laches-第8节
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NICIAS： Why； Laches； I do not call animals or any other things which have
no fear of dangers； because they are ignorant of them； courageous； but only
fearless and senseless。 Do you imagine that I should call little children
courageous； which fear no dangers because they know none？ There is a
difference； to my way of thinking； between fearlessness and courage。 I am
of opinion that thoughtful courage is a quality possessed by very few； but
that rashness and boldness； and fearlessness； which has no forethought； are
very common qualities possessed by many men； many women； many children；
many animals。 And you； and men in general； call by the term 'courageous'
actions which I call rash；my courageous actions are wise actions。
LACHES： Behold； Socrates； how admirably； as he thinks； he dresses himself
out in words； while seeking to deprive of the honour of courage those whom
all the world acknowledges to be courageous。
NICIAS： Not so； Laches； but do not be alarmed； for I am quite willing to
say of you and also of Lamachus； and of many other Athenians； that you are
courageous and therefore wise。
LACHES： I could answer that； but I would not have you cast in my teeth
that I am a haughty Aexonian。
SOCRATES： Do not answer him； Laches； I rather fancy that you are not aware
of the source from which his wisdom is derived。 He has got all this from
my friend Damon； and Damon is always with Prodicus； who； of all the
Sophists； is considered to be the best puller to pieces of words of this
sort。
LACHES： Yes； Socrates； and the examination of such niceties is a much more
suitable employment for a Sophist than for a great statesman whom the city
chooses to preside over her。
SOCRATES： Yes； my sweet friend； but a great statesman is likely to have a
great intelligence。 And I think that the view which is implied in Nicias'
definition of courage is worthy of examination。
LACHES： Then examine for yourself； Socrates。
SOCRATES： That is what I am going to do； my dear friend。 Do not； however；
suppose I shall let you out of the partnership； for I shall expect you to
apply your mind； and join with me in the consideration of the question。
LACHES： I will if you think that I ought。
SOCRATES： Yes； I do； but I must beg of you； Nicias； to begin again。 You
remember that we originally considered courage to be a part of virtue。
NICIAS： Very true。
SOCRATES： And you yourself said that it was a part； and there were many
other parts； all of which taken together are called virtue。
NICIAS： Certainly。
SOCRATES： Do you agree with me about the parts？ For I say that justice；
temperance； and the like； are all of them parts of virtue as well as
courage。 Would you not say the same？
NICIAS： Certainly。
SOCRATES： Well then； so far we are agreed。 And now let us proceed a step；
and try to arrive at a similar agreement about the fearful and the hopeful：
I do not want you to be thinking one thing and myself another。 Let me then
tell you my own opinion； and if I am wrong you shall set me right： in my
opinion the terrible and the hopeful are the things which do or do not
create fear； and fear is not of the present； nor of the past； but is of
future and expected evil。 Do you not agree to that； Laches？
LACHES： Yes； Socrates； entirely。
SOCRATES： That is my view； Nicias； the terrible things； as I should say；
are the evils which are future； and the hopeful are the good or not evil
things which are future。 Do you or do you not agree with me？
NICIAS： I agree。
SOCRATES： And the knowledge of these things you call courage？
NICIAS： Precisely。
SOCRATES： And now let me see whether you agree with Laches and myself as
to a third point。
NICIAS： What is that？
SOCRATES： I will tell you。 He and I have a notion that there is not one
knowledge or science of the past； another of the present； a third of what
is likely to be best and what will be best in the future； but that of all
three there is one science only： for example； there is one science of
medicine which is concerned with the inspection of health equally in all
times； present； past； and future； and one science of husbandry in like
manner； which is concerned with the productions of the earth in all times。
As to the art of the general； you yourselves will be my witnesses that he
has an excellent foreknowledge of the future； and that he claims to be the
master and not the servant of the soothsayer； because he knows better what
is happening or is likely to happen in war： and accordingly the law places
the soothsayer under the general； and not the general under the soothsayer。
Am I not correct in saying so； Laches？
LACHES： Quite correct。
SOCRATES： And do you； Nicias； also acknowledge that the same science has
understanding of the same things； whether future； present； or past？
NICIAS： Yes； indeed Socrates； that is my opinion。
SOCRATES： And courage； my friend； is； as you say； a knowledge of the
fearful and of the hopeful？
NICIAS： Yes。
SOCRATES： And the fearful； and the hopeful； are admitted to be future
goods and future evils？
NICIAS： True。
SOCRATES： And the same science has to do with the same things in the
future or at any time？
NICIAS： That is true。
SOCRATES： Then courage is not the science which is concerned with the
fearful and hopeful； for they are future only； courage； like the other
sciences； is concerned not only with good and evil of the future； but of
the present and past； and of any time？
NICIAS： That； as I suppose； is true。
SOCRATES： Then the answer which you have given； Nicias； includes only a
third part of courage； but our question extended to the whole nature of
courage： and according to your view； that is； according to your present
view； courage is not only the knowledge of the hopeful and the fearful； but
seems to include nearly every good and evil without reference to time。
What do you say to that alteration in your statement？
NICIAS： I agree； Socrates。
SOCRATES： But then； my dear friend； if a man knew all good and evil； and
how they are； and have been； and will be produced； would he not be perfect；
and wanting in no virtue； whether justice； or temperance； or holiness？ He
would possess them all； and he would know which were dangers and which were
not； and guard against them whether they were supernatural or natural； and
he would provide the good； as he would know how to deal both with gods or
men。
NICIAS： I think； Socrates； that there is a great deal of truth in what you
say。
SOCRATES： But then； Nicias； courage； according to this new definition of
yours； instead of being a part of virtue only； will be all virtue？
NICIAS： It would seem so。
SOCRATES： But we were saying that courage is one of the parts of virtue？
NICIAS： Yes； that was what we were saying。
SOCRATES： And that is in contradiction with our present view？
NICIAS： That appears to be the case。
SOCRATES： Then； Nicias； we have not discovered what courage is。
NICIAS： We have not。
LACHES： And yet； friend Nicias； I imagined that you would have made the
discovery； when you were so contemptuous of the answers which I made to
Socrates。 I had very great hopes that you would have been enlightened by
the wisdom of Damon。
NICIAS： I perceive； Laches； that you think nothing of having displayed
your ignorance of the nature of courage； but you look only to see whether I
have not made a similar display； and if we are both equally ignorant of the
things which a man who is good for anything should know； that； I suppose；
will be of no consequence。 You certainly appear to me very like the rest
of the world； looking at your neighbour and not at yourself。 I am of
opinion that enough has been said on the subject which we have been
discussing； and if anything has been imperfectly said； that may be
hereafter corrected by the help of Damon； whom you think to laugh down；
although you have never seen him； and with the help of others。 And when I
am satisfied myself； I will freely impart my satisfaction to you； for I
think that you are very much in want of knowle
