fundamental　causes；　variety　in　effects；　and
affinity　in　phenomena；　are　in　accordance　both　with　reason　and
nature；　and　that　they　are　not　mere　methods　or　plans　devised　for　the
purpose　of　assisting　us　in　our　observation　of　the　external　world。
　　But　it　is　plain　that　this　continuity　of　forms　is　a　mere　idea；　to
which　no　adequate　object　can　be　discovered　in　experience。　And　this　for
two　reasons。　First；　because　the　species　in　nature　are　really
divided；　and　hence　form　quanta　discreta；　and；　if　the　gradual
progression　through　their　affinity　were　continuous；　the　intermediate
members　lying　between　two　given　species　must　be　infinite　in　number；
which　is　impossible。　Secondly；　because　we　cannot　make　any
determinate　empirical　use　of　this　law；　inasmuch　as　it　does　not　present
us　with　any　criterion　of　affinity　which　could　aid　us　in　determining
how　far　we　ought　to　pursue　the　graduation　of　differences：　it　merely
contains　a　general　indication　that　it　is　our　duty　to　seek　for　and；
if　possible；　to　discover　them。
　　When　we　arrange　these　principles　of　systematic　unity　in　the　order
conformable　to　their　employment　in　experience；　they　will　stand　thus：
Variety；　Affinity；　Unity；　each　of　them；　as　ideas；　being　taken　in　the
highest　degree　of　their　pleteness。　Reason　presupposes　the　existence
of　cognitions　of　the　understanding；　which　have　a　direct　relation　to
experience；　and　aims　at　the　ideal　unity